By W. Bradford Wilcox | Rafael A. Mangual | Seth Cannon | Joseph E. Price

The debate about how best to respond to urban crime—a debate that has become more important in light of recent increases in violent crime and homicide in many cities across America—has tended to focus on two perspectives. The first prioritizes tackling the “social structural factors” (unemployment, economic inequality, poverty, etc.) that are thought to be the “root causes” of crime, and violent crime, in particular. A second perspective rejects this structural approach in favor of a strategy that relies on traditional law-enforcement institutions (namely, police, prosecutors, and jails/prisons), often citing the sharp violent crime declines of the 1990s and 2000s that occurred in the wake of new policing and prosecutorial approaches—even in the face of structural realities said to be at the root of the urban crime problem.

But a third perspective seeks to understand how the fragile state of core social institutions—schools, churches, youth sports leagues, and, above all, families—in too many of our cities may also have a hand in urban crime. Princeton sociologist Patrick Sharkey, for instance, has argued that nonprofits “focused on reducing violence and building stronger communities” are linked to lower rates of violent crime in cities across the country. In a new Institute for Family Studies report, we turn our attention to the core institution of family. Drawing on the work of scholars like Harvard sociologist Robert Sampson—who found that “(f)amily structure is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, predictors of … urban violence across cities in the United States”—we explore the relationship between family structure and urban crime in the 21st century. Specifically, we address this question: How is family structure associated with crime, violent crime, and homicide rates in American cities—and with these outcomes in Chicago neighborhoods?

We find that cities are safer when two-parent families are dominant and more crime-ridden when family instability is common. The same story applies to the neighborhoods of Chicago. More specifically, we find the total crime rate is about 48% higher in cities that have above the median share of single-parent families, compared to cities that have fewer single-parent families. That difference is even larger with respect to violent crime and homicide, specifically, with cities above the median level of single parenthood experiencing 118% higher rates of violent crime and 255% higher rates of homicide. In the Windy City, relying on an analysis of census tract level data, our research indicates that neighborhoods above the median fraction of single-parent-headed households experienced 137% higher total crime rates, 226% higher violent crime rates, and 436% higher homicide rates.

When controlling for additional factors such as racial composition, poverty rates, and educational attainment levels, we find that the association between family structure and total crime rates, as well as violent crime rates, in cities across the United States remains statistically significant. However, the association between family structure and homicide in cities does not. In Chicago, the links between family structure and both violent crime and homicide rates at the neighborhood level were significant, net of controls, but not the total crime rate. In addition to the question of whether there exists a statistical relationship between family structure and crime—a question we generally answer in the affirmative—this study also offers possible answers to the question of what might explain the relationships between family instability and crime.

Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of social science research, we theorize that this relationship is likely a byproduct of some mix of the heightened risk of family instability in the socialization of young children and the role that father absence plays in providing less guidance and oversight for adolescent and young adult males.

Particularly in light of the pre-existing literature on the role of family structure in various life outcomes, these findings may have important implications for policymakers. They suggest the need to encourage more young Americans—particularly those living in vulnerable neighborhoods with both high rates of violence and out-of-wedlock childbearing—toward forming strong and stable families in marriage.

Washington, DC: Institute for Family Studies, 2023. 21p.

By Deborah Witzburg and Tobara Ricihardson

  As mandated by the consent decree entered in Illinois v. Chicago, the Public Safety section of the City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG) has conducted an inquiry into the enforcement of the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD or the Department) Rule 14, which prohibits CPD members from “[m]aking a false report, written or oral.”1 Alleged violations of CPD’s Rules and Regulations are usually investigated by CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) and by the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), with the most serious of police disciplinary cases being adjudicated by the Chicago Police Board.2 All of these entities come within the scope of OIG’s inquiry into the enforcement of CPD’s rule against false reports. The truthfulness and credibility of police officers is foundational to the fair administration of justice, and to CPD’s effectiveness as a law enforcement agency. CPD, COPA, and the Police Board have each publicly expressed the view that these qualities in CPD members are integral to their ability to perform their duties and that a member’s violation of Rule 14 poses important risks, including undermining their ability to offer testimony in criminal prosecutions arising from CPD’s arrests. Due to the severity of the impact that stems from a CPD member making a false statement or report, CPD and COPA have reported the position that separation (i.e., termination of employment) is the appropriate disciplinary penalty when a member is found to have violated Rule 14.   

Chicago: City of Chicago, Office of inspector General, 2023. 61p.

By David Weisburd, David B. Wilson, Kevin Petersen, Cody W. Telep

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (KCPPE) was seen by its developers to have produced “consistent evidence of the lack of effects of any consequence on crime,” a conclusion that was to have a strong impact on assumptions about police patrol for almost half a century. We identified the original official crime data from the KCPPE, and reanalyzed outcomes focusing on a comparison of the “proactive” versus “control” beats (“reactive beats” were criticized because of violations of treatment integrity); examining broad categories of crime (to increase statistical power); and using count regression models. Our findings are not unequivocal, but point to modest impacts of police patrol on crime in police beats.

Policy Implications: Our findings suggest that lessons drawn for half a century from the KCPPE need to be revisited. The KCPPE does not show that police patrol in large areas has no influence on crime, and this finding is consistent with several more recent studies. At the same time, we note that the effects of patrol in the KCPPE using our analysis strategy, and those found in other studies of preventive patrol in larger areas, are about half that found in hot spots policing studies. This suggests that police agencies ideally should invest in focused hot spots policing initiatives. However, absent an ability to manage such initiatives, or the crime analysis capabilities to identify crime hot spots routinely, simpler preventive patrol schemes to utilize uncommitted patrol time can be seen as potentially effective in preventing crime.

Criminology and Public Policy,  2023: 1-18

By Johann Koehler, Tony Cheng
We show how both the Chicago Police Department and the New York Police Department sought to settle uncertainty about their propriety and purpose during a period when abrupt transformations destabilized urban order and called the police mandate into question. By comparing annual reports that the Chicago Police Department and the New York Police Department published from 1877 to 1923, we observe two techniques in how the police enacted that settlement: identification of the problems that the police believed themselves uniquely well equipped to manage and authorization of the powers necessary to do so. Comparison of identification and authorization yields insights into the role that these police departments played in convergent and divergent constructions of disorder and, in turn, into Progressivism's varying effects in early urban policing.

Criminology, 2023:1-28

By Wesley G. Skogan , Susan M. Hartnett

In describing successes and limitations of the CP program in Chicago and experimental districts where the CP program was first employed, the authors trace the CP program from its inception to its application in the field and examine the roots of CP and the implementation of CP in the context of political, racial, and fiscal realities. The first chapter of the book defines CP and describes some of the obstacles to making it work in practice. The second chapter discusses the conditions leading to the adoption of CP in Chicago, while the third chapter details the planning process and the eventual deployment of police officers to carry out the CP program. The fourth chapter discusses Chicago's CP program, known as CAPS (Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy). Other chapters explore the public's vital role in CP, linkages between the police and other city agencies, the impact of CP on the quality of life, and lessons learned from Chicago's experience. The authors conclude the CP program has resulted in substantial benefits for most Chicago residents.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 268p.