By Erica Marat and Gulzat Botoeva

Summary This research brief examines the links between illegal drug trafficking, violence, and corruption in Central Asia. We argue that drug trafficking is highly organised with major criminal and state actors participating in the illicit activity. Criminal violence is spread across the region, especially in urban areas, but the Central Asian states are capable of intercepting and preventing illicit activities. By analysing big data on violence, drug interdictions, and patterns of corruption in the region between 2015 and 2022, we explain the relationship between drug trafficking and key actors from the criminal underworld and state agencies in Central Asia. We also rely on expert interviews explaining states’ involvement in the drugs economy. Our analysis of violence and policing dynamics in the region shows how patterns of organised crime change depending on state effectiveness and the presence of competition between traffickers. Each country exhibits a unique relationship between state actors and criminal syndicates in both interdicting and facilitating drug trafficking. Our research comes at a time of an anticipated increase in drug trafficking from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and of growing economic uncertainty in the wider region due to Western sanctions against Russia. In the policy realm, our research findings can help develop anti-trafficking strategies in the Central Asian region and improve our understanding of how drug trafficking can be curbed more effectively by identifying the main actors involved in this highly organised criminal process

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham., 2022. 48p.

By Mark Galeotti

In May 2022, Lithuanian police raided two underground factories where counterfeit cigarettes worth some €73 million were being produced.2 This happens all the time, and even the involvement of a Russian-linked organized crime group was hardly unusual. However, as the investigation extended to Belgium (where the goods would be transhipped to Britain), it became clear that behind the gangsters lay Russian intelligence officers, who were using the business – or at least part of its profits – to raise operational funds for their activities in Europe. With Putin regarding himself as ‘at war’ with the West, at a time when Europol chief Catherine de Bolle is warning that organized crime is on the rise across Europe,3 and Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s counter-intelligence agency, is assessing ‘the risk of [Russian] state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased’,4 it is perhaps unsurprising that gangsters and spies would find themselves brought together in his campaign. It has, after all, become commonplace since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to characterize the relationship between Russia and the West as some shade of war: economic, political, but typically more than just cold. Indeed, even as he insists that his invasion is not a war, just a ‘special military operation’ (SVO) – actually calling it a ‘war’ can conceivably get Russians a 15-year prison sentence5 – Putin freely uses the term when describing his country’s engagement with the West. However, it is less clearly understood just how significant and long held this view of his may be. In this context, it does seem in hindsight that Putin has considered himself as de facto at war with the West – or, more precisely, that the West has been warring against him – since at least around 2012. After stepping back from the presidency to the position of prime minister in order to observe the letter, if not the spirit, of term limits, all the while clearly still running the country, when Putin announced he would be returning to the Kremlin, this was for many the last straw. Demonstrations that became known as the Bolotnaya Protests were mastered and dispersed, but Putin seems to have been unable or unwilling to accept that they were a genuine, organic expression of dismay. Instead, he chose to see them as spurred by the US Department of State, after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘gave the signal’ to opposition leaders.6 There had been a growing school of thought within Russian security circles that the West was using ‘political technologies’ to topple hostile governments, and support for civil society, democratization and the rule of law were seen as part of this campaign. As a former Kremlin insider put it, Putin was scared, then angry. As far as he was concerned, this was it, this was a sign that the West – the Americans – were coming for him. So he was determined to fight back, and that didn’t just mean defending himself, the repressions and arrests, it meant going on the attack. He was clear, he made it clear to us all: if the West was coming to mess with him, we would mess them up worse, by whatever means necessary.

Russia’s transition from a “conscription state” to a full “mobilization state”, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations.

The report also highlights Russia’s weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally.

“Gangsters at War” reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia’s geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 62p.

By the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,

Education plays a critical role in preventing substance use and misuse. Drugs of Abuse, A DEA Resource Guide, is designed to be a reliable resource on the most commonly used and misused drugs in the United States. This comprehensive guide provides important information about the harms and consequences of drug use by describing a drug’s effects on the body and mind, overdose potential, origin, legal status, and other key facts.

Washington, DC: DEA, 2024. 117p.

By Earth League International; John Jay College of Criminal Justice; State University of New York - Farmingdale

In the early twentieth century, the Totoaba fishery was the most important fishery in the Gulf of California. At its peak, in 1942, over two thousand tons of fish maw were exported to China and the Chinese communities in California. Realizing the danger the fish faced, in 1975, the Mexican government banned the fishing of the species (Martínez & Martínez, 2018). Nonetheless, this critically endangered fish remains heavily overfished today, with organized criminal networks across the country playing a pivotal role in trafficking the species (Alvarado Martinez, 2014). The swim bladder is a highly prized commodity in China, as it is believed that the bladder can be used to treat a variety of medical conditions, including infertility, circulatory issues, kidney problems, and arthritis (Yagoub, 2016). Because of this, a single bladder can fetch for significantly high prices, and one gram of totoaba fish bladder can be more expensive than one gram of cocaine (Martínez & Alonso, 2021). Totoaba swim bladders are also referred to as “money maw” (Amepou et al, 2024), as individuals buy the bladder when prices drop in hopes that fish maw prices will rise once again and can be sold for profit. The poaching of totoaba for its swim bladder has had devastating consequences not only for the species itself and the marine life in the Sea of Cortez, but also for the vaquita porpoise, the world's most endangered marine mammal. The illegal fishing methods used to catch totoaba, particularly gillnets, also ensnare and kill vaquitas as bycatch. With only a few individuals remaining, the vaquita is on the brink of extinction. The survival of this species is directly linked to the elimination of totoaba poaching and trafficking.

Using the crime script analytical technique, and the meticulously-recorded first-hand investigative materials by Earth League International, this report analyzes the intricacies involved in trafficking totoaba swim bladder from Mexico to international destinations.

Los Angeles: Earth League International (ELI), 2024. 14p.

By Stephen F Pires and Nerea Marteache

Empirical studies on flora poaching are scarce, and the few that exist tend to focus on the study of illegal logging. The goal of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding of the issue of timber theft in protected parks, as well as to identify potential avenues for detection and prevention of this criminal behavior, using the case study of split-rail theft at Humboldt Redwoods State Park in California (USA). We utilize script analysis to offer a detailed description of the crime-commission process and the procedural requirements to carry out this type of crime. To do so, we used a mixed methods design that included incident data collection, field observations, and informal interviews with park rangers. Interventions that could potentially disrupt the chain of events, based on Situational Crime Prevention, are identified, and discussed.

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 36, March 2020, 12p.

By Lauren J. Tanz; Andrea Stewart, R. Matt Gladden,; Jean Y. Ko, Lauren Owens, Julie O’Donnell

During 2023, approximately 72,000, or nearly seven in 10, drug overdose deaths in the United States were estimated to involve illegally manufactured fentanyls (IMFs). Carfentanil, a fentanyl analog 100 times more potent than fentanyl, has reemerged in the U.S. drug supply. Using CDC’s State Unintentional Drug Overdose Reporting System data, this report describes trends in overdose deaths during January 2021– June 2024, overall and with IMFs detected, by U.S. Census Bureau region, and in deaths with carfentanil detected, in 45 states and the District of Columbia (DC). Numbers of deaths with carfentanil detected by state during January 2023–June 2024 in 49 states and DC are also reported. The number of overdose deaths with IMFs detected declined from 2022 to 2023 in the Northeast (3.2% decline), Midwest (7.8%), and South (2.8%) regions; deaths in the West increased 33.9%. The percentage of deaths with IMFs detected was steady at approximately 70%–80% in the Northeast, Midwest, and South. In contrast, the percentage of deaths with IMFs detected in the West increased from 48.5% during January–March 2021 to 66.5% during April–June 2024. Overdose deaths with carfentanil detected increased approximately sevenfold, from 29 during January–June 2023 to 238 during January–June 2024; during January 2023–June 2024, overdose deaths with carfentanil detected were reported in 37 states. Overdose prevention efforts that address the widespread presence of IMFs, including carfentanil, and can rapidly adapt to other potent opioids in the drug supply might result in lasting reductions in overdose deaths across the entire United States

MMWR | December 5, 2024 | Vol. 73 | No. 48, 7p.

By Tami L. Mark; Benjamin D. Huber

IMPORTANCE: Medicaid programs have expanded coverage of substance use disorder treatment and undertaken many other initiatives to reduce drug overdoses among beneficiaries. However, to date, no information has been published that tracks overdose deaths among the Medicaid population. OBJECTIVE To determine the rate of drug overdose among Medicaid beneficiaries. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In this cross-sectional study, US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services data from 2016 to 2020 that linked enrollment and demographic data from all Medicaid beneficiaries in the US with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Death Index were used to determine the rate of drug overdose death among Medicaid beneficiaries. The Medicaid population rates were compared with those of the total US population, overall and by age and sex. EXPOSURE Participation in the Medicaid program. MAIN OUTCOME Death of a drug overdose. RESULTS In 2020, the drug overdose death rate among Medicaid beneficiaries was 54.6 per 100 000, a rate that was twice as high as the drug overdose rate among all US residents (27.9 per 100 000). In 2020, Medicaid beneficiaries comprised 25.0% of the US population but 48% of all overdose deaths (44 277 of 91 783). For each age and sex group older than 15 years, overdose deaths were higher for the Medicaid population than for the US population, with the greatest difference occurring among adults ages 45 to 64 years. From 2016 to 2020, Medicaid overdose deaths increased by 54%. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The results of this study suggest that more research is needed to understand why Medicaid beneficiaries have higher rates of drug overdoses than all US residents. Additionally, research is needed to understand how best to prevent overdoses among Medicaid beneficiaries. The federal government should s

JAMA Health Forum. 2024;5(12):e244365. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2024.4365

By The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Illinois is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico grown marijuana in the state.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 6p.

By The U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Indiana is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (both fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico-grown marijuana in the state. The opioid threat remains dire and is of grave concern.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 7p.

By V. Boilevin, A. Crosta and S.J. Hennige

Demand for totoaba swim bladders has created a transnational illicit supply chain network. Organised crime groups are instru-mental in this process, impacting Mexico at social, environmen-tal, economic, and political levels. There are five main points within the supply chain: the poachers in the Upper Gulf ofCalifornia, the Mexican illegal traders, the Chinese illegal traders in Mexico, illegal traders and retailers in China and Hong Kong,and the consumers and investors located primarily in China.Illegal fishers in Mexico use gillnets to capture totoaba, leadingto bycatch and decline of the critically endangered vaquita.There have been significant conservation efforts by the local and international communities to reduce this bycatch, but these have been unsuccessful in addressing the continued traf-ficking of totoaba and the decline of the vaquita. Here we highlight the complexity of the totoaba supply chain and argue that totoaba illegal trade has to be viewed as organised envi-ronmental crime rather than as a conservation issue. A particu-larly enforceable point in the chain is through the Chineseorganised crime group in Mexico, which is a crucial link toonward trafficking through ports and airports. While recent efforts have been made with regard to totoaba seizures and prosecutions, to dismantle the supply chain, strong transnational collaboration is needed at multiple levels, and in particular between Mexico, the USA, and China.GRAPHICAL

Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, Volume 26, 2023 - Issue 2, 32p.

By Caroline Cox and Luke Hauser

ABSTRACT - The United Kingdom, with the introduction of the Ivory Act2018, is at the forefront of elephant protection, and it is hopedthat governmental commitments, made in the 25 YearEnvironment Plan, will see increased protection for other spe-cies at risk due to the illegal wildlife trade. However, one spe-cies that currently falls outside of the regulation of theConvention on International Trade in Endangered Species ofWild Fauna and Flora (CITES) can be directly linked to the ivorytrade: the mammoth. The woolly mammoth became extinctmore than 10,000 years ago, but the genus Mammuthus, sinceits appearance in Africa c.5 ma, was one of the most successfulmegafaunal groups, radiating into 10 species and found acrossthe Northern Hemisphere from Siberia to Crete. As the worldwarms and the permafrost melts, mammoth tusks are beinguncovered across the Northern Hemisphere, particularly inSiberia’s Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). There are close similaritiesbetween the tusks of elephants and mammoths, leading con-servationists to fear that the increase in “ice ivory” heralds anew threat to elephants and our wider understanding of the“woolly” mammoth and its world.1. IntroductionThere are no accurate figures for the value of the illegal wildlife trade.1In common with other illegal activities, dealers in illegally sourced wildlifeproducts will not exhibit the kinds of behavior associated with legal traders(such as the completion of accurate tax returns).

Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, Volume 26, Issue 1, 2023, 26p.

By Monique C. Sosnowski msosnowski@jjay.cuny.edu, Judith S. Weis, and Gohar A. Petrossian

Imported to adorn tanks of marine aquarium hobbyists, the trade in live corals poses a significant risk to species that concurrently face threats from rising global temperatures, pollution, and destructive fishing practices. To better understand the live coral trade, we employed a crime script framework to analyze the process by which corals are harvested in two of the world’s major exporting countries—Indonesia and Fiji. We demonstrate that coral harvesting and export are complex activities that require a specific set of skills and tools. As such, various intervention strategies are proposed to address illegal coral harvesting at different stages of the crime script.

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice · March 2020, 20p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency UK (EIA UK).

In 2021, EIA’s report Off the Hook – The need for transparency and accountability in tackling wildlife crime advocated for better access to information and justice, stronger anti-corruption measures, increased international collaboration and more frequent evaluations of key indicators to improve transparency and criminal justice in the fight against wildlife crime.

Since then, EIA has continued to campaign for stronger responses to wildlife crime. Our research from 2024 highlights that significant concerns remain regarding transparency, information sharing and criminal justice in the global fight against wildlife crime.

This report is part of EIA’s regular assessment and focuses on four themes, which build upon the findings of the previous report.

London: by the Environmental Investigation Agency UK (EIA UK). 2024.. 22p

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

The global plastic waste trade is an environmental disaster hiding in plain sight, fuelling organised crime, working conditions that amount to human rights violations and devastation to human health and the environment.

The Environmental Investigation Agency’s (EIA’s) second instalment of our two-part Dirty Deals report pulls back the curtain on a system where misdeclared plastic waste, murky supply chains and shadowy brokers thrive, enabling millions of tonnes of waste to be dumped in countries unequipped to handle such huge volumes.

Despite the Basel Convention, which regulates the transboundary movement of hazardous and other wastes, including plastic waste, these illicit operations exploit loopholes and weak enforcement, creating a facade of ‘recycling’ while wreaking havoc on the local communities on which the Global North dumps its waste.

London: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK), 2024. 28p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency UK (EIA)

Five years after EIA first revealed a widespread European illegal trade in hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) climate super pollutant gases, a new investigation has revealed that significant levels of trafficking persist, despite the worsening climate emergency.

Commonly used in refrigeration and air-conditioning, HFCs are being phased out under the European Union (EU) F-gas Regulation. Driven by high profits and weak law enforcement, organised criminals are closely associated with this illicit trade.

EIA’s previous investigation, 2021’s Europe’s Most Chilling Crime, highlighted Romania as a key entry point for illegal HFCs arriving in the EU. In our latest investigation, we uncovered evidence of traders routing illegal HFCs (sourced primarily in Türkiye and China) from Europe’s edge – Bulgaria – across the continent to the likes of Greece, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

The investigation demonstrated that traders are becoming more sophisticated and adapting their tactics to elude detection, for example by avoiding banned disposable cylinders and disguising HFCs as less regulated hydrofluoroolefin (HFO) refrigerant alternatives.

London: by the Environmental Investigation Agency UK (EIA), 2024. 34p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

Your old wheelie bin might be funding organised crime and fuelling environmental injustice and human rights violations around the globe.

In the shadows of the global economy, an ominous trade flourishes. The latest investigation by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) uncovers shocking evidence of how bad actors exploit regulatory weaknesses, legal loopholes and outdated practices in the global plastic waste trade, fuelling a thriving illegal market. This trade, characterised by its complexity and global reach, involves a multitude of actors, regulatory codes, transportation methods and market dynamics that create an ideal environment for illicit activities.

In the first of this two-part report, we reveal the latest scam: exploiting the UK‘s Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) scheme for packaging recycling with discarded wheelie bins. Despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies to track and dismantle illegal operations, the ongoing consequences of illegal trade inflicts devastating harm to human health and the environment.

London: The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK) , 2024. 28p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

Current estimates indicate there are at least 8,900 tigers being held in more than 300 facilities in East and South-East Asia. More than 6,000 of these tigers are located in China, with the remaining animals found almost exclusively in Thailand (approx.1,635), Laos (451) and Vietnam (395).

These numbers are estimates based on the best available information and, particularly in South-East Asia, can rapidly shift. The rate at which tigers are bred, traded from one facility to another and slaughtered for illegal trade is not known but is believed to be high, accounting for the rapid shifts in captive tiger estimates.

Additionally, there are significant concerns around captive tiger facilities and their role in the tiger trade in Myanmar, South Africa and some EU Member States, as well as the large captive tiger population in the United States.

London: by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK) 2024. 16p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

The long-standing illegal trade in substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

As Parties to the Montreal Protocol meet in Bangkok for the 45th Open Ended Working Group, they will also attend a workshop on strengthening the effective implementation and enforcement of the Montreal Protocol.

EIA has produced this briefing describing the long history of the illegal trade of controlled substances under the Montreal Protocol, including CFCs, HCFCs and HFCs.

It examines efforts by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to combat such trade, with consideration of potential next steps to meet the continued and growing challenge of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and HFC climate crime. EIA has been investigating and documenting the illegal trade in ODS since the mid-1990s, providing unprecedented insights into the dynamics of this multi-million dollar environmental crime, including the shifting smuggling routes and methods used to evade detection.

London: The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK) , 2023. 16p.

By The International Council of Shopping Centers

Organized retail crime (ORC) not only harms communities and retail centers but also threatens the safety of consumers and retail workers alike. ORC involves a criminal enterprise employing a group of individuals (2 or more) who steal substantial quantities of merchandise from a retailer. Stores lost $121.6 billion to retail theft in 2023; projections indicate shoplifting could cost retailers over $150 billion in 2026.

Reducing ORC was a major priority for state lawmakers and law enforcement in 2024. Lawmakers in nine states (Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, Vermont and West Virginia) plus D.C., enacted 23 pieces of legislation that targeted different aspects of organized retail crime (ORC). Most of the measures considered by lawmakers addressed one of the following objectives: 1) provide more flexibility for prosecutors to charge offenders with the total value of stolen goods across multiple jurisdictions, 2) increase funding for law enforcement to investigate ORC cases, and 3) enforce tougher punishment for repeat offenders. To date, 17 states have created ORC Task Forces to coordinate activity among law enforcement, prosecutors, and businesses in stopping multi-jurisdictional retail crime rings.

New York: ICSC, 2023, 44p.

By New York City Office of the Mayor

On December 16, 2022, New York City Mayor Eric Adams convened more than 70 stakeholders to collaborate on policy and find creative solutions to address the prevalent increase in retail theft. The summit brought together law enforcement officials, government stakeholders, small business representatives, large retail groups, union leaders, Business Improvement Districts, Chambers of Commerce, and diversion providers with diverse perspectives to discuss a variety of topics, including physical security measures, new diversion programs, leveraging technology to protect businesses and improve citywide responses, and enhancing existing partnerships among private, government, and non-profit sectors. In developing this report, an evidence-based and stakeholder-informed methodology was followed. The Administration analyzed the information shared by the attendees at the summit, conducted independent research and data analysis, and consulted with law enforcement and retail business management. The Administration also conferred closely with New York State Attorney General Letitia James and with the Loss Prevention Research Council to receive additional input and advice on these matters. A draft of this report was then distributed to stakeholders to solicit feedback and, based on the input received, the report was further refined, and the recommendations developed as described herein. The plan outlined in this report identifies recurring problems that plague New York City businesses, which the subsequent list of solutions seeks to address in order to ensure public safety and promote economic growth.

New York: New York City Office of the Mayor, 2023. 33p.