By Joseph E. Schumacher, Abdullah Ahsan, Amber H. Simpler, Adam P. Natoli & Bradley J. Cain

Conducting research within a carceral health care context offers a unique view into the nature of drug use among arrestees with potential to identify and prevent drug use consequences. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature and extent of drug use among first-time jail arrestees to inform detection and treatment.

Methods

This study utilized a naturalistic research design to collect de-identified urine drug screens (UDS), jail characteristics, and arrestee demographic variables among arrestees indicating drug use from 25 jails across the United States in 2023 through a confidential data sharing agreement with NaphCare, Inc. using its proprietary electronic health record operating system. Descriptive statistics were used to detail the features of the dataset, Pearson’s chi-square tests of independence were performed to statistically analyze associations between UDS results and jail characteristics and arrestee demographics, and significant chi-square test results were further investigated by examining standardized residuals to clarify the nature and significance of within-group differences in proportions.

Results

Of the 43,553 UDS cases comprising the final sample (28.8% of total arrestees), 74.8% (32,561) were positive for one or more drugs, and 25.2% of UDS cases were negative for all drugs. Among those who tested positive, 69.0% were positive for cannabis, 54.8% for stimulants, 29.6% for opioids, and 12.4% for sedatives. Arrestees were positive for multiple drugs half the time, with combinations of cannabis, stimulants, and opioids most common. Significant associations between drug use and both jail characteristics and arrestee demographics were found.

Conclusions

Though drug use is not a recent phenomenon, the lethality potential of the drugs being used today is relatively new. Arrestees with positive urine drug screens are at heightened risk of adverse outcome due to sudden cessation of substance use. Findings highlight the need for objective clinical data to guide acute treatment of individuals at risk of withdrawing while detained. A

ddiction Science & Clinical Practice (2025), 15p.

By Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo and Kars de Bruijne

Since 2022, a synthetic drug known as ‘kush’, has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa. Kush emerged in Sierra Leone, but quickly spread across countries in the subregion, including Liberia, Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, with devastating effects. By April 2024, the health impacts of kush, a synthetic drug containing nitazenes, opioids as – or more – powerful than fentanyl, as well as synthetic cannabinoids, were so acute that the presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia had declared national emergencies over drug use – an unprecedented step.

This drug represents a turning point in West Africa’s drug landscape. The scale of its market expansion and its lethal public health effects are unparalleled. Yet, amidst widespread speculation about kush, a number of critical questions remained unanswered about the drug. What is kush? Where does it come from? Who is producing and trafficking it? And what can be done to reduce the harm posed by this drug?

This research confirms that kush is composed of potent synthetic opioids called nitazenes, some of which are 25 times stronger than fentanyl, and synthetic cannabinoids commonly found in European drug markets. The consequences have been dire, with mass fatalities overwhelming mortuary systems, forcing emergency group cremations, and leading to bodies being abandoned in the streets.

The research identifies China, the Netherlands, and most likely the UK as key sources of kush and it’s active ingredients, which are trafficked via maritime routes and postal courier services. It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids. Initially controlled by a few organized criminal groups, the kush market has since fragmented, making it even more difficult to counteract. Local synthesis of the drug has increased, escalating health risks, and Sierra Leone’s street gangs for a key part of the drug’s distribution network.

Some key points highlighted in the report are:

Kush is a drug that has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa, with Sierra Leone as its epicentre;

Chemical testing finds that nearly 50% of samples contain nitazenes, a very addictive and deadly synthetic opioid comparable to fentanyl (the other half contains synthetic cannabinoids)

Some of these substances are imported from China, the Netherlands and most likely the United Kingdom through maritime routes, the air and postal courier services (It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids);

The market for kush used to be more strongly controlled by large groups but increasingly fragmented, with smaller actors setting up own operations

Urgent coordinated action is needed on three fronts; a) better monitoring, early warning, testing, and information-sharing in West Africa; b) disrupting supply chains by China, the Netherlands and the UK and at Sierra Leonean points of entry; c) a strong push on mitigating the harms of kush consumption

Clingendael: 2025. 60p

By Ediomo-Ubong Nelson, Gernot Klantschnig

This article examines narratives of cannabis legalization in Nigeria. While most existing research on cannabis legalization has concentrated on the global North, we focus on one of Africa's largest cannabis markets, as well as the views of actors heavily criminalized and excluded from policy debates. Based on in-depth interviews and long-time engagement with illicit cannabis farmers and traders, the article highlights the contestations in their hidden narratives, troubling extant views of cannabis legalization which uncritically laud its socioeconomic benefits, and revealing the potential downsides of legalization in the context of an exploitative legal neo-liberal economy rife with social inequities. The findings of this study also highlight a need for open policy debate that engages criminalized cannabis producing communities who have borne the brunt of both prohibition and economic marginalization to chart the way forward for more inclusive and meaningful cannabis policy reform.

Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 0, No. 0, 2025, pages 1–17  

By Anna Sergi  

  The ‘ndrangheta is a mafa group from Calabria, Southern Italy. Considerable eforts have been made to understand the structures and the organisation of this mafa, not only in the province of Reggio Calabria where it originated, but also in other Calabrian provinces and even outside the Calabrian region. Building on judicial data from a recent maxi-trial (Rinascita-Scott) against ‘ndrangheta clans in the province of Vibo Valentia, we build a theoretical approach based on narrative criminology applied to organisational studies of secretive organisations. We fnd a ‘script of narratives’ emerging from collaborators and affiliates' stories – about socialisation, discretion, and accreditation - which reveals how recognition and constitution of ‘added’ ‘ndrangheta clans are thought to work. This script helps us understand the constitutive power of narratives in mafas and critically approach the study of such organisations.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:389–411 pages

By J. R. Nicolás-Carlock and  Luna-Pla

In recent years, the analysis of economic crime and corruption in procurement has benefited from integrative studies that acknowledge the interconnected nature of the procurement ecosystem. Following this line of research, we present a networks approach for the analysis of shell-companies operations in procurement that makes use of contracting and ownership data under one framework to gain knowledge about the organized crime behavior that emerges in this setting. In this approach, ownership and management data are used to identify connected components in shell-company networks that, together with the contracting data, allows to develop an alternative representation of the traditional buyer-supplier network: the module-component bipartite network, where the modules are groups of buyers and the connected components are groups of suppliers. This is applied to two documented cases of procurement corruption in Mexico characterized by the involvement of large groups of shell-companies in the misappropriation of millions of dollars across many sectors. We quantify the economic impact of single versus connected shell-companies operations. In addition, we incorporate metrics for the diversity of operations and favoritism levels. This paper builds into the quantitative organized crime in the private sector studies and contributes by proposing a networks approach for preventing fraud and understanding the need for legal reforms.   

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27: pages 412–428

By Emily Ferrguson and Emma Schroeder

Following decades of cyclical insecurity in Myanmar, conflict reached a new level following a coup d’etat in 2021 during which Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, deposed the democratically elected National League for Democracy government. Meanwhile, criminal syndicates, entrenched primarily in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) like Shwe Kokko within Myanmar’s Karen state, have expanded and evolved their criminal operations throughout this evolving conflict. The Tatmadaw forces have intertwined themselves in complicated and carefully balanced alliances to support the ongoing conflict, including with the Karen State Border Guard Force (BGF) . As the Tatmadaw and BGF look to sustain themselves and outlast each other, they have found allies of convenience and alternative funding sources in the criminal groups operating in Karen state. In the last two years, organized criminal groups in Myanmar have expanded their activities to include forms of profitable cybercrime and increased their partnership with the BGF , which enables their operations in return for a cut of the illicit profits. Since roughly 2020, criminal syndicates across Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand have largely lured individuals with fake offers of employment at resorts or casinos operating as criminal fronts where they are detained, beaten, and forced to scam, steal from, and defraud people over the  internet The tactics—kidnap-to-scam operations—evolved in response to the pandemic and to the Myanmar civil war, allowing criminal groups to build on existing networks and capabilities. These operations do not require significant upfront investment or technical expertise, but what they do need is time—time that can be stolen from victims trapped in the region’s already developed human trafficking network. The profits that these syndicates reap from victims around the globe add fuel to the ongoing civil war in Myanmar and threaten the stability of Southeast Asia. These groups entrench themselves and their illicit activities into the local environment by bribing, partnering with, or otherwise paying off a key local faction within the Myanmar civil war, creating an interconnectedness between regional instability and profit-generating cybercrime. What is unfolding in Myanmar challenges conventional interpretations of cybercrime and the tacit separation of criminal activities in cyberspace from armed conflict. The criminal syndicates, and their BGF partners, adapted to the instability in Myanmar so effectively that each is financially and even existentially motivated to perpetuate this instability. This paper explores the connectivity between cybercriminal activities and violence, instability, and armed conflict in a vulnerable region, exploring how cybercrime has become an effective vehicle through which nonstate actors can fund and perpetuate conflict. The following section examines the key precipitating conditions of this case, traces the use of cyber scams to create significant financial losses for victims across the world, sow instability across Southeast Asia, exacerbate the violence in Myanmar, and, finally, considers the risks that this model could be adopted and evolved elsewhere. This paper concludes with implications for the policy and research communities, highlighting the ways in which conflict can move, unbounded, between the cyber and physical domains as combatants and opportunists alike follow clear incentives to marry strategic and financial gain.

Washington, DC: Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) at the Atlantic Council, 2023. 16p.

By Samantha B. Larkin

Niki Hutchinson, at twenty-four years of age, decided it was time to start dating. She thought she connected with a guy named Hao on Hinge, a dating website. The two started messaging and formed a bond after Hao told Niki he was born in the same town in China from which she was adopted. After learning she recently lost her mom, Hao offered to help Niki make money with her inheritance and told her he knew how to invest in cryptocurrency. While Niki was initially skeptical, Hao eventually instructed Niki on how to make wire transfers from her bank account to Crypto.com, an exchange platform. Through illustrated screenshots and text messaging, Hao described to Niki exactly how to use the platform. From there, Hao convinced Niki to transfer her crypto assets to another website. On the second platform, Niki saw profits in her account and decided to keep investing. She even convinced her father to invest in cryptocurrency too. But when Niki went to withdraw her virtual funds, she was informed that she needed to pay the tax bill with a new transfer of capital to release her earnings. The realization then set in that Niki and her dad lost over $390,000 to scammers. The scam Niki encountered is called “pig butchering.” Pig butchering is a billion-dollar industry of loss, draining American bank accounts, according to official government publications. Scammers abroad invented the term, referring to the concept of “fattening a pig before the slaughter,” where the goal is to nourish trust and confidence in a virtual relationship before conning the victim out of their money and slaughtering their savings. Cryptocurrency is the signature of the scheme. According to complaints received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), the typical targets in crypto-investment scams are individuals between the ages of thirty and forty-nine. Aiming at young professionals with disposable income, these scammers vet their targets to ensure a level of sophistication with technology and susceptibility to emotional manipulation. Scammers then coach their targets into virtual exchanges on false websites, where the victims are manipulated into believing they are making a profit. Their investments increase over time, typically until the victim attempts to cash out their illusory gains, and then the scam reaches its final stage: the victim is informed they need to pay exorbitant taxes or fees with fresh crypto transfers in order to release their funds. In reality, their assets were already gone. (continued)

Roger Williams University Law Review, Volume 30, Issue 1 (2025) Winter 2025, 47p.

By Deanna Davy

The transnational organized crime (TOC) landscape in Southeast Asia has evolved dramatically in recent years. Trafficking in persons for the purpose of forced criminality to commit online scams and financial fraud, particularly occurring in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other areas of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), and Myanmar, as well as other destination countries (including Malaysia, and the Philippines), has emerged as a new and growing trend. Trafficking in persons for forced criminality has been driven by organized crime groups in the region, which operate in a remarkably open way. Their illicit activities are linked to various legal and illegal entertainment establishments, such as casinos, hotels, and registered companies (businesses), which operate from compound-like buildings where victims are harbored and forced to commit, or be complicit in, cyber-enabled crimes. This phenomenon of trafficking for forced criminality has recently become prominent in Southeast Asia, though it had already been identified in many parts of the world. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2022 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons1 has indicated a considerable increase in the identification of trafficking in persons for the purpose of committing criminal offences, currently reaching 10.2% of all reported trafficking cases globally. Trafficking for forced criminality (or for exploitation in criminal activities) can be understood as trafficking in persons for the purpose of exploitation of victims through forcing or otherwise compelling them to commit criminal acts for economic or other gains of traffickers or exploiters. While not included in the definition of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (Trafficking in Persons Protocol) explicitly, exploitation in criminal activities has been incorporated into the trafficking definition of many countries around the world. In the Southeast Asia region, currently only Malaysia has incorporated this form of exploitation into domestic legislation. Nevertheless, the intent of traffickers, the methods.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2023. 50p.

By Global Financial Integrity and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice

On September 7, 2021, El Salvador became the first country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. Two years later, the country has undergone technological change and growth, faced operational and regulatory challenges, and learned a tremendous amount in the process. This joint publication by the Vance Center and Global Financial Integrity (GFI) analyzes virtual assets (VAs) in El Salvador, first from a legal and regulatory perspective, as well as from an anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CFT) perspective The first half of the report analyzes the current regulatory landscape in El Salvador regarding Bitcoin and VAs. El Salvador has taken a major leap in embracing technological innovation, specifically in the digitalization of the financial system, through adopting bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and digital assets. The country has established a regulatory framework encompassing the Bitcoin Law, the Digital Assets Issuance Law, and the Innovation and Manufacture of Technologies Promotion Law. These laws aim to provide a supportive environment for individuals and businesses engaging in transactions involving digital currencies while fostering innovation and technology manufacturing within the nation.

As a result, El Salvador is poised to become a leading proponent of emerging technologies across various sectors of its economy. Due to the dynamic nature of the subject matter and the ongoing efforts to standardize these frameworks internationally, the report identifies additional areas that may still require regulation.

The second half of the report analyzes VAs in El Salvador from an AML/CFT perspective. The report approaches these issues from the perspective of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which states that “the cornerstone (…) is the risk-based approach which emphasizes the need for countries to identify and understand the money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF) risks they are exposed to.”

Understanding risks enables countries such as El Salvador to take mitigating measures and to deploy limited resources effectively. In this regard, the report analyzes financial crime risks for the most common predicate offenses for ML in El Salvador, considering drug trafficking, extortion, migrant smuggling, and misappropriation of public funds (peculado). The report also assesses financial crime risks related to specific operational features or developments within El Salvador’s VA ecosystem.

The report concludes with policy recommendations that can help El Salvador to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks associated with financial innovation. Key recommendations include:

Policymakers in El Salvador should urgently adopt reforms strengthening AML/CFT as well as ensuring robust oversight over VAs. These reforms are particularly important in light of El Salvador’s upcoming Mutual Evaluation.

The Government of El Salvador, and specifically the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) and the National Commission of Digital Assets (NCDA), should engage with the legal and business community in developing regulations and technical standards according to need and practice for the Bitcoin Law and Digital Assets Issuance Law, following international best practices.

Lawyers and law firms advising companies wanting to operate in El Salvador should enhance compliance mechanisms to verify client backgrounds to prevent criminal actors from entering the national financial system.

All relevant government agencies should ensure transparency and access to public information, including contractual and operational processes, fraud and mismanagement investigations, and the use of public funds, per domestic laws and international standards.

The BCR should incorporate information on government Bitcoin purchases into the Balance of Payments and other similar documents.

The Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF) should require that Chivo Wallet collect information on legal persons opening Chivo Wallet accounts in line with the requirements for legal persons to open other types of financial accounts. In addition, Chivo Wallet should maintain beneficial ownership information for legal persons using Chivo Wallet, in line with FATF Recommendation 15’s interpretive guidance and similar to the requirements for financial institutions.

Considering that financial institutions and other obligated entities submit suspicious transaction reports (STRs) for crypto transactions, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of El Salvador and other government authorities should provide education and training opportunities to the financial sector and other obligated entities regarding identification of red flag indicators in crypto transactions. This will help to ensure that STRs contain relevant information and reflect an informed understanding of the risks.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity 2023. 63p,

By Paul Pazen, Thomas Young, DJ Summers and Cooper Pollard

Colorado’s crime rate is not back to its pre-pandemic level. Both local and state authorities are currently attempting to find policy solutions.

Some localities have created policies and procedures that go beyond state guidelines in an effort to control crime. The City of Aurora implemented mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for auto theft in 2022, for example, the year that Colorado’s and Aurora’s auto theft rates were highest. This policy led to a decrease in the auto theft rate in the city beyond what was seen statewide. In 2023, state lawmakers tried to address auto theft with passage of SB23-097. This bill did not implement mandatory minimum sentences, but instead made it a felony to commit auto theft regardless of the value of the vehicle. The law went into effect on July 1, 2023.

Using Aurora’s experience as a guide, CSI attempted to assess what the economic savings would be if the state were to experience the same decrease in auto theft, shoplifting, and overall crime that Aurora did after implementing its ordinance.

Key Findings

The share of auto theft in Aurora was 19% in July 2022. Since the passage of Aurora’s ordinance, known as “Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Motor Vehicle Theft,” the share averaged 16% from August 2022 through December 2024, representing a three percentage point decrease from the pre-August 2022 period.

A market model predicting auto theft in Aurora suggests there were 723 fewer auto thefts in Aurora from August 2022 to December 2024, a 6% decline relative to other large cities in the state.

For automobile crime, a 6% decline equates to $16.3 million in economic savings for Aurora from August 2022 through December 2024. For the largest city in the state, Denver, the economic savings would be $37.3 million over the same 29 months.

In contrast to Aurora’s experience, initial model results on the state impact from its 2023 effort was less pronounced at a 3% reduction in auto theft.

If Aurora’s experience is indicative of the potential savings of a similar statewide approach to crime, a 6% decline in crime statewide for all reported criminal offenses would have equated to $1.8 billion in economic savings in 2024, or roughly $774 per Colorado household.

Changes in local crime are not uniform across the state, however. The change in crime over the past five years varies widely by city and county.

Greenwood Village, CO : Common Sense Institute, 2025, 18p

By Joseph R Friedman, Daniela Abramovitz, Britt Skaathun, Gudelia Rangel, Alicia Harvey-Vera, Carlos F Vera, Irina Artamonova, Sheryl Muñoz, Natasha K Martin, William H Eger ...

Background

Illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF) increases overdose mortality, but its role in infectious disease transmission is unknown. We examined whether IMF use predicts hepatitis C virus (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) incidence among a cohort of people who inject drugs (PWID) in San Diego, California and Tijuana, Mexico.

Methods

PWID were recruited during 2020–2022, undergoing semi-annual interviewer-administered surveys and HIV and HCV serological rapid tests through 2024. Cox regression was conducted to examine predictors of seroconversion considering self-reported IMF use as a 6-month lagged, time-dependent covariate.

Results

Of 398 PWID at baseline, 67% resided in San Diego, 70% were male, median age was 43 years, 42% reported receptive needle sharing, and 25% reported using IMF. HCV incidence was 14.26 per 100 person-years (95% confidence interval [CI]: 11.49–17.02), and HIV incidence was 1.29 (95% CI: .49–2.10). IMF was associated with HCV seroconversion, with a univariable hazard ratio (HR) of 1.64 (95% CI: 1.09–2.40), and multivariable HR of 1.57 (95% CI: 1.03–2.40). The direction of the relationship with HIV was similar, albeit not significant (HR 2.39; 95% CI: .66–8.64).

Conclusions

We document a novel association between IMF and HCV seroconversion among PWID in Tijuana–San Diego. Few HIV seroconversions (n = 10) precluded our ability to assess if a similar relationship held for HIV. IMF's short half-life may destabilize PWID—increasing the need for repeat dosing and sharing smoking materials and syringes. New preventive care approaches may reduce HCV transmission in the fentanyl era.

Clinical Infectious Diseases, cia e372, 2024.

By Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry & Hanna Hernandez

Data is needed to understand and assess the demographic differences—and at times, disparities and disproportionalities—in how the criminal justice system serves our communities and administers justice. Understanding these disparities and disproportionality in the criminal justice system is crucial for addressing systemic inequities. Disparities and disproportionalities within the criminal justice system are present in all stages of the criminal justice system, from arrest to incarceration (Brame et al., 2014; Kim & Kiesel, 2018; Kovera, 2019; Monk, 2019). This topic continues to draw significant attention from a variety of resources such as local, state, and federal government agencies, advocacy groups, policymakers and lawmakers, researchers and scholars, and the community. Evaluating these disparities and disproportionality is critical for addressing systemic inequalities and promoting fairness in the administration of justice. To respond to these impacts, the Criminal Justice Research & Statistics Center. the Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2023 State Justice Statistics (SJS) grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to assess this work. Through the use of publicly available data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to evaluate sex and racial disparities and disproportionalities, this report, which is part of a series of NIBRS reports, will endeavor to better understand more about the different demographic groups that are most impacted, and how these trends vary by time. Furthermore, this report will assess the demographic differences in the presence of injury, the presence of bias motivation, the use of weapons and/ or force, and the presence of familiarity in victimization in NIBRS crimes against property (i.e., criminal acts that destroy or deprive another's property against the owner's will - generally considered less serious than crimes against persons, but they can still be felonies).

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2024. 74p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The influx of weapons to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, added to an already large reservoir of weapons in the country (especially since the outbreak of the conflict in 2014), raised concern over the spread of these weapons in the hands of criminals further in Western Europe, and the possible effect on organized criminal activities.

Both Ukraine and Ukraine’s Western partners have been aware of the political and criminal risks of arms diversion, and have put in place strict oversight mechanisms to track the delivery of weapons. According to Vadym Dzyubynskyi, head of criminal investigation at the Ukrainian National Police:

• All lost and stolen weapons, which currently number 593 000, are all accounted for, numbered, and our European partners know about these weapons. If such a weapon emerges in any country in Europe or the world, we will immediately understand that it is a drop-in and a fake, that it is the work of Russian special services for disinformation and narratives about Ukraine.

Ukrainian soldiers interviewed in February 2024 all spoke of strict standards over weapons, both during and at the end of their service. But in this nervous climate, any official shortcomings have been heavily scrutinized. And although not directly connected to weapons diversion, corruption scandals over military procurement in Ukraine have fed into concerns over the accountability of materiel in the war. Parsing the true risk has become essential to deepen the discussion beyond the headlines.

In order to provide insight into this issue, in 2023 the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) established an arms monitoring programme (‘the Monitor’) to track the flows of weapons out of Ukraine and into Europe.

At the heart of the project was the collection of black market prices for weapons both in Ukraine and in Europe, on the assumption that a comparison of prices in different countries, and an analysis of changes in those prices, would help shed light on the nature of supply and demand at the national and transnational level. This data has been sourced from underworld contacts and law enforcement in various countries. Qualitative interviews with underworld sources, law enforcement, journalists, activists and others have helped flesh out the data picture with regard to demand for weapons among criminals, appetite for risk and potential drivers and barriers. In addition, the Monitor collected information on seizures and official reports on firearms, and commissioned a survey of dark web marketplaces.

GI-TOC ARMS MONITORING PROJECT , 2024. 76p.

By Jonathan P. Caulkins

Background and aims: Multiple countries are considering revising cannabis policies. This study aimed to measure long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States and compare them with alcohol use.

Design and setting: Secondary analysis of United States general population survey data.

Participants: The national surveys had a total of 1 641 041 participants across 27 surveys from 1979 to 2022.

Measurements

Rates of use reported to the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health and its predecessors are described, as are trends in days of use reported. Four milepost years are contrasted: 1979 (first available data and end of relatively liberal policies of the 1970s), 1992 (end of 12 years of conservative Reagan-Bush era policies), 2008 (last year before the Justice Department signaled explicit federal non-interference with state-level legalizations) and 2022 (most recent data available).

Findings

Reported cannabis use declined to a nadir in 1992, with partial recovery through 2008, and substantial increases since then, particularly for measures of more intensive use. Between 2008 and 2022, the per capita rate of reporting past-year use increased by 120%, and days of use reported per capita increased by 218% (in absolute terms from the annual equivalent of 2.3 to 8.1 billion days per year). From 1992 to 2022, there was a 15-fold increase in the per capita rate of reporting daily or near daily use. Whereas the 1992 survey recorded 10 times as many daily or near daily alcohol as cannabis users (8.9 vs. 0.9 M), the 2022 survey, for the first time, recorded more daily and near daily users of cannabis than alcohol (17.7 vs. 14.7 M). Far more people drink, but high-frequency drinking is less common. In 2022, the median drinker reported drinking on 4–5 days in the past month, versus 15–16 days in the past month for cannabis. In 2022, past-month cannabis consumers were almost four times as likely to report daily or near daily use (42.3% vs. 10.9%) and 7.4 times more likely to report daily use (28.2% vs. 3.8%).

Conclusions

Long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States parallel corresponding changes in cannabis policy, with declines during periods of greater restriction and growth during periods of policy liberalization. A growing share of cannabis consumers report daily or near daily use, and their numbers now exceed the number of daily and near daily drinkers.

Addiction, Volume119, Issue9, September 2024, Pages 1648-1652

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The third edition of the World Wildlife Crime Report probes recent trends in the illicit trafficking of protected species of wild fauna and flora and provides a broad assessment of current knowledge about the causes and implications of associated crime at a global level. As was the case for the first two editions published in 2016 and 2020, research carried out for this report included quantitative assessment of global wildlife trafficking and a series of in-depth case studies. An additional emphasis for this edition is on systematic analysis of wildlife crime harms and impacts, factors driving crime trends and the evidence for what remedial interventions work best.

The report concludes that wildlife trafficking persists worldwide despite two decades of concerted action at international and national levels. There are signs of progress in reducing the impacts of trafficking for some iconic species, elephants and rhinoceros, for which a combination of efforts from both the demand and supply side have yielded positive outcomes. However, UNODC’s assessment of available evidence gives no confidence that wildlife trafficking overall is being substantially reduced.

The global scope and scale of wildlife crime remain substantial with seizures during 2015–2021 indicating an illegal trade in 162 countries and territories affecting around 4,000 plant and animal species. Beyond the immediate conservation threat to target species, population reductions caused by wildlife trafficking can play a role in triggering ecosystem-level impacts by disturbing interdependencies between different species and undermining related functions and processes, including those important to climate change resilience and mitigation. Wildlife crime also threatens the socioeconomic benefits people derive from nature, whether as a source of income, employment, food, medicine or other values. It further corrodes good governance and the rule of law through corruption, money-laundering and illicit financial flows.

The report notes that transnational organized crime groups are active in some illicit wildlife markets, where they exploit inconsistencies and weaknesses in regulation and enforcement, adapting their methods and routes continuously to evade detection and prosecution. Corruption also plays a key role in undermining regulation and enforcement actions against wildlife trade.

The 2024 World Wildlife Crime Report tracks all these issues, trends and more

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 169p.

By  Susan Olzak

Scholars document that attitudes toward guns and gun policy reflect deeply entrenched cultures that overlap with ideological affiliations and party politics. Does exposure to dramatic events such as school shootings and protests regarding gun control affect these patterns? I first argue that school shootings are significant triggering events that will become associated with attitudes favoring gun restrictions. The second argument holds that rising protests by one’s opponent can be transformed into mobilizing opportunity by a focal group. To examine these ideas, I combine information from a national exit poll data on respondents’ attitudes on gun policy with state-level information on the counts of recent school shootings, gun-policy protest, existing laws restricting gun use, and membership in the National Rifle Association. To minimize bias, the analysis of public opinion applies Coarsened Exact Matching techniques followed by analysis using mixed-level logit. The second analysis uses data on gun control protests, school shootings, and NRA memberships in states over time. Results show that conservatives (but not liberals) exposed to more school shootings favor more restrictive gun policies. The second, longitudinal analysis found that there is a significant interaction effect between increases in school shootings and gun control protests that diminishes NRA memberships significantly.

Unpublished paper. 2022. 49p.

By The International Crisis Group 

Over half a century on from the declaration of a “war on drugs”, Latin America is struggling to manage the eruption of violence tied to the narcotics trade. Though drugrelated organised crime has brought notorious peaks of violence in the past, above all in Colombia and Mexico, never has it spread so wide, and rarely has it penetrated so deeply into states and communities. Criminal groups have splintered, multiplied and diversified, adding lethal synthetics like fentanyl to the traditional plant-based supply of marijuana, cocaine and heroin, as well as moving into new rackets like extortion. Where communities are poor and unprotected, criminal groups act as employers and overlords; where state officials are present, they coerce and corrupt them. With Washington pushing for a fresh military-led crackdown on drug cartels, perhaps involving U.S. forces, Latin American leaders face difficult decisions. Despite the pressure to comply, experience suggests that a balance of improved policing, alternative livelihoods, gun control and, under specific conditions, negotiations would be more effective in reducing violence. The map of the drug trade in Latin America has been transformed in the decades since supply routes from the Andes to the U.S. first emerged. Demand for narcotics outside the region remains at record highs, with newer markets booming – particularly for cocaine in Europe and fentanyl in the U.S. At the same time, waves of U.S.- backed law enforcement, based on capture and extradition of crime bosses (known as kingpins), drug seizures and forced eradication have revolutionised the supply chain. Although Colombia and Mexico remain at the heart of the drug business, a main route to the U.S. and Europe runs down the Pacific, passing through countries that were largely untouched by illicit trafficking such as Costa Rica and Ecuador. Each of these has seen rates of violence rise sharply; in 2024, Ecuador was South America’s most violent nation. Across the region, surges of bloodshed have marked the new hubs of a fast-shifting, hyper-violent drug trade. Understanding how this rolling crime wave came about is fundamental to arresting it. Drug-related organised crime has adapted to the threat posed by law enforcement by becoming more flexible and resilient. In place of hierarchical syndicates that could be dismantled once their leaders were identified, the trade increasingly functions through networks of providers who subcontract each step of the route to lower tiers of operators. High-level financiers engage sophisticated international traffickers, who oversee drug exports to user markets. These in turn partner with national and local crime groups to meet the orders. National groups manage production or ensure safe passage of the drug along a particular trafficking corridor. At the local level, urban gangs are contracted by larger criminal allies for small-scale logistical services like smuggling drugs through ports. All the layers of these networks have learned that capturing state officials is a business asset. Using a mix of threats and payoffs, they target police officers, judges, prosecutors and politicians who can ensure that business runs smoothly, without the risk of arrest or seizure of shipments. Likewise, prisons in some of Latin America’s roughest settings are run by inmates, who manage their criminal enterprises behind bars and carry out vendettas against rivals inside and outside.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 51p.

By Jonathan Lusthaus

Cybercrime is not a solely technical subject but one that involves human offenders who are susceptible to social scientific study. Yet, despite calls for cybercrime research to be mainstreamed, the topic remains a niche area within legal studies and the social sciences. Drawing on the most significant findings over recent years, this review aims to make the subject more accessible to a wide range of scholars by softening some of the perceived boundaries between conceptions of cybercrime and conventional crime. It examines these key themes in the literature: definitions and categories of cybercrime, cybercrime marketplaces, the governance of cybercrime, the importance of “place” within the world of cybercrime, cybercriminal networks, a discussion of what is new or old about cybercrime, and how we should define the concept going forward. The empirical literature on these themes suggests a simple definition is most appropriate: Cybercrime is crime that uses digital technology in a significant way.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 20 (2024), pp. 369–385

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non- state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 61(4), 2024, 673­ –693 pages

By Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

Three categories of organised groups that exploit advances in information and communications technologies (ICT) to infringe legal and regulatory controls: (1) traditional organised criminal groups which make use of ICT to enhance their terrestrial criminal activities; (2) organised cybercriminal groups which operate exclusively online; and (3) organised groups of ideologically and politically motivated individuals who make use of ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct are described in this article. The need for law enforcement to have in-depth knowledge of computer forensic principles, guidelines, procedures, tools, and techniques, as well as anti-forensic tools and techniques will become more pronounced with the increased likelihood of digital content being a source of disputes or forming part of underlying evidence to support or refute a dispute in judicial proceedings. There is also a need for new strategies of response and further research on analysing organised criminal activities in cyberspace.

Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, 2008, 26p.