By Reynell Badillo-Sarmiento & Luis Fernando Trejos-Rosero 

This article explores how organized criminal organizations exercise criminal governance over other organized and non-organized criminals using public messaging, lethal and extra-lethal violence. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, over 350 press reports, and an original database on inter-criminal lethal violence, we show, in line with recent literature on organized crime, that while these organizations use violence to build their reputation as actors willing to use force, they also provide benefits to other criminals such as financing and protection from state and competitors. This article contributes to the literature on criminal governance by elaborating on the mechanisms shown in recent work and by detailing an unexplored case study in Barranquilla (Colombia).

Colombia: Trends in Organized Crime, 2023. 27p.

By Rebecca A. Delfino

Deepfakes—audiovisual recordings created using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to believably map one person’s movements and words onto another—are ubiquitous. They have permeated societal and civic spaces from entertainment, news, and social media to politics. And now deepfakes are invading the courts, threatening our justice system’s truth-seeking function. Ways deepfakes could infect a court proceeding run the gamut and include parties fabricating evidence to win a civil action, government actors wrongfully securing criminal convictions, and lawyers purposely exploiting a lay jury’s suspicions about evidence. As deepfake technology improves and it becomes harder to tell what is real, juries may start questioning the authenticity of properly admitted evidence, which in turn may have a corrosive effect on the justice system. No evidentiary procedure explicitly governs the presentation of deepfake evidence in court. The existing legal standards governing the authentication of evidence are inadequate because they were developed before the advent of deepfake technology. As a result, they do not solve the urgent problem of how to determine when an audiovisual image is fake and when it is not. Although legal scholarship and the popular media have addressed certain facets of deepfakes in the last several years, there has been no commentary on the procedural aspects of deepfake evidence in court. Absent from the discussion is who gets to decide whether a deepfake is authentic. This Article addresses the matters that prior academic scholarship on deepfakes obscures. It is the first to propose a new addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence reflecting a novel reallocation of fact-determining responsibilities from the jury to the judge, treating the question of deepfake authenticity as one for the court to decide as an expanded gatekeeping function under the Rules. The challenges of deepfakes—problems of proof, the “deepfake defense,” and juror skepticism—can be best addressed by amending the Rules for authenticating digital audiovisual evidence, instructing the jury on its use of that evidence, and limiting counsel’s efforts to exploit the existence of deepfakes.

Hastings Law Journal, 2023. 57p.

By Taurus Myhand

The proliferation of deepfake videos has resulted in rapid improvements in the technology used to create them. Although the use of fake videos and images are not new, advances in artificial intelligence have made deepfakes easier to make and harder to detect. Basic human perception is no longer sufficient to detect deepfakes. Yet, under the current construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, trials judges are expected to do just that. Trial judges face a daunting challenge when applying the current evidence authentication standards to video evidence in this new reality of widely available deepfake videos. This article examines the gatekeeping role trial judges must perform in light of the unique challenges posed by deepfake video evidence. This article further examines why the jury instruction approach and the rule change approaches proposed by other scholars are insufficient to combat the grave threat of false video evidence. This article concludes with a discussion of the affidavit of forensic analysis approach, a robust response to the authentication challenges posed by deepfakes. The AFA approach preserves most of the current construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence while reviving the gatekeeping role of the trial judge in determining the admissibility of video evidence. The AFA will provide the trial judges with the tools necessary to detect and exclude deepfake videos without leaving an everlasting taint on the juries that would have otherwise seen the falsified videos.

Widener Law Review, 2023. 19p.

By Michele Goodwin

On August 31, 2017, The New York Times published a provocative news article, “The Incarcerated Women Who Fight California’s Wildfires.” California is particularly known for its wildfires.1 The dry-air, hot-weather conditions that persist much of the year and limited rainfall create the conditions that make pockets of the state ripe for devastating wildfires. Strong winds, often referred to as the Diablo (or the devil), radiate in the northern part of the state, exacerbating the already vulnerable conditions. The Santa Ana winds do the same in southern counties. Fighting these fires can be a matter of life or death. In fact, Shawna Lynn Jones died in 2016, only hours after battling a fire in Southern California. She was nearly done with a three-year sentence—barely two months remained of her incarceration. However, the night before, at 3 a.m., she and other women had been called to put out a raging fire. Tyquesha Brown recalls that the fire that night required traversing a steep hillside of loose rocks and soil.2 This made their task even more challenging. Another woman told a reporter that Jones struggled that night—the weight of her gear and chain  made it difficult for her to establish footing to hike up the hill where the fire blazed.3 However, she and the other women of Crew 13-3 performed their duties, holding back the fire so that it did not “jump the line.”4 By doing so, they saved expensive properties in Malibu. However, Jones was dead by 10 a.m. the next morning.5 For “less than $2 an hour,” female inmates like Shawna Jones and Tyquesha Brown “work their bodies to the breaking point” with this dangerous work.6 The women trudge heavy chains, saws, medical supplies, safety gear, and various other equipment into burning hillsides surrounded by intense flames. On occasion, they may arrive “ahead of any aerial support or local fire trucks,”7 leaving the prisons in the peak of night, when it is pitch black, arriving before dawn to the color of bright flames and intense heat. Sometimes the women are called upon to “set the line,” meaning they clear “potential fuel from a six-foot-wide stretch of ground” between the source of the fire (or whatever is burning) and the land or property in need of protection.8 They dig trenches, moving toward the fire with tools in hand, keeping about ten feet apart from each other while calling out conditions.9 The women cut wood, clearing it before the flames lick at its brittle brush. After, they scrape or shovel—all in syncopation—while clouds of smoke envelope them. For protection, thin bandanas or yellow handkerchiefs cover their mouths. They operate in a frightening rhythm of sorts: saw, hook, shovel, and rake charred earth, trees, or whatever remains from the blazing fire. To the naked eye, the women could appear to represent progress. For too long, state, federal, and local agencies excluded women from professions that demanded the service of their bodies at the front lines of anything other than childbearing, motherhood, and domestic duties. Women waged legal battles to become firefighters and police officers.10 Thus, a glance at the women battling California’s fires might convey a message of hope and that the only battles left are the fires themselves—and not the persistent claims of institutional and private discrimination,11 such as colleagues urinating on their beds,12 sexual harassment,13 and retaliation for performing their jobs well.

New York: Cornell Law Review, 2019.

By Christine Acosta Weirich

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011, many nations in the Cradle of Civilization faced civil unrest, much of which continues today in the form of the ongoing Syrian Civil War, the conflict in Yemen, and instability in nations such as Iraq and Turkey. As a consequence, antiquities and cultural heritage in the region are currently facing a notoriously exacerbated level of risk. Despite the looting and destruction of cultural objects and monuments presenting a longstanding global and historical trend, the field of antiquities trafficking research lacks a unique and effective perspective within its current body of work and research. Likewise, criminology as a scientific field of study has largely overlooked the complex issue of looting and trafficking of cultural objects. This thesis focuses on the issue of Antiquities Trafficking Networks from a crime prevention perspective and attempts to demonstrate the effectiveness and apt nature of Crime Script Analysis and Situational Crime Prevention. This is accomplished first with a study and analysis of the wider phenomenon of Antiquities Trafficking Networks (from looting to market), followed by a specific case study of antiquities trafficked from within Syria since the beginning of the Civil War. Following these analyses, thirteen prominent Situational Crime Prevention strategies for Antiquities Trafficking Networks, and ten strategies for future conflict zones are generated by this research project. Through these strategies, Crime Script Analysis – in conjunction with Situational Crime Prevention – has proven to be a highly effective and efficient method and framework for studying this particularly difficult field. Ultimately, this thesis proposes a new crime prevention-focused methodology, to help tackle the issue of antiquities trafficking, as well as presenting one of the first prevention-specific analyses in this area. In doing so, it offers a basic model that maps the structure and necessary elements for antiquities trafficking to occur and allows for future research projects to adapt or customize this script model to situation-specific cases of antiquities looting, transit, and marketing.

Ph.D. Thesis. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 2018. 312p.

By Michaela Millinder

KEY FINDINGS

• Illicit actors, including terrorists, target cultural heritage and soft targets for a myriad of motivations: for financial gain and to diversify revenue streams, to validate their narratives or propaganda, and to systematically erase communities’ collective identities, both to subjugate these societies and re-write and control their histories. These seemingly divergent motivations are not exclusive, and the same illicit actor can destroy cultural heritage for propaganda and profit from its sale.

• The intentional destruction of cultural heritage, which is a war crime, often occurs concurrently with other human rights abuses and is a condition that can be conducive to genocide. It can furthermore hinder post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding efforts.

• Due to the inherent aspects of cultural heritage and soft targets, protection challenges include: tensions in balancing security and civilian access to sites or public spaces, lack of awareness and education on the risks to cultural heritage, the multiplicity of actors involved in cultural heritage management and, at times, the difficulty in securing their engagement, siloed responses, limited resources, and state involvement in the targeting and destruction of cultural heritage.

• Risk assessments, information sharing, cross-sectoral and agency partnerships, educational and awareness raising efforts, including on the threats facing cultural heritage, and prosecutions and international accountability mechanisms have all been utilized as good protection practices and responses.

• Recommendations: Share risk assessments locally, regionally, and globally across relevant sectors and agencies with adequate international assistance; align soft target and critical infrastructure protection efforts; prioritize targeted education and public awareness on the importance of protecting cultural heritage and threats facing it; build capacity of stakeholders involved in protection efforts; and pursue accountability for cultural heritage destruction, including antiquities trafficking, and enforce penalties for violations.

New York: Soufan Center, 2024 26p.

By Coen Teunissen and Sarah Napier

We analysed the chat logs of seven Australia-based men who had committed 145 child sexual abuse (CSA) live streaming offences, to examine the overlap between this offending, contact sexual offending and engagement with child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

Four CSA live streaming offenders attempted to travel to offend against victims in person, in that they discussed travelling or actually booked flights in order to meet these children. Offenders also requested or received images and videos of victims they had viewed over live stream, and recorded live streams to produce CSAM.

Travelling to offend against children, use of CSAM and CSA live streaming appear to be interrelated and should be considered by law enforcement as potential risk factors for one another. Further, detection and removal of new CSAM, and scanning of live streams for abusive content, should be a priority for all electronic service providers.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 671. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 16p.

By Charlotte Hunn, Paul Watters, Jeremy Prichard, Richard Wortley, Joel Scanlan, Caroline Spiranovic and Tony Krone

Online CSAM offending is a challenge for law enforcement, policymakers and child welfare organisations alike. The use of online warning messages to prevent or deter an individual when they actively search for CSAM is gaining traction as a response to some types of CSAM offending. Yet, to date, the technical question of how warning messages can be implemented, and who can implement them, has been largely unexplored. To address this, we use a case study to analyse the actions individuals and organisations within the technology, government, non-government and private sectors could take to implement warning messages. We find that, from a technical perspective, there is considerable opportunity to implement warning messages, although further research into efficacy and cost is needed.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 669. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 14p.

By Anthony Morgan, Timothy Cubitt and Christopher Dowling

In this paper we explore the prevalence and patterns of recorded domestic violence offending among outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members in New South Wales. We then compare domestic violence offending among a sample of OMCG members and other male offenders who committed their first recorded offence in the same year.

Forty percent of OMCG members had been proceeded against for a domestic violence offence in the last 10 years. OMCG members were twice as likely to have been proceeded against for domestic violence offences as the wider male offending population. Domestic violence offending by OMCG members was more harmful and charges were less likely to result in a guilty outcome.

OMCG members have a greater propensity for violence and this includes domestic violence. This research has implications for law enforcement and domestic violence support services.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 670. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 17p.

By Siobhan Lawler, Hayley Boxall and Christopher Dowling

Previous research has shown that persons with depression are over-represented among perpetrators of intimate partner homicide (IPH). However, the relationship between IPH and depression is not well understood. This study explores the role of offender depression within a sample of 199 cases of male-perpetrated IPH in Australia, as described by judges in sentencing remarks. Over one-third of the IPH offenders had experienced depression at some point in their lifetime. Qualitative information about the onset and cause of depression, co-occurring risk factors and the relationship between depression and culpability is presented. Findings show that depression alone holds limited explanatory value for understanding IPH, and must be considered in the context of other co-occurring risk factors

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 672. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 16p.

By Christopher Dowling, Heather Wolbers, Anthony Morgan and Cameron Long

This study examines how accurately the refined Family Violence Risk Assessment Tool (FVRAT) predicts repeat domestic violence. Developed on the basis of a previous validation study of an earlier, much longer version of the tool, the refined FVRAT consists of 10 checkbox items, along with sections recording victim and officer judgements. These are used to inform police responses in the Australian Capital Territory.

A sample of over 450 unique reports of violence involving current and former intimate partners between March and December 2020 in which police used the refined FVRAT were examined. Repeat domestic violence was measured based on whether a subsequent report of domestic violence was made to police within six months.

Consistent with the previous study, the refined FVRAT predicts repeat domestic violence at least moderately well. Victim judgements were also shown to enhance the tool’s ability to correctly identify repeat domestic violence, although the findings also suggest some caution is warranted in using these judgements.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 674. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 18p.

By Isabella Voce and Anthony Morgan

This study analyses data from a survey of Australian adult computer users conducted in June 2021 to examine the influence of online routine activities and life stressors on the likelihood of profit-motivated cybercrime victimisation.

Compared with non-victims, victims spent more time online, more frequently engaged in recreational online activities and were more likely to employ higher-risk online practices. Small-to-medium enterprise owners working from home were more likely to be victims. Respondents who had experienced recent increases in financial stress and gambling and negative impacts on interpersonal relationships during the COVID-19 pandemic were also more likely to be a victim of cybercrime.

Being accessible online and a lack of personal and physical guardianship are associated with an increased risk of being a victim, but other factors may influence the susceptibility of computer users to cybercrime victimisation. This has important implications for cybercrime responses

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 675. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 18p.

By Radha Barooah and Ana Paula Oliveira Siria Gastélum Félix

This brief aims to bring specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY People from all walks of life have disappeared during Mexico’s so-called ‘war on drugs’; many others become victims of the growing global human trafficking industry; migrants go missing as they travel to seek a better life elsewhere, often displaced by criminal groups. Vulnerable youth, particularly young boys, are co-opted by criminal interests and then ‘disappeared’ to forcibly join gangs, often groomed to provide gang ‘muscle’ or traffic drugs.1 Women and children are often trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour.2 Many activists, journalists, politicians and whistle-blowers who campaign against organized crime or corruption have disappeared. Disappearances – as we define the phenomenon in this paper – are deployed for various reasons: to silence the voices of social and political leaders, activists and journalists; to assert violent control over criminal territories and illicit markets; or to monetize vulnerable people as a tradeable commodity. In all these cases, criminal groups have a hand, and although organized crime-related disappearances vary in motive and scope, they disproportionately affect the most marginalized communities. Criminal groups therefore instrumentalize disappearances for different objectives. But a fundamental challenge of dealing with this widespread problem is that cases are rarely differentiated and often assumed by law enforcement authorities to be one-off isolated incidents. However, when examining this issue closely, there is a more menacing pattern behind them, namely that they are often perpetrated by organized criminal groups operating in a particular community or controlling a market territory. By not discerning this broader picture of underlying criminal intent, by focusing on the what and ignoring the why, the phenomenon tends to receive limited attention in public policy agendas. There is also inadequate institutional support and investigative work, which has the effect of impeding victims’ access to justice. The international framework designed to address enforced disappearances – the International Convention for Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICPPED)3 – requires that state involvement in the act (in the form of collusion, authorization or acquiescence) is proven in order to trigger its obligations. Compounding this, the conditions of state involvement and the role of organized crime actors are not clearly set out in the wording of the convention, so cases of disappearances linked to illicit economies tend to be confined to the margins of national and international agendas. Meanwhile, the international human rights discourse on disappearances perpetrated by non-state actors (e.g. criminal groups or networks) has progressed to a certain degree, but it, too, remains ill-equipped to determine the conditions and factors of collusion between organized crime and state actors that would amount to authorization, acquiescence or omission. These imprecisions and gaps in the legal framework result in a general lack of institutional support for victims and their families. Despite this, individuals and communities affected by this crime have developed mechanisms to respond. Since 2019, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), through its Resilience Fund, has supported over 50 community-based initiatives and activists searching for people who have disappeared, including relatives seeking justice and journalists investigating disappearances related to organized crime around the world.4 The Resilience Fund has documented first-hand experiences through interviews and dialogues and provided financial and capacity-building support.5 This brief draws from the work and perspectives of such civil society and community members who live in environments that are exposed to disappearances. It assesses this form of organized crime as a serious human rights violation. While informed by the global dynamics of this criminal market, it focuses on contexts in which disappearances occur in Latin America, analyzing in particular the cases of Mexico and Venezuela. The first setting examines how criminal groups strategically deploy disappearances to fulfill various objectives; the other considers how disappearances occur in the mining sector, which experiences a high prevalence of criminality. This policy brief therefore aims to bring these specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field. While some of the evidence in the brief is anecdotal, the authors have corroborated it with open-source data and a literature review. The analysis is exploratory and is designed to add to a small yet growing body of literature on disappearances among vulnerable communities exposed to organized crime and amplify understanding of the pressing nature of the problem in policy circles.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 28p.

By J.R. Mailey

Sudan’s current conflict, which erupted in April 2023, is the latest chapter in a story of rival predatory networks competing for control over formal and illicit economies, the information environment and the use of organized violence.

As the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) spread death and destruction across the country, fuelling a humanitarian crisis, their battle is driven by the desire to preserve their vast economic empires and the systems that support them.

This report explores the intricate web of illicit networks, armed conflicts, and the devastating impact on Sudan’s socio-political landscape. It explores how predatory networks commoditize violence, exploit strategic industries, and manipulate state institutions for their gain. From the militarization of the economy to the instrumentalization of criminal markets, this investigation sheds light on the arc of state collapse and the urgent need for comprehensive peacebuilding strategies.

The paper is the first in a series focusing on Sudan, aiming to present an overview about the competition for control of Sudan’s security services, civilian bureaucracy and strategic industries. The following reports will explore the people, institutions, networks and transactions that have underpinned the enduring ecosystem of crime and corruption in Sudan that ultimately gave way to the current civil war.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 28p.

By The International Crisis Group Latin America and Caribbean

What’s new? The assassination in July of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, perpetrated with no apparent resistance from his elite security detail, and a bout of natural disasters weeks later have further destabilised an already fragile Haiti and intensified its humanitarian crisis at a time of extreme insecurity. Why does it matter? Coming amid intersecting political, human rights, economic and humanitarian crises, Moïse’s killing and other recent events have exposed the chronic failings of state authorities and difficulties in ensuring that foreign support is deployed effectively. Growing insecurity is also driving instability and increased migrant flows within and outside the country. What should be done? Funnelling aid to vulnerable people hit by recent natural disasters, preferably through local civil society, is the imperative. International back ing for prosecuting high-level crimes, police reform and support for a broad-based representative and inclusive interim government stand a better chance than a rush to elections of helping restore stability.

Bogotá/New York/Brussels, The International Crisis Group, 30 September 2021 24p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Robert Muggah, et al.

KEY FINDINGS

• Increasingly sophisticated and high-calibre firearms and ammunition are being trafficked into Haiti amid an unprecedented and rapidly deteriorating security situation.

• Haiti remains a trans-shipment country for drugs, primarily cocaine and cannabis, which mostly enter the country via boat or plane, arriving through public, private and informal ports as well as clandestine runways.

• Haiti’s borders are essentially porous, and the challenges of patrolling 1,771 kilometres of coastline and a 392-kilometre land border with the Dominican Republic are overwhelming the capacities of Haiti’s national police, customs, border patrols and coast guard, who are severely under-staffed and under-resourced, a variety of sources with their attendant limitations, including unverified media reports, to take account of recent developments. It opens with a cursory overview of the criminal context in which firearms and drug trafficking are occurring. The second section considers the basic infrastructure that facilitates trafficking, especially seaports, roads and airstrips. Sections three and four examine patterns of trafficking of both firearms and drugs into and out of Haiti. The final section summarizes global, regional and national measures to address related challenges, alongside knowledge gaps warranting deeper investigation. Given the evolving circumstances, any attempt to document firearms and drug trafficking trends in Haiti will be fragmented and partial. Even so, certain tendencies and patterns can be discerned. Very generally, firearms and ammunition typically enter Haiti via land and sea, and drugs usually transit Haiti from seaports, airports and across poorly monitored border points. Most weapons are sourced in the US and make their way to gang members and private residents through intermediaries, often through public and private ports and porous checkpoints. Whether they are interdicted or not, most drugs passing through Haiti are produced in Colombia (cocaine) or Jamaica (cannabis) and shipped directly from source, or pass via Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Venezuela. From Haiti they are shipped onward to the Dominican Republic, Western Europe and, primarily, the US. and increasingly targeted by gangs.

• Heavily armed criminal gangs are targeting ports, highways, critical infrastructure, customs offices, police stations, court houses, prisons, businesses and neighbourhoods.

• Virtually every metric of insecurity, from homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping to the killing of police and migration out of the country – is trending upward.

• International, regional and national responses have underscored the importance of increasing support to law enforcement and border management. Comprehensive approaches encompassing investments in community policing, criminal justice reform and anti-corruption measures are crucial to delivering sustainable peace and stability in Haiti.

Haiti is in the grip of multiple, interlocking, and cascading crises. If unattended, there are serious risks of further destabilization from a myriad of increasingly powerful criminal armed groups. The risks of regional spill-over and contagion are widely acknowledged: The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly raised concerns about the country’s “protracted and deteriorating political, economic, security, human rights, humanitarian and food security crises” and “extremely high levels of gang violence and other criminal activities”. 1 A particular preoccupation relates to the contribution of illegal firearms and drug trafficking in fuelling Haiti’s deepening security dilemmas. This assessment provides an overview of the scope, scale and dynamics of firearms and drug trafficking in Haiti, including sources, routes, vectors and destinations. It is based on published and unpublished information and 45 interviews conducted by UNODC with representatives of the Haitian government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, subject matter experts, and Haitian civil society.2 The situation in the country is deteriorating rapidly, and this assessment has drawn upon

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 47p.

By Insa Koch, Patrick Williams, and Lauren Wroe

Government policies relating to dealers in ‘county lines’ drugs trafficking cases have been welcomed as a departure from punitive approaches to drugs and ‘gang’ policing, in that those on the bottom rung of the drugs economy of heroin and crack cocaine are no longer treated as criminals but as potential victims and ‘modern slaves’ in need of protection. However, our research suggests not so much a radical break with previous modes of policing as that the term ‘county lines’ emerged as a logical extension of the government’s racist and classist language surrounding ‘gangs’, knife crime and youth violence. Policies implemented in the name of safeguarding the vulnerable also act as a gateway for criminalisation not just under drugs laws but also modern slavery legislation. The government’s discovery of, and responses to, ‘county lines’ hinge on a moral crisis in the making, which ultimately deepens the state’s pre-emptive and violent criminalisation of the ‘Black criminal other’ at a time of deep political crisis.

First published online November 15, 2023., Race & Class, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/03063968231201325

By The U.K. Home Office

Purpose - This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies:

• A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm

• That the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

• That the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)

• A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory

• A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and

• If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

London: Assets Publishing Service, 2022. 84p.

By  James Porteous

This report examines human trafficking linked to organised crime groups involved in illegal betting and related criminal activity in four key regions in Southeast Asia. Research was primarily via desktop information gathering conducted in 2022/23, supplemented by the expertise and existing knowledge of the Mekong Club and the Asian Racing Federation Council on Anti-Illegal Betting and Related Financial Crime in human trafficking and illegal betting, respectively. Key findings are: • Tens of thousands of people are being held in modern slavery conditions to work in organised illegal betting and cyber-scam operations across Southeast Asia. • These operations, which are run by individuals with long histories of involvement in illegal betting and organised crime across Asia, are estimated to make at least USD 40 to 100 billion a year in illicit profits from such activity. • Some individuals are recruited on false job advertisements, have their passports removed and are kept in dormitories attached to fully contained casino compounds as forced labour to promote illegal betting websites and engage in industrial-scale cyber-fraud such as “pig butchering”, romance scams, and cryptocurrency Ponzi schemes. • Workers are typically not permitted to leave without paying large ransoms to their captors, and can be sold and traded between organised crime groups. Fines for breaking rules or failing to hit monetary targets are added to victims’ ransoms. • Reports on victim testimony and online video shows “staff” being beaten with iron bars, shocked with cattle prods, tied up, and subject to other forms of torture. Female victims have been forced into sex work for failing to meet targets. • The groups running such operations have been active in organising and promoting gambling across Asia since at least the 1990s. Because many of the core activities in this business (e.g., movement of money across borders, violent debt collection, bribery of local officials, provision of related “entertainment” such as narcotics and sex), are illicit, such operations have by necessity been closely associated with, or directly run by, individuals with organised crime backgrounds. • In the early 2000s, this business was supercharged by the development of online gambling (both casino games and sports betting), run directly out of existing casinos or related properties, which massively increased the target market, and has grown to be a trillion dollar illegal industry funding organised crime. • Attempts to profit from this by governments in Southeast Asia, typically by licensing operators for a fee, have led to the spread of such operations across the region and had major negative impacts, including widespread corruption. It has also concentrated operations in self-contained compounds and so-called special economic zones which local police are often unwilling or unable to enter or investigate. • Hundreds of thousands of workers are required to serve the industry in marketing, customer recruitment, funds transfers, tech support and related fields. • Pre-pandemic, demand for workers was usually satisfied by voluntary means, although an unknown percentage of “voluntary” arrivals were held in modern-slavery like conditions, and there were related human trafficking aspects such as trafficking of sex workers to serve the industry. • This began to change in 2018 as a result of China’s growing concern over cross-border illegal betting, and change was accelerated massively by travel restrictions due to the pandemic, which cut off the supply of workers. • At the same time, the organised criminal groups had a key business line – land-based casinos – essentially closed down because of travel restrictions. As a result, they greatly expanded and developed existing cyber-scam operations, leveraging their expertise and technology in areas such as social media marketing, customer recruitment and cryptocurrency, which were in place from their online illegal betting operations. • Now, as the pandemic recedes, the organised crime groups running these operations have, in effect, hugely increased their potential revenue by complementing illegal betting with cyber-scam operations of comparable scale. • The success of such operations has been an enormous financial boon to organised crime, for whom cyber scams and illegal betting are just two of many illicit business lines that include money laundering as a service, illicit wildlife trafficking and production and distribution of methamphetamine and heroin. • The vast profits from such operations have provided plentiful ammunition to corrupt local authorities, and the operations in this group are frequently protected by powerful politicians and/or armed militias. • Global attention on the issue has not eliminated this activity, just displaced it into even more vulnerable jurisdictions, leading some to fear the industry could lead to geopolitical instability.   

Hong Kong: Asian Racing Federation, 2023. 39p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ted Robert Gurr

VIOLENCE IN AMERICA Vol. 1 explores the intricate tapestry of crime throughout the nation's history, shedding light on the various facets of violence that have shaped American society. From notorious outlaws of the Wild West to the rise of organized crime during Prohibition, this volume delves into the darker chapters of the past, offering a compelling narrative that examines the root causes and consequences of criminal activities. Through meticulous research and insightful analysis, this book provides a comprehensive overview of the history of crime in America, inviting readers to reflect on the enduring legacy of violence in a nation built on conflicting ideals.

Newbury Park. Sage. 1989. 281p.