By Annika Mozer and Stefan Prost

Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) is among the most lucrative illegal industries in the world. Its consequences go far beyond direct effects on the species in trade. In this review, we outline the basics of IWT and discuss its cascading consequences on environments, human lives and communities, national stability, and the economy. In addition, we outline structures used in IWT, from subsistence and local use to more complicated configurations, which can include multiple players. Furthermore, while a small fraction of poaching is opportunistic, most of the international IWT is run by organised crime groups. We outline how IWT can be associated with many different crimes like drug trafficking, corruption, or whitewashing. Additionally, many studies have observed a rapidly increasing trend of online trade with endangered and protected species. Moreover, this review gives a short overview of the situation in the European Union (EU) regarding laws and implementation of CITES and highlights that the EU acts as a major source, transit hub, and consumer in IWT. To address the highly dynamic and complicated problem of IWT, research, knowledge exchange, funding, and collaborations in all fields are necessary.

Forensic Science International: Animals and Environments. Volume 3, December 2023

By Davyth Stewart, Christian Nellemann, Ben Brock, Emilie Van der Henst

Wildlife and timber trafficking often involves transnational organised crime networks and generates significant illicit proceeds, billions each year. Despite the seriousness of this criminal activity, related financial investigations and asset recovery approaches remain largely under-utilised in the EU, with investigations and prosecutions of wildlife trafficking still relying primarily on charges for poaching or trafficking. Wildlife criminals are, therefore, not punished for the financial crimes they have committed, and their criminal assets remain in their hands, allowing them to further invest in their illegal business.

TRAFFIC International Cambridge, United Kingdom. 2023. 86p.

By Marianne Allison Lee, Ramacandra Wong

Giant clams (Bivalvia: Cardiidae: Tridacninae) are the largest bivalves in the world. They are distributed in the tropical and subtropical waters of the Indian and Pacific oceans and play a vital role in the ecosystem. Giant clams contribute to coral reef health, abundance, and diversity by increasing seabed heterogeneity, acting as a substrate for reef-associated organisms, providing an additional food source, and filtering water to sequester nutrients, among others (Othman et al., 2010; Neo et al., 2015). Under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), giant clams are classified under family Tridacnidae, but a recent phylogenetic analysis placed the twelve extant giant clam species under family Cardiidae and sub-family Tridacninae (Tan, 2021). Ten of these giant clam species have been listed on CITES Appendix II since 1985. This listing was in response to the increased harvesting of giant clams for their meat, shells, and the aquarium trade that led to some species like Southern Giant Clam Tridacna derasa, Giant Clam T. gigas, and Scaly Clam T. squamosa becoming locally extinct in their range countries (Lucas, 1994; Wells, 1997; Huelsken et al., 2013). In 2010, Othman et al. reported that populations of all seven species of giant clams in Southeast Asia were in severe decline, while some species were functionally extinct. This has moved some countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, to implement giant clam restocking programmes.

TRAFFIC, Southeast Asia Regional Office, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia., 2023. 16p.

By Fernandes M., Chopra M., Gautam A., and Badola, S. T

In Deep Waters: India's sea cucumbers in illegal wildlife trade – found at least 101.40 tonnes and 6,976 sea cucumber individuals in illicit wildlife trade in India for 2010-2021. It was released ahead of World Fisheries Day on 21 November 2022, a day dedicated to highlighting the critical importance of healthy ocean ecosystems and the need to ensure sustainable fisheries stocks. The report looked into the reasons behind the unsustainable sea cucumber trade and found that demand for sea cucumbers in East Asian and Southeast Asian markets, along with the ease of harvest and low processing costs (drying), are proving detrimental to the species and their survival in India. According to the seizure reports, Sri Lanka, China, and Southeast Asia were the top three destinations for sea cucumbers trafficked from India. The new report also provides action points to help curb the illegal sea cucumber trade in India, including a detailed recommendation on future research priorities, enhancing capacity for interdiction by law enforcement agencies, devising policies and promoting community engagement and awareness.

New Delhi: TRAFFIC India 2022. 36p.

By Cardell D. Johnson

The National Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Customs and Border Protection collaborate to combat imports of seafood caught via illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. The agencies share information in several ways, including through Border Protection's interagency coordination center. But, NMFS officials reported concerns about getting timely information from Border Protection. For example, an NMFS official told us it may take as long as a week for the agency to get information on a shipment that it might want to inspect—which may be too late. We recommended that Border Protection ensure that NMFS has timely access to such information.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2023. 29p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

All eight pangolin species are facing an unprecedented threat from the transnational trafficking of their scales and meat by criminal networks. • Between 2017, when the Appendix I listing for all pangolin species entered force, and July 2021, at least 269 tonnes of pangolin scales were confiscated globally. • Pangolin scales are trafficked to China, often via Vietnam, and are primarily sourced from West, Central and East Africa. • Nigeria, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo are the top export hubs for pangolin scales trafficked from Africa to Asia. • Global pangolin trafficking is driven by consumer demand for traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) products containing pangolin scales. • In China, licenced hospitals and pharmaceutical companies can legally trade and utilise pangolin scales from privately held stockpiles. • In 2020, 56 pharmaceutical companies in China were confirmed to be advertising 64 manufactured medicines containing pangolin scales online. • It is very likely that demand for pangolin scales in China far exceeds the legally available supply from stockpiles. …

London; Washington DC: EIA, 2021. 18P.

By Alin Kadfak, Kate Barclay, and Andrew M. Song

Focusing on the experiences of Thailand and Australia, this book examines the impact of trade-restrictive measures as related to the EU’s regulations to prevent Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. It is widely accepted that IUU fishing is harmful, and should be stopped, but there are different approaches to tackling it. Acknowledging this, this book argues that major efforts to fight IUU fishing require careful analyses if the goal is to achieve optimal results and avoid unintended consequences. The book draws on the recent experiences of Thailand and Australia to offer an empirical examination of one increasingly prominent solution, trade-restrictive measures. With Thailand representing direct, active intervention by the EU and Australia a more indirect dispersion of policy narratives and discourses, the book provides a rounded view on how likely it is that different countries in different situations will adapt to the changing policy norms regarding IUU fishing. Understanding the reactions of countries who might be targeted, or otherwise be influenced by the policy, generates new knowledge that helps inform a more effective and scalable implementation of the policy on the part of the EU and a better governance preparedness on the part of non-EU fishing nations. In broader terms, this book exposes a key moment of change in the compatibility between environmental regulations and international trade. The EU IUU policy is a prime example of a policy that uses the mechanisms of international trade to account for environmental and conservation objectives. …

Abingdon, Oxon, UK ; New York: Routledge, 2023. 95p.

By Venezuela Investigative Unit

In 2013, Nicolás Maduro became president of Venezuela following the death of his charismatic predecessor Hugo Chávez. Since then, the country’s cocaine trade has undergone revolutionary changes. Today, Venezuela is at risk of becoming the world’s fourth cocaine-producing country. And the Maduro regime has positioned itself as the gatekeeper to the country’s drug trade, controlling access to cocaine’s riches not only for drug traffickers but also for corrupt politicians and the military-embedded trafficking network known as the “Cartel of the Suns.” The product of more than three years of investigations, hundreds of interviews and field work in all of Venezuela’s key drug trafficking territories, this InSight Crime investigation looks at one of the world’s most important cocaine trafficking hubs – and the authoritarian regime that keeps the drugs flowing.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2022. 53p.

By Venezuela Investigative Unit

Is Venezuela now a hybrid state, where the line between governance and criminality has blurred, or even disappeared altogether? The start of this evolution can be traced back 20 years to then-President Hugo Chávez and his willingness to use all means necessary to cling to power. Since then, the country has seen the emergence of new generations of hybrid armed groups, which systematically coordinate and cooperate with elements of the state. In some parts of Venezuela, authorities now co-govern with these groups, working hand in hand to maintain social control over the population and to counter political, social, and economic threats.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2023. 41p

By Mark R. Mallon

Informal entrepreneurship represents a common mode of business formation globally and entails starting and operating a business without registering it with legal authorities. Despite the size of the informal sector in many countries, the motivations for entrepreneurs to operate non-registered ventures are not well understood. Although formal institutions play an important role, we argue that the decision to operate a non-registered new venture is influenced by a pervasive informal institution around the world: the practice of extortion payments to organized crime. Because criminal organizations foster the development of norms and beliefs cementing extortion payments as an institution, we posit that entrepreneurs will use non registration as a buffer to avoid extortion costs preemptively. We further explicate that this choice is contingent upon founders’ access to resources and ventures’ product-market strategy, which shape visibility to organized crime and the ability to resist extortion and, thus, alter the need for non- registration as a buffer against institutionalized extortion. Our analysis of over 8,000 new ventures operating in 39 economies largely supports these arguments. This study identifies a novel causal mechanism in the nomological network of informal entrepreneurship, namely, the prevalence of organized crime, and informs a multilevel theory of how entrepreneurs choose the type of organizational form for their ventures. Finally, it illuminates the importance of shadow institutions—illegal and not widely accepted practices—which may operate as unique but often overlooked types of institutions that shape entrepreneurial and organizational decisions.

Journal of Management, 48(1): 2022.

By Anja Shortland, Tom Keatinge and Jamie MacColl

Ransomware has become a major risk to global business and undermines national economic and societal resilience. Some consider that generous insurance-funded ransom payments are a major contributor to the problem, but many think insurance should be part of the solution. This report examines research activities investigating ‘insurance as governance’ in the field of extortive crime. Insurers have a financial interest in limiting the losses they cover. It is commonly known that insurers routinely manage moral hazard and adverse selection among the insured population by incentivising behaviour that limits risk and penalises excessive risk taking. Insurers also create processes that reduce the overall cost of claims by making it more difficult for third parties to benefit from the insurance relationship.

This report applies this approach to insurance as crime governance.

By Diane E. Davis and Tina Hilgers

Using a focus on the ways that Covid-19 has impacted everyday life in urban Latin America, this article examines the shifting activities of organized criminal groups in the context of a global pandemic. Using grounded ethnographic fieldwork drawn from Brazil, it asks whether a health crisis with direct life and death consequences has empowered illicit actors, and by so doing changed long-standing relationships between illicit actors and citizens on one hand, and/or illicit actors and local authorities on the other. Its larger aim is to understand whether and how the global pandemic has impacted governance by producing new scalar and sovereignty tensions between state and non-state actors at the scale of the city, and with what implications for the legitimacy of national authorities and democratic governance more generally.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 4(3), pp. 241–256, 2022. DOI: https:// doi.org/10.31389/jied.134

By John Collins

This report aims to provide a broad overview of cryptocurrencies and organized crime. It is meant for readers that may have an expertise in one, both or neither, as a means to better understand the challenges posed by emerging blockchain technologies and decentralized finance. The paper argues that blockchain technologies and their derivatives are a significant technological innovation, but one that has unclear use cases and outcomes. Potential use cases are currently speculative and surrounded by uncertainty, hype and, in many cases, fraud and Ponzi schemes. The paper points to central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) as a key global innovation with perhaps the most significant transformative outcomes of blockchain technologies, despite not being based on such technology. It also points to the regulatory changes underway in response to these emerging technologies and calls for a continued roll‑out in regulatory and law enforcement capabilities to limit the risks and challenges posed by these technologies.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 38p.

By Peter Tinti

Since 2013, the Republic of Mali has become a focal point of international efforts to stabilize the Sahel region through a mix of direct military intervention, security assistance, development aid and humanitarian support. A coup on 18 August 2020, and a subsequent consolidation of power by the ruling junta on 24 May 2021, combined with ongoing insecurity throughout the country’s centre and north, have prompted various international actors to reconsider their stabilization efforts in Mali. While mandates from international coalitions aim to restore stability, governance and security to the country, a misinterpretation of the relationship between violent extremism and organized crime has led to an emphasis on technical, militarized approaches that do not adequately consider consequential dynamics on the ground. This paper explains the risks of this approach for undermining stabilization efforts across the region and provides recommendations for: focusing analysis and policy on informal and criminal economies, rather than violent extremism; and adopting more development-focused interventions that better support Malian communities.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 32p.

By Ivan Briscoe and David Keseberg

Legend has it that Pope John Paul II, during his visit to Guatemala at the height of that country’s civil war in 1983, handed down a highly undiplomatic refrain to his official hosts: “you like to kill.” It is a conclusion that, decades on from the Cold War era of military dictatorships, left-wing revolutionary regimes, and embattled democracies, is still largely valid across Latin America, although for quite different reasons. This is the region of the world that is now least affected by armed conflict, yet most exposed to a daily dose of largely criminal violence. In 2016, 17 of the 20 countries and 43 of the 50 cities with the world’s highest rates of homicide—excluding those affected by armed conflict—were to be found in Latin America.1 In absolute terms, one in four global homicides occurs in only four countries: Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia.2 This lethal yet commonplace violence is most closely associated with those countries saddled with the presence of vibrant criminal organizations, groups which are in turn associated in the minds of many Latin Americans with the spread of sinister tentacles across poor urban communities, peripheral rural areas, prisons, police forces, judges, eminences of the political establishment, and international bankers and lawyers. Crime no longer appears as a mere underworld, but has become a source of fear, resentment, popular entertainment and, perhaps most crucially, livelihood and opportunity; it has become a culture. ...

Prism, 8(1); 2019.

By  Steven Dudley, Parker Asmann and Victoria Dittmar 

In 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP).1 What would become known as “remain in Mexico” was the latest in a decades-long effort by successive Republican and Democrat administrations to curb migration by making it increasingly difficult for migrants to enter and stay in the United States. However, the policies have had numerous unintended consequences, including bolstering criminal organizations along the US-Mexico border. Whereas the smuggling of drugs and weapons used to dominate the cross-border contraband trade, human smuggling has morphed into one of the most lucrative industries for crime groups. It also has made it increasingly dangerous for migrants who face more risks en route and along the US border. This report aims to highlight the role US policy has played in this transformation, which continues to evolve today. Specifically, it analyzes the ways in which Mexican organized crime groups have become involved in human smuggling as risks rose, prices surged, and migrants began to move through less-traveled corridors. The goal is to inform policymakers who are looking to address irregular migration and combat Mexico’s criminal organizations. ….  

Washington DC: Insight Crime, 2023. 22p.

By Eleanor Beevor 

In May 2022, two Nigerian citizens were arrested in Niamey, Niger, while trying to drive back to Nigeria in a stolen Toyota Corolla. The Corolla had a Nigerian licence plate, but police discovered that the car had recently been stolen from a Nigerien police officer. Fake military identification cards, and another Nigerian licence plate, were found in the car. The men were posing as Nigerian military officers. One had in fact been a former officer but was discharged in 2017 for desertion, and the other worked for Nigeria’s correctional service. After an investigation, it transpired that the men had left Nigeria three days before the arrest, and they had driven to Niamey in a stolen Toyota Hilux. The car, stolen in Nigeria, was resold in Niamey with the assistance of a Nigerien accomplice who was later arrested. It appears that this accomplice was also involved in the theft and resale of motorbikes, and possibly of other illicit commodities such as weapons. He was found with three AK-47 rifles and 151 cartridges, along with a stolen motorbike, other motorbike parts and three wristwatches. This example showcases many of the dynamics of car theft in the central Sahel region….

Geneva, SWIT::Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2023.  38p.

 By Anastasia Austin and Douwe den Held 

The Dominican Republic prides itself on its openness to the world. As one of the first countries to open up during the COVID-19 pandemic, it seeks to be ever welcoming to tourism and business. But criminals may feel welcome as well. In this three-part series, InSight Crime dives into the infrastructure, the trafficking networks, and the corruption facilitating organized crime in the Dominican Republic.

Washington, DC, Insight Crime, 2022. 26p

  By The Task Force

  The United States government is committed to combating human trafficking at home and around the world. The particular problem of forced labor on fishing vessels on the high seas – a form of human trafficking – has emerged as an especially vexing challenge to policymakers, enforcement officials, and worker advocates. This is a particular challenge due in part to the physical isolation of those workplaces and the complex legal and jurisdictional issues on the high seas. While this report focuses on legal and jurisdictional issues, it is important to bear in mind the situation of workers victimized by human trafficking. Understanding the human suffering of victims is paramount in designing an effective – and a morally sound – policy solution. Fishing workers, often from impoverished backgrounds, have left their families and support systems behind in order to work long hours in difficult and dangerous conditions in hopes of earning enough money to create a better life. When a worker instead confronts physical or psychological abuse and punishing debt, and loses hope of finding the better life they were looking for, the lasting psychological, physical and financial harm can be incalculable. Due to ongoing concern in both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, Congress in March of 2018 directed the Department of Justice to convene an interagency task force to examine legal and jurisdictional issues related to human trafficking on fishing vessels in international waters and to make recommendations for executive and legislative action to address this scourge.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2021. 51p.

United States. Executive Office Of The President; United States. Office Of National Drug Control Policy

From the document: "On April 12, 2023, Dr. Rahul Gupta, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), formally designated fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine as an emerging drug threat, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. [United States Code] § 1708. [...] The emerging threat designation, made under the authority provided by 'The Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act of 2018' (P.L. [Public Law] 115-271), requires the Executive Branch to take several steps: First, ONDCP, in collaboration with relevant federal agencies, must draft and publicly issue a fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine Response Plan (within 90 days of designation). Second, ONDCP must issue Implementation Guidance to agencies (120 days after designation). Third, agencies must provide a specific Agency Implementation Report to ONDCP (180 days after designation). Fourth, ONDCP must publish a National Implementation Report on the Response Plan (in February 2024, with other ONDCP annual reports). The response plan presented here fulfills the first of these requirements and addresses urgent public health and safety needs. The SUPPORT Act also requires that the ONDCP Director decide whether a stand-alone national media campaign would be effective in addressing the emerging threat. In the case of xylazine-adulterated fentanyl, Director Gupta has determined that it will be productive to include such public messaging on fentanyl adulterants in existing campaigns and other federal messaging on fentanyl, in lieu of establishing a new stand-alone campaign focused solely on xylazine. The SUPPORT Act requires that an emerging threat response plan include evidence-based prevention, treatment, and supply reduction action steps, in addition to establishing goals and performance measures informed by comprehensive data. In the plan outlined below, we apply those requirements to the case of fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine and describe critically important and urgent next action steps."

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of National Drug Control Policy 2023. 15p.