By  Griffin Sims Edwards and Stephen Rushin

This Article examines the effect of state laws restricting the use of police quotas. Police quotas describe the establishment of a predetermined number of traffic stops, citations, or arrests that officers must make within a particular time period. Some police supervisors have historically used quotas to ensure adequate productivity by officers. However, critics argue that quotas incentivize officers to engage in unnecessary, and in some cases, unconstitutional, coercive behavior. Numerous states across the country have enacted laws banning or limiting the use of police quotas.

This Article analyzes a dataset of traffic and pedestrian stops from eleven law enforcement agencies with varied laws on police quotas over time. It finds minimal evidence that laws limiting police quotas reduce coercive behavior by police. If anything, agencies may engage in slightly more coercive behavior after the introduction of these laws. However, we find evidence that restrictions on the use of police quotas may improve the quality of traffic stops and vehicle searches.

We offer several hypotheses to explain these results. First, the narrow focus of quota laws may limit their effectiveness. Second, the managerial tactics that replace police quotas may incentivize officers to engage in similar amounts of coercive behavior. And third, the relatively weak enforcement mechanisms in state quota bans may reduce their deterrent effect.

We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the literature on police regulation. We also offer recommendations for reforming police quota laws.

109 Iowa Law Review 2127 (2024), 

By Anne McNamara

During the height of the Civil Rights movement, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio crafted the policing power to stop and search an individual without a warrant, without probable cause, and if the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Thirty years later, in Whren v. United States, the Court willfully blinded itself to the subjective motivations of an officer who initiate a Terry stop, requiring only a claim of some lawful reason to initiate a stop to adhere to the Fourth Amendments protections. Despite overwhelming evidence that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence disparately affects Black people, the Court continuously asserts that the Equal Protection Clause (EPC)—not the Fourth Amendment—is the proper constitutional avenue for relief from race-motivated policing. Even a defendant who successfully overcomes the EPC’s practically insurmountable requirement of proving discriminatory intent is not afforded the exclusionary rule’s protection. Ultimately, the Court’s use of EPC as its suggested remedy provides little concrete relief for individuals subjected to pretextual stops. Against this backdrop of racially influenced law enforcement, the advent and development of Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) has fundamentally altered American policing over the past decade. FRT is an algorithmic code, created by private companies, capable of recognizing a person’s facial identity by comparing it to other faces that are located in a centralized database. Some critics of the police’s use of FRT warn of its disparate impact on people of color who already face higher instances of police surveillance. Further, critics caution that FRT algorithms have higher error rates in identifying people of color, that databases used are often overly saturated with people of color, and that the police’s unregulated, unrestrained use of FRT reinforces preconceived notions of “Black criminality.” Historically, federal courts have been reluctant to condemn police implementation of technological advances as violative of the Fourth Amendment. While the police are prohibited from using publicly unavailable technology to surveil the details of an individual’s home, technology deployed by law enforcement in a public space often escapes constitutional constraints. In some instances, however, defendants successfully challenge police use of advanced technology for surveillance purposes through the lens of mosaic theory, which assesses police behavior in the aggregate to determine whether prolonged periods of surveillance constitutes an invasion of privacy impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. In light of the Court’s silence regarding FRT, a handful of cities and states have enacted laws that curb or completely ban police use of FRT. On the federal level, the preceding Congress proposed two bills: one seeking to require probable cause for police to deploy the technology, the other seeking to implement a complete federal ban of FRT and to disincentivize state and local use by withholding certain funding. This Note first surveys the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that created a legal justice system that is willfully ignorant of an officer’s potential racial motivations.18 Then, this Note discusses the police’s implementation of FRT and how it further infringes upon Black people’s liberties and dignities under the guise of “neutral” technology. Next, this Note explores the Court’s reasoning in evolving technology and surveillances cases—with a particular emphasis on mosaic theory—and discusses state and proposed federal statutory approaches to FRT regulation. Then, this Note argues that the most dangerous uses of FRT are the least likely to be recognized and curbed by the Supreme Court due to its longstanding refusal to allow the constitution to check unrestrained police behavior, leaving Black people defenseless against FRT’s role in increasing the structural inequalities embedded in our legal system. This Note concludes by calling for a comprehensive federal ban on police use of FRT that adequately incentivizes state and local law enforcement to enact similar bans.

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. LVI:731 , 26p.

By Jessica M. Eaglin

Much public debate circles around grassroots activists’ demand to “defund the police,” raised in public consciousness in the summer of 2020. Yet confusion about the demand is pervasive. This Essay adopts a literal interpretation of “defund” to clarify and distinguish four alternative, substantive policy positions that legal reforms related to police funding can validate. It argues that the policy debates between these positions exist on top of the ideological critique launched by grassroots activists, who use the term “defund the police” as a discursive tactic to make visible deeper transformations in government practices that normalize the structural marginalization of black people enforced through criminal law. w. By recognizing this socially contextualized meaning to the call to defund the police, this Essay offers two important insights for the public in this current moment. First, it urges the public to confront the structural marginalization of black people when evaluating legal reforms that may impact police budgets. Second, the Essay encourages the public to embrace the state of confusion produced by the demand to “defund the police” when considering social reforms going forward.

Stanford Law Review Online Volume 73 (2020-2021), 21p.

By Stephanie Seguino, Nancy Brooks, Pat Autilio

This study has three goals. The first it to analyze police behavior as regards race and traffic policing. The second is to evaluate police compliance with the law requiring the collection and reporting of traffic stop data. And the third is to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation in generating robust data collection on race and traffic policing that is relatively user friendly for analysis by community stakeholders. With regard to the first goal, we examine the data for evidence of racial disparities in several areas: racial shares and magnitudes of stops as well as racial disparities in stop rates, reasons for stops, arrest rates, search rates, and contraband “hit” rates. We also examine trends to determine whether racial disparities fall over time, particularly in response to the legalization of cannabis in July 2018. Our study is based on more than 800,000 traffic stops and 79 Vermont law enforcement agencies. The study includes a number of agencies that had not reported their data in time for our earlier study (Seguino and Brooks 2017). In addition to providing a statewide overview of racial disparities, we compare policing patterns as well as racial disparities across agencies, and separately for municipal law enforcement agencies, sheriff’s departments, and the Vermont State Police. We report raw data on all agencies in our sample, and these results can be found in the appendix. We have been careful to include in the body of the report that follows agency-level statistics only for those agencies that have the minimum number of observations by race (typically, 10 or more). Our main findings are as follows: • The Black and Hispanic shares of stopped drivers exceed their shares of the estimated driving population. The data indicate Black drivers were over-stopped by between 3% to 81%, depending on the measure of the driving population used. Hispanic drivers were over-stopped by 26%. The shares of stops of all other racial groups are at or below their share of the driving population. These numbers represent a statewide average, and obscure wide variation at the agency level. We provide detailed agency-level data in the report, which show that approximately 45 agencies over-stopped Black drivers by more than 25%. • The stop rate per 1,000 residents is very high in Vermont (255 drivers stopped per 1,000 residents) compared to the national average of 86 per 1,000 residents. This overall average obscures notable racial disparities in stop rates. The statewide white stop rate per 1,000 white residents is 256 compared to 459 stops of Black drivers per 1,000 Black residents. The Black stop rate is about 80% higher than the white stop rate and matches the upper bound described above since one of our measures of the driving population of an area is its number of residents. • These averages also obscure the wide variation in stop rates per 1,000 residents. Of particular concern are agencies with large racial disparities in stop rates that also significantly over-stop relative to the national average. For example, in Bennington the overall stop rate per 1,000 residents is estimated to be 659 and Black drivers are over-stopped from 55% to 335% depending on the measure of driving population. • Black and Hispanic drivers were ticketed at a higher rate than white drivers, and Black drivers were also more likely to be given multiple tickets per stop. Our ability to report accurately on ticket rates is limited by data quality concerns as some agencies only report a single outcome per stop even when more than one outcome occurred, such as multiple tickets. • White drivers were more likely to be stopped for moving violations than Black drivers. Black drivers were more likely to experience a stop for vehicle equipment violations. We are concerned that this type of stop may be more investigatory and pretextual than moving violations. Stops that are investigatory/pretextual, based on suspicion of illegal activity rather than observable behavior or evidence, are more susceptible to officer racial bias than stops based on other reasons, such as a moving violation or suspicion of Driving While Impaired (DWI). Several experts have recommended banning this type of stop, which could help to reduce not only racial stop rate disparities but also search disparities. (A November 2019 ruling by the Oregon Supreme Court has banned this increasingly controversial policing practice). • The arrest rate of Black drivers is roughly 70% greater than that of white drivers. The Hispanic-white arrest rate disparity is even larger, with the arrest rate of Hispanic drivers 90% greater than the white arrest rate. Some agency-level disparities were much wider. In Brattleboro, Black drivers’ arrest rate is 400% greater than the white rate; in Colchester, 185% times greater. • Black drivers are about 3.5 times more likely to be searched subsequent to a stop than white drivers and Hispanic drivers are searched at a rate that is 3.9 times greater than that of white drivers. Asian drivers are less likely to be searched than white drivers. Again, some agencies exhibited much wider disparities than the state average. In Brattleboro, Black drivers are almost 9 times more likely to be searched than white drivers; in Shelburne, 4.4 times greater; in South Burlington; 3.9 times greater; in Vergennes, 3.8 times greater; in Burlington, 3.6 times greater; and in Rutland, 3.45 times greater. • Black, Hispanic, and Asian drivers were less likely to be found with contraband than white drivers. The lower hit rate (that is, the percentage of searches that yield contraband) of drivers of color is widely regarded as providing evidence the police rely on a lower bar of evidence to search drivers of color than white drivers, suggesting possible racial bias in the decision to search. In a second test (a logit analysis) for racial bias in searches, we find that the race of the driver continues to be strongly correlated with the officer’s decision to search a vehicle, even after controlling for other factors that may influence the officer’s decision to search a vehicle. • We find that searches based on reasonable suspicion (a lower threshold of evidence than probable cause) have lower hit rates for all racial groups. And, the gap between the (higher) white hit rates and (lower) hit rates for people of color increases. Just as with investigatory/pretextual stops, searches based on reasonable suspicion are more prone to racial bias. With regard to trends over time: • From 2015 to 2019, the number of traffic stops has increased for all racial groups. Sheriff’s Departments registered an 86.4% increase in traffic stops over this time period, compared to a statewide average for all agencies of 39.7%. • Racial disparities in the increase in number of traffic stops are notable. While stops of white drivers increased by 44.6% over this time period, Black stops increased 72.5%; Asian stops, 66.7%; and Hispanic stops, 120.3%. • The share of stops that are investigatory/pretextual, including vehicle equipment stops, increased for all racial groups, but increases were greatest for Black drivers—so much so that by 2019, about one third of all stops of Black drivers were included in this category, up from 23% in 2016. For Hispanics, the increases in the share of such stops was even greater, rising from 18.0% in 2015 to 27.5% in 2019. • Racial disparities in arrest rates have also widened since 2014. The widening gap is due to a decline in the white arrest rate from 2018 to 2019 rather than an increase in the Black arrest rate. • Search rates declined for all racial groups after cannabis legalization but by 2019, the Black search rate continued to be 3 times greater than the white rate. Legalization of cannabis, in other words, did not have a substantial impact on the Black-white search rate disparity. The Hispanic search rate disparity widened from 2018 to 2019 with Hispanic drivers 2.6 times more likely to be searched than white drivers by 2019. • Hit rates have decreased for searches that result in any outcome (warning, ticket, or arrest) but the arrest-worthy hit rate rose slightly from 20.3% to 24.9% from 2018 to 2019. As search rates have fallen, searches appear to be somewhat more productive with regard to those that lead to an arrest but are somewhat less productive overall. Increasing hit rates suggests greater efficiency in policing decisions regarding searches, and clearly, less negative impact on drivers for whom searches are often traumatic experiences. Regarding data quality, our main findings are: • Data quality has improved for some but not all agencies over time. There continues to be a lack of compliance with the legislation requiring race data collection during traffic stops. Missing data on all of the outcomes of a stop, when stops have more than one outcome, date and time of stop, and stops IDs also hinders analysis. • Particularly worrisome is the large number of stops missing race of driver, the main concern of traffic stop data collection. One way to put into perspective the quantity of missing data is to compare the share of stops missing race of driver to the percentage of stops that are of BIPOC drivers. Given the low percentages of people of color in Vermont, even a small amount of missing race data can distort results. For more than a dozen agencies, the percentage of stops missing race of driver is at least double the percentage of stops that are reported to be of BIPOC drivers. At a minimum, this leads to low quality data and the accuracy of results from those agencies. It also violates the spirit of the legislation requiring race data collection. • The legislation has not been sufficiently precise or comprehensive in delineating the data to be collected. Police chiefs have interpreted the meaning of various components of the legislation differently, and thus do not follow a uniform method of reporting data. Some categories of data that would be useful—and are already collected—were not stipulated in the legislation. Law enforcement agencies have as a result declined to share those data. These findings suggest the need to revise the legislation on traffic stop race data collection in order to insure complete data that is uniformly submitted so that it can be analyzed without excessive difficulty.    

Burlington, VT: University of Vermont, 2021. 159p.

By Susan Olzak

An underlying premise of democratic politics is that protest can be an effective form of civic engagement that shapes policy changes desired by marginalized groups. But it is not certain that this premise holds up under scrutiny. This paper presents a three-part argument that protest (a) signals the salience of a movements’ focal issue and expands awareness that an issue is a social problem requiring a solution, (b) empowers residents in disadvantaged communities and raises a sense of community cohesion, which together (c) raise costs and exert pressure on elites to make concessions. The empirical analysis examines the likelihood that a city will establish a Civilian Review Board (CRB). It then compares the effects of protest and CRB presence on counts of officer-involved fatalities by race and ethnicity. Two main conjectures about the effect of protest are supported: Cities with more protest against police brutality are significantly more likely to establish a CRB, and protest against police brutality reduces officer-involved fatalities for African Americans and Latinos (but not for Whites). But the establishment of CRBs does not reduce fatalities, as some have hoped. Nonetheless, mobilizing against police brutality matters, even in the absence of civilian review boards.

Forthcoming. “Does Protest Against Police Violence Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities, 1980-2019.” American Sociological Review., 83 p.

By Shelley S. Hyland

This report describes the purpose for developing the National Law Enforcement Accountability Database (NLEAD), a centralized repository of official records documenting instances of law enforcement officer misconduct as well as commendations and awards to help inform hiring, job assignment, and promotion decisions. It also provides statistics on the NLEAD’s records, the federal law enforcement officers included, and its usage. This is the first annual report, and it covers NLEAD records for events occurring in calendar years 2018 to 2023 and usage of the NLEAD from January 1, 2024 to August 31, 2024.

Launched on December 18, 2023, the NLEAD was established in accordance with Section 5 of Executive Order 14074, Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices To Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety. The Justice Management Division was given responsibility for developing and maintaining the NLEAD, and BJS was given responsibility for producing the annual report.

Highlights

● As of September 20, 2024:

○ All federal law enforcement agencies required to report to the

NLEAD (N=90) and four additional agencies voluntarily submitted records or submitted documentation that they had zero qualifying incidents for all their officers for 2018–2023.

○ There were 4,790 records of federal officer misconduct and 4,011 federal law enforcement officers in the NLEAD for 2018–2023.

● In 2018–2023, 63% (3,031) of incidents in the NLEAD were for sustained complaints or records of disciplinary action based on findings of serious misconduct.

● From January 1, 2024 to August 31, 2024, 9,985 searches were conducted on records in the NLEAD.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 15p.

By The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC)

The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) examined over 500 motor vehicle stops conducted by New Jersey State Police (NJSP) that ended with no enforcement. OSC looked at body-worn camera footage of stops that are rarely, if ever, watched—stops where tickets were not given, arrests were not made, and no one was even ordered to exit their vehicle. Most of the traffic stops OSC reviewed started with the trooper briefly explaining the reason for the stop and requesting a driver’s license, registration, and insurance. But in more than one out of four stops reviewed, the motorist presented a courtesy card, asserted a personal relationship with a law enforcement officer, or even flashed a law enforcement badge. When that happened, the side-of-the-road interactions between the motorists and the stopping troopers shifted, and in some cases, shifted dramatically.

Sometimes, the motorist boldly handed over a courtesy card, occasionally in lieu of driving credentials, and the stop resolved relatively quickly with the trooper offering some version of “you’re good.” Other times, a driver volunteered “my dad is a lieutenant” or “my best friend works at [insert name of any law enforcement agency]” and received remarkably solicitous treatment from the trooper. This was the case even when the drivers were stopped for dangerous traffic infractions, such as driving more than 100 miles per hour or suspected drunk driving. The most serious consequence the troopers imposed in these stops was advising the motorists that they left a voicemail message for the law enforcement officer named on the courtesy card or invoked as a friend or relative. In one instance of suspected drunk driving, the trooper also warned the driver to “stay off my highway,” after reminding him how bad things would be if he crashed under the circumstances.

OSC’s Police Accountability Project initiated this investigation in response to multiple reports that New Jersey law enforcement officers’ exercise of discretion in motor vehicle stops is often influenced by improper factors, such as courtesy cards given to or purchased by motorists. OSC reviewed more than 3,000 minutes of body-worn camera footage, which included 501 traffic stops conducted by a sample of NJSP troopers over a ten-day period in late 2022. In doing so, OSC found evidence of a two-tiered system in which motorists with ties to law enforcement—no matter how tenuous—were given preferential treatment.

Among the findings:

Courtesy cards—which are given out by police labor associations and sold by private companies online—appear to be in wide usage and function as accepted currency. Of the 501 stops OSC reviewed, 87 motorists presented courtesy cards which came from municipal police departments, county and state agencies, as well as inter-state and out-of-state law enforcement agencies. They all appeared to be equally effective at getting motorists released without enforcement.

Motorists who asserted personal relationships with law enforcement have similarly strong social capital that often has the same effect as a courtesy card. In ten percent of the stops, the motorist did not present a courtesy card but cited a relationship to a law enforcement officer and was able to evade any consequences, even for serious motor vehicle violations. In one stop, a driver was speeding 103 miles per hour. The trooper released her after she said her father was a lieutenant. Another motorist, stopped for tailgating, speeding, and driving over the median in a tunnel, was released promptly after he cited a friendship with a law enforcement officer.

Many active duty law enforcement officers were observed using their official government position to get out of a ticket. Some volunteered that they were law enforcement, some flashed badges, and in one instance, a trooper sitting in the back seat of a car offered up his badge number.

Troopers’ decisions to grant preferential treatment to motorists who have courtesy cards or asserted close personal relationships with law enforcement seem to be having a discriminatory impact. White motorists were more likely to hold a courtesy card or assert a relationship to law enforcement. Of the 87 courtesy cards observed in the sample, for instance, 69 were presented by White drivers, while Black, Hispanic/LatinX, Asian, and other drivers presented a combined 18 courtesy cards.

NJSP policy requires troopers to request and review driving credentials (driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance) for all stopped drivers. Yet, drivers without courtesy cards or a close relationship with law enforcement were more likely to have all three driving credentials requested and verified by the trooper, more likely to have the trooper take the extra step of conducting a full motor vehicle lookup in the computer, and more likely to be given some form of a warning.

An overall analysis of the full sample revealed racial disparities that went beyond courtesy cards. White and Asian drivers were less likely to have all three of their credentials requested and verified when compared to Black and Hispanic/LatinX drivers. And Hispanic/LatinX drivers who were stopped were generally subjected to a more thorough computerized lookup. Most striking, troopers conducted computerized lookups of Hispanic/LatinX drivers 65 percent of the time, while looking up White drivers only 34 percent of the time.

Out of the 501 stops that resulted in no enforcement, 232 related to speeding. At least 80 of those stops were for 20 or more miles per hour over the speed limit. Speeding is one of the common causes of traffic fatalities.

In short, this two-tiered system of justice that provides differing treatment for those with law enforcement connections and those without is unethical, discriminatory, and fundamentally unfair. It also contributes to making New Jersey roads less safe. Traffic fatalities on New Jersey roads continue to rise, with fatal crashes at the end of November 2024 already well surpassing the number of fatal crashes from the prior year. Impaired driving and speeding are some of the leading causes of accidents. Millions of public dollars are allocated to law enforcement agencies throughout the state to prioritize safety initiatives and adherence to traffic laws. Yet for some drivers, these priorities do not seem to apply.

For these reasons, and those set forth in more detail below, OSC makes 11 recommendations and has also made appropriate referrals. OSC’s findings also make clear that regular review of no enforcement stops could provide valuable insight into officer discretion and also could reveal why particular data trends persist, highlight the need for training or retraining and updates to policies, and ensure that the motor vehicle laws are being enforced fairly and equitably. While some of the drivers in this sample had courtesy cards or asserted relationships to law enforcement, many did not, and yet still avoided any consequences for often serious violations.

Trenton: New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, 2024. 38p.

By Susan Olzak

Though it has had a long history, the recent social movement aimed at stopping police violence against minorities has consistently endorsed policies designed to make police conduct more accountable. This paper analyzes the effects of protest in cities on the establishment of Citizen Review Boards (CRBs) in recent decades. It also examines whether or not the presence of a CRB influences subsequent rates of police-involved fatalities in cities.

Preprint, 2020.

By Matthew B. Ross

 1. Introduction In November 2021, the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (NJOPIA) engaged the author of this study for the purpose of conducting an independent analysis of traffic stops made by the New Jersey State Police (NJ-SP). Based on the author’s extensive experience working with state and local policymakers to develop early warning systems for identifying police disparities, the NJ OPIA requested that the analysis focus on the central question of whether there was disparate treatment on the part of NJ-SP towards racial and ethnic minorities.2 After cleaning and linking all of the raw data provided by the New Jersey Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards (NJ-OLEPS), the analytical sample used in this analysis consisted of 6,177,109 traffic stops made by NJ-SP from 2009 to 2021. In the full analytical sample, 60.52 percent of traffic stops were made of White non-Hispanic motorists while 18.8 percent were Black/African-American and 13.44 percent were Hispanic/Latinx. The overall volume of minority motorists stopped by NJ-SP increased from 35.34 percent in 2009 to 46.28 percent in 2021. The overarching finding from the analysis of the NJ-SP data from 2009-21 is that there was extremely strong evidence of a large and persistent disparity both is the decision to stop as well as the decision to engage in post-stop enforcement like search, vehicular exits, use of force, and arrest. In general, the results were estimated with a very high degree of statistical confidence, survived multiple robustness tests, and were found across most years and troops/stations. In the opinion of this study’s author, these disparities represent strong empirical evidence that NJ-SP is engaged in enforcement practices that result in adverse treatment towards minority motorists. Following best practices, this study applies an ensemble of the most reliable statistical tests available in the scientific literature. The intuition of this approach is that the shortcomings of any individual test are overcome by the totality of the evidence produced by a multitude of tests examining a broad set of enforcement outcomes.

Boston: Northeastern University, 2023. 44p.

By Madison, Wisconsin Police Department

  In August 2023, Madison City Council passed a resolution authorizing the Implementation of the Body-Worn Camera Experiment Program. The resolution included multiple attachments that provide a history of the body worn cameras (BWC), feasibility reports, example policy, public comments, Alder amendments, legal review, and Chief Barnes’ memo requesting approval to conduct the experiment. The resolution represents a culmination of several years of effort by city residents, staff and alders. The experiment program consisted of technology, research and cost estimates. The technology portion began April 1, 2024, and was completed July 14. The BWC units were worn by officers in the North District. The first two weeks consisted of setting up and assigning units to officers, testing, and training. The use of body worn cameras began in the field on April 15. The BWC units were loaned by MPD’s existing dash camera vendor for the duration of experiment. The research was conducted by an outside researcher; Dr. Broderick Turner at Virginia Tech. Police Director Eleazer Hunt and members of the BWC Committee met with Dr. Turner multiple times to identify needed data and survey questions. This report includes Dr. Turner’s findings (Appendix A) and a budget estimate for implementation (Appendix B). Estimates are based on full deployment of BWC across MPD, the acquisition of hardware, operations/storage needs, peripherals, personnel, and support several years of operation. During the experiment, an interim Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) guided the use of BWC (Appendix C). This SOP is informed by the Police Body-Worn Camera Feasibility Review Committee, MPD’s current SOP for dash cameras and audio microphones , and a review of model policies developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the U.S. Department of Justice. Findings from the experiment: 1- Officers did not change behavior while wearing a BWC 2- Charges were not added when officers reviewed video 3- Technical issues related to battery life and uploading video were evident in the first half of the experiment and resolved 4- Specific situational use of BWC required clarification of the SOP 5- The limitations of the experiment included a short duration, a small number of officers participated, there was limited time for analysis (interviews), and no post-experiment analysis 6- BWC may help with trust building, legitimacy, and transparency  7- Public Records requests impacted staff time to research, redact, and provide videos to requestors  

Madison, WI: City Police Department, 2024. 47p.

By Elda Celislami, Stephen Kastoryano, Giovanni Mastrobuoni:

Police accountability is essential to uphold the social contract. Monitoring the monitors is, however, not without difficulty. This paper reveals how police departments exploit specific laws surrounding death investigations to facilitate the underreporting of police killings. Our results show that US counties in which law enforcement can certify the cause of death, including counties which appoint the sheriff as the lead death investigator, display 46% more underreported police killings than their comparable adjacent counties. Drawing on a novel adapted-LATE potential outcomes framework, we demonstrate that underreported police killings are most often reclassified as 'circumstances undetermined' homicides. We also show that law enforcement agencies in counties with permissive death certification laws withhold more homicide reports from the public. The main underreporting results are primarily driven by underreporting of White and Hispanic deaths in our analysis sample, with the effect on Hispanic people particularly pronounced along the US-Mexico border. We do not find that excess underreported killings are associated with more violence directed towards police. We do, however, note a nationwide positive correlation between the permissiveness of gun-laws and underreported police killings. In addition, we find more underreporting in counties which have both high per-capita Google searches for Black Lives Matter and which allow law enforcement to certify the cause of death. Our results do not indicate that other differences in death investigation systems - coroner vs. medical examiner, appointed vs. elected, or physician vs. non-physician - affect the underreporting of police killings.

Bonn, Germany:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2023. 72p.

By Julie Berg and Emily Mann

The authors undertook a literature review on intersectionality and policing to provide a critical, impact-based account of scholarly/academic engagement with policing and intersectionality. This review informs an intersectional good practice toolkit by which police organisations can better engage with the phenomenon of intersectionality and its implications for policing and ‘seldom heard communities’. Additionally, the authors hosted two interactive workshops to share preliminary findings, consult with academics and police practitioners and request feedback. The review highlighted that intersectional convergence of certain social identities and characteristics can provide complex challenges for policing, for example: The impact of micro-interactions between the police and those with intersecting social identities. Meso-level institutional issues may mitigate or aggravate negative interactions between the police and those with intersecting identities (such as police culture, resources, specialist training, and/or whether the police have specialist teams or programmes). Macro-level factors; the police operate under broader structural influences and power dynamics which negatively impact on certain groups, and which is informed by both historical and contemporary factors such as law, policy, political and public discourses and expectations.

Edinburgh: Scottish Police Academy, 2023. 71p.

By Brian Rappert, Otto Adang, Aline Daillère, Jasper De Paepe (UGent) , Abi Dymond, Marleen Easton (UGent) and Stephen Skinner

The use of force by the police and other law enforcement officers has long been a significant topic of concern, especially when it results in death. This issue and the controversies around it have recently been highlighted by a series of high-profile deaths in 2020. Police Lethal Force and Accountability assesses the frequency of deaths, and the availability and reliability of information regarding deaths, associated with the application of force by law enforcement agencies in four jurisdictions: Belgium, England & Wales, France and the Netherlands. By adopting a common set of considerations for assessing the policies and practices within these individual jurisdictions, this report enables comparisons to be made across them. In doing so, we look to provide those in policing agencies, campaigning groups, government ministries and others, with sound information with which they can identify priorities to ensure uses of force are being accurately recorded and investigated. By enabling those concerned to understand how uses of force are recorded and addressed in comparison with other jurisdictions, we hope this report will help them to build a stronger case when holding public institutions accountable and identifying points for improvement. As documented, while deaths from the use of force appear relatively rare across these four jurisdictions when compared to countries such as the US1 , the procedures 1 In the US, roughly 1,110 police killings have taken place annually over recent years, see https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/national trends, (accessed 4 December 2020). and policies for recording, investigating and disclosing details associated with deaths are wanting. The availability of official information on the number of deaths associated with the use of force, its reliability, and the extent of details collected on those that die at the hands of the state vary from country to country. While there are elements of good practice, the procedures and policies are often lacking in critical respects. As a result of such deficiencies, it is difficult to assess many important dimensions of policing, including whether some communities are disproportionality subjected to the lethal use of force. Ultimately, reducing the extent of police force requires addressing underlying societal conditions associated with employment, health, housing and education. However, more can be done by law enforcement agencies, as well as by their oversight bodies and government ministers. Assembling data and evidence that is accessible, relevant and useful to those concerned with lethal force is a necessary step to enhance accountability for, and possibly prevent, deaths. In the context of democratic societies, the police and police-related bodies not only need to act on what they know in order to learn lessons, but also to demonstrate they are doing so to the populations they are meant to serve. Every death associated with the use of force by law enforcement officials should be recorded, recognised and investigated. No one’s death should go unacknowledged and unexamined.

Exeter, UK: University of Exeter, et al. 2020. 63p.