By Sarah Monaghan, Kellyann Bock, Michael Rempel, & Olive Lu

Spanning more than four decades, how has the footprint of New York’s criminal legal system changed? This comprehensive report explores the changing landscape of law enforcement in New York State from 1980 to 2023. It analyzes trends in arrests, prosecutorial declinations, criminal convictions, and sentencing practices, with a focus on regional and racial disparities.

Key Takeaways

● Statewide Arrest Trends

● After varying patterns by charge and region from 1980 to 2010, arrest rates declined significantly from 2010 to 2020, with a modest resurgence from 2020 to 2023.

● Misdemeanor arrests in NYC increased nearly fourfold from 1980 to 2010, dropped by 75% from 2010 to 2020 but rose by 40% from 2020 to 2023.

● Felony arrests decreased across all regions from 1980 to 2020, with a modest uptick in recent years.

● Charge-Specific Arrest Patterns

● Drug arrests in NYC peaked at over 128,000 in 2000, before falling to under 18,000 in 2023.

● Prostitution and fare evasion arrests in NYC saw drastic declines. Prostitution declined 99% from 1985 to 2023, and fare evasion declined 99% from 1994 to 2021, before a 2021-to-2023 uptick.

● DUI remained a leading charge outside NYC, comprising 18%-19% of suburban and upstate misdemeanors in 2023.

● Prosecutorial Declinations

● After changing only modestly until 2017, district attorneys’ offices in the Bronx, Manhattan, and Brooklyn declined to prosecute increasing numbers of low level misdemeanor arrests from 2017 to 2023.

● Select low level arrests for transit fare evasion, prostitution, trespass, and marijuana possession saw especially significant increases in declinations in the Bronx, Manhattan, and/or Brooklyn.

● Sentencing Trends: Jail and prison sentences for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies peaked around 2000 before decreasing significantly by 2023. Violent felony convictions increasingly resulted in prison sentences across all regions.

● Racial and Ethnic Disparities: While shrinking in some areas since 1980 (e.g., felony arrest disparities narrowed), the study found that sizable Black-white and Hispanic-white disparities on most metrics examined.

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College, 2024. 45p.

By Chris Tully

JENGbA facilitated a series of Listening Days with the families and friends of those impacted by Joint Enterprise (JE). Between October 2023 and May 2024 four such days took place in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield. The days were attended by 41 family members and friends. Each listening day focussed on five themes; knowledge of JE and when they were first aware their loved ones were to be charged under joint enterprise, the impact on them and their communities following conviction, racism and the gang narrative, role of the media, developing support networks and the fightback against the injustice of joint enterprise. Families reported having little or no previous knowledge of JE and in a considerable number of cases only found out immediately prior to, or during the trial and in some cases not until the judges’ summing up. Inevitably the impact was profound. We heard of the toll on peoples’ physical and mental health, the damage done to family relationships, the breakdown of relationships with neighbours and members of their local communities, often based on stigma, a suspicion that there is ‘no smoke without fire’ and a general lack of awareness amongst the general public of how JE is applied. A lack of independent, accessible information, support and guidance at the point of charging was seen as a fundamental problem for families confronting a trial. Families expressed anger towards the role of the police, often seen as complicit with the Crown Prosecution Service, in using JE as a blunt instrument to “round up” and prosecute young people particularly on the basis of race, class, family name and by dint of neighbourhood. Participants in the conversations also had poor experiences with lawyers citing; a lack of experience, little or no expertise in JE cases, little empathy, a reluctance to share. information and documents. The experiences of trials were predicated on similar concerns. We heard families describe juries who appeared unaware of what guilty verdicts in JE cases meant for defendants, judges who were dismissive of evidence, and concerns that juries rarely reflected the diversity of the cities and towns where trials were taking place. A key concern was disproportionate use of JE in relation to black and racialised communities, working class communities and children and young people. Often underpinning this was the use of a gang narrative to justify charging and prosecution. Families were angered by the speed with which the gang narrative was introduced into proceedings and why this was applied when association was actually founded on living in the same neighbourhood, shared interests such as music and sport, school friendships etc. As such JE was seen as both “lazy” and susceptible to stereotyping and demonisation. Many we heard from had experienced unacceptable treatment at the hands of the media. Commonly this is presented as malign or inaccurate reporting, geared towards racism, blame often attributed to parents and especially mothers. Some felt the media and police worked hand in hand to perpetuate moral panics. Retractions of inaccurate reporting were hard to come by and we also heard how images of families’ children were used repeatedly by local press, sometimes years later, to highlight youth crime or gang violence. The most positive conversations revolved around the value of family relationships as a buffer against the isolation of having a loved one sentenced under JE. Additionally a community of interest has been forged by the work of JENGbA, without which many felt they would have collapsed under the weight of trying to support loved ones and sustain other relationships. JENGbA have provided support, information, understanding and access to a group of people who share campaigning zeal and a desire to put an end to the misuse of a legal doctrine that punishes many more people than ‘just’ those it imprisons.

London: Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association,

2024. 28p.

By Jesse Kelley

Texas has become a leader in criminal justice reform by replacing old, “tough on crime” policies with more appropriate “smart on crime” ones. And although this new approach has seen success in the adult system, progress has stalled in the juvenile justice system. Accordingly, if Texas is to reassert its position as a leader in reforms, the best and most effective way is to improve their juvenile justice system by raising the age of criminal majority, by providing a “second look” for those juveniles who were sentenced to life in prison, and by shifting the way the state views and prosecutes youth who have committed serious and violent crimes. 

R STREET SHORTS NO. 83 February 2020 

Washington, DC: R Street, 2020. 5p.

By Marc Hyden and Arthur Rizer

In 2016, Georgia’s nine executions led the nation—surpassing even Texas. While this could be mistaken as a thriving Peach State death penalty, the truth is far different. Rather, capital punishment is quickly dwindling in Georgia. In fact, juries have delivered only one death sentence in over five years, and national polls show that death penalty support is near historic lows for several reasons, including the capital punishment’s inherent risk to innocent life, high costs and failure to adequately protect society. Given the death penalty’s shortcomings, the Georgia legislature ought to debate its repeal.

R STREET SHORTS NO. 78 November 2019

Washington, DC: R Street, 2019. 3p.

By Lars Trautman and SteVon Felton

Every year, police in America conduct over 10 million arrests. Once in the criminal justice system, these individuals face a dizzying series of bail hearings, pretrial conferences, plea deals, trials and in all likelihood, a sentencing. At each of these decision points, nothing less than a person’s freedom hangs in the balance. As such, it may seem a reasonable assumption that the person evaluating the merits of the case and applying the law will be an experienced jurist with a trained legal mind. And yet, in some places that person may not have even gone to college, let alone passed the bar exam or practiced law. Instead, many Americans find their fates in the hands of a motley assortment of officials serving as front-line judicial officers or in courts of limited jurisdiction. Whatever the moniker attached, these magistrates have the right to deprive an individual of her freedom through a collection of powers such as the ability to set bails, issue warrants and sometimes even preside over certain criminal trials themselves. While their decisions are subject to review by more traditionally educated and legally trained judges, in our messy, overburdened criminal justice system, this is often too little, too late. Appellate review, for example, is of limited value to a person already placed in pretrial detention, and is of even less value to a person who has chosen a guilty plea to avoid an even longer period of incarceration. Moreover, unlike the lawyers who practice before them, these magistrates do not face any universal requirements or tests like the bar exam. Indeed, while the increasing complexity of our laws and a greater appreciation for the awesome power that judges wield led to higher professional standards over the last century for most other judicial offices and the legal profession as a whole, the same is not true for these magistrates. Despite holding many of the same judicial powers and facing the same set of byzantine procedural rules and complex case law as other judges, they are often able to take the bench with only minimal legal training or education. Accordingly, what follows is an examination of these magistrates. It will begin by describing the four primary categories of lay officials that hold judicial powers of detention, the scope of their powers and their qualifications. Next, it will explain how their authority over the front end of the criminal justice process and misdemeanors can give them outsized, if sometimes underappreciated, power. It will then discuss why the use of nonlawyers in these roles and other minimal qualifications currently in use are particularly concerning. And finally, it will consider what minimum standards jurisdictions should adopt in order to ensure that their magistrates are able to effectively and equitably serve as the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 173 May 2019

Washington, DC: R Street, 2019. 13p.

By Brandon L. Garrett and Luke Mears

After 44 years in prison for a conviction of rape in the small town of Concord, North Carolina, Ronnie Long was released from prison in 2021. Four months later, the Governor granted him a full pardon on the grounds of innocence. That pardon made it possible to obtain compensation from a state commission, which awarded Long $750,000. This amount was the maximum available under state law that permitted compensation of $50,000 per year of incarceration, but with an upper limit of $750,000. After his exoneration, Long also filed a civil rights lawsuit in federal court. This federal case against the city settled for $22 million in 2024. Long also received $3 million from the North Carolina State Crime Lab as a result of its “role in hiding evidence from Mr. Long and his legal team that proved his innocence.” This substantial settlement made Long Compensating Exonerees in the United States highly unusual among exonerees in the United States. Most exonerees, if they are compensated, received something more along the lines of the $50,000 per year available under the state law that initially compensated Long, and nothing more. Many exonerees receive no compensation at all. Academics have long criticized the traditional lack of compensation for wrongful conviction in the United States. In 1932, Edwin Borchard wrote that the United States needed national legislation regarding compensation for wrongful convictions. For many decades, no such legislation existed, however. Civil rights litigation, like the case brought by Long, was uncommon, and compensation under statutory schemes was similarly rare. This changed once exonerations became much more common, including those based on post-conviction DNA evidence, in the 1990s. In general, many of the exonerees that have received substantial compensation, like Ronnie Long, have brought civil rights lawsuits in federal, not state court. For example, of the first 250 DNA exonerees, 60% received some type of compensation, and of those, half of them obtained it in federal court. However, exonerees are increasingly seeeking compensation under state compensation statutes. In this fact sheet, we describe how compensation for exonerees has evolved in the past several decades, including through successful litigation efforts and through the enactment of compensation legislation, in thirty-nine states, Washington D.C., and by the federal government. We summarize each of these state and federal statutes in the table at the end of this document. To date, 39 states have enacted such compensation statutes, in addition to Washington D.C. and the federal government. In addition, five of the remaining 11 states currently have pending legislation on the issue. The figure below shows which jurisdictions have these statutes currently, and which have legislation pending.

Durham, NC: Wilson Center for Science and Justice at Duke Law, 2024. 20p.

By Sarah Monaghan, Kellyann Bock, Michael Rempel, & Olive Lu

Spanning more than four decades, how has the footprint of New York’s criminal legal system changed? This comprehensive report explores the changing landscape of law enforcement in New York State from 1980 to 2023. It analyzes trends in arrests, prosecutorial declinations, criminal convictions, and sentencing practices, with a focus on regional and racial disparities.

Key Takeaways

Statewide Arrest Trends

After varying patterns by charge and region from 1980 to 2010, arrest rates declined significantly from 2010 to 2020, with a modest resurgence from 2020 to 2023.

Misdemeanor arrests in NYC increased nearly fourfold from 1980 to 2010, dropped by 75% from 2010 to 2020 but rose by 40% from 2020 to 2023.

Felony arrests decreased across all regions from 1980 to 2020, with a modest uptick in recent years.

Charge-Specific Arrest Patterns

Drug arrests in NYC peaked at over 128,000 in 2000, before falling to under 18,000 in 2023.

Prostitution and fare evasion arrests in NYC saw drastic declines. Prostitution declined 99% from 1985 to 2023, and fare evasion declined 99% from 1994 to 2021, before a 2021-to-2023 uptick.

DUI remained a leading charge outside NYC, comprising 18%-19% of suburban and upstate misdemeanors in 2023.

Prosecutorial Declinations

After changing only modestly until 2017, district attorneys’ offices in the Bronx, Manhattan, and Brooklyn declined to prosecute increasing numbers of low level misdemeanor arrests from 2017 to 2023.

Select low level arrests for transit fare evasion, prostitution, trespass, and marijuana possession saw especially significant increases in declinations in the Bronx, Manhattan, and/or Brooklyn.

Sentencing Trends: Jail and prison sentences for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies peaked around 2000 before decreasing significantly by 2023. Violent felony convictions increasingly resulted in prison sentences across all regions.

Racial and Ethnic Disparities: While shrinking in some areas since 1980 (e.g., felony arrest disparities narrowed), the study found that sizable Black-white and Hispanic-white disparities on most metrics examined.

New York:

Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College,

2024. 45p.

By Chris Tully

JENGbA facilitated a series of Listening Days with the families and friends of those impacted by Joint Enterprise (JE). Between October 2023 and May 2024 four such days took place in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield. The days were attended by 41 family members and friends. Each listening day focussed on five themes; knowledge of JE and when they were first aware their loved ones were to be charged under joint enterprise, the impact on them and their communities following conviction, racism and the gang narrative, role of the media, developing support networks and the fightback against the injustice of joint enterprise. Families reported having little or no previous knowledge of JE and in a considerable number of cases only found out immediately prior to, or during the trial and in some cases not until the judges’ summing up. Inevitably the impact was profound. We heard of the toll on peoples’ physical and mental health, the damage done to family relationships, the breakdown of relationships with neighbours and members of their local communities, often based on stigma, a suspicion that there is ‘no smoke without fire’ and a general lack of awareness amongst the general public of how JE is applied. A lack of independent, accessible information, support and guidance at the point of charging was seen as a fundamental problem for families confronting a trial. Families expressed anger towards the role of the police, often seen as complicit with the Crown Prosecution Service, in using JE as a blunt instrument to “round up” and prosecute young people particularly on the basis of race, class, family name and by dint of neighbourhood. Participants in the conversations also had poor experiences with lawyers citing; a lack of experience, little or no expertise in JE cases, little empathy, a reluctance to share. information and documents. The experiences of trials were predicated on similar concerns. We heard families describe juries who appeared unaware of what guilty verdicts in JE cases meant for defendants, judges who were dismissive of evidence, and concerns that juries rarely reflected the diversity of the cities and towns where trials were taking place. A key concern was disproportionate use of JE in relation to black and racialised communities, working class communities and children and young people. Often underpinning this was the use of a gang narrative to justify charging and prosecution. Families were angered by the speed with which the gang narrative was introduced into proceedings and why this was applied when association was actually founded on living in the same neighbourhood, shared interests such as music and sport, school friendships etc. As such JE was seen as both “lazy” and susceptible to stereotyping and demonisation. Many we heard from had experienced unacceptable treatment at the hands of the media. Commonly this is presented as malign or inaccurate reporting, geared towards racism, blame often attributed to parents and especially mothers. Some felt the media and police worked hand in hand to perpetuate moral panics. Retractions of inaccurate reporting were hard to come by and we also heard how images of families’ children were used repeatedly by local press, sometimes years later, to highlight youth crime or gang violence. The most positive conversations revolved around the value of family relationships as a buffer against the isolation of having a loved one sentenced under JE. Additionally a community of interest has been forged by the work of JENGbA, without which many felt they would have collapsed under the weight of trying to support loved ones and sustain other relationships. JENGbA have provided support, information, understanding and access to a group of people who share campaigning zeal and a desire to put an end to the misuse of a legal doctrine that punishes many more people than ‘just’ those it imprisons.

London: Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association,

2024. 28p.

By Francisco Alba

In This Article

Large-scale Mexican migration to the United States began in the early 1940s

After flatlining for several years, emigration has started to bounce back

The shift into a country of transit is perhaps Mexico's recent defining migration feature

Immigration is largely a product of return migration from the United States and transit migrants who remain

There has been a change in the government’s posture regarding transit migration

Migration Information Source, May 23, 2024

By Anthony Duarte, Sophia Hunt, and Matthew Clair

This report describes—and offers recommendations for improving—the quality of attorney-client relationships in a criminal courthouse in Santa Clara County, California. We draw on in-depth interviews and ethnographic observations collected between July 2021 and June 2022 from the Hall of Justice, one of four state courthouses in Santa Clara County that deals with adult criminal cases. Interviews with a diverse sample of 37 defendants suggest that they hold mostly positive views of their relationships with defense attorneys, though such perceptions vary by type of counsel and income. Moreover, among those who hold positive perceptions of their current defense lawyers, some defendants expressed negative attitudes toward, and recounted negative experiences with, current and previous lawyers. Ethnographic observations of public court proceedings further reveal recurring negative attorney-client relationship attributes, including silencing and sidelining, miscommunication, brevity of interaction, and cooperation with the state (or, coercion). We conclude with several immediate and long-range suggestions for improving the quality of defense provision in the county.

Court Listening Project, Report no. 2. Court Listening Project ((c/o Matthew Clair, Stanford University) 2022. 25p.

By Matthew Clair & Amanda Woog

This Essay theorizes and reimagines the place of courts in the contemporary struggle for the abolition of racialized punitive systems of legal control and exploitation. In the spring and summer of 2020, the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many other Black and Indigenous people sparked continuous protests against racist police violence and other forms of oppression. Meanwhile, abolitionist organizers and scholars have long critiqued the prison-industrial complex, or the constellation of corporations, media entities, governmental actors, and racist and capitalist ideologies that have driven mass incarceration. But between the police and the prison cell sits the criminal court. Criminal courts are the legal pathway from an arrest to a prison sentence—with myriad systems of control in between, including ones branded as “off-ramps”—and we cannot understand the present crisis without understanding how the criminal courts not only function to legitimate police and funnel people into carceral spaces but also contribute unique forms of violence, social control, and exploitation all their own, revealing the machinations of mass criminalization and injustice operating between the police encounter and the prison cell. Our central argument is that courts—with a focus here on the criminal trial courts and the workgroup of actors within them—function as an unjust social institution; we should therefore work toward abolishing criminal courts and replacing them with other institutions that do not inherently legitimate police, rely on jails and prisons, or themselves operate as tools of racial and economic oppression. Drawing on legal scholarship and empirical social scientific research, Part I describes injustices perpetrated by criminal courts, detailing their role in the present crisis of mass criminalization through legal doctrine, racialized social control and violence, and economic exploitation. In Part II, we describe the contemporary abolition movement, briefly laying out its genesis and three guiding principles we view as typically considered in relation to policing and prisons: (1) power shifting, (2) defunding and reinvesting, and (3) transformation. Part III explores how these principles could operate in relation to the courts, drawing on analysis of existing grassroots efforts as well as offering new possibilities. In the short term, non-reformist reforms could make criminal courts a venue to unmask, and therefore aid in dismantling, police and prisons. Such reforms could complement the broader abolition movement and reduce the churn of people through the system. Ultimately, the goal would be to abolish criminal courts as systems of coercion, violence, and exploitation, and to replace them with other social institutions, such as community-based restorative justice and peacemaking programs while at the same time investing in the robust provision of social, political, and economic resources in marginalized communities.

110 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW (Volume 110February 20222022) 45p.

By Matthew Clair, Jesus Orozco, and Iris H. Zhang

This article theorizes how space shapes access to state institutions, and with what consequences. Drawing on 125 interviews and over 400 hours of ethnographic observations concerning two criminal courthouses within the same county, we identify four spatial features that differentially shape access while working alongside institutional rules and norms: functional distance, neighborhood social life, exterior built forms, and interior built forms. When they constrain access, these features constitute spatial burdens, which contribute to distinct institutional and collateral costs concentrated among marginalized groups. We theorize how these costs likely reproduce systemic patterns of inequality by extending people’s burdensome interactions with the state institution they seek to access and compelling them to interact with other state institutions that further the state’s power over their lives. The theory of spatial burdens has implications for the study of poverty governance and institutional inequality.

Social Service Review, October 2024, 72 p.

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

  In the aftermath of the riot and breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, among the questions that were raised was how the breach had occurred and what was known by federal law enforcement in advance of January 6 about the possibility of a violent protest that day. On January 15, 2021, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) announced its review to examine the role and activity of DOJ and its components in preparing for and responding to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Separately, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department prosecutors immediately began criminally investigating individuals who violated federal law in connection with the riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6. The Department—through the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of Columbia (DC)— has reported that it has brought charges against over 1,500 individuals and described the January 6 investigations and prosecutions as having “moved forward at an unprecedented speed and scale.” In the public announcement of our review of the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, we took note of these ongoing criminal prosecutions, stating that the OIG was “mindful of the sensitive nature of the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions related to the events of January 6. Consistent with longstanding OIG practice, in conducting this review, the DOJ OIG will take care to ensure that the review does not interfere with these investigations or prosecutions.” As is customary for the OIG, we coordinated closely with the Department and the DC USAO to ensure that the OIG’s investigative work did not conflict with or compromise any ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. To that end, and consistent with OIG practice, in spring 2022 the OIG paused aspects of our review. 1 Once the OIG determined last year, after consultation with federal prosecutors, that our review would no longer potentially interfere with pending prosecutions, we resumed our review. In doing so, we were cognizant of the amount of time that had passed in deference to the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions, as well as the number of other non-DOJ OIG oversight reports that have since been publicly released regarding the January 6 events, and we therefore decided to largely focus our inquiry on an issue that has not yet been thoroughly reviewed in oversight conducted by other entities, namely the FBI’s direction and handling of its confidential human sources (CHS) in the lead-up to and on January 6, and whether the FBI exploited its CHSs and other available information to determine the nature of threats in advance of the electoral vote certification on January 6. In addition to the DOJ OIG’s oversight efforts reflected in this report, several other Inspectors General have conducted reviews of their agency’s actions in connection with the events of January 6:  The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) OIG immediately began a review to determine if the USCP, which is responsible for policing the Capitol Complex, (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate  internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations.  The Department of Defense (DoD) OIG initiated a review of the relevant events leading up to January 6, including the DoD’s review and approval of the DC government’s request for assistance from the DC National Guard; DoD’s coordination with DC and federal officials in preparation for January 6; DoD’s receipt and approval of the USCP’s request for assistance on January 6; and the planning involved for National Guard forces to help secure the Capitol in the immediate aftermath of the riot.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG began a review to examine the role and activity of DHS and its components in preparing for and responding to the events of January 6, 2021, including DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis’s responsibility for providing intelligence to law enforcement and DHS law enforcement components’ roles, responsibilities, and actions on January 6. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS), which was responsible for protecting then Vice President Mike Pence on January 6 during his time at the U.S. Capitol, is a law enforcement component within DHS. In addition, DHS is responsible for designating an event as a national special security event (NSSE) or as a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) event, which it did not do for the electoral vote certification on January 6. 2 The FBI defines a special event as a “significant international event or a domestic event” formally designated as an NSSE event or a SEAR event, which requires the FBI “to plan, coordinate, develop, or provide FBI resources to mitigate potential threats the special event may cause to national security or threats of significant criminal activity that the FBI is responsible for identifying, preventing, investigating, or disrupting.”  The Department of Interior (DOI) OIG initiated a review of the actions of the National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S. Park Police (USPP) in preparing for and responding to the events at the Ellipse and the Capitol on January 6 and in information-sharing between the NPS, the USPP, and their law enforcement partners. The demonstration that preceded the violence at the Capitol occurred at the Ellipse, which is part of President’s Park—a national park under the control of the NPS. The USPP is a unit of the NPS authorized to conduct law enforcement in the national park system and, pursuant to local statutes, within DC generally. A further oversight effort was undertaken by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of Congress, which announced that it would conduct “a comprehensive overview of events leading up to, during, and following the January 6 attack.” The U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives also conducted oversight regarding the events of January 6. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) together with the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (RAC) announced a joint investigation on January 8, 2021, to “examine the intelligence and security failures” that led to the events of January 6. On January 12, 2021, the House of Representatives and Senate leadership were briefed by senior FBI officials about the FBI’s posture leading up to January 6, its response and investigation into the events of January 6, and the threat picture and operational posture leading into the Inauguration on January 20, 2021. Subsequently, numerous congressional committee hearings addressed how various federal agencies prepared in advance of the January 6 Electoral Certification and how they responded on January 6, with the first one being held by the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on January 26, 2021. In early March 2021, HSGAC/RAC jointly held an oversight hearing that included testimony from the FBI, Hearing Examining the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Part II, as well as from non-FBI witnesses. On June 30, 2021, the House of Representatives established a 13-member Select Committee to investigate the rioting and breaching of the Capitol on January 6, named the “House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol” (House Select Committee). The House Select Committee held 10 televised hearings beginning on June 9, 2022, and concluded the last hearing on December 19, 2022. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2024. 88p.

By Jane Arnold Lincove, Catherine Mata & Kalena Cortes

This research analyzes the implementation of a school suspension ban in Maryland to investigate whether a top-down state-initiated ban on suspensions in early primary grades can influence school behavior regarding school discipline. Beginning in the fall of 2017, the State of Maryland banned the use of out-of-school suspensions for grades PK-2, unless a student posed an "imminent threat" to staff or students. This research investigates (1) what was the effect of the ban on discipline outcomes for students in both treated grades and upper elementary grades not subject to the ban. (2) did schools bypass the ban by coding more events as threatening or increasing the use of in-school suspensions? and (3) Were there differential effects for students in groups that are historically suspended more often? Using a comparative interrupted time series strategy, we find that the ban is associated with a substantial reduction in, but not a total elimination of, out-of-school suspensions for targeted grades without substitution of in-school suspensions. Disproportionalities by race and other characteristics remain after the ban. Grades not subject to the ban experienced few effects, suggesting the ban did not trigger a schoolwide response that reduced exclusionary discipline.

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 65p.

By the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR)

Meaningful federal guidelines and oversight for responsible FRT use have lagged behind the application of this technology in real-world scenarios. With the advent of biometric technology and its widespread use by both private and government entities, the Commission studied how the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are utilizing this technology, in compliance with existing civil rights laws. Currently, there are no laws that expressly regulate the use of FRT or other AI by the federal government, and no constitutional provisions governing its use.

Washington DC: USCCR,, 2024. 194p.

By The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Arkansas Advisory Committee

On January 19, 2024, the Arkansas Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights adopted a proposal to study the right to counsel for indigent defendants in Arkansas. The focus of the Committee’s inquiry was to examine the role public defenders play in ensuring equal protection of the laws in the administration of justice. The Committee considered a public investment and funding available to support the right to counsel for those who cannot afford it and the impact such counsel (or the lack thereof) may have on persistent disparities throughout the criminal justice system based on race, color, sex, disability, and national origin.

Washington, DC: USCCR, 2024. 27p.

By Nina Rabin

This Article describes the ways in which prolonged states of legal limbo have grown more precarious, and thereby subordinating, under the Trump administration. Liminal forms of status have long been a feature of U.S. immigration law. But under the Trump administration, legal limbo grew both in prevalence and precarity. Due to Trump’s pursuit of an aggressive enforcement agenda, the legal system has become so overwhelmed that non-detained immigrants find themselves in protracted removal proceedings that routinely last for years. During this time, immigrants are consigned to a marginalized existence that harms their long-term ability to achieve social and economic mobility and integration. In this way, legal limbo has become increasingly tied to the creation and maintenance of a caste system in U.S. society. This Article offers a new conceptual framework, the “spectrum of precarity,” to analyze how and to what extent various types of liminal legal status in immigration law marginalize immigrants. Application of this spectrum to the states of limbo experienced by immigrants under the Obama and Trump administrations reveals very different approaches and outcomes. President Obama created liminal forms of legal status through specific policies and programs: administrative closure and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). These efforts were explicitly designed to provide immigrants with a measure of social integration, along with protection from deportation. In contrast, immigrants in the Trump Era found themselves in limbo due to ballooning backlogs in the over-burdened legal immigration system. As a result, at the close of the Trump administration, immigrants with pending visas and asylum-seekers live in a state of prolonged uncertainty and fear that forces them into a marginalized existence in the shadows. This state of affairs poses a challenge for removal defense attorneys of non-detained immigrants and calls into question the due process framework that often serves as a guiding structure for advocates in the immigration system. Due process, with its focus on discrete legal events and its failure to pay sufficient attention to the passage of time, risks causing attorneys to become accomplices in the creation of caste. Instead, in the current dysfunctional and disempowering legal immigration system, removal defense attorneys must seek to counterbalance the marginalizing effects of legal limbo on their clients’ daily lives and future trajectories through multi-faceted, interdisciplinary, and community-based models of lawyering.   

35 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 567,569. 2021.

By Jonathan Booth

Privately managed detention centers hold the majority of detained immigrants in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody.1 Coerced detainee labor in these for-profit facilities is commonplace. The practice contributes significantly to the financial viability of CoreCivic and GEO Group, the two corporations that manage most ICE detention centers, but it violates the prohibition on forced labor contained in the 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”).2 Despite a growing field of scholarship on “immigration” and proposals to abolish immigration detention, or on its extraterritorial application.7 Because practitioners, rather than scholars, were the first to recognize that the TVPA’s prohibition of forced labor applies to private detention centers, there has been little scholarly analysis of the application of the TVPA to forced labor within detention facilities. This Article provides the first scholarly assessment of a wave of pending class action lawsuits challenging forced labor in privately managed ICE facilities under the TVPA. It concludes that such lawsuits are likely to succeed, given the facts known about conditions in for-profit immigrant detention facilities and the broad text and favorable legislative history of the TVPA. If the plaintiffs win a favorable jury verdict or a far-reaching settlement, the cases may cause fundamental changes to the current system of mass immigration detention. Part I of this Article examines the rise of for-profit detention in the United States and shows that detaining immigrants is now a central business of for-profit detention corporations. Next, Part II describes the labor policies within ICE detention that plaintiffs in these lawsuits allege amount to forced labor and thus violate the TVPA. Part III turns to the TVPA itself and analyzes its text, legislative history, and applicability to class actions. Part IV argues that its text and legislative history demonstrate that the TVPA covers forced labor claims within for-profit immigrant detention facilities and that such claims, if successful, could transform the business of detaining immigrants. Finally, Part V argues that publicly available information, including that revealed through discovery in these lawsuits, makes it likely that plaintiffs will prevail at trial.   

35 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 573 (2020)

By Mark A. Motivans,

This report uses data from BJS’s Federal Justice Statistics Program (FJSP) and other published sources to describe persons arrested and convicted for a federal drug offense involving methamphetamine, cocaine, methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA), methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), and other amphetamines. It focuses on psychostimulants, including their classification under the Controlled Substances Act (P.L. 91–513), persons arrested for a federal offense involving psychostimulants, deaths due to overdose, and persons sentenced for a federal offense involving these substances. The FJSP receives administrative data files from six federal criminal justice agencies: the U.S. Marshals Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. Sentencing Commission, and Federal Bureau of Prisons. Data represent the federal criminal case-processing stages from arrest to imprisonment and release. FJSP data are available in the Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics Data Tool, which provides statistics by stage of the federal criminal case process, including law enforcement, prosecution and courts, and incarceration

Highlights

• From FY 2021 to FY 2022, the number of arrests the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) made for psychostimulants decreased by 9%, from 15,846 to 14,392.

• More than half (55%) of the arrests the DEA made in FY 2022 were for psychostimulants.

• Of the 26,233 total arrests by the DEA in FY 2022, 8,035 (31%) were for methamphetamine, 5,118 (20%) were for powder cocaine, 1,009 (4%) were for crack cocaine, and 230 (<1%) were for other psychostimulants.

• DEA arrests for methamphetamine increased from 6,518 in FY 2002 to 9,335 in FY 2021, then decreased to 8,035 in FY 2022.

Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 25p.

By Brian Johnson,  Kiminori Nakamura,  Lydia Becker, Raquel Hernandez

Firearms violence is a major policy concern in America. How criminal courts address firearm crimes represents a critical opportunity for improving public safety. The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are settled by guilty plea, yet little is known about the ways that plea deals impact criminal punishment for firearms-involved offenders, or how they shape subsequent recidivism. This project investigates the association between plea bargaining, sentencing, and recidivism outcomes in state-wide sample of firearms-involved offenders. It provides a descriptive overview of case characteristics and outcomes in firearms cases, examines the scope and impact of plea bargaining for these offenses, and considers how plea discounts potentially impact future reoffending. Findings indicate that plea negotiations are common in firearms-related offenses – a majority of cases involve multiple filed charges but a single conviction charge, and more than half of all cases include a reduction in the severity of the top charge between filing and conviction. The mean distance traveled, or average magnitude of plea discounts, results in a significant reduction in the likelihood of incarceration and expected sentence lengths. Results also reveal significant relationships between plea discounts and recidivism. Defendants who are convicted and sentenced to longer incarceration terms have lower odds of coming back into the system for a new offense, whereas those who receive charge reductions and are given larger plea discounts are more likely to recidivate during our study period. Because average sentences in firearms cases are substantial, and because our follow-up period is limited, these results likely reflect the short-term incapacitation effects of lengthier incarceration terms. Overall, the current study suggests there may be significant public safety implications of plea discounts in firearms cases, though future research is needed before strong policy recommendations can be offered.  

College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2024. 88p.