By Avalere Health

In 2022, over six million people in the United States reported having an opioid use disorder (OUD). Past research has not yielded comprehensive estimates of the full societal burden of OUD or the impact of OUD treatments in limiting associated costs. To evaluate the costs of OUD and the benefits and cost savings associated with OUD treatment, Avalere Health conducted secondary research and modeled the costs as well as the savings associated with treatment of OUD, nationally and by state. This research (1) characterized the prevalence of OUD, (2) modeled the costs of OUD, and (3) modeled the net cost impact of four ambulatory OUD treatments: (a) behavioral therapy alone, (b) behavioral therapy plus methadone, (c) behavioral therapy plus transmucosal buprenorphine, and (d) behavioral therapy plus longacting injectable (LAI) buprenorphine. Key findings: 1. OUD prevalence: OUD cases per capita (the percentage of individuals per state with OUD) ranged among states from 0.75% to 2.99%. New Hampshire, Nevada, Massachusetts, and Kentucky had the highest rates of OUD (greater than 2.5%), while Wyoming, Hawaii, Washington DC, and Minnesota had the lowest (less than 1.0%). 2. Cost burden of OUD: The average annual total cost per OUD case OUD is approximately $695,000 across all stakeholders analyzed. The annual cost per OUD case, excluding the patient burden to the individual with OUD, is approximately $163,000, spread across public and private stakeholders. Including lost quality and length of life, the patient burden of OUD is approximately $532,000 per year. 3. Costs to external stakeholders: The costs to the federal government, state/local government, private businesses, and society are driven by lost productivity for employers ($438 billion), employees ($248 billion), and households ($73 billion). Health insurance and uninsured costs were $111 billion, criminal justice costs are $52 billion, and other substance use treatment costs are: $12 billion. 4. Treatment benefits of OUD: Medications and behavioral therapy to treat OUD are associated with significant average cost savings per case. Estimated annual per-case savings net of treatment cost from ambulatory treatments are estimated to be: • $144,000 for behavioral therapy alone • $271,000 for behavioral therapy plus methadone • $271,000 for behavioral therapy plus sublingual buprenorphine • $295,000 for behavioral therapy plus LAI buprenorphine

Washington, DC: Avalere Health, 2025. 21p.

By:Natalie Butler

The Washington/Baltimore HIDTA Information Bulletin by Butler et al. highlights the emergence of Bis(2,2,6,6-tetramethyl-4-piperidyl) sebacate (BTMPS), or Tinuvin 770, in Maryland’s illicit drug supply. BTMPS, an industrial UV stabilizer not approved for human use, was found in 0.7% of drug-positive samples (Jan–Mar 2025), often alongside fentanyl, heroin, and xylazine. It acts as a potent L-type calcium channel blocker and non-competitive antagonist at nicotinic receptors and does not respond to naloxone. First detected in 2024, BTMPS has since spread to at least 11 states. In New Mexico, it appeared in counterfeit M30 tablets with reports of severe withdrawal. Individuals who have used it describe BTMPS as smelling like bug spray or burning plastic.

Washington/Baltimore HIDTA Investigative Support Center , 2025. 3p.

By Diana Moldafsky

Drug overdose deaths in the U.S., including from synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, surged during the past 25 years, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Congress appropriated approximately $1.33 billion dollars for the National Guard Counterdrug Program during fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024. This program supports federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement with drug interdiction activities in 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and U.S. Virgin Islands. The joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review certain DOD and National Guard Bureau counterdrug instructions and examine whether they limit support for counterdrug efforts under the law. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD and National Guard Bureau align their counterdrug policies with applicable federal counterdrug laws; and (2) DOD’s changes in guidance during fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024 clarified how counterdrug activities could be conducted. GAO identified and reviewed federal counterdrug laws; evaluated relevant DOD and National Guard Bureau policies; and reviewed changes in DOD policies and guidance related to the implementation of domestic counterdrug activities during the past 6 fiscal years. GAO also interviewed DOD, federal law enforcement, and state National Guard officials. GAO also conducted site visits to locations in California and Texas.

Drug overdose deaths in the U.S., including those from fentanyl, surged over the past 25 years.

To reduce drug trafficking and criminal activity, the Department of Defense and the National Guard help support federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement. The counterdrug support services they offer include information analysis, translation and transcription, and air and ground surveillance.

DOD and the National Guard Bureau work to ensure their counterdrug policies match up with the activities described in federal laws. DOD periodically updates its guidance to further clarify what counterdrug activities can be conducted.

Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025. 35p.

By Hale Utar

This paper examines how firms in an emerging economy are affected by violence due to drug trafficking. Employing rich longitudinal plant-level data covering all of Mexico from 2005–2010, and using an instrumental variable strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous spatiotemporal variation in the homicide rate during the outbreak of drug-trade related violence in Mexico, I show that violence has a significant negative impact on plant output, product scope, employment, and capacity utilization. Resilience to violence differs widely across different types of employment within firms and across firms with different characteristics. Employment decline is driven by blue collar employment only. Dissecting within- and cross-plant heterogeneity points to a local labor supply channel where particularly plants utilizing low-wage, female, blue-collar workers are impacted. Consistent with a blue-collar labor supply shock, the results show a positive impact on average blue-collar wages and a negative impact on average white-collar wages at the firm level. Output elasticity of violence is also shown to be larger among low-wage, female-intensive but also domestically buying and selling plants. These findings show the rise of drug violence has significant distortive effects on domestic industrial development in Mexico and shed light on the characteristics of the most affected firms and the channels through which they are affected.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2022. 121p.

By The Drug Enforcement Administration

Mexican cartels’ production, trafficking, and distribution of powerful illicit synthetic drugs, chiefly fentanyla and methamphetamine, represent a dire threat to public health, the rule of law, and national security in the United States. The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels (CJNG), together with their procurement, distribution, and financial support networks stretching across Latin America, China, and other key global nodes, remain the dominant threats for the trafficking of these and other drugs into the United States. In the 12-month period ending in October 2024, 84,076 Americans died from a drug overdose, according to the most recent available provisional statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), underscoring the devastating effect these cartels have on our country. Although these numbers show a 25 percent decline since the same 12-month period last year – when the country lost 112,910 people to drug poisonings – demonstrating positive momentum in the fight against these drugs and the organizations trafficking them, the threat remains grave. The trend is hopeful, however. October 2024 was the eleventh consecutive month in which CDC reported a reduction, and the current statistics represent the largest 12-month reduction in drug overdose deaths ever recorded. Fentanyl and other synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine, are the primary drivers of fatal drug overdose deaths nationwide, while other illicit drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, and diverted prescription opioids still contribute meaningfully to the drug threat landscape in the United States. However, overdose and poisoning deaths involving fentanyl and other synthetic opioids caused more deaths than all other categories of drugs. This exceptionally deadly drug – often pressed into pills resembling legitimate medications and presented as authentic to customers or mixed into other drugs – creates a heightened risk of fatal overdose for unsuspecting or otherwise opioid-naïve users. The production and trafficking of drugs by Mexican cartels has fundamentally altered the drug and criminal landscapes in North America. The cartels capitalize on the relative ease of synthetic drug production compared to the physical and environmental limitations of traditional plant-based drug production to generate immense revenues. The cartels maintain steady supply chains for obtaining the precursor chemicals, primarily from China and India, necessary to produce these synthetic drugs. The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels, in particular, control clandestine production sites in Mexico, smuggling routes into the United States, and distribution hubs in key U.S. cities. The cartels work with U.S. drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and violent gangs to distribute drugs throughout the country, all exploiting social media and messaging applications to extend their reach to a larger and younger customer base. The cartels’ extensive, complex, and adaptable networks present formidable challenges across the U.S. law enforcement, national security, regulatory, financial, and health and wellness sectors.  

Washington, DC: DEA, 2025. 80p.

By Peter Leasure and Robert Kaminski

The current study used a time series design with Ohio State Highway Patrol and Ohio Department of Public Safety data to explore whether sales of recreational marijuana increased incidents of operating a vehicle while impaired (OVI) in Franklin County, Ohio and vehicle crashes in Columbus, Ohio. Two different statistical models were used to ensure the robustness of the results (a generalized linear model and Linden's itsa). In other words, we would want to see the same results from both models for moderate support of a particular finding. The results were mixed regarding the impact of recreational marijuana sales on total OVIs in Franklin County, Ohio. The generalized linear model showed a statistically significant increase in OVIs after recreational sales began, but the itsa model failed to replicate that finding. The results were also mixed regarding the impact of recreational marijuana sales on marijuana OVIs in Franklin County, Ohio. The generalized linear model showed a statistically significant increase in marijuana OVIs after recreational sales began, but the itsa model failed to replicate that finding. However, both models failed to find that recreational sales increased vehicle crashes in Columbus, Ohio, meaning that there is modest evidence that recreational sales did not increase vehicle crashes in Columbus, Ohio. A sensitivity analysis that used a balanced time series (91 days before the intervention and 91 days after) was also utilized, and those results largely confirmed the above findings.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 915

Columbus, OH Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law

By Flore Berger and Mouhamadou Kane 

West Africa has become a hotspot for the trafficking of medical products, with estimations that the illicit market makes up to 80% of medical products in Burkina Faso and Guinea, the two case studies of this brief. Despite its enormous scale, there are gaps in knowledge that this report seeks to address by providing a qualitative analysis of the market’s key characteristics and enablers (corruption and insecurity), and an assessment of national and regional responses. Recommendations l The complex supply chains feeding the illicit market for medical products dictate that responses must be international, and at the very least regional, to be effective. ECOWAS hence has a key role to play at the regional level to enhance cross-border intelligence gathering and cooperation. l National authorities are best placed to tackle the structural drivers (affordability and accessibility) behind the demand for illicit medical products, and should work simultaneously on awareness campaigns, as well as on wider distribution of and access to key high-demand products such as antimalarials. l Civil society has a key role to play. In addition to supporting the awareness-raising effort, civil society is also central in holding people accountable (including customs officials and politicians, for example) by denouncing cases of corruption and malfeasance.  

  OCWAR-T Policy Brief 5 | August 2023, Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 10p.

By Fatjona Mejdini

Organized crime groups from the Western Balkans have over the last 20 years established a remarkably strong foothold in South America in their pursuit of cocaine that they ship to and distribute in Europe and beyond. They have evolved from minor European players into prominent international criminal enterprises in this illicit global commodity trade, building durable relationships at both ends of the highly lucrative supply chain. Their rise has been spurred, in part, by luck. Two key factors have favoured them: an unprecedented surge in cocaine production in South America and insatiable demand for the drug in Europe. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s European Drug Trends Monitor suggests that after reaching record high levels in 2023, and despite a drop in seizures in the beginning of 2024, cocaine availability remains stable, if not on the rise, in Europe.1 Indeed, record seizures are being documented at key EU ports and the bloc’s drugs monitoring agency, the European Union Drugs Agency, announced in March 2023 another annual increase in the levels of cocaine detected in wastewater, continuing an upward trend that began in 2016.2 But guile has played an equally important role in the success of these groups, which have leveraged the smuggling expertise and paramilitary training established during the Balkan ethnic conflicts and civil unrests of the 1990s. Playing the long game, they have learned from and won the respect of the Italian mafia, among others, while retaining an agility that has allowed them to seize market opportunities. This has largely been achieved – so far, at least – without provoking debilitating blowback from rival players. The research for this report focused on Western Balkan organized crime groups and was conducted within this framework. Consequently, the dynamics observed in South American countries are explored solely in relation to these criminal groups. The report aims to provide a detailed understanding of their presence in South America and the broader implications that this has for their future in the context of the Western Balkans. Balkan brokers have been crucial to their success in establishing symbiotic local relationships. They have forged strong and enduring connections in the cocaine-producing countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, from cartels to coca farmers. They have also been able to establish strong bases and key relationships in dispatching countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and, more recently, the neighbouring Caribbean region. Not only have they managed to navigate the South America’s criminal environment with relative ease, but in some cases they have also proved able to forge relationships within high-level business and political circles in the countries where they operate.3 To avoid disruptions to their operations at the wholesale source, they have intentionally maintained a professional working distance from other foreign criminal organizations operating in South America, especially the infamous Mexican cartels. However, they have managed to expand their footprint in global cocaine markets, partly through arrangements with some of Europe’s most prominent criminal organizations, such as the Dutch–Moroccan networks, the Kinahan cartel and Italian mafia groups like the ’Ndrangheta and the Camorra. They have also displayed creativity by employing various forms of trafficking methods. These extend beyond the use of container ships, to also encompass cargo and leisure vessels and planes. Their presence in South America and the international cocaine supply chain has left a conspicuous footprint that has been tracked by law enforcement activity. Over the past three years, half of the targets of Europol-coordinated cocaine operations have been linked to individuals and networks from this region, thanks in part to the crackdown on communication platforms such as EncroChat and SKY ECC, which were widely used by criminal organizations from the Western Balkans.4 Western Balkan criminals have been accused of transporting tens of tonnes of cocaine from South America to major ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and elsewhere. Although these major European entry hubs appear to be the primary channels for criminal organizations from the Western Balkans, these actors also utilize ports in the Balkans region as transit points for trafficking cocaine elsewhere in Europe. Their involvement in the global illicit cocaine trade is not confined to the European consumer market, however. Western Balkan groups have been linked to significant seizures on other continents as well, including one of the largest cocaine seizures in US history (more than 20 tonnes, worth more than US$1 billion).5 Western Balkans groups have also, in recent years, been using their strong presence in South America to target even wealthier markets, such as Australia, using Africa and Southern Europe as transit regions.6 These criminal entities have also left a trail of blood. Since 2010, at least 19 people from the Western Balkans believed to be linked with cocaine trafficking have been killed in South America, according to GI-TOC records. Their activities have exacerbated instability in certain South American countries such as Ecuador, as they relentlessly secure supplies of cocaine and its safe shipment – at any cost. This research report identifies the links between criminal actors from the Western Balkans and the South American cocaine trafficking market. It provides an overview of the factors that have impelled the region’s organized crime groups towards South America and addresses the implications arising from their presence in that region. The study sheds light on their origins and operations, revealing common patterns despite the diverse backgrounds from which they have emerged. The study finds that links between the Western Balkans and South America have existed for around three decades but have significantly intensified in the last two. It predominantly focuses on organized crime groups from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, but also makes reference to those from other countries in South Eastern Europe where relevant, in relation to their collaboration in the cocaine trade. It is important to note that international law enforcement organizations, in their reporting, often refer to criminal groups from the Western Balkans as ‘Albanian-speaking networks’7 or the ‘Balkan Cartel’.8 The former is used to denote criminal groups of Albanian nationality that speak Albanian, while the latter refers to criminal groups of Slavic origin that speak the Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian language.9 These terms indicate ethnicity and linguistic variations among actors rather than their organizational characteristics. Inter-ethnic cooperation between organized crime groups in the Western Balkans has a long history, particularly in the trafficking of weaponry and ammunition, cigarettes, fuel and drugs, and human smuggling. In some cases, integrated organized crime groups have emerged bringing together members from different countries within the region. But these groups prefer to retain their independence, and there is no evidence of the creation of cartels in the Western Balkan region.10 Organized crime groups in the region generally have a clear leadership structure, but Balkan organized crime groups operating in South America appear to prefer a horizontal organizational structure that allows flexibility. Due to the transnational nature of cocaine trafficking, these groups have become adaptable. Often, their trafficking operations in South America are seen as ‘joint ventures’ or ‘projects’ that bring together organizations or groups of criminals from different countries and ethnic backgrounds who happen to be in the right place and have the necessary resources and skills to achieve the desired outcome. The extensive supply chain coordination needed to procure, transport, process and distribute the drug has prompted enhanced flexibility within these groups. Therefore, in this report, the terms ‘organized crime groups’ and ‘criminal networks’ will be used interchangeably.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 48p.

By Don Weatherburn, Michael Farrell, Wai-Yin Wan, Sara Rahman

Background: Very few studies have examined the criminal careers of drug traffickers. Our aim in this study was to determine (a) the percentage of drug traffickers who cease involvement in crime following their first conviction for drug trafficking, (b) the factors that affect the likelihood and speed of re-offending among drug traffickers, (c) the factors that affect the rate of reoffending among drug traffickers and (d) the scale of drug trafficker involvement in crimes other than drug trafficking.

Methods: We characterize the criminal careers of a sample of 30,020 cases of offenders convicted of drug trafficking in New South Wales (NSW), Australia over the 29-year period between 2000 and 2023, focussing on how drug charge, trafficker type, and drug and alcohol use affect the risk and frequency of offending. We use a combination of descriptive statistics, cure fraction regression and negative binomial regression. Our controls in the regression analyses consist of age, age of first conviction and number of prior convictions.

Results: The 'cure' rate among males aged 30-39 who were first convicted between 19 and 35 years of age, whose principal offence is trafficking in a non-commercial quantity of heroin, who have three prior convictions and who score 'moderate' in terms of the LSI-R drug/alcohol scale is 31 per cent. The instantaneous risk of re-offending among ATS, heroin, cannabis and ecstasy traffickers ranges between 62 and 82 per cent higher than among cocaine traffickers. Convicted drug traffickers commit a wide variety of offences but only a small proportion are convicted of drug offences before or after their first conviction for drug trafficking.

Conclusions: The present study raises two important questions for future research. The first concerns whether those involved in drug trafficking in Australia rely on it as a primary source of income or whether it is just one of several income-generating criminal activities they switch between in the course of a criminal career. The second question is why there are such marked differences in the risk, speed and frequency of offending among traffickers of different drugs.

International Journal of Drug Policy; 2024, 10p.

By Nicolas Lien and Gabriel Feltran

International cocaine trafficking from South America has increased significantly over the past decade. Based on mixed-methods research, we hypothesize that this change has been driven primarily by the globalization of its logistics, which has led to relevant technical and political changes along the value chain. Today’s global criminal logistics connect a wider variety of producers and retailers, ensuring a market without monopoly and monopsony, although very few transnational criminal groups control the center of the value chain. Their cooperation results in a virtuous circle for illicit accumulation, in which the constant improvement in productivity in South America also leads to an increase in consumer demand in Europe and, more recently, in Africa, Asia, and Oceania. We used a mixed-methods approach to relationally analyze coherent changes in the cocaine value chain in Latin American, African, and European countries. 

  Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 7(1): pp. 20–34

By Measures for Justice

South Dakota is currently in a dispute about legalized marijuana use for recreational and medicinal purposes. In this context, it’s worth considering how the state handles criminal cases involving drug and DUI offenses. Measures for Justice (MFJ) recently published county-level criminal justice data for the state of South Dakota that span 2009–2017. A review of our findings suggests that relative to other offenses, South Dakota counties pursue harsher responses to court cases in which the most serious offense was related to drug possession/distribution or driving under the influence (DUI). The pattern can be seen at multiple points in case processing. This report explores these disparate findings using three Measures: dismissal rates, time to disposition, amount of fees and fines. Year by year, we have found that drug and DUI cases (1) are dismissed at a lower rate in most counties, (2) take longer, on average, to dispose of than other case types, and (3) face some of the highest financial obligations at conviction

Rochester, NY: Measures for Justice, 2021. 7p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Key Takeaways Significant gross income from illicit drug trafficking Between 2019 and 2022, the Balkan route – a major corridor for trafficking opiates and, more recently, methamphetamine – generated an estimated total annual illicit gross income ranging from US$13.9 to US$21.4 billion. Opiates accounted for about 90 per cent of this total, with methamphetamine representing a smaller but growing share. The aggregated value of these trafficking flows surpasses the gross domestic product (GDP) of several countries along the route, highlighting the significant economic impact of these illegal activities. The data and analysis do not cover the period following the drug ban in Afghanistan that was imposed in 2022 by the Taliban and its impact on drug consumption and trafficking patterns. Geographic distribution of trafficking routes The Balkan route remains a critical pathway for drug trafficking, stretching from Afghanistan through Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye, and splitting into three main branches, all leading into Europe. Alongside the opiate flow, methamphetamine trafficking is expanding, with manufacturing hotspots identified in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovakia), Southern Europe (Greece) and Western Europe (Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands). Opiates and methamphetamine trafficking is concentrated in key hubs Given their location at the start of the Balkan route, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye are the main hotspots for trafficking both drugs. Trafficking through Iran (Islamic Republic of) plays a pivotal role in the opiate trade, accounting for over one-third of total gross income along the Balkan route related to opiates. Other key trafficking hotspots can be found in Belgium and the Netherlands (Kingdom of the). These countries are not only key stops for traffickers but also act as hotspots for distributing opiates and methamphetamine in smaller quantities. Illicit actors in some countries like the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) also contribute to methamphetamine manufacture the impact of proximity and trafficker adaptability on interception rates Interception rates of illegally traded opiates and methamphetamine along the Balkan route are highest in the proximity of production sources. Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye intercept the highest percentage of all opiates that cross their territories at 28.2 and 29.3 percent respectively. Traffickers' adaptability − through tactics such as breaking shipments into smaller quantities, altering routes and employing advanced concealment methods − continue to pose significant challenges to law enforcement, particularly further along the supply chain. High profit margins in the drug trade Trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine can yield substantial profits, with an estimated combined annual illicit net income ranging from US$10.9 to US$16.9 billion. These profits represent more than 70 per cent of the total illicit gross income acquired through the trafficking of these two substances after deducting intermediate expenditures, production and purchasing costs.The largest shares of illicit net income are generated at the retail level, where price markups are highest. However, individuals higher up in the supply chain may earn more per person, as fewer people share the profits at the international and wholesale levels. Illicit financial flows (IFFs) related to the management of drug trafficking profits are in the order of billions. IFFs are cross border flows of financial or nonfinancial assets that are illicit in origin, transfer or use. These flows represent the hidden movement of wealth that undermines economic stability and evades lawful oversight. Looking at IFFs generated through the trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine, it is estimated that between a quarter and half of the US$13.7 billion in illicit net income generated from drug trafficking along the Balkan route is illegally moved across borders, generating potential IFFs related to the management of drug trafficking profits of US$3.4 billion to US$6.9 billion annually. Link between money laundering and IFFs There is some evidence that income from drug trafficking is laundered both domestically and abroad through investments in real estate, luxury vehicles and other assets. Shell companies and informal systems like Hawala are frequently used to transfer and launder money, complicating efforts to trace the illicit proceeds. Key trafficking transit points not only facilitate drug movement but also serve as hubs for laundering and redistributing illicit financial resources. Contrary to common assumptions, traditional tax havens may play a minimal role in laundering drug trafficking proceeds. Instead, the limited available data suggests that countries like Luxembourg, the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) and Spain are potential hubs for drug-related IFFs generated along the Balkan route, alongside the United Arab Emirates.

. Vienna / ©United Nations, 2025 59p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch\

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

UNODC, in partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), further released a report on capacities and resources for the treatment of substance use disorders in Afghanistan.

The survey findings show that treatment services are available in 32 out of 34 provinces, but significant disparities exist in service distribution, accessibility, and gender representation, particularly affecting female patients.

Although opiates remain the most frequently reported class of substance used by patients seeking treatment, demand for services addressing stimulant-related disorders is rising, as synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine have become increasingly available in Afghanistan.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC: 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This second volume provides the latest figures on national and regional opium poppy production in 2024 and the challenges farmers are facing as they adapt to new economic conditions. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban; drug trafficking and supply; and treatment availability and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, having continued for a second year, UNODC has sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs, and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan population, as well as on neighbouring countries and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing efforts to address demand and supply of drugs within and outside Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using latest data at highest quality standards. The present insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC through remote sensing techniques, rural village surveys; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide the latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This fourth volume provides an assessment of drug seizure trends near Afghanistan and estimates potential opium stocks within the country by the end of 2022, just before the start of the ban. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban, and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, which has continued for a second year, UNODC sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, the reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the effects of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan economy, as well as on Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing international engagement in Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using the latest data of the highest quality standards, presenting it in an evidence-based, coherent, coordinated, and structured manner as foreseen in Security Council resolution 2721 (2023). The present Insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC by remote sensing, through rural village surveys and other tools; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and the UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023. Other data used in this report to model stock estimates come from UNODC’s Afghan Opiate Trade Project published in 2020.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2025. 52p.

By Rima Ah Toong, Shelby Grauer, Katherine Tallan

  The Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has administered the Illegal Marijuana Market Enforcement Grant since 2018 and is required to issue an annual report concerning the status and effectiveness of the program and to provide future funding recommendations to the Oregon Legislature (legislature). The Legislature funds this grant program with $6 million on a biennial basis. In response to a sharp increase in reports of unaddressed illegal grow sites and associated worker abuse in 2021 and 2022, the Legislature infused the grant program with an additional $26 million in emergency one-time funding, which the CJC awarded to grantees in 2022. In 2023, the legislature supplemented the $6 million in base funding with an additional $5 million, for a total of $11 million in biennial funds that will be awarded through a competitive grant solicitation process in 2024. This report examines the status of the grant program and grantee expenditures from 2021 to 2023. The CJC, with input from grantees, other agencies, and interested parties, also changed its program data reporting structure, in 2022, to better gauge the problems being addressed with these grant funds. Described in this report, among other things, are the following findings: • Since April 1, 2022, grant-funded law enforcement operations reported 424 illegal cannabis incidents, occurring in 96 unique zip codes. • Eleven zip codes saw 10 or more incidents involving grant-funded law enforcement activities during the reporting period. The zip codes experiencing the highest number of incidents were 97523 (the greater Cave Junction area, with 35 incidents) and 97526 (Grants Pass and areas north, with 17 incidents). • The number of incidents in which law enforcement observed or suspected labor trafficking and/or worker abuse decreased from 39 (20 percent) in 2022 to eight (3.5 percent) in 2023. However, the number of survivors of human trafficking served by grant funded community-based organizations (CBOs) increased from 100 to 344 during the same time period. • Survivors served by CBO grantees were primarily male (41.4 percent), Hispanic (48.9 percent), and ages 18-35 (28.8 percent). The majority received legal assistance (63.5 percent) and/or referrals to other needed crisis or long-term support services (56.8 percent). • Grantees reported that the 424 incidents resulted in 184 felony case filings in Oregon circuit courts. • Of the 424 reported incidents, 54.2 percent involved a land, natural resource, or civil code violation. • Law enforcement grantees seized approximately 1.8 million illegal cannabis plants and 351,781 pounds of illegal processed cannabis, as well as other illegal narcotics and substances, firearms, and equipment used to operate illegal grows off-grid. Based on the best available information, the projected cost for e  

Salem, OR: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. 2024. 31p.

By Hai Thanh Luong

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), including five Southeast Asian countries and China, has experienced a significant increase in the cultivation of opium, trafficking of heroin and methamphetamine, and consumption of these illicit drugs. In recent years, the GMS has been expanded considerably as supply, destination, and transit route for illegal drug trade’s networks to and through, particularly when China officially applied ‘Belt and Road’ strategy. This paper reviews historical aspects and current trends in drug production and trafficking in the GMS, with special emphasis on Mekong River areas where China is ‘located’ as the heart of the transition. Some evidence consistent with the ‘supply, destination, and transit route’ arguments is found through locating and mapping drug trafficking networks to connect with China. Finally, this paper calls for some initial recommendations to improve the process of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the GMS within the scope of Belt and Road Initiative. 

The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6 (2020) 20–35 

By Joseph E. Schumacher, Abdullah Ahsan, Amber H. Simpler, Adam P. Natoli & Bradley J. Cain

Conducting research within a carceral health care context offers a unique view into the nature of drug use among arrestees with potential to identify and prevent drug use consequences. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature and extent of drug use among first-time jail arrestees to inform detection and treatment.

Methods

This study utilized a naturalistic research design to collect de-identified urine drug screens (UDS), jail characteristics, and arrestee demographic variables among arrestees indicating drug use from 25 jails across the United States in 2023 through a confidential data sharing agreement with NaphCare, Inc. using its proprietary electronic health record operating system. Descriptive statistics were used to detail the features of the dataset, Pearson’s chi-square tests of independence were performed to statistically analyze associations between UDS results and jail characteristics and arrestee demographics, and significant chi-square test results were further investigated by examining standardized residuals to clarify the nature and significance of within-group differences in proportions.

Results

Of the 43,553 UDS cases comprising the final sample (28.8% of total arrestees), 74.8% (32,561) were positive for one or more drugs, and 25.2% of UDS cases were negative for all drugs. Among those who tested positive, 69.0% were positive for cannabis, 54.8% for stimulants, 29.6% for opioids, and 12.4% for sedatives. Arrestees were positive for multiple drugs half the time, with combinations of cannabis, stimulants, and opioids most common. Significant associations between drug use and both jail characteristics and arrestee demographics were found.

Conclusions

Though drug use is not a recent phenomenon, the lethality potential of the drugs being used today is relatively new. Arrestees with positive urine drug screens are at heightened risk of adverse outcome due to sudden cessation of substance use. Findings highlight the need for objective clinical data to guide acute treatment of individuals at risk of withdrawing while detained. A

ddiction Science & Clinical Practice (2025), 15p.

By Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo and Kars de Bruijne

Since 2022, a synthetic drug known as ‘kush’, has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa. Kush emerged in Sierra Leone, but quickly spread across countries in the subregion, including Liberia, Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, with devastating effects. By April 2024, the health impacts of kush, a synthetic drug containing nitazenes, opioids as – or more – powerful than fentanyl, as well as synthetic cannabinoids, were so acute that the presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia had declared national emergencies over drug use – an unprecedented step.

This drug represents a turning point in West Africa’s drug landscape. The scale of its market expansion and its lethal public health effects are unparalleled. Yet, amidst widespread speculation about kush, a number of critical questions remained unanswered about the drug. What is kush? Where does it come from? Who is producing and trafficking it? And what can be done to reduce the harm posed by this drug?

This research confirms that kush is composed of potent synthetic opioids called nitazenes, some of which are 25 times stronger than fentanyl, and synthetic cannabinoids commonly found in European drug markets. The consequences have been dire, with mass fatalities overwhelming mortuary systems, forcing emergency group cremations, and leading to bodies being abandoned in the streets.

The research identifies China, the Netherlands, and most likely the UK as key sources of kush and it’s active ingredients, which are trafficked via maritime routes and postal courier services. It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids. Initially controlled by a few organized criminal groups, the kush market has since fragmented, making it even more difficult to counteract. Local synthesis of the drug has increased, escalating health risks, and Sierra Leone’s street gangs for a key part of the drug’s distribution network.

Some key points highlighted in the report are:

Kush is a drug that has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa, with Sierra Leone as its epicentre;

Chemical testing finds that nearly 50% of samples contain nitazenes, a very addictive and deadly synthetic opioid comparable to fentanyl (the other half contains synthetic cannabinoids)

Some of these substances are imported from China, the Netherlands and most likely the United Kingdom through maritime routes, the air and postal courier services (It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids);

The market for kush used to be more strongly controlled by large groups but increasingly fragmented, with smaller actors setting up own operations

Urgent coordinated action is needed on three fronts; a) better monitoring, early warning, testing, and information-sharing in West Africa; b) disrupting supply chains by China, the Netherlands and the UK and at Sierra Leonean points of entry; c) a strong push on mitigating the harms of kush consumption

Clingendael: 2025. 60p

By Ediomo-Ubong Nelson, Gernot Klantschnig

This article examines narratives of cannabis legalization in Nigeria. While most existing research on cannabis legalization has concentrated on the global North, we focus on one of Africa's largest cannabis markets, as well as the views of actors heavily criminalized and excluded from policy debates. Based on in-depth interviews and long-time engagement with illicit cannabis farmers and traders, the article highlights the contestations in their hidden narratives, troubling extant views of cannabis legalization which uncritically laud its socioeconomic benefits, and revealing the potential downsides of legalization in the context of an exploitative legal neo-liberal economy rife with social inequities. The findings of this study also highlight a need for open policy debate that engages criminalized cannabis producing communities who have borne the brunt of both prohibition and economic marginalization to chart the way forward for more inclusive and meaningful cannabis policy reform.

Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 0, No. 0, 2025, pages 1–17