By The U.S. Department of Justice

On May 24, 2022, a mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, shook the nation. In the aftermath of the tragedy, there was significant public criticism of the law enforcement response to the shooting. At the request of the then mayor of Uvalde, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the law enforcement response to the mass shooting. In providing a detailed accounting and critical assessment of the first responder actions in Uvalde, and the efforts since to ameliorate gaps and deficiencies in that response, this report is intended to build on the knowledge base for responding to incidents of mass violence. It also will identify generally accepted practices for an effective law enforcement response to such incidents. Finally, it is intended to help honor the victims and survivors of the Robb Elementary School tragedy. 

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2024. 610p.

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

  In this volume, we describe the various processes involved in leading and designing the Mass Casualty Commission. The mass casualty of April 18 and 19, 2020, created profound grief, disruption, and destabilization in Nova Scotia and beyond. Early in our mandate, the Commission adopted the image and metaphor of rippled water to signify the breadth and depth of the impact of what happened over approximately 13 hours on April 18 to April 19, 2020, and in the aftermath. The ripple acknowledges that the immediate impact experienced by those most affected – the individuals, families, first responders, service providers, and local communities – was appropriately the starting point of our mandate. it also captures the dynamic impact of the mass casualty, which expanded outward and affected communities, institutions, and society in Nova Scotia, across Canada, in the United States, and further afield. The Commission saw every day how the mass casualty was a source of grief, bereavement, and trauma for many individuals, families, and communities. Some members of the Commission staff and their families live in Colchester, Cumberland, or Hants counties as well as throughout Nova Scotia. While acknowledging the unique nature and depth of loss for those whose loved ones were taken, regardless of where we live, the mass casualty to varying degrees affected everyone’s sense of safety, trust, and well-being. That impact will continue long past the conclusion of our mandate. As Commissioners, we were motivated by a desire to ensure that our collective work would provide answers and make positive contributions to community safety and well-being in the future. From our first days on the job we made a series of decisions about how best to carry out our mandate with the public interest at the forefront. in line with and throughout our mandate, we invited and endeavoured to seek and respond to input from directly affected Participants in the Commission’s process, while maintaining our independence. The mandate also directed that we not express any conclusion or recommendation regarding the civil or criminal  liability of any person or organization. This direction was not unique to our inquiry; the Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that all public inquiries are prohibited by law from making any findings or conclusions regarding civil and criminal liability….

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2023. 294p.

 By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

  in this volume, we build on the findings and conclusions reached so far by turning to the institutional context of policing. This volume addresses the policing dimensions of the following issues set out in our mandate: … (iii) interactions with police, including any specific relationship between the perpetrator and the RCMP and between the perpetrator and social services, including mental health services, prior to the event and the outcomes of those interactions, (iv) police actions, including operational tactics, response, decision-making and supervision, (v) communications with the public during and after the event, including the appropriate use of the public alerting system established under the Alert Ready program, (vi) communications between and within the RCMP, municipal police forces, the Canada Border Services Agency, the Criminal intelligence Service Nova Scotia, the Canadian Firearms Program, and the Alert Ready program, (vii) police policies, procedures and training in respect of gender-based and intimate partner violence, (viii) police policies, procedures and training in respect of active shooter incidents, … (x) policies with respect to police responses to reports of the possession of prohibited firearms, including communications between law enforcement agencies, and (xi) information and support provided to the families of victims, affected citizens, police personnel and the community  

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, , 2023. 722p.

By The  Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty 

Volume 2 sets out a narrative overview of what happened leading up to, during, and in the immediate aftermath of the Nova Scotia mass casualty on April 18 and 19, 2020. In addition, it contains our first set of main findings with respect to the perpetrator’s actions and the responses of individuals and the community, the RCMP, and other police and emergency response agencies. Volumes 3, 4, and 5 build on these main findings and examine them in light of the causes, circumstances, and context of these events. Our mandate directs us to include 11 specific issues as part of our examination of how and why the mass casualty occurred. We canvassed these specific issues in relation to three broad themes, and each of these themes is the subject of a volume in this Report: Violence (Volume 3), Community (Volume 4), and Policing (Volume 5). These volumes contain our additional findings and conclusions with respect to a range of topics within each theme, and they expand on them by identifying lessons to be learned and recommendations for action. The first three specific issues set out in our mandate relate to violence: (i) contributing and contextual factors, including the role of gender-based and intimate partner violence; (ii) access to firearms; (iii) interactions with police, including any specific relationship between the perpetrator and the RCMP and between the perpetrator and social services, including mental health services, prior to the event and the outcomes of those interactions.  

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2023. 517p.

By Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak and Brent R. Klein.

Research Summary: In this article, we argue that situ- ational crime prevention (SCP) strategies can be used to prevent public mass violence, as well as to mitigate the harms caused from those attacks that still occur. We draw from the SCP perspective generally, and its application to terrorism particularly, as well as from the public mass violence literature. We focus on the pillars of opportunity that include target selection, weapon selection, tools used, and conditions that facilitate public mass violence attacks.

Policy Implications: We conclude that SCP’s EVIL DONE risk assessment template could be refined for the public mass violence context. We argue that the exposed, occupied, nearer, and easy dimensions, along with a newly created personal grievance dimension, could be used to identify more at-risk settings that should receive more situational interventions to prevent these attacks. We similarly conclude that SCP’s other pillars could be used to prevent these attacks. We outline specific hard and soft interventions that could thwart these attacks. Importantly, we use examples to illustrate that SCP’s strategies could effectively mitigate the harms caused by public mass violence attacks that do occur. We also set forth research strategies to test our claims.

Criminology & Public Policy. 2020;19:271–293. DOI: 10.1111/1745-9133.12480