By Don Weatherburn, Michael Farrell, Wai-Yin Wan, Sara Rahman

Background: Very few studies have examined the criminal careers of drug traffickers. Our aim in this study was to determine (a) the percentage of drug traffickers who cease involvement in crime following their first conviction for drug trafficking, (b) the factors that affect the likelihood and speed of re-offending among drug traffickers, (c) the factors that affect the rate of reoffending among drug traffickers and (d) the scale of drug trafficker involvement in crimes other than drug trafficking.

Methods: We characterize the criminal careers of a sample of 30,020 cases of offenders convicted of drug trafficking in New South Wales (NSW), Australia over the 29-year period between 2000 and 2023, focussing on how drug charge, trafficker type, and drug and alcohol use affect the risk and frequency of offending. We use a combination of descriptive statistics, cure fraction regression and negative binomial regression. Our controls in the regression analyses consist of age, age of first conviction and number of prior convictions.

Results: The 'cure' rate among males aged 30-39 who were first convicted between 19 and 35 years of age, whose principal offence is trafficking in a non-commercial quantity of heroin, who have three prior convictions and who score 'moderate' in terms of the LSI-R drug/alcohol scale is 31 per cent. The instantaneous risk of re-offending among ATS, heroin, cannabis and ecstasy traffickers ranges between 62 and 82 per cent higher than among cocaine traffickers. Convicted drug traffickers commit a wide variety of offences but only a small proportion are convicted of drug offences before or after their first conviction for drug trafficking.

Conclusions: The present study raises two important questions for future research. The first concerns whether those involved in drug trafficking in Australia rely on it as a primary source of income or whether it is just one of several income-generating criminal activities they switch between in the course of a criminal career. The second question is why there are such marked differences in the risk, speed and frequency of offending among traffickers of different drugs.

International Journal of Drug Policy; 2024, 10p.

By Nicolas Lien and Gabriel Feltran

International cocaine trafficking from South America has increased significantly over the past decade. Based on mixed-methods research, we hypothesize that this change has been driven primarily by the globalization of its logistics, which has led to relevant technical and political changes along the value chain. Today’s global criminal logistics connect a wider variety of producers and retailers, ensuring a market without monopoly and monopsony, although very few transnational criminal groups control the center of the value chain. Their cooperation results in a virtuous circle for illicit accumulation, in which the constant improvement in productivity in South America also leads to an increase in consumer demand in Europe and, more recently, in Africa, Asia, and Oceania. We used a mixed-methods approach to relationally analyze coherent changes in the cocaine value chain in Latin American, African, and European countries. 

  Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 7(1): pp. 20–34

By Measures for Justice

South Dakota is currently in a dispute about legalized marijuana use for recreational and medicinal purposes. In this context, it’s worth considering how the state handles criminal cases involving drug and DUI offenses. Measures for Justice (MFJ) recently published county-level criminal justice data for the state of South Dakota that span 2009–2017. A review of our findings suggests that relative to other offenses, South Dakota counties pursue harsher responses to court cases in which the most serious offense was related to drug possession/distribution or driving under the influence (DUI). The pattern can be seen at multiple points in case processing. This report explores these disparate findings using three Measures: dismissal rates, time to disposition, amount of fees and fines. Year by year, we have found that drug and DUI cases (1) are dismissed at a lower rate in most counties, (2) take longer, on average, to dispose of than other case types, and (3) face some of the highest financial obligations at conviction

Rochester, NY: Measures for Justice, 2021. 7p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Key Takeaways Significant gross income from illicit drug trafficking Between 2019 and 2022, the Balkan route – a major corridor for trafficking opiates and, more recently, methamphetamine – generated an estimated total annual illicit gross income ranging from US$13.9 to US$21.4 billion. Opiates accounted for about 90 per cent of this total, with methamphetamine representing a smaller but growing share. The aggregated value of these trafficking flows surpasses the gross domestic product (GDP) of several countries along the route, highlighting the significant economic impact of these illegal activities. The data and analysis do not cover the period following the drug ban in Afghanistan that was imposed in 2022 by the Taliban and its impact on drug consumption and trafficking patterns. Geographic distribution of trafficking routes The Balkan route remains a critical pathway for drug trafficking, stretching from Afghanistan through Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye, and splitting into three main branches, all leading into Europe. Alongside the opiate flow, methamphetamine trafficking is expanding, with manufacturing hotspots identified in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovakia), Southern Europe (Greece) and Western Europe (Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands). Opiates and methamphetamine trafficking is concentrated in key hubs Given their location at the start of the Balkan route, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye are the main hotspots for trafficking both drugs. Trafficking through Iran (Islamic Republic of) plays a pivotal role in the opiate trade, accounting for over one-third of total gross income along the Balkan route related to opiates. Other key trafficking hotspots can be found in Belgium and the Netherlands (Kingdom of the). These countries are not only key stops for traffickers but also act as hotspots for distributing opiates and methamphetamine in smaller quantities. Illicit actors in some countries like the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) also contribute to methamphetamine manufacture the impact of proximity and trafficker adaptability on interception rates Interception rates of illegally traded opiates and methamphetamine along the Balkan route are highest in the proximity of production sources. Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye intercept the highest percentage of all opiates that cross their territories at 28.2 and 29.3 percent respectively. Traffickers' adaptability − through tactics such as breaking shipments into smaller quantities, altering routes and employing advanced concealment methods − continue to pose significant challenges to law enforcement, particularly further along the supply chain. High profit margins in the drug trade Trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine can yield substantial profits, with an estimated combined annual illicit net income ranging from US$10.9 to US$16.9 billion. These profits represent more than 70 per cent of the total illicit gross income acquired through the trafficking of these two substances after deducting intermediate expenditures, production and purchasing costs.The largest shares of illicit net income are generated at the retail level, where price markups are highest. However, individuals higher up in the supply chain may earn more per person, as fewer people share the profits at the international and wholesale levels. Illicit financial flows (IFFs) related to the management of drug trafficking profits are in the order of billions. IFFs are cross border flows of financial or nonfinancial assets that are illicit in origin, transfer or use. These flows represent the hidden movement of wealth that undermines economic stability and evades lawful oversight. Looking at IFFs generated through the trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine, it is estimated that between a quarter and half of the US$13.7 billion in illicit net income generated from drug trafficking along the Balkan route is illegally moved across borders, generating potential IFFs related to the management of drug trafficking profits of US$3.4 billion to US$6.9 billion annually. Link between money laundering and IFFs There is some evidence that income from drug trafficking is laundered both domestically and abroad through investments in real estate, luxury vehicles and other assets. Shell companies and informal systems like Hawala are frequently used to transfer and launder money, complicating efforts to trace the illicit proceeds. Key trafficking transit points not only facilitate drug movement but also serve as hubs for laundering and redistributing illicit financial resources. Contrary to common assumptions, traditional tax havens may play a minimal role in laundering drug trafficking proceeds. Instead, the limited available data suggests that countries like Luxembourg, the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) and Spain are potential hubs for drug-related IFFs generated along the Balkan route, alongside the United Arab Emirates.

. Vienna / ©United Nations, 2025 59p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch\

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

UNODC, in partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), further released a report on capacities and resources for the treatment of substance use disorders in Afghanistan.

The survey findings show that treatment services are available in 32 out of 34 provinces, but significant disparities exist in service distribution, accessibility, and gender representation, particularly affecting female patients.

Although opiates remain the most frequently reported class of substance used by patients seeking treatment, demand for services addressing stimulant-related disorders is rising, as synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine have become increasingly available in Afghanistan.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC: 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This second volume provides the latest figures on national and regional opium poppy production in 2024 and the challenges farmers are facing as they adapt to new economic conditions. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban; drug trafficking and supply; and treatment availability and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, having continued for a second year, UNODC has sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs, and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan population, as well as on neighbouring countries and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing efforts to address demand and supply of drugs within and outside Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using latest data at highest quality standards. The present insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC through remote sensing techniques, rural village surveys; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide the latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This fourth volume provides an assessment of drug seizure trends near Afghanistan and estimates potential opium stocks within the country by the end of 2022, just before the start of the ban. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban, and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, which has continued for a second year, UNODC sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, the reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the effects of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan economy, as well as on Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing international engagement in Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using the latest data of the highest quality standards, presenting it in an evidence-based, coherent, coordinated, and structured manner as foreseen in Security Council resolution 2721 (2023). The present Insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC by remote sensing, through rural village surveys and other tools; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and the UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023. Other data used in this report to model stock estimates come from UNODC’s Afghan Opiate Trade Project published in 2020.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2025. 52p.

By Rima Ah Toong, Shelby Grauer, Katherine Tallan

  The Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has administered the Illegal Marijuana Market Enforcement Grant since 2018 and is required to issue an annual report concerning the status and effectiveness of the program and to provide future funding recommendations to the Oregon Legislature (legislature). The Legislature funds this grant program with $6 million on a biennial basis. In response to a sharp increase in reports of unaddressed illegal grow sites and associated worker abuse in 2021 and 2022, the Legislature infused the grant program with an additional $26 million in emergency one-time funding, which the CJC awarded to grantees in 2022. In 2023, the legislature supplemented the $6 million in base funding with an additional $5 million, for a total of $11 million in biennial funds that will be awarded through a competitive grant solicitation process in 2024. This report examines the status of the grant program and grantee expenditures from 2021 to 2023. The CJC, with input from grantees, other agencies, and interested parties, also changed its program data reporting structure, in 2022, to better gauge the problems being addressed with these grant funds. Described in this report, among other things, are the following findings: • Since April 1, 2022, grant-funded law enforcement operations reported 424 illegal cannabis incidents, occurring in 96 unique zip codes. • Eleven zip codes saw 10 or more incidents involving grant-funded law enforcement activities during the reporting period. The zip codes experiencing the highest number of incidents were 97523 (the greater Cave Junction area, with 35 incidents) and 97526 (Grants Pass and areas north, with 17 incidents). • The number of incidents in which law enforcement observed or suspected labor trafficking and/or worker abuse decreased from 39 (20 percent) in 2022 to eight (3.5 percent) in 2023. However, the number of survivors of human trafficking served by grant funded community-based organizations (CBOs) increased from 100 to 344 during the same time period. • Survivors served by CBO grantees were primarily male (41.4 percent), Hispanic (48.9 percent), and ages 18-35 (28.8 percent). The majority received legal assistance (63.5 percent) and/or referrals to other needed crisis or long-term support services (56.8 percent). • Grantees reported that the 424 incidents resulted in 184 felony case filings in Oregon circuit courts. • Of the 424 reported incidents, 54.2 percent involved a land, natural resource, or civil code violation. • Law enforcement grantees seized approximately 1.8 million illegal cannabis plants and 351,781 pounds of illegal processed cannabis, as well as other illegal narcotics and substances, firearms, and equipment used to operate illegal grows off-grid. Based on the best available information, the projected cost for e  

Salem, OR: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. 2024. 31p.

By Hai Thanh Luong

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), including five Southeast Asian countries and China, has experienced a significant increase in the cultivation of opium, trafficking of heroin and methamphetamine, and consumption of these illicit drugs. In recent years, the GMS has been expanded considerably as supply, destination, and transit route for illegal drug trade’s networks to and through, particularly when China officially applied ‘Belt and Road’ strategy. This paper reviews historical aspects and current trends in drug production and trafficking in the GMS, with special emphasis on Mekong River areas where China is ‘located’ as the heart of the transition. Some evidence consistent with the ‘supply, destination, and transit route’ arguments is found through locating and mapping drug trafficking networks to connect with China. Finally, this paper calls for some initial recommendations to improve the process of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the GMS within the scope of Belt and Road Initiative. 

The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6 (2020) 20–35 

By Joseph E. Schumacher, Abdullah Ahsan, Amber H. Simpler, Adam P. Natoli & Bradley J. Cain

Conducting research within a carceral health care context offers a unique view into the nature of drug use among arrestees with potential to identify and prevent drug use consequences. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature and extent of drug use among first-time jail arrestees to inform detection and treatment.

Methods

This study utilized a naturalistic research design to collect de-identified urine drug screens (UDS), jail characteristics, and arrestee demographic variables among arrestees indicating drug use from 25 jails across the United States in 2023 through a confidential data sharing agreement with NaphCare, Inc. using its proprietary electronic health record operating system. Descriptive statistics were used to detail the features of the dataset, Pearson’s chi-square tests of independence were performed to statistically analyze associations between UDS results and jail characteristics and arrestee demographics, and significant chi-square test results were further investigated by examining standardized residuals to clarify the nature and significance of within-group differences in proportions.

Results

Of the 43,553 UDS cases comprising the final sample (28.8% of total arrestees), 74.8% (32,561) were positive for one or more drugs, and 25.2% of UDS cases were negative for all drugs. Among those who tested positive, 69.0% were positive for cannabis, 54.8% for stimulants, 29.6% for opioids, and 12.4% for sedatives. Arrestees were positive for multiple drugs half the time, with combinations of cannabis, stimulants, and opioids most common. Significant associations between drug use and both jail characteristics and arrestee demographics were found.

Conclusions

Though drug use is not a recent phenomenon, the lethality potential of the drugs being used today is relatively new. Arrestees with positive urine drug screens are at heightened risk of adverse outcome due to sudden cessation of substance use. Findings highlight the need for objective clinical data to guide acute treatment of individuals at risk of withdrawing while detained. A

ddiction Science & Clinical Practice (2025), 15p.

By Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo and Kars de Bruijne

Since 2022, a synthetic drug known as ‘kush’, has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa. Kush emerged in Sierra Leone, but quickly spread across countries in the subregion, including Liberia, Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, with devastating effects. By April 2024, the health impacts of kush, a synthetic drug containing nitazenes, opioids as – or more – powerful than fentanyl, as well as synthetic cannabinoids, were so acute that the presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia had declared national emergencies over drug use – an unprecedented step.

This drug represents a turning point in West Africa’s drug landscape. The scale of its market expansion and its lethal public health effects are unparalleled. Yet, amidst widespread speculation about kush, a number of critical questions remained unanswered about the drug. What is kush? Where does it come from? Who is producing and trafficking it? And what can be done to reduce the harm posed by this drug?

This research confirms that kush is composed of potent synthetic opioids called nitazenes, some of which are 25 times stronger than fentanyl, and synthetic cannabinoids commonly found in European drug markets. The consequences have been dire, with mass fatalities overwhelming mortuary systems, forcing emergency group cremations, and leading to bodies being abandoned in the streets.

The research identifies China, the Netherlands, and most likely the UK as key sources of kush and it’s active ingredients, which are trafficked via maritime routes and postal courier services. It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids. Initially controlled by a few organized criminal groups, the kush market has since fragmented, making it even more difficult to counteract. Local synthesis of the drug has increased, escalating health risks, and Sierra Leone’s street gangs for a key part of the drug’s distribution network.

Some key points highlighted in the report are:

Kush is a drug that has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa, with Sierra Leone as its epicentre;

Chemical testing finds that nearly 50% of samples contain nitazenes, a very addictive and deadly synthetic opioid comparable to fentanyl (the other half contains synthetic cannabinoids)

Some of these substances are imported from China, the Netherlands and most likely the United Kingdom through maritime routes, the air and postal courier services (It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids);

The market for kush used to be more strongly controlled by large groups but increasingly fragmented, with smaller actors setting up own operations

Urgent coordinated action is needed on three fronts; a) better monitoring, early warning, testing, and information-sharing in West Africa; b) disrupting supply chains by China, the Netherlands and the UK and at Sierra Leonean points of entry; c) a strong push on mitigating the harms of kush consumption

Clingendael: 2025. 60p

By Ediomo-Ubong Nelson, Gernot Klantschnig

This article examines narratives of cannabis legalization in Nigeria. While most existing research on cannabis legalization has concentrated on the global North, we focus on one of Africa's largest cannabis markets, as well as the views of actors heavily criminalized and excluded from policy debates. Based on in-depth interviews and long-time engagement with illicit cannabis farmers and traders, the article highlights the contestations in their hidden narratives, troubling extant views of cannabis legalization which uncritically laud its socioeconomic benefits, and revealing the potential downsides of legalization in the context of an exploitative legal neo-liberal economy rife with social inequities. The findings of this study also highlight a need for open policy debate that engages criminalized cannabis producing communities who have borne the brunt of both prohibition and economic marginalization to chart the way forward for more inclusive and meaningful cannabis policy reform.

Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 0, No. 0, 2025, pages 1–17  

By Jonathan P. Caulkins

Background and aims: Multiple countries are considering revising cannabis policies. This study aimed to measure long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States and compare them with alcohol use.

Design and setting: Secondary analysis of United States general population survey data.

Participants: The national surveys had a total of 1 641 041 participants across 27 surveys from 1979 to 2022.

Measurements

Rates of use reported to the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health and its predecessors are described, as are trends in days of use reported. Four milepost years are contrasted: 1979 (first available data and end of relatively liberal policies of the 1970s), 1992 (end of 12 years of conservative Reagan-Bush era policies), 2008 (last year before the Justice Department signaled explicit federal non-interference with state-level legalizations) and 2022 (most recent data available).

Findings

Reported cannabis use declined to a nadir in 1992, with partial recovery through 2008, and substantial increases since then, particularly for measures of more intensive use. Between 2008 and 2022, the per capita rate of reporting past-year use increased by 120%, and days of use reported per capita increased by 218% (in absolute terms from the annual equivalent of 2.3 to 8.1 billion days per year). From 1992 to 2022, there was a 15-fold increase in the per capita rate of reporting daily or near daily use. Whereas the 1992 survey recorded 10 times as many daily or near daily alcohol as cannabis users (8.9 vs. 0.9 M), the 2022 survey, for the first time, recorded more daily and near daily users of cannabis than alcohol (17.7 vs. 14.7 M). Far more people drink, but high-frequency drinking is less common. In 2022, the median drinker reported drinking on 4–5 days in the past month, versus 15–16 days in the past month for cannabis. In 2022, past-month cannabis consumers were almost four times as likely to report daily or near daily use (42.3% vs. 10.9%) and 7.4 times more likely to report daily use (28.2% vs. 3.8%).

Conclusions

Long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States parallel corresponding changes in cannabis policy, with declines during periods of greater restriction and growth during periods of policy liberalization. A growing share of cannabis consumers report daily or near daily use, and their numbers now exceed the number of daily and near daily drinkers.

Addiction, Volume119, Issue9, September 2024, Pages 1648-1652

By European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA).

This report explores the intricate relationship between economic recessions and illicit drug use through an in-depth scoping review of the literature. Unravelling complexities among demographics and drug types, this analysis sheds light on potential impacts of economic downturns, suggesting that young and already socioeconomically vulnerable population groups appear to be most affected during economic downturns. Among young adults, several studies indicate that the use of cannabis may increase during economic downturns. In addition, there are indications that transitioning to more problematic patterns of drug use, such as from smoking or snorting to injecting, may also increase during times of economic turmoil.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union., 2024. 60p.

By Claire Provost,

U.S. leads global drug war

The role of the United States in exporting the destructive war on drugs to other countries is unparalleled. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent more than a trillion dollars on the war on drugs, prioritising law enforcement responses and fuelling mass incarceration within its borders. It has also played a leading role in pushing and funding punitive responses to drugs internationally. This has continued despite clear evidence that such approaches don’t work to achieve their stated aims (ending drug use and sales) while having devastating effects on rights and health, including mass criminalisation, disease transmission, repression and displacement.

This report demonstrates how U.S. assistance has supported and expanded destructive and deadly anti-drug responses in low- and middle-income countries around the world. It also presents new follow-the-money data analysis on U.S. international drug control spending by various government departments and budgets. This includes official development assistance (ODA) intended to support poverty reduction and other global development goals; and three case studies – Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines – to reveal the damage done by this spending.

Vast and complex global network

The 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the U.S. State Department described a “whole of government approach” to drug control and a strategy of deep collaboration and “capacity building” with counterparts in other countries. A vast and complex global network of U.S. government agencies, programs, and activities has been developed in the ongoing “war on drugs.”

U.S. support for drug enforcement internationally includes financial, material and technical assistance. The U.S. drug war bureaucracy is expansive, involving numerous agencies of the government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as the infamous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), under the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2023, the DEA had 93 foreign offices in 69 countries.

Follow the money

Over the decade between 2015-2024, a total of almost $13 billion of U.S. taxpayer money was allocated to “counternarcotics” activities internationally.

For fiscal year 2025, the President requested $1 billion for international “counternarcotics” activities. Almost half of this request was to be received and spent by the DEA ($480 million); the second largest planned intermediary for this spending was to be the State Department’s INL bureau (about $350 million).

Separate budget documents from the involved departments contain further detail on where and how international drug control funding is to be spent. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) showed that Latin America was budgeted to receive more than half ($225 million) of the total $375 million for “counternarcotics” requested by the department and its agencies (including INL and USAID). Colombia was to be the largest single country recipient ($115 million).

Aid donors (led by the U.S.) spent almost $1 billion of their ODA on “narcotics control” projects in dozens of low- and middle-income countries over the decade 2013-2022. No donor contributed more to these “narcotics control” budgets than the U.S.

Controversially, the U.S. has been increasingly classifying drug control spending as ODA: in 2020, it counted just over $30 million like this; in 2021 that figure was $309 million (and while it dropped to $106 million in 2022, this was still higher than earlier years).

Profit-making companies are also benefiting from this ODA spending on “narcotics control.” The top “channel” for this spending has been private companies (“private sector institutions,” receiving $244 million over the decade) followed by the governments of countries funded ($202 million), and then multilateral organisations such as UNODC ($77 million).

Harm Reduction International | Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 47p.

UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

From the document: "America is facing the deadliest drug threat in our history. Over the last 25 years, drug overdose deaths in the United States from synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, have risen to more than 100 times their 1999 levels. The rate of fatal overdoses from other drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine, has also surged. The overdose crisis calls for bold action. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has outlined vital steps for attacking two drivers of this crisis. [...] ONDCP's 2024 '[National Drug Control] Strategy' looks to the future this Nation needs. That future is one with greater access to prevention, treatment, harm reduction and recovery support services; with a focus on equity and equal justice; with support for incarcerated individuals, as well as post-incarceration reentry assistance; with a SUD [substance use disorder] and health care workforce that meets our Nation's needs; with a payment system that sufficiently funds care; and with a concerted transnational effort to hold drug traffickers, their enablers, and facilitators accountable. [...] The 2024 'Strategy' is aimed at addressing the overdose crisis from multiple angles. This includes preventing youth substance use, expanding access to life-saving medications like naloxone, expanding access to evidence-based treatment, building a recovery-ready Nation, and ramping up efforts to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking."

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE; UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; . MAY, 2024. 124p.

By Jakob Manthey, Jürgen Rehm,and Uwe Vertheina

With the enforcement of the Cannabis Act on 1 April 2024, Germany has adopted one of the most liberal legal approaches to cannabis on the continent. The German model prioritises a non-profit approach and precludes legal market mechanisms. We believe these are the main drivers for increasing cannabis use and related health problems, based on observations following cannabis legalisation in Canada and many states in the U.S. Although legalising cannabis possession and cultivation may not immediately eliminate the illegal market, it is expected to serve public health goals. Despite the overall positive evaluation of the Cannabis Act in Germany, there are three potential areas of concern: the potential for misuse of the medical system, the normalization of cannabis use, and the influence of the cannabis industry. The German model may herald the beginning of a new generation of European cannabis policies, but concerted efforts will be required to ensure that these policy reforms serve rather than undermine public health goals.

The LANCET Regional Health - Europe, Vol 42 July, 2024

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

From the webpage description: "A global reference on drug markets, trends and policy developments, the World Drug Report offers a wealth of data and analysis and in 2024 comprises several elements tailored to different audiences. The web-based Drug market patterns and trends [hyperlink] module contains the latest analysis of global, regional and subregional estimates of and trends in drug demand and supply in a user-friendly, interactive format supported by graphs, infographics and maps. The Key findings and conclusions booklet [hyperlink] provides an overview of selected findings from the analysis presented in the Drug market patterns and trends module and the thematic Contemporary issues on drugs booklet, while the Special points of interest [hyperlink] fascicle offers a framework for the main takeaways and policy implications that can be drawn from those findings. As well as providing an in-depth analysis of key developments and emerging trends in selected drug markets, the Contemporary issues on drugs booklet [hyperlink] looks at several other developments of policy relevance. [...] The World Drug Report 2024 is aimed not only at fostering greater international cooperation to counter the impact of the world drug problem on health, governance and security, but also at assisting Member States in anticipating and addressing threats posed by drug markets and mitigating their consequences."

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. 2024

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

From the document: "The fentanyl crisis is one of the most horrific disasters that America has ever faced. On average, fentanyl kills over 200 Americans daily, the equivalent of a packed Boeing 737 crashing every single day. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45 and a leading cause in the historic drop in American life expectancy. It has led to millions more suffering from addiction and the destruction of countless families and communities. Beyond the United States, fentanyl and other mass-produced synthetic narcotics from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are devastating nations around the world. It is truly a global crisis. The PRC, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the ultimate geographic source of the fentanyl crisis. Companies in China produce nearly all of illicit fentanyl precursors, the key ingredients that drive the global illicit fentanyl trade. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) launched an investigation to better understand the role of the CCP in the fentanyl crisis. This investigation involved delving deep into public PRC websites, analyzing PRC government documents, acquiring over 37,000 unique data points of PRC companies selling narcotics online through web scraping and data analytics, undercover communications with PRC drug trafficking companies, and consultations with experts in the public and private sectors, among other steps. [...] [T]he Select Committee found thousands of PRC companies openly selling [...] illicit materials on the Chinese internet--the most heavily surveilled country-wide network in the world. The CCP runs the most advanced techno-totalitarian state in human history that 'leave[s] criminals with nowhere to hide' and has the means to stop illicit fentanyl materials manufacturers, yet it has failed to pursue flagrant violations of its own laws."

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE. 16 APR, 2024. 64p.

By Mafalda Pardal, Elle Wadsworth, Beau Kilmer

Potent synthetic opioids, illegally produced, are starting to emerge in Europe. Considering the damaging harms caused by the opioid crisis in North America, which has led to a substantial surge in overdose deaths, it is crucial that European leaders understand the challenges associated with synthetic opioids. In this Perspective, we present and discuss the current situation in Europe concerning synthetic opioids, and draw on earlier and ongoing crises involving this group of substances to reflect on likely challenges ahead and ways to improve preparedness.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 20p.