By Morgan C. Williams Jr., Nathan Weil, Elizabeth A. Rasich, Jens Ludwig, Hye Chang, and Sophia Egrari

Body-worn cameras (BWCs) are an increasingly common tool for police oversight, accountability, and transparency, yet there remains uncertainty about their impacts on policing outcomes. This paper reviews what we know about the benefits of BWCs and how those benefits compare to the costs of this new technology. We make two contributions relative to existing research. First, we update prior meta-analyses of studies of the impacts of BWCs on policing outcomes to incorporate the most recent, and largest, studies carried out to date in this literature. This additional information provides additional support for the idea that cameras may affect a number of policing outcomes that are important from a social welfare perspective, particularly police use of force. Second, we carry out a benefit-cost analysis of BWCs, as financial barriers are often cited as a key impediment to adoption by police departments. Our baseline estimate for the benefit-cost ratio of BWCs is 4.95. Perhaps as much as one-quarter of the estimated benefits accrue to government budgets directly, which suggests the possibility that this technology could, from the narrow perspective of government budgets, even pay for itself.

Chicago: Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, 2021. 32p.

By Philip Matthew Stinson, Sr., John Liederbach, Steven P. Lab and Steven L. Brewer, Jr

There are no comprehensive statistics available on problems with police integrity, and no government entity collects data on all criminal arrests of law enforcement officers in the United States. Police crimes are those crimes committed by sworn law enforcement officers with the general powers of arrest. These crimes can occur while the officer is either on- or off-duty and include offenses committed by officers employed by state and local law enforcement agencies. This study provides a wealth of data on a phenomena that relates directly to police integrity— data that previously did not exist in any useable format. The first goal of the study is to determine the nature and extent of police crime in the United States. The objective for this goal is to determine the incidence and prevalence of officers arrested. A second goal is to determine what factors influence how an agency responds to arrests of its officers.

Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University, 2016. 671p.

By William H. Sousa and George L. Kelling

This study evaluates explanations that have been advanced for the sharp decline in crime in New York City during the 1990s. The authors consider arguments that crime in New York City during the 1990s. The authors consider arguments that crime drops have been the result of socio-economic factors, such as an improving economy, falling numbers of teenaged males, and declining use of crack cocaine. They also consider the argument that police interventions—particularly the enforcement of laws against minor crimes, known as "broken windows" policing—played a major role.

New York: Manhattan Institute, Center for Civic Innovation, 2001. 32p.

By Priscillia Hunt, Jessica Saunders and John S. Hollywood

Even though there is a growing interest in predictive policing, to date there have been few, if any, formal evaluations of these programs. This report documents an assessment of a predictive policing effort in Shreveport, Louisiana, in 2012, which was conducted to evaluate the crime reduction effects of policing guided by statistical predictions. RAND researchers led multiple interviews and focus groups with the Shreveport Police Department throughout the course of the trial to document the implementation of the statistical predictive and prevention models. In addition to a basic assessment of the process, the report shows the crime impacts and costs directly attributable to the strategy. It is hoped that this will provide a fuller picture for police departments considering if and how a predictive policing strategy should be adopted.

There was no statistically significant change in property crime in the experimental districts that applied the predictive models compared with the control districts; therefore, overall, the intervention was deemed to have no effect. There are both statistical and substantive possibilities to explain this null effect. In addition, it is likely that the predictive policing program did not cost any more than the status quo.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 88p.

ByTanaya Devi and Roland G. Fryer Jr,

This paper provides the first empirical examination of the impact of federal and state "Pattern-or-Practice" investigations on crime and policing. For investigations that were not preceded by "viral" incidents of deadly force, investigations, on average, led to a statistically significant reduction in homicides and total crime. In stark contrast, all investigations that were preceded by "viral" incidents of deadly force have led to a large and statistically significant increase in homicides and total crime. We estimate that these investigations caused almost 900 excess homicides and almost 34,000 excess felonies. The leading hypothesis for why these investigations increase homicides and total crime is an abrupt change in the quantity of policing activity. In Chicago, the number of police-civilian interactions decreased by almost 90% in the month after the investigation was announced. In Riverside CA, interactions decreased 54%. In St. Louis, self-initiated police activities declined by 46%. Other theories we test such as changes in community trust or the aggressiveness of consent decrees associated with investigations -- all contradict the data in important ways.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020. 63p.

By Sungwoo Cho, Felipe Gonçalves, and Emily Weisburst

Do reductions in arrests increase crime? We study line-of-duty deaths of police officers, events that likely impact police behavior through increased fear but are unlikely to directly impact civilian behavior. Officer deaths cause significant short-term reductions in all arrest types, with the largest reductions in arrests for lower-level offenses. In contrast, we find no evidence of an increase in crime or a change in victim reporting through 911 calls. There is also no apparent threshold of arrest decline beyond which crime increases. Our findings suggest that enforcement activity can be reduced at the margin without incurring public safety costs.

Bonn, Germany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2021. 69p.

By Aaron Chalfin, David Mitre-Becerril and Morgan C. Williams, Jr.

In December 2014 and January 2015, police officers in New York City engaged in an organized slowdown of police work to protest the murder of two police officers who were targeted by a gunman while sitting in their patrol car. An influential 2017 article in Nature Human Behaviour studies the effect of the NYPD’s work slowdown on major crimes and concludes that the slowdown led to a significant improvement in public safety. Contrary to the remainder of the literature, the authors conclude that proactive policing can cause an increase in crime. We re-evaluate this claim and point out several fatal weaknesses in the authors’ analysis that call this finding into question. In particular, we note that there was considerable variation in the intensity of the slowdown across NYC communities and that the communities which experienced a more pronounced reduction in police proactivity did not experience the largest reductions in major crime. The authors’ analysis constitutes a quintessential example of an ecological fallacy in statistical reasoning, a logical miscalculation in which inferences from aggregated data are mistakenly applied to a more granular phenomenon. We raise several additional and equally compelling concerns regarding the tests presented in the paper and conclude that there is little evidence that the slowdown led to short-term changes in major crimes in either direction.

Department of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania. Department of Economics, Barnard College, Columbia University , 2021. 38p.

By Bocar A. Ba and Roman G. Rivera

Does policing the police increase crime? We avoid simultaneity effects of increased public oversight during a major scandal by identifying events in Chicago that only impacted officers’ self-imposed monitoring. We estimate crime’s response to self- and public-monitoring using regression discontinuity and generalized synthetic control methods. Self-monitoring, triggered by police union memos, significantly reduced serious complaints without impacting crime or effort. However, after a scandal, both civilian complaints and crime rates rise, suggesting that higher crime rates following heightened oversight results from de-policing and civilian behavior simultaneously changing. Our research suggests that proactive internal accountability improves police-community relations without increasing crime.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, 2019. 89p.

By Desmond Ang

Nearly a thousand officer-involved killings occur each year in the United States. This paper documents the large, racially-disparate impacts of these events on the educational and psychological well-being of Los Angeles public high school students. Exploiting hyperlocal variation in how close students live to a killing, I find that exposure to police violence leads to persistent decreases in GPA, increased incidence of emotional disturbance and lower rates of high school completion and college enrollment. These effects are driven entirely by black and Hispanic students in response to police killings of other minorities and are largest for incidents involving unarmed individuals.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, 2020. 81p.

By Jonathan P. Caulkins and Keith Humphreys

Drug policy often comprises efforts to reduce the supply of drugs, to provide health and social services to addicted individuals, and to prevent the development of addiction in the first place. The last of these efforts—prevention—is the subject of this paper. The scientific literature on drug policy offers some insights on the relative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of different strategies for preventing traditional opioid misuse and related harm. But these insights don’t apply perfectly to the current opioid crisis in the U.S. and Canada, due to many important differences between today’s epidemic and those of the past (e.g., heroin in the 1960s and 1970s). School-based universal primary prevention programs, for example, will probably remain only modestly effective, mainly because it is mostly adults, rather than adolescents, who initiate opioid use through prescription drugs. However, there are new opportunities for prevention, including promoting safer opioid prescribing, and issuing public health warnings about fentanyl’s dangers and the need to keep prescription opioids locked up. Importantly, the audience for these prevention interventions can include prescribers and pharmacists, not just potential users, and the mechanisms should involve incentives and nudges, not just information and education. Classic drug law enforcement against retail sellers and their suppliers may become even less effective than it has been in the past. However, other forms of supply control are possible because most of the prescription opioids that get misused come from legal and regulated distribution. Because prescription opioids remain the dominant route through which opioid use disorder is initiated, reducing its incidence can translate over time into reduced deaths not only from prescription opioids, but also from heroin and fentanyl. Enforcement against licensed producers and distributors may perform well even if enforcement against traditional dealers does not, and there are a wide range of actions visa-vis these licensees that do not require arrest or incarceration.

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2020. 24p.

The synthetic opioid crisis in North America has increased fatal overdose rates to unprecedented levels within a matter of a few years. It involves new technologies, a new source of supply (the chemical industry in China), and new forms of distribution (the internet and mail). These elements are perhaps even more difficult to suppress than other supply sources from foreign countries. This has led to an assumption that nothing can be learned from prior experience in trying to control drug markets.

This paper applies the insights of the “focused deterrence” approach developed by David Kennedy and Mark Kleiman, which involves using multiple levers to attain a specific policy goal. We conclude with some specific suggestions for local and national supply-control agencies— including the need to focus more on regulating rather than reducing markets to minimize harm, and to distinguish between markets not yet swamped by fentanyl or in transition and those where the drug is entrenched. Strategies appropriate in one context may not serve well in another.

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2020. 21p.

By Liz Ward, Sian Nicholas and Maria Willoughby

The Tackling Knives Action Programme (TKAP) ran initially from June 2008 until March 2009 and aimed to reduce teenage knife crime in ten police force areas in England and Wales. TKAP Phase II was then launched and the programme re-branded into the Tackling Knives and Serious Youth Violence Action Programme. Phase II ran from April 2009 to March 2010 in 16 police force areas (the original ten TKAP forces and six new areas)1 and aimed to reduce all serious violence involving 13- to 24-year-olds using a range of enforcement, education and prevention initiatives.

London: Home Office, 2011. 67p.

By Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center

This report examines the weapons and equipment generally at the disposal of law enforcement officers in several countries around the world. It also provides, for each of these countries, a brief overview of the rules governing the use of weapons by law enforcement officers. Precise and reliable information on the weapons and equipment of some countries’ police forces was often difficult to find. Nevertheless, certain interesting facts and patterns emerged from the Law Library’s research.

Washington, DC: Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, 2014. 106p.

The Knife Crime Prevention Programme: Process Evaluation

By Grant Thornton UK LLP

The Knife Crime Prevention Programme (KCPP) is an intervention which aims to reduce the prevalence of knife carrying and use by young people. Young people are referred to the programme if they are aged between 10 and 17 and have been convicted of an offence where a knife or the threat of a knife is a feature. The programme is based on a national delivery framework, with flexibility for local adaptation. It was rolled out as part of the Home Office ‘Tackling Knives Action Programme’ (TKAP). This process evaluation was commissioned to:  provide a picture of the implementation and delivery of KCPP  explore participants’ knowledge, perceptions and attitudes to knife crime before and after the programme  explore staff attitudes to the programme.

London: Youth Justice Board for England and Wales 2013. 29p.

By Jeremy Schoenfelder

This research investigated the theft of copper, including scope, impacts, and countermeasures. The researchers completed a literature review to demonstrate a global perspective of the problem. They took a survey of other state departments of transportation, utility companies, and developers to determine both successful and unsuccessful techniques being used to deter copper theft and the impact copper theft had on other geographical regions and other industries. Additionally, the researchers conducted a site survey to gain knowledge of the specific issues impacting the Arizona Department of Transportation and what mitigation techniques it was implementing. During the time of the research it was found: 1. The Arizona Department of Transportation estimates that costs over the last two years have exceeded $500,000. 2. The Arizona Department of Transportation has been diligent in implementing and adapting various methods and/or techniques to prevent copper theft and apprehend culprits. Suggested mitigation techniques include: 1. Implement a collaborative effort among ADOT, the

contracted private investigation firm, and outside consultant(s) to review and amend efforts on a periodic basis to maximize effectiveness through a thinktank type of approach. 2. Implement a program that would monitor ongoing development of methods used by other organizations. 3. Make particular use of the Copper Keeper, a device that makes it difficult to pull wire through conduit by locking the wire in place through the tightening of a compression bolt.

Rockville, MD: MITC (Mid-Atlantic Innovative Technology Center), 2009. 51p.

By International Union of Railways

Metal theft is a big problem for railway networks as thieves target signalling cables, overhead power lines and even metal fences to sell it for scrap. Railway networks are designed to fail safe, which means that when a cable is cut, trains are brought to a stop. This protects passengers but can lead to long and frustrating delays while the problem is examined and fixed safely. This type of crime causes considerable disruptions and the costs that are associated with replacing and repairing the damage often massively exceed the value of the metal stolen. Loss of communication networks and damage to railway tracks also raise public safety concerns. A large proportion of railway networks funds come from the government, so these thefts are, ultimately, at the taxpayer’s expense. It is clear that the stolen metal is often transported across several borders and sold as scrap or for recycling far away from the actual scene of the crime. Thus, both national and international cooperation and collaboration initiatives are needed to raise awareness, provide expertise and best practice to allow the exchange of ideas between all parties involved. Therefore, only a structured and common approach can provide a wide and extended set of solutions.

Paris: International Union of Railways, 2013. 12p.

By U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) monitors changes, threats, and risks to the energy infrastructure in the United States. As part of that responsibility, OE published research in 2007 on the theft of copper wire from electric utilities. Early in 2010 there was evidence of an increase in such thefts. Because of this increase, OE decided to update its 2007 assessment of copper wire thefts. 1 • Electric utilities have launched public awareness campaigns, offered rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of thieves, marked copper wire for easier recovery from scrap metal dealers, and collaborated with stakeholders. Copper wire theft continues today throughout the United States, but the magnitude of theft has been reduced considerably. The problem is not likely to cease as long as copper prices remain sufficiently attractive to would-be thieves. However, the combined efforts of electric utilities, lawmakers, scrap metal dealers, and local law enforcement have succeeded in reducing the problem and driving a wedge between copper price increases and comparable increases in copper theft. • Legislation to reduce copper theft has been introduced in every State and passed into law in all but five States as of August 2010. • Scrap metal dealers are cooperating with utilities and lawmakers, reporting suspected thefts, and disseminating information through ISRI’s Theft Alerts. • Local law enforcement has become more responsive to electric utilities facing copper theft and is collaborating to recover more stolen copper and arrest those responsible. Since the beginning of the 2004 spike in copper prices, copper theft and copper prices have been directly linked. Although this link continues today, the rate of thefts as a function of the upward pull of prices has been mitigated

Washington DC: The Department, 2010. 17p.

By Nick Morgan, Jacqueline Hoare and Christos Byron

While most acquisitive crimes have fallen consistently over the past five years, metal theft increased between 2009 and 2011 in line with a sharp rise in global metal prices. It then fell during 2012 and 2013.  This paper summarises results of analyses which aimed to test whether the decline from 2012 was caused primarily by the government/law enforcement interventions launched to address metal theft, or was simply due to metal prices falling back from their peak.  The analysis is based mainly on data for metal thefts held by the Energy Networks Association (ENA), though data from British Transport Police (BTP) are also used to verify the main results. The phased roll-out of Operation Tornado across England and Wales helps to identify the specific impact of the interventions, as distinct from other factors that might have contributed to the fall in metal thefts.  The analysis found that metal thefts recorded by the Energy Networks Association and by British Transport Police fell to levels far lower during 2012 and 2013 than would be expected from the drop in metal prices alone.  This implies that the interventions launched during that period, Operation Tornado and cashless trading at scrap metal dealers (described below), did contribute to a substantial reduction in the number of offences.  Analysis showed a large, statistically significant effect for the interventions even when controlling for metal prices and other factors driving acquisitive crime.  Scotland, which did not receive the interventions, had a rising trend in metal theft during the post-intervention period, according to the Energy Networks Association data. This adds further weight to the main finding, and suggests that some metal theft may have been displaced north of the border.  As with most retrospective evaluations, there are necessary limitations with both the data and the methodology employed, but these findings are in line with the limited existing evidence from other nations.

London: Home Office, 2015. 26p.

By Chad Posick

In recent months the theft of some metals, especially objects made of copper, has received considerable attention in the media. Recently CPSI staff learned of a steep decline in “copper burglaries” in the City of Rochester over the past couple of months. That information prompted the following brief analysis. Copper Burglaries most often involve the removal of copper wire and/or pipe from residential property or the theft of such material from construction sites. Vacant or abandoned properties are especially vulnerable. Nearly eighty percent of Rochester’s copper burglaries have occurred in vacant property and nearly 80% occurred during renovations of that property. Costly damages often result from this offense including flooded basements, gas leaks and walls damaged to gain access to pipes. As the owner of many unoccupied properties, this offense is especially costly to the City of Rochester. In Rochester Copper burglaries showed a generally increasing trend over the past two years. They averaged 30 per month in Rochester and peaked at 59 in September of this year before falling dramatically. There were 17 reported copper burglaries in November, 2008.

Rochester, NY: Center for Public Safety Initiatives Rochester Institute of Technology , 2008. 4 p.

By Kevin Whiteacre and Raeann Howes

The study found that scrap yard presence in a community was the factor with the strongest impact on metal theft rate; the more scrap yards a city has, the more metal thefts it may have. Other factors included burglary rates and manufacturing presence in a community. Findings state that metals theft provides an opportunity for cooperation between law enforcement and scrap yard operators to work together to reduce purchases of stolen metals and maintain the integrity of the scrap market. The Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc. (ISRI), a member of the National Crime Prevention Council maintains a Theft Alert System that allows law enforcement to notify scrap yards when metal theft is reported. Police provide the estimated date and time of theft; location of theft; and a detailed description of the materials, including serial numbers and measurements; the investigating jurisdiction; a contact phone number; and the name of the investigating officer. This tool is available free of charge to any law enforcement agency and helps recyclers identify stolen material brought to their location. The Theft Alert System then sends this information via email to local scrap yards, allowing operators to identify material. The study is based on police reports and insurance claims.

Indianapolis: University of Indianapolis Community Research Center, 2009. 12p.