By Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz,  Angela Bruns , Amanda J Aubel , Xiaoya Zhang , Shani A Buggs

Understanding the burden of gun violence among youth is a public health imperative. While most estimates are based on direct and witnessed victimization, living nearby gun violence incidents may be consequential too. Yet detailed information about these broader experiences of violence is lacking. We use data on a population-based cohort of youth merged with incident-level data on deadly gun violence to assess the prevalence and intensity of community exposure to gun homicides across cross-classified categories of exposure distance and recency, overall and by race/ethnicity, household poverty, and neighborhood disadvantage. In total, 2–18% of youth resided within 600 m of a gun homicide occurring in the past 14–365 days. These percentages were 3–25% for incidents within 800 m and 5–37% for those within a 1300-m radius. Black and Latinx youth were 3–7 times more likely, depending on the exposure radius, to experience a past-year gun homicide than white youth and on average experienced incidents more recently and closer to home. Household poverty contributed to exposure inequities, but disproportionate residence in disadvantaged neighborhoods was especially consequential: for all racial/ethnic groups, the difference in the probability of exposure between youth in low vs high poverty households was approximately 5–10 percentage points, while the difference between youth residing in low vs high disadvantage neighborhoods was approximately 50 percentage points. Given well-documented consequences of gun violence exposure on health, these more comprehensive estimates underscore the importance of supportive strategies not only for individual victims but entire communities in the aftermath of gun violence.

J Urban Health, 2022 Jun 7, 16p.

By CSE Aware

  The United Nations and other experts have highlighted that women with learning disabilities (LDs) are at higher risk of experiencing gender-based violence (GBV) because of the lifelong isolation, dependency and oppression they often they experience. These inequalities also put them at risk of commercial sexual exploitation (CSE). Despite global recognition of these impacts, in Scotland to date there is very limited evidence and information on how commercial sexual exploitation affects women with learning disabilities. In the recent report Unequal, Unheard, Unjust: But not Hidden Anymore,the Scottish Commission forPeoplewithLearningDisabilities (SCLD) highlighted SEason of the types of GBV women with learning disabilities experienced. What’s more, this groundbreaking report specifically recommended that the Scottish Government “commission national research examining the commercial sexual exploitation of women with learning disabilities in Scotland,” noting the lack of documented information. While some information does exist about learning disabled women’s experiences of selling or exchanging sex, it is mostly anecdotal and has not been documented nor analysed to truly understand the effects on this population and the effectiveness of, andgaps in, service responses.The present report was born from therecognition that there is a significant knowledge gap on the issue of CSE and its intersection with this particularly vulnerable group of women. Whilst the present report is not the much needed full-scale research which SCLD and ourselves are calling for (see recommendations), it does provide initial findings and recommendations from the exploratory researchweconductedoverthecourseofthreemonths. The Aims Of This research were to: Collect and document evidence of learningisabledwomen’sexperiencesof sellingorexchangingsex. Understandthedynamicsofwomen’s involvement and their specific needs. Explore service responses and challenges and opportunities when addressing women's experiences and needs. Produce Initial Recommendations thattheScottishGovernment and organisations canuseas abasis to design service and policy responses that meet theneeds women with LDs impacted byCSE.

Glasgow: CSE, 3035. 32p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown 

Over the past several decades, the U.S. opioid epidemic has spanned four phases:  Oversupply of prescription opioids in the 1990s.. A significant increase in heroin supply and use in the 2000s.  A supply-driven explosion of fentanyl use after 2012.  Most recently, polydrug use, with fentanyl mixed into/with all kinds of drugs. Since fentanyl entered the U.S. illegal drug market, more than a million people in the United States have died of opioid overdose. The costs of fentanyl use go beyond the tragic deaths and drug-use-related morbidity, however. In addition to having significant implications for public health and the economy, the fentanyl crisis intersects in many ways with U.S. foreign policy. U.S. overdose deaths began declining in 2023. But there is little certainty as to which domestic or foreign-policy interventions have been crucial drivers. The wider availability of overdose-reversal medication is fundamental, as is expanded access to evidence-based treatment. It is also possible that the Biden administration’s actions toward international supply from Mexico and China are contributing to this reduction in overdose deaths: since the start of 2024, China has become more active in suppressing the flow of precursor chemicals, and Mexican cartels, perhaps purposefully, are now trafficking a less lethal version of fentanyl. A wide array of policy measures as well as structural factors outside of policy control could be cumulatively and interactively reducing mortality. The fact that the declines in mortality are not uniform across U.S. ethnic, racial, and social groups or geographic areas suggests the importance of access to medication for overdose reversal and the treatment of opioid use disorder, as well as the influence of structural factors. There is strong bipartisan support for preserving access to medication-based treatments. But crucially, access depends on medical insurance coverage, such as that provided through Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act. There are strong ideological divides about the financing and structure of the U.S. insurance industry as well as other aspects of drug policy. On February 1, President Donald Trump imposed a 25% tariff on imports from Mexico and Canada and a 10% tariff on imports from China until each country stops the flow of fentanyl (as well as migrants, in the cases of Mexico and Canada).1 He gave all three countries a month-long reprieve before implementing the tariffs in March to see if they satisfied his counternarcotics demands. Canada adopted a robust package of anti-fentanyl measures. Mexico too tried to appease the United States through a set of law enforcement actions, though it held out on perhaps the most important form of cooperation—expanding the presence and mandates of U.S. law enforcement agents in Mexico to levels at least approaching those enjoyed during the Felipe Calderón administration. Unlike Mexico or Canada, China did not take any further counternarcotics actions and instead responded with counter-tariffs of its own, even as Trump threatened to add additional tariffs on imports from China of up to 60%.2 On March 4, 2025, Trump dismissed Canada’s and Mexico’s law enforcement actions as inadequate, implementing the 25% tariffs. He also added an additional 10% tariff on China, meaning the second Trump administration has now placed a 20% tariff on Chinese goods.3 Apart from increasing the cost of goods for U.S. customers and driving up inflation, these tariffs will have complex effects on anti-fentanyl cooperation. Any large U.S. tariffs on China will likely eviscerate Beijing’s cooperation with the United States, resetting the diplomatic clock  back to the bargaining of 2018 and noncooperation of 2021-2023. As crucial as it is to induce the government of Mexico to start robustly and systematically acting against Mexican criminal groups, whose power has grown enormously and threatens the Mexican state, Mexican society, and U.S. interests, Mexico has no capacity to halt the flow of fentanyl. Mixing the issues of migration and fentanyl risks Mexico appeasing the United States principally on migration while placating it with inadequate anti-fentanyl actions. Further, U.S. military action in Mexico, which has been threatened by Republican politicians close to Trump, would yield no sustained weakening of Mexican criminal groups or fentanyl flows. It would, however, poison the political atmosphere in Mexico and hinder its meaningful cooperation with the United States. Strong law enforcement cooperation with Canada is crucial. Canada has been facing law enforcement challenges, such as the expansion of Mexican and Asian organized crime groups and money laundering operations in Canada. But disregarding the domestic and collaborative law enforcement efforts Canada has put on the table is capricious. At home, Trump’s favored approach, which renews focus on imprisoning users and drug dealers, and dramatically toughening penalties for the latter, would be ineffective and counterproductive. And while providing treatment is very important, the dramatic effect of treatment modality on effectiveness cannot be overlooked. Approaches to treatment should be designed based on evidence, not ideology.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2025. 49p.

 By The United States Sentencing Commission

  More than 780,000 Americans died from a drug overdose in the last ten years. Overdose deaths have increased more than 300 percent from the level two decades ago. The number of such deaths has continued to increase in recent years, with the Centers for Disease Control reporting that 91,799 people died of drug overdoses in 2020, 106,699 in 2021, 107,941 in 2022, and 105,007 in 2023. Provisional data shows a recent decline in overdose deaths beginning in late 2023 and continuing into 2024. Overdoses remain one of the leading causes of deaths in adults in the United States. While fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin are the drugs most often involved in these deaths, synthetic opioids like fentanyl— which is up to 50 times more potent than heroin—contribute to nearly 70 percent of overdose deaths. In this report, the Commission examines all overdoses identified in drug trafficking cases reported to the Commission for fiscal years 2019 to 2023. One or more deaths occurred in more than three-quarters of these cases, while no deaths occurred in the remaining cases. The Commission is able to collect information about the overdoses reported in these cases through the sentencing documents the courts provide to the Commission in every case.8 Using that information, this report provides an analysis of the 1,340 individuals sentenced for a federal drug trafficking offense involving an overdose in fiscal years 2019 to 2023. In it, the Commission analyzes the demographic characteristics of these individuals, the offense conduct that occurred in the case, and how the courts sentenced these individuals—including the application of sentencing guideline provisions that provide for heightened base offense levels when the offense of conviction established that death or serious bodily injury resulting from an overdose occurred, or departures from the guideline range for death or physical injury, or how often courts varied from the guideline range for a similar reason. Additionally, in this report, the Commission provides the results of a special data collection project to explore the outcome of each overdose, the type of drug involved in the overdose, the victim’s knowledge of the drug they were taking, and the sentenced individual’s conduct during the offense.  

Washington, DC, USSC, 2025.   52p.

By Sasha Murray,  Sarah Welland, Madeleine Storry

For victims who have experienced a serious criminal offence in England and Wales, the Crown Court is a vital part of their journey to receive justice. This is where jury trials are conducted to reach a verdict on whether the defendant is guilty of the crime or not. This report comes following a record number of outstanding cases at the Crown Courts in England and Wales. 2 At the end of September 2024, 73,105 cases were outstanding and almost a quarter (23%) of these had been outstanding at the Crown Court for over a year and 8% had been outstanding for over two years. This is a considerable increase since the end of March 2020, when just 7% of cases were outstanding for over a year and 2% of cases were outstanding for over two years. 3 This means an increasing number of victims are waiting extended lengths of time for justice. This report explores how these unprecedented delays in the Crown Court system impact on victims of crime, victims’ services, and the wider criminal justice system. The findings are based on primary research conducted by the Office of the Victims’ Commissioner in 2024, including a survey and interviews with victims and a survey with victim services staff. Based on these findings, the Victims’ Commissioner makes key, actionable recommendations for justice agencies and policy makers to consider. About the research This report aims to: • Understand the experiences of victims of all crime types who are navigating the Crown Court system in England and Wales amidst a record backlog. • Identify the impact of the Crown Court backlog on victims, the criminal justice system and victim services. • Understand victims’ experiences of support and communication whilst navigating the Crown Court backlog. Findings from the research The Crown Court system is experiencing an unprecedented backlog meaning victims commonly face delays and adjournments. • In the latest official statistics, a quarter of trials listed at the Crown Court had to be rearranged on the day of trial. • Further data, provided by HMCTS, showed that the number of completed Crown Court cases that had been rearranged more than three times on the day of trial, was four times higher in 2023/24 than it was in 2019/20. 4 • In our research, we found that of those victims who had been given a trial date, nearly half (48%) had this date changed at some point in their criminal justice journey and 26% of these victims had the date changed four or more times. For  victims often navigating the criminal justice system for the first time, this worsened an already stressful and traumatic process. The delays in the Crown Court cause debilitating stress and trauma for victims. • Our research highlighted how the Crown Court backlog caused immense stress for victims, prompting a deterioration in physical and mental health. Some victims resorted to drug and alcohol use or self-harm to cope, while other victims reported attempting suicide as it was too difficult to continue. • We found that while victims were still involved in the criminal justice process, they were unable to move on and prevented from recovering from the crime. • Additionally, when victims experienced repeated adjournments, the emotional distress and the necessity to re-live the trauma for each additional listing further exacerbated their trauma. The Crown Court backlog damages victims’ lives and futures. • We found that whilst enduring the prolonged waits for Crown Court trials, many victims were unable to maintain their daily functioning. Their lives were subsequently further disrupted by repeated adjournments. • Our findings also highlighted the impact of the Crown Court delays on victims’ employment. Victims often had to take periods of time off work for each trial listing, and some were unable to work or were signed off sick due to the stress of the delays. This had significant financial implications for some victims, particularly those who were self-employed. • The delays also adversely affected younger victims, as it disrupted their education and put their lives on hold during significant periods of their development. Our findings also highlighted the impact on victims’ interpersonal relationships. The turmoil of the Crown Court delays sometimes led to relationship breakdowns, at a time when a victim’s support network was vital. • We also heard how the delays in the Crown Court system impacted on other legal processes. For example, delays to trials concluding caused issues with Family Court proceedings, applications to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) and eviction orders. The effectiveness of the criminal justice system and victims’ confidence in its ability to deliver justice is at risk due to the delays in the Crown Court system. • Our findings highlighted how increased waiting time for trials heightened the risk of victims’ memories fading and therefore, the quality of their evidence diminishing. • The increased waits also meant supportive prosecution witnesses became more likely to withdraw. • In addition, victims’ faith and trust in the criminal justice system was damaged, leading to disengagement from with the criminal justice process and in many cases, an entire withdrawal. • Where victims persevered with the criminal justice process, they often felt justice did not prevail. We were informed of cases where the time taken for the trial to take place meant the defendants’ sentence had already been served, either on remand or through bail conditions. We were also told of instances where the Crown Prosecution Service had dropped charges due to cases no longer being in the public interest and where defendants had died before the trial could take place. • For many victims, their experiences of the Crown Court backlog left them unwilling to engage with the criminal justice system in the future. High-quality support helps victims to stay engaged with the criminal justice process amidst the Crown Court delays, however the delays impede support organisations’ ability to provide this support. • Despite support being vital for their engagement, we found that for some victims, the delays prevented them accessing support. Some rape and sexual offence victims were advised not to seek therapy until after trial. However, the delays in cases coming to court resulted in long periods without support, further delaying their recovery. • We also found that the delays led to an increased demand for support services. This was due to an increased number of victims waiting for court and increased victim support needs due to the impact of the Crown Court delays. Many staff reported unsustainable caseloads and many support services had to implement waiting lists. Many services also raised concerns about the quality and consistency of support provision being compromised as a result of the overwhelming demand. • Our research highlighted the negative impact of the Crown Court backlogs on the wellbeing and job satisfaction of support staff, with some at risk of burnout and leaving their roles. This further exacerbated issues with support accessibility, quality, and consistency. Poor communication compounds the impact of the Crown Court backlog on victims. • Our research highlighted that poor initial expectation management of how long a case can take to get to trial and a lack of communication whilst victims waited for trial worsened victims’ experiences. • We also found that many victims experienced trials being adjourned at very short notice and with minimal or no explanation. This added to the emotional distress they experienced navigating an already challenging process. Key recommendations This report contains 19 recommendations that are grouped into three overarching aims. We have identified a key recommendation for change to help achieve each of these aims: 1. Improve the victim experience of the criminal justice system. o The government to explore how victims whose case is going to trial might be given a single point of contact to improve communication and ensure their Victims’ Code entitlements are delivered. 2. Make court processes more transparent and efficient. o The restoration of an Independent Courts’ Inspectorate so that the operation of the Court Service is subject to rigorous independent scrutiny. 3. Ensure victim services can provide support to victims as they wait for the case to get to trial. o Providing emergency funding to victim support services to help them cope with increased caseloads arising from the court backlog crisis.  

London: Victims Commissioner, 2025. 73p.

By Jamie MacColl, James Sullivan, Jason R C Nurse, Sarah Turner, Gareth Mott, Edward Cartwright and Anna Cartwright  

The cyber insurance industry has been heavily criticised for providing coverage for ransom payments. A frequent accusation, which has become close to perceived wisdom in policymaking and cyber security discussions on ransomware, is that cyber insurance has incentivised victims to pay a ransom following a cyber incident, rather than seek alternative remediation options. Over a 12-month research project, researchers from RUSI, the University of Kent, De Montfort University and Oxford Brookes University conducted a series of expert interviews and workshops to explore the relationship between cyber insurance and ransomware in depth. This paper argues that there is, in fact, no compelling evidence that victims with cyber insurance are much more likely to pay ransoms than those without. Ransomware remains one of the most persistent cyber threats facing the UK. Despite a range of government, law enforcement and even military cyber unit initiatives, ransomware remains lucrative for criminals. During this research, we identified three main drivers that ensure its continued success: 1. A profitable business model that continues to find innovative ways to extort victims. 2. Challenges around securing organisations of all sizes. 3. The low costs and risks for cybercriminals involved in the ransomware ecosystem, both in terms of the barriers to entry and the prospect of punishment. Despite this perfect storm of factors, the cyber insurance industry has been singled out for criticism with the claim that it is funding organised cybercrime by covering ransom payments. In reality, cyber insurance’s influence on victim decision-making is considerably more nuanced than the public debate has captured so far. While there is evidence that cyber insurance policies exfiltrated during attacks are used as leverage in negotiations and to set higher ransom demands, the conclusion that ransomware operators are deliberately targeting organisations with insurance has been overstated. However, the insurance industry could do much more to instil discipline in both insureds and the ransomware response ecosystem in relation to ransom payments to reduce cybercriminals’ profits. Insurers’ role as convenors of incident response services gives them considerable power to reward firms that drive best practices and only guide victims towards payment as a last resort. But the lack of clearly defined negotiation protocols and the challenges around learning from incidents make it difficult to develop a sense of collective responsibility and shared best  practices around ransomware response. This has not been helped by the UK government’s black-and-white position on ransom payments, which has created a vacuum of assurance and advice on best practices for ransom negotiations and payments. This paper does not advocate for an outright ban on ransom payments or for stopping insurers from providing coverage for them. Instead, it makes the case for interventions that would improve market-wide ransom discipline so that fewer victims pay ransoms, or pay lower demands. Ultimately, this involves creating more pathways for victims that do not result in ransom payments. Beyond ransom payments, cyber insurance has a growing role in raising cyber security standards, which could make it more difficult to successfully compromise victims and increase costs for ransomware operators. Successive years of losses from ransomware have led to more stringent security requirements and risk selection by underwriters. Although the overall effect of this on the frequency and severity of ransomware attacks remains to be seen, by linking improvements in security practices to coverage, cyber insurance is currently one of the few market-based levers for incentivising organisations to implement security controls and resilience measures. However, continued challenges around collecting and assessing reliable cyber risk and forensic claims data continue to place limits on the market’s effectiveness as a mechanism for reducing ransomware risk. This, along with cyber insurance’s low market penetration, makes clear that cyber insurance should not be treated as a substitute for the legislation and regulation required to improve minimum cyber security standards and resilience. Insurers are also commercial entities that primarily exist to help organisations transfer risk, rather than to improve national security and societal cyber resilience. The cyber insurance industry could be a valuable partner for the UK government through increased ransomware attack and payment reporting, sharing aggregated claims data, and distributing National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) guidance and intelligence to organisations. However, the government has not made a compelling enough case to insurers and insureds about the benefits of doing so. Instead, it has relied on appealing to their general sense of altruism. While insurers will benefit if governments are able to generate more accurate and actionable data on ransomware, albeit indirectly, this needs to be sold to the industry in a more convincing way. Some principles and recommendations for both the insurance industry and the UK government are listed below. These are not designed to solve all the challenges of the cyber insurance market, nor do they present wide-ranging solutions to the ransomware challenge. Instead, they focus on where the cyber insurance industry can have the most impact on key ransomware drivers. This reflects the fact that disrupting the ransomware economy involves applying pressure from different angles in a whole-of-society approach. The recommendations also start from the position that the UK government’s light-touch approach is unsustainable and requires more intervention in private markets that are involved in ransomware prevention and response. While they are specifically aimed at UK policymakers, regulators and insurers, they may be applicable to other national contexts     

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2023.  84p.

By Jamie MacColl, Jason R C Nurse and James Sullivan 

  GOVERNMENTS AND BUSINESSES are struggling to cope with the scale and complexity of managing cyber risk. Over the last year, remote working, rapid digitalisation and the need for increased connectivity have emphasised the cyber security challenge. As the pursuit of approaches to prevent, mitigate and recover from malicious cyber activity has progressed, one tool that has gained traction is cyber insurance. If it can follow the path of other insurance classes, it could play a significant role in managing digital risk. This paper explores whether cyber insurance can incentivise better cyber security practices among policyholders. It finds that the shortcomings of cyber insurance mean that its contribution to improving cyber security practices is more limited than policymakers and businesses might hope. Although several means by which cyber insurance can incentivise better cyber security practices are identified, they have significant limitations. Interviewees from across government, industry and business consistently stated that the positive effects of cyber insurance on cyber security have yet to fully materialise. While some mature insurers are moving in the right direction, cyber insurance as a whole is still struggling to move from theory into practice when it comes to incentivising cyber security. If this is to change, the insurance industry must overcome significant challenges. One is the competitiveness of the nascent cyber insurance market over the last two decades. Most of the market has used neither carrots (financial incentives) nor sticks (security obligations) to improve the cyber security practices of policyholders. The industry is also struggling to collect and share reliable cyber risk data that can inform underwriting and risk modelling. The difficulties inherent in understanding cyber risk, which is anthropogenic and systemic, mean insurers and reinsurers are unable to accurately quantify its causes and effects. This limits insurers’ ability to accurately assess an organisation’s risk profile or security practices and price policy premiums accordingly. The spectre of systemic incidents such as NotPetya1 and SolarWinds2 has also limited the availability of capital for cyber insurance markets. However, the most pressing challenge currently facing the industry is ransomware. Although it is a societal problem, cyber insurers have received considerable criticism for facilitating ransom payments to cybercriminals. These add fuel to the fire by incentivising cybercriminals’ engagement in ransomware operations and enabling existing operators to invest in and expand their capabilities. Growing losses from ransomware attacks have also emphasised that the current reality is not sustainable for insurers either.

To overcome these challenges and champion the positive effects of cyber insurance, this paper calls for a series of interventions from government and industry. Some in the industry favour allowing the market to mature on its own, but it will not be possible to rely on changing market forces alone. To date, the UK government has taken a light-touch approach to the cyber insurance industry. With the market undergoing changes amid growing losses, more coordinated action by government and regulators is necessary to help the industry reach its full potential. The interventions recommended here are still relatively light, and reflect the fact that cyber insurance is only a potential incentive for managing societal cyber risk. They include: developing guidance for minimum security standards for underwriting; expanding data collection and data sharing; mandating cyber insurance for government suppliers; and creating a new collaborative approach between insurers and intelligence and law enforcement agencies around ransomware. Finally, although a well-functioning cyber insurance industry could improve cyber security practices on a societal scale, it is not a silver bullet for the cyber security challenge. It is important to remember that the primary purpose of cyber insurance is not to improve cyber security, but to transfer residual risk. As such, it should be one of many tools that governments and businesses can draw on to manage cyber risk more effectively.   

RUSI Occasional Paper, June 2021, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies , 2021. 68p.

By Greg Hannah, Caroline Harper, Heather James and Grace Whitehead, under the direction of Oliver Lodge.

 Definitions of the term ‘violence against women and girls’ (VAWG) vary, but the government defines it as “acts of violence or abuse that we know disproportionately affect women and girls”. It covers crimes including rape and other sexual offences, stalking, domestic abuse, ‘honour’-based abuse (including female genital mutilation, forced marriage and ‘honour’ killings), ‘revenge porn’ and ‘upskirting’.  Over one in four women are estimated to be victims of sexual assault or attempted assault in their lifetime, and one in 12 women are victims of VAWG each year, although the actual number is likely to be much higher. The National Police Chiefs’ Council reported that, in 2022-23, 20% of all police-recorded crime was related to violence against women and girls. The victim was female in 86% of all police-recorded sexual offences in the year to March 2022. In the year ending December 2023, over 97% (23,723) of people convicted of sexual offences were male, and crimes are often committed by someone known to the victim. 3 Violence against women and girls can have long-term impacts on victims, affecting them physically, mentally, socially and financially. It is estimated that the economic and social cost of domestic abuse could be as high as £84 billion. The Home Office last estimated the societal cost of rape cases in 2018, based on 2015-16 data, when it estimated that the 122,000 rape cases reported that year could have a societal cost of around £4.8 billion.  In 2021, the then government introduced its strategy, “Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls” (the VAWG Strategy), which outlined a series of commitments focused on: • prevention – to deliver long-term cultural and societal change; • supporting victims – to increase support for victims and survivors including providing support services that are run by and for the communities they serve; • pursuing perpetrators – to transform the criminal justice response to ensure all perpetrators of offences against women are brought to justice; and • building a stronger system – working with multiple government departments to develop a joined-up system across health, justice, law enforcement, housing, social care and education. In 2021, the Domestic Abuse Act received Royal Assent, and in 2022 the Home Office published a separate “Tackling Domestic Abuse” Plan (the Domestic Abuse Plan)   The Home Office leads on the government’s response to tackling VAWG, including domestic abuse. However, achieving progress requires the commitment of multiple government departments. There are important roles for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Ministry of Justice and other parts of the criminal justice system, the Department for Education and NHS England in, for example, identifying victims and supporting them to feel safe, educating young people in safe relationships and ensuring justice through the courts and prison systems.  The new government has committed to halve the prevalence of VAWG within a decade as part of its ‘mission’ to make streets safer. The Home Office will lead this mission and is developing a new VAWG strategy. In this report, we have examined the Home Office’s leadership of the 2021 “Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls” Strategy (the VAWG Strategy) and the 2022 “Tackling Domestic Abuse Plan” (the Domestic Abuse Plan), to identify lessons to support the delivery of the government’s ambition to halve violence against women and girls. Key Findings Progress against the 2021 strategy  Violence against women and girls is a serious and growing problem. In 2023-24 the prevalence of sexual assault against women aged 16 to 59 in England and Wales (the percentage of the population estimated to have suffered a sexual assault each year) was higher than in 2009-10 (4.3% and 3.4% respectively). Conversely, the prevalence of domestic abuse against women was lower (9.2% and 7.4% respectively). Over the same period incidents of rape and sexual assault against women and girls recorded by police have increased almost fourfold, from 34,000 to 123,000, although this can in part be explained by improved recording of these crimes. The societal landscape against which these crimes are committed has also become increasingly complex and in recent years online harms (such as revenge porn) have been recognised as crimes in themselves (paragraphs 1.2, 1.4, 1.7 to 1.9 and Figures 1 and 2). 8 To date, the Home Office has not led an effective whole-system response. Successfully addressing the harms caused by VAWG requires the coordinated effort and commitment of many government departments. But the cross-departmental governance in place did not ensure all departments were prioritising the VAWG Strategy’s aims and were pulling in the same direction. The Home Office created a dedicated team to lead the VAWG Strategy, but it has found it challenging to get buy-in from other government departments. The Home Office’s Officials’ oversight group, established to progress the Strategy, did not meet until a year after the VAWG Strategy’s launch. The Home Office has since revised its governance, which has been welcomed by some departments. While strong ministerial support can encourage cross-government working, the Ministerial oversight group for the VAWG Strategy only met four times in three years (paragraphs 1.10, 3.4 to 3.8). 9 The Home Office has not had a full understanding of the scale of resources committed to tackling VAWG across government, limiting its ability to prioritise efforts. As the lead department for tackling VAWG, the Home Office needs to understand the capacity and resources other bodies are committing to the VAWG Strategy so it can effectively coordinate and oversee their work. The Home Office has not centrally coordinated funding for VAWG across government and, in contrast with the 2021 illegal drugs strategy, the relevant departments did not prepare a joint spending review bid during the period of implementing the VAWG Strategy. Our analysis suggests other government departments spent at least £979 million between 2021-22 and 2023-24. The Home Office has historically underspent its own budget allocated to the VAWG Strategy, by an average of 15% between 2021-22 and 2023-24 (paragraphs 2.5 to 2.9 and Figure 7).  The lack of a consistent definition for VAWG across public bodies and their approaches to measuring the scale of VAWG crimes has made it difficult to measure progress in a consistent way. The Home Office’s definition of VAWG includes all victims, across all ages and genders, whereas police forces only include women and girls. The Home Office told us it uses estimates from the Crime Survey for England and Wales to measure prevalence, which does not include children under the age of 16, even though they are included in the Strategy. The Home Office does not consider police-recorded crime an accurate indicator of the prevalence of VAWG, since it is likely to under-report crimes: the police only record one crime per victim/perpetrator relationship, even where multiple VAWG crimes are committed. This, in addition to gaps in data for some VAWG crime types such as ‘honour’-based abuse, limits the data available to measure progress. A consistent definition and approach to measuring the scale of VAWG crimes across all of government and policing would help to create a better shared understanding of the scale of the challenge the government is trying to address (paragraphs 3.16 to 3.21 and Figure 12).  

London: National Audit Office, 2025. 69p.

By Rima Ah Toong, Shelby Grauer, Katherine Tallan

  The Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has administered the Illegal Marijuana Market Enforcement Grant since 2018 and is required to issue an annual report concerning the status and effectiveness of the program and to provide future funding recommendations to the Oregon Legislature (legislature). The Legislature funds this grant program with $6 million on a biennial basis. In response to a sharp increase in reports of unaddressed illegal grow sites and associated worker abuse in 2021 and 2022, the Legislature infused the grant program with an additional $26 million in emergency one-time funding, which the CJC awarded to grantees in 2022. In 2023, the legislature supplemented the $6 million in base funding with an additional $5 million, for a total of $11 million in biennial funds that will be awarded through a competitive grant solicitation process in 2024. This report examines the status of the grant program and grantee expenditures from 2021 to 2023. The CJC, with input from grantees, other agencies, and interested parties, also changed its program data reporting structure, in 2022, to better gauge the problems being addressed with these grant funds. Described in this report, among other things, are the following findings: • Since April 1, 2022, grant-funded law enforcement operations reported 424 illegal cannabis incidents, occurring in 96 unique zip codes. • Eleven zip codes saw 10 or more incidents involving grant-funded law enforcement activities during the reporting period. The zip codes experiencing the highest number of incidents were 97523 (the greater Cave Junction area, with 35 incidents) and 97526 (Grants Pass and areas north, with 17 incidents). • The number of incidents in which law enforcement observed or suspected labor trafficking and/or worker abuse decreased from 39 (20 percent) in 2022 to eight (3.5 percent) in 2023. However, the number of survivors of human trafficking served by grant funded community-based organizations (CBOs) increased from 100 to 344 during the same time period. • Survivors served by CBO grantees were primarily male (41.4 percent), Hispanic (48.9 percent), and ages 18-35 (28.8 percent). The majority received legal assistance (63.5 percent) and/or referrals to other needed crisis or long-term support services (56.8 percent). • Grantees reported that the 424 incidents resulted in 184 felony case filings in Oregon circuit courts. • Of the 424 reported incidents, 54.2 percent involved a land, natural resource, or civil code violation. • Law enforcement grantees seized approximately 1.8 million illegal cannabis plants and 351,781 pounds of illegal processed cannabis, as well as other illegal narcotics and substances, firearms, and equipment used to operate illegal grows off-grid. Based on the best available information, the projected cost for e  

Salem, OR: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. 2024. 31p.

By Eurojust and Europol

This report is a collaborative effort between Eurojust and Europol that addresses persistent and emerging challenges in cybercrime and investigations involving digital evidence. Key challenges include management of massive volumes of data, legal uncertainties following the invalidation of the Data Retention Directive, and technologies that create barriers to accessing data.

Just like in the previous edition, this 2024 review identifies and categorises challenges from both the law enforcement and judicial perspectives. However, this report includes a second part focusing on legislative tools that could alleviate those challenges and their practical application.

Europol, 2025. 18p

By Thorn in partnership with Burson Insights, Data & Intelligence 

Since 2019, Thorn has focused on amplifying youth voices to better understand their digital lives, with particular attention to how they encounter and navigate technologyfacilitated forms of sexual abuse and exploitation. Previous youth-centered research has explored topics such as child sexual abuse material (CSAM)1 —including that which is self-generated (“SG-CSAM”)—nonconsensual resharing, online grooming, and the barriers young people face in disclosing or reporting negative experiences. Thorn’s Emerging Threats to Young People research series aims to examine emergent online risks to better understand how current technologies create and/or exacerbate child safety vulnerabilities and identify areas where solutions are needed. This report, the first in the series, sheds light specifically on young people’s perceptions of and experiences with deepfake nudes. Future reports in this initiative will address other pressing issues, including sextortion and online solicitations. Drawing on responses from a survey of 1,200 young people aged 13-20, this report explores their awareness of deepfake nudes, lived experiences with them, and their involvement in creating such content. Three key findings emerged from this researc.  1. Young people overwhelmingly recognize deepfake nudes as a form of technology-facilitated abuse that harms the person depicted. Eighty-four percent of those surveyed believe that deepfake nudes cause harm, attributing this largely to the emotional and psychological impacts on victims, the potential for reputational damage, and the increasingly photorealistic quality of the imagery, which leads viewers to perceive—and consume—it as authentic. 2. Deepfake nudes already represent real experiences that young people have to navigate. Not only are many young people familiar with the concept, but a significant number report personal connections to this harm—either knowing someone targeted or experiencing it themselves. Forty-one percent of young people surveyed indicated they had heard the term “deepfake nudes,” including 1 in 3 (31%) teens. Additionally, among teens, 1 in 10 (10%) reported personally knowing someone who had deepfake nude imagery created of them, and 1 in 17 (6%) disclosed having been a direct victim of this form of abuse. 3. Among the limited sample of young people who admit to creating deepfake nudes of others, they describe easy access to deepfake technologies. Creators described access to the technologies through their devices’ app stores and accessibility via general search engines and social media 

El Segundo, CA  Thorn, 2025. 32p.

By Anne Summers, Thomas Shortridge, Kristen Sobeck

Whichever way you look at it, many women are paying a huge economic price in addition to the physical, emotional and psychological damage done to them by domestic violence. It is no accident that employment and education – the pathway to better employment – are targeted by perpetrators as a prime means of depleting or even destroying women’s ability to be financially self-sufficient.

The data used in this report enables the authors, for the first time, to quantify the economic impact of domestic violence on Australian women. The report sets out in detail how large numbers of women have not attained a degree, have left the labour force, have reduced their working hours, or have taken time off work– all because of domestic violence.

The authors identify changes that need to be made across the following areas: paid domestic violence leave policie tthe operation of paid domestic violence leave multiple avenues of support are needed support to (re-)enter employment the Leaving Violence Program.

Sydney: University of Technology Sydney 2025. 52p.

By Gustavo J. Bobonis and Anke Kessler

To what extent can anti-corruption measures serve to limit patronage and corrupt networks effectively and sustainably in clientelist societies with a prevailing norm of corruption? We develop a political agency model in which office holders are motivated to reduce rent seeking behavior through re-election incentives operating via elections and audits (formal institutions), but also through reputational or self-image concerns that are influenced by the prevailing norm on corruption in their peer group (informal institutions). We show that, while the formal institutions of audits and elections have the desired direct effect of reducing corruption, they also affect informal rules of conduct, which can have unintended effects. In particular, in clientelist societies with high levels of corruption, the social concerns work in opposition to formal incentives provided by anti-corruption efforts. Applying the theory to data from Puerto Rico’s anti-corruption municipal audits program, we find evidence consistent with the idea that anticorruption measures are less effective due to social spillovers.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11715, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, 2025.

By Dan Werb, dwerb@health.u HaeSeung Sung ∙ Yingbo Naa ∙ Indhu Rammohana ∙ Jolene Eeuwesa ∙ Ashly Smoke∙  Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, Thomas Kerr,g, and Mohammad Karamouzian

  Background Supervised consumption services (SCS) are effective at preventing overdose mortality. However, their effect on public safety remains contested. We investigated homicide rates in areas near SCS in Toronto. Methods We classified coroner-reported fatal shootings and stabbings (January 1st, 2010 to September 30th 2023) by geographic zone: within 500 m (‘near’), between 500 m and 3 km (‘far’), and beyond 3 km of an SCS (‘out’). We then used Poisson regression to calculate the rate ratio (RR) across zones 18, 36, 48, and 60 months pre vs. post SCS implementation. Finally, we compared spatial homicide incidence prior to and after the date of the implementation of each SCS using interrupted time series (ITS). Findings Overall, 956 homicides occurred, and 590 (62%) were fatal shootings and stabbings. There was no meaningful change in the rate of fatal shootings and stabbings within 3 kms of SCS (near and far zones) after their implementation. However, between 48 and 60 months pos-implementation, we detected an increase in out zones. In an ITS analysis, we observed a reduction in the monthly incidence in near zones and an increase in out zones. Interpretation SCS implementation was not associated with increased homicide rates; instead, we observed a reduction in monthly incidence near SCS. These results may inform drug market activity responses that optimize community health and safety.

The Lancet Regional Health – Americas, Volume 43, 2025. 101022

By European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, FRA; European Institute for Gender Equality

  This report presents, for the first time, selected key results of the EU gender-based violence survey based on data from all 27 Member States. Across the EU-27, 114 023 women were interviewed about their experiences. The report focuses on the prevalence of various forms of violence against women in the EU. The EU gender-based violence survey also collected specific data about women’s experiences of violence, including on the consequences of violence and contacts with different services that provide assistance to victims, as survivors of violence. Data on both the prevalence of violence and the consequences of violence will be analysed in detail in the survey report that Eurostat, FRA and EIGE will publish in 2025. In this report, the results are presented in four chapters, starting with the overall prevalence of physical violence or threats and/or sexual violence by any perpetrator. This is followed by two chapters that focus on violence perpetrated by women’s intimate partners and by other people (non-partners). The fourth chapter examines women’s experiences of sexual harassment at work. Finally, the report includes an annex that summarises the survey data collection methodology  

Vienna: FRA 2024. 48p.

By The  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights = FRA

This paper sets out some of the key challenges and concrete solutions in the implementation and enjoyment of victims’ rights that have emerged from FRA’s research over the past decade on how victims of crime have accessed their rights in practice across the EU. The findings are intended to inform and support the work of key stakeholders with respect to the revised Victims’ Rights Directive and related legislative files that address various victims’ rights. Those include the Directive on combatting violence against women and domestic violence, the Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protection of its victims, the Directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, the Directive on combatting terrorism, and the Compensation Directive.

Based on existing FRA data, the paper brings together key findings from FRA’s quantitative and qualitative research on victims of crime relating to three areas:

• Reporting crime

• Protection from secondary victimisation

• Victim support services.

The paper highlights challenges and solutions in each of these areas, drawing directly from FRA’s published work.

Empirical evidence concerning victims’ enjoyment of their rights in practice, and the challenges they face, emerges from data that FRA has gathered using a variety of methodologies; namely:

1. Large-scale quantitative surveys collecting data from tens of thousands of victims (based on interviews in person or carried out online; some surveys covering all EU Member States and others a selection of countries); and

2. In-depth qualitative research that involves the testimony of victims but also practitioners who deal directly with victims within the criminal justice system (e.g. police, prosecutors, judges, lawyers, victim support services).

See list of relevant FRA publications at the end of this section.

The solutions outlined in this paper, drawn from existing FRA findings, are based on practices in various EU Member States that have proven to be effective in responding to the practical needs of victims and to improving their ability to access their rights. These findings can assist the EU institutions and Member States in identifying actions that could be taken in these three areas to guarantee the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.

Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, FRA, 2024. 39p.

By Triana McNeil

 Criminal organizations generate money from illicit activities such as drug and human trafficking and launder the proceeds. Federal agencies investigate illicit activity and have developed several strategies and efforts to combat these crimes. GAO was asked to review efforts to counter illicit finance activities. This report addresses, among other things, (1) selected agencies’ roles and responsibilities in investigating and prosecuting illicit finance activities and (2) the progress made with selected strategies and efforts to counter illicit finance activities. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency documents and data, including those related to eight selected federal strategies and efforts on countering illicit finance activities. GAO compared four of these strategies and efforts—which represent long range, multi agency undertakings—to selected key practices for evidencebased policymaking and for interagency collaboration. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations, including that Treasury collect and assess performance information on implementing the Illicit Finance Strategy, and that the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development establish goals and assess progress for implementing the Initiative. Treasury disagreed with the recommendation, State agreed with the intent of the recommendation but believes it already addressed it, and USAID agreed.

The National Security Council did not provide comments. 2025. 94p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) . Southeast Asia and the Pacific

  The transnational organized crime threat landscape in Southeast Asia is evolving faster than in any previous point in history. This change has been marked by growth in the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs and cyber-enabled fraud, driven by highly sophisticated syndicates and complex networks of money launderers, human traffickers, and a growing number of other service providers and facilitators. Despite mounting enforcement efforts, cyber enabled fraud has continued to intensify, resulting in estimated financial losses between US $18 billion and $37 billion from scams targeting victims in East and Southeast Asia in 2023. A predominant proportion of these losses were attributed to scams committed by organized crime groups in Southeast Asia. Fundamentally, the sheer scale of proceeds being generated within the region’s booming illicit economy has required the professionalization and innovation of money laundering activities, and transnational criminal groups in Southeast Asia have emerged as global market leaders. Building on existing underground banking infrastructure including underregulated casinos, junkets, and illegal online gambling platforms that have adopted cryptocurrency, the proliferation of high-risk virtual asset service providers (VASPs) across Southeast Asia have now emerged as a new vehicle through which this has taken place, servicing criminal industries without accountability. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that several countries in Southeast Asia, and particularly those in the Mekong, have been targeted as a key testing ground for transnational criminal networks looking to expand their influence and diversify into new business lines. Asian crime syndicates have rapidly integrated new service-based business models and technologies including malware, generative AI, and deepfakes into their operations while opening up new underground markets and cryptocurrency solutions for their money laundering needs. As law enforcement and regulators stepped up their efforts against casinos, illegal online gambling, and cyber-enabled fraud in Southeast Asia, organized crime have hedged and consolidated by expanding operations across inaccessible and autonomous non-state armed group territories and other criminal enclaves in and around the Golden Triangle and elsewhere in the region and beyond. It is now increasingly clear that a potentially irreversible displacement and spillover has taken place in which organized crime are able to pick, choose, and move value and jurisdictions as needed, with the resulting situation rapidly outpacing the capacity of governments to contain it. Expanding on UNODC’s past analyses of casinos, money laundering, underground banking and transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia, the development of this report has required analysis of law enforcement investigations and prosecutions which have provided insights into the region’s shifting threat landscape. More specifically, it has been developed through extensive examination of criminal indictments and case records, intelligence analysis, court documents, and corporate records, as well as consultation with both international and regional law enforcement and criminal intelligence partners. UNODC has also conducted an extensive mapping and analysis of data obtained from thousands of Telegram underground marketplaces, groups, and channels attributed to Asian organized crime networks and affiliated service providers. The report consists of three comprehensive chapters, offering insights into the latest regional developments and trends, underground banking and money laundering, and technological innovation fueling the ongoing situation. It presents information and data points that have not previously been pieced together, representing a unique attempt to further improve understanding of the region’s evolving criminal ecosystem and the convergence of cyber-enabled fraud, underground banking, and technological innovation 

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 142p.

By The United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

This briefing paper sets out human rights concerns arising since early 2021 from online scam operations including their link to human trafficking in Southeast Asia as well as recommendations drawn from international human rights standards. These concerns occur in the context of wide-ranging digital criminal activity such as romance-investment scams, crypto fraud, money laundering and illegal gambling. At the time of writing this paper, the situation remains fluid: hundreds of thousands of people from across the region and beyond have been forcibly engaged in online criminality, States within the region are trying to identify actions and policies to address this phenomenon, while criminal actors are reacting by finding ways to change and relocate their operations, building new centres across the region and upgrading existing compounds. At the outset it is important to acknowledge that there are two sets of victims in this complex phenomenon. People who have been defrauded through online criminality are victims of the financial and other crimes committed by these scam operations. Many have lost their life savings, taken on debt and suffered shame and stigma for having been scammed. On the other side, individuals who are coerced into working in these scam operations and endure inhumane treatment are victims of serious human rights violations and it is their situation that is the focus of this briefing paper. People who are forced to take part in online scams are most often trafficked persons and migrants in vulnerable situations who face a range of human rights risks, violations and abuses. A human rights-based approach to this complex situation means not merely addressing organised crime or enforcing border controls, but seeks to place the victims at the centre of the response, by addressing structural factors, tackling impunity and providing protection and justice for victims of trafficking and migrants in situations of vulnerability. Human trafficking is a recognised criminal offence under international law and many of the practices associated with trafficking constitute violations under international human rights law. Violations of human rights are both a root cause of trafficking and can occur throughout the trafficking cycle. The majority of people trafficked into online scam operations are men, although women and children are also among the victims. Most are not citizens of the countries in which the trafficking occurs, however reports have indicated that at least in some countries nationals are also being targeted. People who have been trafficked into online forced criminality face threats to their right to life, liberty and security of the person. They are subject to torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, forced labour and other forms of labour exploitation as well as a range of other human rights violations and abuses.  This briefing paper is primarily focused on migrants who have endured trafficking and other human rights violations in the context of the scam operations, while acknowledging that the concerns and guidance contained here apply equally in most cases to citizens in this situation. The information in this briefing paper draws on primary and secondary research by the UN Human Rights Office, including victim testimony, as well as the work of the UN human rights mechanisms and information from other UN entities, supplemented by open-source information. While not exhaustive, Section A seeks to draw attention to the many serious human rights issues that result from this emerging phenomenon. Section B offers guidance to States and other stakeholders drawing from human rights standards and offers targeted recommendations aimed at ensuring responses are human rights-based. The briefing paper was transmitted to the relevant States for factual comments prior to publication

Bangkok: OHCHR, 2023. 38p.  

By Hai Thanh Luong

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), including five Southeast Asian countries and China, has experienced a significant increase in the cultivation of opium, trafficking of heroin and methamphetamine, and consumption of these illicit drugs. In recent years, the GMS has been expanded considerably as supply, destination, and transit route for illegal drug trade’s networks to and through, particularly when China officially applied ‘Belt and Road’ strategy. This paper reviews historical aspects and current trends in drug production and trafficking in the GMS, with special emphasis on Mekong River areas where China is ‘located’ as the heart of the transition. Some evidence consistent with the ‘supply, destination, and transit route’ arguments is found through locating and mapping drug trafficking networks to connect with China. Finally, this paper calls for some initial recommendations to improve the process of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the GMS within the scope of Belt and Road Initiative. 

The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6 (2020) 20–35