By Nazgol Ghandnoosh and Celeste Barry

As noted in the first installment of this One in Five series, scholars have declared a “generational shift” in the lifetime likelihood of imprisonment for Black men, from a staggering one in three for those born in 1981 to a still troubling one in five for Black men born in 2001. “I can’t breathe,” George Floyd said over 20 times. “Every time you see me, you want to mess with me,” said Eric Garner. “I just want to go home,” said Tyre Nichols. Breonna Taylor asked who had come into her apartment in the middle of the night. Police killed them all. The Black Lives Matter movement has rightly highlighted the tragic deaths resulting from policing’s biased and excessive contact with people of color. Nearly half of those killed by police in recent years have been Black or Latinx, and officers are rarely held accountable. This report interrogates the large footprint of policing—particularly of Black Americans— as, in part, a failed response to racial disparities in serious crimes. The wide net that police cast across people of color is at odds with advancing safety because excessive police contact often fails to intercept serious criminal activity and diminishes the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement. Excessive policing also distracts policymakers from making investments to promote community safety without the harms of policing and incarceration. In addition, the large footprint of policing gets in the way of, as the National Academies of Sciences has called for, needed “durable investments in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods that match the persistent and longstanding nature of institutional disinvestment that such neighborhoods have endured over many years.”

Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2023. 27p.

By Md Jahirul Islam, Masahiro Suzuki, Paul Mazerolle

Background: Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) has transformed from a private matter into a global concern. Although progress has been made in enhancing police responsiveness to IPV, research on interventions in IPV cases involving children remains limited. Objective: This study investigates how police officers' responses vary depending on the nature and severity of IPV incidents and explores disparities in their responses when children are present at IPV incidents. Participants and setting: 175 police officers (126 males, 49 females) in a single Australian jurisdiction. Methods: A mixed-methods approach utilized an online survey with four hypothetical IPV scenarios to capture anticipated responses. The quantitative analysis assessed officers' recognition of incident seriousness and willingness to take action, while the qualitative thematic analysis explored reasons for response modifications in the presence of children. Results: The quantitative analysis revealed that officers consistently recognized the seriousness of IPV incidents and displayed a willingness to take various actions, such as initiating investigations and detaining perpetrators. Thematic analysis of qualitative data uncovered officers' reasons for modifying or maintaining their responses to IPV incidents with child presence. Concerns for child safety, emotional impact on children, and breaking the cycle of violence were identified as key drivers for officers' modified responses. Additionally, some officers adhered to standard procedures, emphasizing their legal obligations and the adequacy of their existing actions. Conclusions: This study contributes to an enhanced understanding of the complex decision-making processes among police officers when responding to IPV incidents involving children, highlighting the necessity of balanced policies and comprehensive training to navigate these complexities effectively.

Australia: Child Abuse & Neglect, 2023, 13p.

By Elda Celislami, Stephen Kastoryano, Giovanni Mastrobuoni:

Police accountability is essential to uphold the social contract. Monitoring the monitors is, however, not without difficulty. This paper reveals how police departments exploit specific laws surrounding death investigations to facilitate the underreporting of police killings. Our results show that US counties in which law enforcement can certify the cause of death, including counties which appoint the sheriff as the lead death investigator, display 46% more underreported police killings than their comparable adjacent counties. Drawing on a novel adapted-LATE potential outcomes framework, we demonstrate that underreported police killings are most often reclassified as 'circumstances undetermined' homicides. We also show that law enforcement agencies in counties with permissive death certification laws withhold more homicide reports from the public. The main underreporting results are primarily driven by underreporting of White and Hispanic deaths in our analysis sample, with the effect on Hispanic people particularly pronounced along the US-Mexico border. We do not find that excess underreported killings are associated with more violence directed towards police. We do, however, note a nationwide positive correlation between the permissiveness of gun-laws and underreported police killings. In addition, we find more underreporting in counties which have both high per-capita Google searches for Black Lives Matter and which allow law enforcement to certify the cause of death. Our results do not indicate that other differences in death investigation systems - coroner vs. medical examiner, appointed vs. elected, or physician vs. non-physician - affect the underreporting of police killings.

Bonn, Germany:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2023. 72p.

By Julie Berg and Emily Mann

The authors undertook a literature review on intersectionality and policing to provide a critical, impact-based account of scholarly/academic engagement with policing and intersectionality. This review informs an intersectional good practice toolkit by which police organisations can better engage with the phenomenon of intersectionality and its implications for policing and ‘seldom heard communities’. Additionally, the authors hosted two interactive workshops to share preliminary findings, consult with academics and police practitioners and request feedback. The review highlighted that intersectional convergence of certain social identities and characteristics can provide complex challenges for policing, for example: The impact of micro-interactions between the police and those with intersecting social identities. Meso-level institutional issues may mitigate or aggravate negative interactions between the police and those with intersecting identities (such as police culture, resources, specialist training, and/or whether the police have specialist teams or programmes). Macro-level factors; the police operate under broader structural influences and power dynamics which negatively impact on certain groups, and which is informed by both historical and contemporary factors such as law, policy, political and public discourses and expectations.

Edinburgh: Scottish Police Academy, 2023. 71p.

By Grahame Allen, Helena Carthew

Data from the Home Office, Scottish Government, and Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) shows us how large the police workforce is. It also indicates how diverse forces are, including breakdowns by sex and ethnicity. This briefing breaks down data by police force area where possible and includes international comparisons where available.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2024. 32p.

By The California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC)

In April of 2023, the CPSC was contacted by the office of Mayor Sheng Thao to discuss the effectiveness of the current Ceasefire strategy, specific to the internal workings of the city. In essence, Mayor Thao wanted to know how and whether the City of Oakland was doing its part to implement the strategy effectively. She referred to a recommendation that was provided to the City of Oakland in a 2021 Problem Analysis conducted by Dr. Anthony Braga of the University of Pennsylvania and Dr. Lisa Barao of Westfield State University, where they stated: “It is recommended that the City of Oakland closely audits the resources allocated and activities of the organizations responsible for implementing Ceasefire. This audit will assess whether the challenges of the pandemic and demands for police reform have diminished focus. The audit should determine whether each key component (communications, service provision, law enforcement) has the necessary focus, quality, and scale to reduce the violence problem the city now faces.4” As a result of this recommendation and those discussions, Mayor Thao requested the CPSC to audit the current Ceasefire strategy. This audit is limited to the Ceasefire strategy and to the role of the Oakland Police Department, Department of Violence Prevention, and how they work with  their partners5, who are funded to provide services for those clients. This audit does not examine the role of community partners such as moral voices or outside agencies. Objectives of the audit: 1. To determine if the Ceasefire strategy is being implemented effectively. 2. To determine if Ceasefire is the appropriate strategy for Oakland’s current gun violence challenges. 3. To understand what is currently driving gun violence in Oakland. This includes an updated brief problem analysis that captures Oakland’s shootings and homicides from January 2023 to September 30, 2023.

The Partnership, 2023. 57p.

By Anthony A. Braga,  Lisa M. Barao. Gregory Zimmerman,  Rod K. Brunson,  Andrew V. Papachristos, George Wood,  Chelsea Farrell

The City of Oakland, California, has long suffered from very high levels of serious violence. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, Oakland’s homicide rate (31.8 per 100,000) was almost 6.8 times higher than the national homicide rate (4.7 per 100,000) in 2012. That year, the City of Oakland engaged the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) to help design and implement a focused deterrence program to reduce serious gun violence. The CPSC collaborated with the Oakland Police Department (OPD) on ongoing problem analysis research to understand the underlying nature of gun violence in Oakland. The OPD led an interagency Ceasefire enforcement group comprised of federal, state, and county criminal justice agencies. The broader Oakland Ceasefire Partnership included the Mayor’s Office, social service agencies led by the Human Services Department, and community leaders from local organizations such as Oakland Community Organizations (OCO). The Oakland Ceasefire program closely followed the key elements of a focused deterrence Group Violence Reduction Strategy (GVRS). Briefly, GVRS programs seek to change offender behavior by understanding underlying crime‐producing dynamics and conditions that sustain recurring crime problems, and implementing a blended strategy of law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service actions. The Oakland Ceasefire program was fully implemented in early 2013. Between 2010 and 2017, total Oakland shooting victimizations peaked at 710 in 2011 (93 gun homicide victims and 617 non-fatal shooting victims) and decreased by 52.1 percent to a low of 340 in 2017 (63 gun homicide victims and 277 non-fatal shooting victims). The impact evaluation was designed to determine whether the Ceasefire intervention was associated with this steep decline in serious gun violence and assess how Ceasefire partners and community leaders perceived the implementation of the strategy.

Unpublished report, 2019.   113p.

 By The U.S. Department of Justice

On May 24, 2022, a mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, shook the nation. In the aftermath of the tragedy, there was significant public criticism of the law enforcement response to the shooting. At the request of the then mayor of Uvalde, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the law enforcement response to the mass shooting. In providing a detailed accounting and critical assessment of the first responder actions in Uvalde, and the efforts since to ameliorate gaps and deficiencies in that response, this report is intended to build on the knowledge base for responding to incidents of mass violence. It also will identify generally accepted practices for an effective law enforcement response to such incidents. Finally, it is intended to help honor the victims and survivors of the Robb Elementary School tragedy. 

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2024. 610p.

By Grant Duwe

Key Points

• Despite pursuing a similar goal, the “what works” and desistance literatures have largely ignored and undervalued the contributions the other has made.

• The what works literature has been mostly quantitative and has consisted of program evaluations and meta-analyses, leading to the emergence of principles of effective correctional intervention and the risk-needs-responsivity model.

• The desistance literature has been more qualitative and has focused on persons rather than correctional programs, stressing the importance of identity transformation in the desistance process.

• Correctional systems do not provide “desistance opportunities”—programs, interventions, and services—to the extent they are needed. Programs should become more person-centered by placing a greater emphasis on identity transformation.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020. 6p

By W. Bradford Wilcox | Rafael A. Mangual | Seth Cannon | Joseph E. Price

The debate about how best to respond to urban crime—a debate that has become more important in light of recent increases in violent crime and homicide in many cities across America—has tended to focus on two perspectives. The first prioritizes tackling the “social structural factors” (unemployment, economic inequality, poverty, etc.) that are thought to be the “root causes” of crime, and violent crime, in particular. A second perspective rejects this structural approach in favor of a strategy that relies on traditional law-enforcement institutions (namely, police, prosecutors, and jails/prisons), often citing the sharp violent crime declines of the 1990s and 2000s that occurred in the wake of new policing and prosecutorial approaches—even in the face of structural realities said to be at the root of the urban crime problem.

But a third perspective seeks to understand how the fragile state of core social institutions—schools, churches, youth sports leagues, and, above all, families—in too many of our cities may also have a hand in urban crime. Princeton sociologist Patrick Sharkey, for instance, has argued that nonprofits “focused on reducing violence and building stronger communities” are linked to lower rates of violent crime in cities across the country. In a new Institute for Family Studies report, we turn our attention to the core institution of family. Drawing on the work of scholars like Harvard sociologist Robert Sampson—who found that “(f)amily structure is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, predictors of … urban violence across cities in the United States”—we explore the relationship between family structure and urban crime in the 21st century. Specifically, we address this question: How is family structure associated with crime, violent crime, and homicide rates in American cities—and with these outcomes in Chicago neighborhoods?

We find that cities are safer when two-parent families are dominant and more crime-ridden when family instability is common. The same story applies to the neighborhoods of Chicago. More specifically, we find the total crime rate is about 48% higher in cities that have above the median share of single-parent families, compared to cities that have fewer single-parent families. That difference is even larger with respect to violent crime and homicide, specifically, with cities above the median level of single parenthood experiencing 118% higher rates of violent crime and 255% higher rates of homicide. In the Windy City, relying on an analysis of census tract level data, our research indicates that neighborhoods above the median fraction of single-parent-headed households experienced 137% higher total crime rates, 226% higher violent crime rates, and 436% higher homicide rates.

When controlling for additional factors such as racial composition, poverty rates, and educational attainment levels, we find that the association between family structure and total crime rates, as well as violent crime rates, in cities across the United States remains statistically significant. However, the association between family structure and homicide in cities does not. In Chicago, the links between family structure and both violent crime and homicide rates at the neighborhood level were significant, net of controls, but not the total crime rate. In addition to the question of whether there exists a statistical relationship between family structure and crime—a question we generally answer in the affirmative—this study also offers possible answers to the question of what might explain the relationships between family instability and crime.

Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of social science research, we theorize that this relationship is likely a byproduct of some mix of the heightened risk of family instability in the socialization of young children and the role that father absence plays in providing less guidance and oversight for adolescent and young adult males.

Particularly in light of the pre-existing literature on the role of family structure in various life outcomes, these findings may have important implications for policymakers. They suggest the need to encourage more young Americans—particularly those living in vulnerable neighborhoods with both high rates of violence and out-of-wedlock childbearing—toward forming strong and stable families in marriage.

Washington, DC: Institute for Family Studies, 2023. 21p.

By: Atheendar S. Venkataramani, MD, PhD; Elizabeth F. Bair, MS; Jacob Bor, Sc; et al

Importance: Racial disparities in sleep health may mediate the broader health outcomes of structural racism.

Objective: To assess changes in sleep duration in the Black population after officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, a cardinal manifestation of structural racism.

Design, Setting, and Participants: Two distinct difference-in-differences analyses examined the changes in sleep duration for the US non-Hispanic Black (hereafter, Black) population before vs after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, using data from adult respondents in the US Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS; 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2018) and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS; 2013-2019) with data on officer-involved killings from the Mapping Police Violence database. Data analyses were conducted between September 24, 2021, and September 12, 2023.

Exposures: Occurrence of any police killing of an unarmed Black person in the state, county, or commuting zone of the survey respondent’s residence in each of the four 90-day periods prior to interview, or occurence of a highly public, nationally prominent police killing of an unarmed Black person anywhere in the US during the 90 days prior to interview.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Self-reported total sleep duration (hours), short sleep (<7 hours), and very short sleep (<6 hours).

Results: Data from 181 865 Black and 1 799 757 White respondents in the BRFSS and 9858 Black and 46 532 White respondents in the ATUS were analyzed. In the larger BRFSS, the majority of Black respondents were between the ages of 35 and 64 (99 014 [weighted 51.4%]), women (115 731 [weighted 54.1%]), and college educated (100 434 [weighted 52.3%]). Black respondents in the BRFSS reported short sleep duration at a rate of 45.9%, while White respondents reported it at a rate of 32.6%; for very short sleep, the corresponding values were 18.4% vs 10.4%, respectively. Statistically significant increases in the probability of short sleep and very short sleep were found among Black respondents when officers killed an unarmed Black person in their state of residence during the first two 90-day periods prior to interview. Magnitudes were larger in models using exposure to a nationally prominent police killing occurring anywhere in the US. Estimates were equivalent to 7% to 16% of the sample disparity between Black and White individuals in short sleep and 13% to 30% of the disparity in very short sleep.

Conclusions and Relevance: Sleep health among Black adults worsened after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black individuals. These empirical findings underscore the role of structural racism in shaping racial disparities in sleep health outcomes

JAMA Internat Medicine, online Feb. 2024.

By Matt Weidinger | Amy Simon

Key Points

• The nation’s unemployment benefits system, which was significantly expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic, suffered unprecedented losses to fraud and improper payments.

• Official—and still partial—estimates of improper payments approach $200 billion, while unofficial estimates suggest $400 billion or more may have been lost.

• There are multiple causes of these record improper payments, including historically large benefits, poor program design including eligibility self-certification in new programs, and degraded administrative systems without adequate defenses against various fraudulent schemes.

• State and federal policymakers should review the causes and consequences of these unprecedented losses and take specific steps, such as those outlined in this report, to both prevent a recurrence of the record taxpayer losses experienced during the pandemic and better establish a proactive anti-fraud posture for the unemployment insurance system.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 45p.

By Alex Brill | Scott Ganz

Recent data show a small decline in opioid-related mortality following a decade during which opioid-related mortality more than doubled to nearly 53,000 in 2018. However, the aggregate statistics mask important spatial and temporal trends in the data. This report estimates nationwide, regional, and county-level economic costs associated with the opioid crisis. The data show that, despite recent nationwide per capita opioid-related cost declines, the impact of the crisis continues to be felt across large swaths of the Northeast, Midwest, and South. We also find that opioid-related mortality tends to diffuse among nearby counties, with the local diffusion rate from illegal opioids—which are the primary cause in the current wave of the crisis—exceeding the rate from prescription opioids, which were the primary cause in earlier waves. The combination of lower aggregate mortality and faster diffusion among nearby counties points to a changed spatial distribution of economic costs as the opioid crisis evolves.

Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020.

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

• Under US federal law, weed, also known as “marijuana” or “cannabis,” remains a Schedule I illegal narcotic, in the same category as cocaine and heroin. Production and sale of weed are federal felonies punishable by severe prison terms.

• Individual US states, in conflict with federal law, began legalizing medical weed in 1996. However, in the past decade, the US Department of Justice has agreed not to enforce federal criminal weed laws against anyone who is following state laws.

• As of 2022, 33 percent of all Americans live in states with legal recreational sales of weed, 41 percent live in states with medical legalization but no legal recreational sale, and 26 percent live in states with total weed prohibitions.

• In its early years, legally produced and sold weed has struggled to capture market share. In most places where the sale and use of weed are now legal, illegal weed—unlicensed, unregulated, and untaxed—still has a dominant market share and shows no signs of fading away.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 7p.

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

Key Points

• Cannabis containing more than 0.3 percent tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which the US government still calls “marijuana” but here we call “weed,” has been legalized by many state governments but is still illegal at the federal level.

• If a major goal of federal legalization is to help legal weed replace illegal weed, the best step forward for federal policy is simply to step out of the way. This would involve removing weed from the schedule of illegal narcotics, permitting states to implement cannabis policy as they see fit, and allowing cannabis to move among jurisdictions where it is legal.

• Forms of federal legalization that include more regulations and taxes on cannabis—including House and Senate bills that have been recently publicized—would almost surely do more harm than good, given the state and local policies already in place.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 5p.

By Howard Husock

• The legalization of cannabis, rather than sidelining the black market, has fueled it, providing cover to illicit cannabis enterprises that often undercut the legal market on price and accessibility.

• State policies, such as high or complex cannabis taxes, scant issuance of licenses for legal operation, and widespread local “opt-outs,” play a key role in keeping the legal market from outcompeting illegal alternatives.

• The treatment of alcohol and cigarettes may be better models: States should allow legal retail to proliferate to minimize the advantages illicit operators now enjoy.

• At the same time, as with tobacco, public health authorities should mount education campaigns to minimize marijuana use, in light of its demonstrated dangers.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 1113p.

By Rachel E. Barkow and Mark Osler

The federal government and most American states provide for some form of clemency that allows the president or the governor to reduce a sentence or pardon a conviction. Although most US presidents and some governors have made great use of this power in the past, it has long been in decline. Diagnosing the reasons for this decline proves easier than providing solutions to reinvigorate this practice. A great deal of scholarship explores the causes and offers solutions, and this review catalogs the main lines of argument. It also explains why clemency's renewal remains urgent, even in regimes dedicated to the rule of law, to serve the best purposes of punishment and check the excesses of criminal law and punishment that are inevitable given the political process and enforcement practices.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 311 - 327

By Tim Head

Serious Violence Reduction Orders (SVROs) are a new police stop and search power, being piloted by forces in England and Wales. Introduced under the controversial Police Crime Sentencing and Courts Act (2022), SVROs are part of a broader expansion of police powers and the rolling back of safeguards and avenues for police accountability. The Home Office itself has admitted that many of the potential harmful consequences of SVROs will likely fall on people of colour, on Black people in particular. In “Against SVROs”, we review the evidence around high-discretion police powers similar to SVROs, which overwhelmingly shows that they do not work to reduce serious violence. Contrary to the government's claim that SVROs will "break the cycle of offending”, we found that high-discretion police powers and behavioural orders push people, disproportionately people of colour, into the criminal justice system. These policing interventions are clearly evidenced to harm the mental and physical health of those targeted, while reproducing deep-seated racial discrimination in the use and abuse of police powers. 

London: Runnymede Trust, 2023. 43p.

By Chris Bath

Police forces in England and Wales carried out an estimated 145,000 voluntary interviews under caution in 2022/23, of which around one fifth were of children. Only 4.8% of adults attending a voluntary interview were recorded as meeting the criteria for appropriate adult (AA) support – around half the rate in police custody. While custody rightly attracts scrutiny, this report highlights both why and how a strategic focus should be brought to bear on voluntary interviews. Part 1 presents an analysis of quantitative data provided by police forces. Part 2 sets out the policy and practice challenges from the perspective of local appropriate adult scheme leaders.   

Ashford, Kent, UK: National Appropriate Adult Network , 2023. 29p.  

By April M. Zeoli, Jennifer Paruk, Charles C. Branas, Patrick M. Carter, Rebecca Cunningham, Justin Heinze and Daniel W. Webster

We examined petition and respondent characteristics from extreme risk protection order (ERPO) cases in Oregon for the 15 months after implementation (n = 93). Most petitions were filed by law enforcement (65%) a were more likely to be granted than petitions filed by family/household members (p < 0.001). Most ERPO respondents were reported by petitioners to have histories of suicidality (73%) or interpersonal violence (75%), with over half of death threats, suicide threats, or suicide attempts with known timing occurring within 1 week of the petition being filed. Policy Implications: ERPO petitions and orders are overwhelmingly being used as intended, that is, specifically for cases of imminent risk of harm to self or others. Greater dissemination of public information about ERPOs may increase their appropriate use and the proportion of high-risk individuals and families who may benefit. Legal aid assistance for family or household members in filling out petitions is advisable.

United States, Criminology & Public Policy. 2021, 19pg