By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)

Cocaine, cannabis resin and pharmaceutical opioids are the internationally trafficked drugs most seized in the Sahel. In terms of quantity, cannabis herb is actually the most commonly seized drug in the Sahel countries, but it seems to be produced locally and trafficked mostly for local consumption. Cannabis is also the principal substance for which people seek treatment in the region. The geographical location of West Africa renders it a natural stopover point for cocaine produced in South America en route to Europe, one of the largest consumer markets for cocaine after North America. In a context of increasing cocaine production in South America and increasing demand for the drug in Europe, flows of cocaine trafficked through West Africa have intensified. The re-emergence of large cocaine seizures since 2019 suggests a surge in large shipments of the drug to the coastal countries of West Africa, with 9.5 tons being seized in Cabo Verde. Although the majority of the cocaine reaching West Africa typically continues northwards towards North Africa and Europe via maritime routes along the African coast, an increasing number of significant cocaine seizures involving Sahel countries has provided evidence of large-scale cocaine trafficking through the region. From an average of 13 kg per year in the period 2015–2020, the quantity of cocaine seized in the Sahel countries increased to 41 kg in 2021 and 1,466 kg in 2022, with the bulk reported by Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. Annual estimates were not available for 2023, but at the time of writing over 2.3 tons of cocaine had already been seized in Mauritania in 2023.

Cannabis resin is the second most seized drug in the Sahel countries after cannabis herb, with 24.8 tons seized in the period 2021–2022. Representing over 52.6 per cent of the total quantity of cannabis resin seized in West and Central Africa in the same period, this illustrates the importance of the Sahel route for cannabis resin trafficking. According to data from the Sahel countries, the cannabis resin trafficked in the region generally originates in Morocco, where an increase in cannabis resin production has been reported, reaching an estimated 901 tons in 2022. It is typically destined for countries in Western Europe and North Africa. Aside from the direct trafficking route between Spain and Morocco, cannabis resin is typically trafficked overland from Morocco to Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Chad, then onwards to Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Since 2020, the Sahel countries have reported that cannabis resin is being transported by sea via an alternative maritime route, mostly from Morocco down the coast of West Africa to ports on the Gulf of Guinea, in Benin and Togo in particular, before being transported north to the Niger and then on to North Africa. The reconfiguration of the cannabis resin trafficking routes in West Africa is likely to have an effect on the drug distribution networks operating between North Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. For example, Moroccan drug traffickers are likely to become less reliant on Malian organized crime groups, while traffickers in the Gulf of Guinea are likely to be increasingly exposed to cannabis resin, enabling them to diversify their trade and the markets to which they have access. Between 2011 and 2021, the annual prevalence of opioid use (including opiates) increased from 0.33 to 1.24 per cent in Africa. The non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids appears to have grown considerably, from just two countries (the Niger and Togo) citing tramadol as the principal drug of concern by people entering drug treatment in 2017, to five countries (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, the Niger and Sierra Leone) in 2019. Indeed, the non-medical use of tramadol remains a threat in North, West and Central Africa in particular. Tramadol is the most used opioid for non-medical purposes in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Moreover, in 2022, Tramadol was the second most common drug for which female patients sought treatment in Mali and Mauritania etc.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 40p.