By Corine Tachtiris

Translation and Race brings together translation studies with critical race studies for a long-overdue reckoning with race and racism in translation theory and practice. This book explores the "unbearable whiteness of translation" in the West that excludes scholars and translators of color from the field and also upholds racial inequities more broadly. Outlining relevant concepts from critical race studies, Translation and Race demonstrates how norms of translation theory and practice in the West actually derive from ideas rooted in white supremacy and other forms of racism. Chapters explore translation’s role in historical processes of racialization, racial capitalism and intellectual property, identity politics and Black translation praxis, the globalization of critical race studies, and ethical strategies for translating racist discourse. Beyond attempts to diversify the field of translation studies and the literary translation profession, this book ultimately calls for a radical transformation of translation theory and practice. This book is crucial reading for advanced students and scholars in translation studies, critical race and ethnic studies, and related areas, as well as for practicing translators.

London: Routledge, 2024. 188p.

By J.M. Vorster, Nico Vorster, Jan A. du Rand, Riaan Rheeder, Dirk van der Merwe, Theuns Eloff, Ferdi P. Kruger, Reginald W. Nel 

Race and inequality have always been sensitive topics in South African society due to its colonial past, diverse social composition and apartheid legacy of legal discrimination against people on the basis of their skin colour. Racial tensions seem to be escalating in South African society and disturbing racialised rhetoric and slogans are re-entering the political and social landscape. Another disturbing phenomenon has been violent incidents of xenophobia against African immigrants. The question probed by this book is: What perspectives can theology offer in addressing the roots of racism, inequality and xenophobia in South Africa and how can it and the church contribute to reconciliation and a sense of togetherness among South African citizens? Various methodologies and approaches are used to address this question. In chapter 1, Theuns Eloff employs a historical and socio-analytical approach to describe the social context that has given rise, and is still giving impetus to racism and other forms of intolerance in South African society. Nico Vorster approaches the issue of distorted racial identity constructions from a theological-anthropological perspective. Utilising various empirical studies, he attempts to provide conceptual clarity to the concepts of racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia, and maps the various racisms that we find in South Africa. His contribution concludes with a theological-anthropological discussion on ways in which theology can deconstruct distorted identities and contribute to the development of authentic identities. Koos Vorster provides a theological-ethical perspective on social stratification in South Africa. He identifies the patterns inherent to the institutionalisation of racist social structures and argues that many of these patterns are still present, albeit in a new disguise, in the South African social order. Jan du Rand provides in chapter 4 a semantic discussion of the notions of race and xenophobia. He argues that racist ideologies are not constructed on a factual basis, but that racial ideologies use semantic notions to construct social myths that enable them to attain power and justify the exploitation and oppression of the other. Du Rand’s second contribution in chapter 5 provides Reformed exegetical and hermeneutic perspectives on various passages and themes in the Bible that relate to anthropology, xenophobia and the imperative to xenophilia [love of the stranger]. Dirk Van der Merwe’s contribution analyses, evaluates, and compares both contemporary literature and ancient texts of the Bible to develop a model that can enable churches to promote reconciliation in society, while Ferdi Kruger investigates the various ways in which language can be used as a tool to disseminate hate speech. He offers an analytical description of hate language, provides normative perspectives on the duty to counter hate speech through truth speaking and phronesis (wisdom) and concludes with practical-theological perspectives that might enable us to address problematic praxis. Reggie Nel explores the Confessions of Belhar and the Declaration of Accra as theological lenses to provide markers for public witness in a postcolonial South African setting. The volume concludes with Riaan Rheeder’s Christian bioethical perspective on inequality in the health sector of sub-Sahara Africa. This book contains original research. No part was plagiarised or published elsewhere. The target audience are theologians, ministers and the Christian community, but social activists, social scientists, politicians, political theorists, sociologists and psychologists might also find the book applicable to their fields.

Durbanville, AOSIS, 2017. 338p.

By Nikita Lalwani

For much of the twentieth century, the United States did little to help repatriate looted antiquities, thanks to a powerful coalition of art collectors, museums, and numismatists who preferred an unregulated art market. Today, however, the country treats the protection of cultural property as an important national-security issue. What changed? This Essay tells the story of how a confluence of events—including the high-profile destruction and looting of cultural property in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the revelation that looted antiquities were helping to bankroll terrorist organizations in the Middle East—convinced both Congress and the State Department to take the issue seriously. It then asks what this shift says about how the United States sets its policy agenda and reflects on how cultural property law should evolve from here.

Yale Law Journal, VOLUME 130, 2020-2021

By Christine Acosta Weirich

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011, many nations in the Cradle of Civilization faced civil unrest, much of which continues today in the form of the ongoing Syrian Civil War, the conflict in Yemen, and instability in nations such as Iraq and Turkey. As a consequence, antiquities and cultural heritage in the region are currently facing a notoriously exacerbated level of risk. Despite the looting and destruction of cultural objects and monuments presenting a longstanding global and historical trend, the field of antiquities trafficking research lacks a unique and effective perspective within its current body of work and research. Likewise, criminology as a scientific field of study has largely overlooked the complex issue of looting and trafficking of cultural objects. This thesis focuses on the issue of Antiquities Trafficking Networks from a crime prevention perspective and attempts to demonstrate the effectiveness and apt nature of Crime Script Analysis and Situational Crime Prevention. This is accomplished first with a study and analysis of the wider phenomenon of Antiquities Trafficking Networks (from looting to market), followed by a specific case study of antiquities trafficked from within Syria since the beginning of the Civil War. Following these analyses, thirteen prominent Situational Crime Prevention strategies for Antiquities Trafficking Networks, and ten strategies for future conflict zones are generated by this research project. Through these strategies, Crime Script Analysis – in conjunction with Situational Crime Prevention – has proven to be a highly effective and efficient method and framework for studying this particularly difficult field. Ultimately, this thesis proposes a new crime prevention-focused methodology, to help tackle the issue of antiquities trafficking, as well as presenting one of the first prevention-specific analyses in this area. In doing so, it offers a basic model that maps the structure and necessary elements for antiquities trafficking to occur and allows for future research projects to adapt or customize this script model to situation-specific cases of antiquities looting, transit, and marketing.

Ph.D. Thesis. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 2018. 312p.

By Michaela Millinder

KEY FINDINGS

• Illicit actors, including terrorists, target cultural heritage and soft targets for a myriad of motivations: for financial gain and to diversify revenue streams, to validate their narratives or propaganda, and to systematically erase communities’ collective identities, both to subjugate these societies and re-write and control their histories. These seemingly divergent motivations are not exclusive, and the same illicit actor can destroy cultural heritage for propaganda and profit from its sale.

• The intentional destruction of cultural heritage, which is a war crime, often occurs concurrently with other human rights abuses and is a condition that can be conducive to genocide. It can furthermore hinder post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding efforts.

• Due to the inherent aspects of cultural heritage and soft targets, protection challenges include: tensions in balancing security and civilian access to sites or public spaces, lack of awareness and education on the risks to cultural heritage, the multiplicity of actors involved in cultural heritage management and, at times, the difficulty in securing their engagement, siloed responses, limited resources, and state involvement in the targeting and destruction of cultural heritage.

• Risk assessments, information sharing, cross-sectoral and agency partnerships, educational and awareness raising efforts, including on the threats facing cultural heritage, and prosecutions and international accountability mechanisms have all been utilized as good protection practices and responses.

• Recommendations: Share risk assessments locally, regionally, and globally across relevant sectors and agencies with adequate international assistance; align soft target and critical infrastructure protection efforts; prioritize targeted education and public awareness on the importance of protecting cultural heritage and threats facing it; build capacity of stakeholders involved in protection efforts; and pursue accountability for cultural heritage destruction, including antiquities trafficking, and enforce penalties for violations.

New York: Soufan Center, 2024 26p.

By Radha Barooah and Ana Paula Oliveira Siria Gastélum Félix

This brief aims to bring specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY People from all walks of life have disappeared during Mexico’s so-called ‘war on drugs’; many others become victims of the growing global human trafficking industry; migrants go missing as they travel to seek a better life elsewhere, often displaced by criminal groups. Vulnerable youth, particularly young boys, are co-opted by criminal interests and then ‘disappeared’ to forcibly join gangs, often groomed to provide gang ‘muscle’ or traffic drugs.1 Women and children are often trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour.2 Many activists, journalists, politicians and whistle-blowers who campaign against organized crime or corruption have disappeared. Disappearances – as we define the phenomenon in this paper – are deployed for various reasons: to silence the voices of social and political leaders, activists and journalists; to assert violent control over criminal territories and illicit markets; or to monetize vulnerable people as a tradeable commodity. In all these cases, criminal groups have a hand, and although organized crime-related disappearances vary in motive and scope, they disproportionately affect the most marginalized communities. Criminal groups therefore instrumentalize disappearances for different objectives. But a fundamental challenge of dealing with this widespread problem is that cases are rarely differentiated and often assumed by law enforcement authorities to be one-off isolated incidents. However, when examining this issue closely, there is a more menacing pattern behind them, namely that they are often perpetrated by organized criminal groups operating in a particular community or controlling a market territory. By not discerning this broader picture of underlying criminal intent, by focusing on the what and ignoring the why, the phenomenon tends to receive limited attention in public policy agendas. There is also inadequate institutional support and investigative work, which has the effect of impeding victims’ access to justice. The international framework designed to address enforced disappearances – the International Convention for Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICPPED)3 – requires that state involvement in the act (in the form of collusion, authorization or acquiescence) is proven in order to trigger its obligations. Compounding this, the conditions of state involvement and the role of organized crime actors are not clearly set out in the wording of the convention, so cases of disappearances linked to illicit economies tend to be confined to the margins of national and international agendas. Meanwhile, the international human rights discourse on disappearances perpetrated by non-state actors (e.g. criminal groups or networks) has progressed to a certain degree, but it, too, remains ill-equipped to determine the conditions and factors of collusion between organized crime and state actors that would amount to authorization, acquiescence or omission. These imprecisions and gaps in the legal framework result in a general lack of institutional support for victims and their families. Despite this, individuals and communities affected by this crime have developed mechanisms to respond. Since 2019, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), through its Resilience Fund, has supported over 50 community-based initiatives and activists searching for people who have disappeared, including relatives seeking justice and journalists investigating disappearances related to organized crime around the world.4 The Resilience Fund has documented first-hand experiences through interviews and dialogues and provided financial and capacity-building support.5 This brief draws from the work and perspectives of such civil society and community members who live in environments that are exposed to disappearances. It assesses this form of organized crime as a serious human rights violation. While informed by the global dynamics of this criminal market, it focuses on contexts in which disappearances occur in Latin America, analyzing in particular the cases of Mexico and Venezuela. The first setting examines how criminal groups strategically deploy disappearances to fulfill various objectives; the other considers how disappearances occur in the mining sector, which experiences a high prevalence of criminality. This policy brief therefore aims to bring these specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field. While some of the evidence in the brief is anecdotal, the authors have corroborated it with open-source data and a literature review. The analysis is exploratory and is designed to add to a small yet growing body of literature on disappearances among vulnerable communities exposed to organized crime and amplify understanding of the pressing nature of the problem in policy circles.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 28p.

By J.R. Mailey

Sudan’s current conflict, which erupted in April 2023, is the latest chapter in a story of rival predatory networks competing for control over formal and illicit economies, the information environment and the use of organized violence.

As the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) spread death and destruction across the country, fuelling a humanitarian crisis, their battle is driven by the desire to preserve their vast economic empires and the systems that support them.

This report explores the intricate web of illicit networks, armed conflicts, and the devastating impact on Sudan’s socio-political landscape. It explores how predatory networks commoditize violence, exploit strategic industries, and manipulate state institutions for their gain. From the militarization of the economy to the instrumentalization of criminal markets, this investigation sheds light on the arc of state collapse and the urgent need for comprehensive peacebuilding strategies.

The paper is the first in a series focusing on Sudan, aiming to present an overview about the competition for control of Sudan’s security services, civilian bureaucracy and strategic industries. The following reports will explore the people, institutions, networks and transactions that have underpinned the enduring ecosystem of crime and corruption in Sudan that ultimately gave way to the current civil war.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 28p.

By The International Crisis Group Latin America and Caribbean

What’s new? The assassination in July of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, perpetrated with no apparent resistance from his elite security detail, and a bout of natural disasters weeks later have further destabilised an already fragile Haiti and intensified its humanitarian crisis at a time of extreme insecurity. Why does it matter? Coming amid intersecting political, human rights, economic and humanitarian crises, Moïse’s killing and other recent events have exposed the chronic failings of state authorities and difficulties in ensuring that foreign support is deployed effectively. Growing insecurity is also driving instability and increased migrant flows within and outside the country. What should be done? Funnelling aid to vulnerable people hit by recent natural disasters, preferably through local civil society, is the imperative. International back ing for prosecuting high-level crimes, police reform and support for a broad-based representative and inclusive interim government stand a better chance than a rush to elections of helping restore stability.

Bogotá/New York/Brussels, The International Crisis Group, 30 September 2021 24p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Robert Muggah, et al.

KEY FINDINGS

• Increasingly sophisticated and high-calibre firearms and ammunition are being trafficked into Haiti amid an unprecedented and rapidly deteriorating security situation.

• Haiti remains a trans-shipment country for drugs, primarily cocaine and cannabis, which mostly enter the country via boat or plane, arriving through public, private and informal ports as well as clandestine runways.

• Haiti’s borders are essentially porous, and the challenges of patrolling 1,771 kilometres of coastline and a 392-kilometre land border with the Dominican Republic are overwhelming the capacities of Haiti’s national police, customs, border patrols and coast guard, who are severely under-staffed and under-resourced, a variety of sources with their attendant limitations, including unverified media reports, to take account of recent developments. It opens with a cursory overview of the criminal context in which firearms and drug trafficking are occurring. The second section considers the basic infrastructure that facilitates trafficking, especially seaports, roads and airstrips. Sections three and four examine patterns of trafficking of both firearms and drugs into and out of Haiti. The final section summarizes global, regional and national measures to address related challenges, alongside knowledge gaps warranting deeper investigation. Given the evolving circumstances, any attempt to document firearms and drug trafficking trends in Haiti will be fragmented and partial. Even so, certain tendencies and patterns can be discerned. Very generally, firearms and ammunition typically enter Haiti via land and sea, and drugs usually transit Haiti from seaports, airports and across poorly monitored border points. Most weapons are sourced in the US and make their way to gang members and private residents through intermediaries, often through public and private ports and porous checkpoints. Whether they are interdicted or not, most drugs passing through Haiti are produced in Colombia (cocaine) or Jamaica (cannabis) and shipped directly from source, or pass via Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Venezuela. From Haiti they are shipped onward to the Dominican Republic, Western Europe and, primarily, the US. and increasingly targeted by gangs.

• Heavily armed criminal gangs are targeting ports, highways, critical infrastructure, customs offices, police stations, court houses, prisons, businesses and neighbourhoods.

• Virtually every metric of insecurity, from homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping to the killing of police and migration out of the country – is trending upward.

• International, regional and national responses have underscored the importance of increasing support to law enforcement and border management. Comprehensive approaches encompassing investments in community policing, criminal justice reform and anti-corruption measures are crucial to delivering sustainable peace and stability in Haiti.

Haiti is in the grip of multiple, interlocking, and cascading crises. If unattended, there are serious risks of further destabilization from a myriad of increasingly powerful criminal armed groups. The risks of regional spill-over and contagion are widely acknowledged: The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly raised concerns about the country’s “protracted and deteriorating political, economic, security, human rights, humanitarian and food security crises” and “extremely high levels of gang violence and other criminal activities”. 1 A particular preoccupation relates to the contribution of illegal firearms and drug trafficking in fuelling Haiti’s deepening security dilemmas. This assessment provides an overview of the scope, scale and dynamics of firearms and drug trafficking in Haiti, including sources, routes, vectors and destinations. It is based on published and unpublished information and 45 interviews conducted by UNODC with representatives of the Haitian government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, subject matter experts, and Haitian civil society.2 The situation in the country is deteriorating rapidly, and this assessment has drawn upon

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 47p.

By Insa Koch, Patrick Williams, and Lauren Wroe

Government policies relating to dealers in ‘county lines’ drugs trafficking cases have been welcomed as a departure from punitive approaches to drugs and ‘gang’ policing, in that those on the bottom rung of the drugs economy of heroin and crack cocaine are no longer treated as criminals but as potential victims and ‘modern slaves’ in need of protection. However, our research suggests not so much a radical break with previous modes of policing as that the term ‘county lines’ emerged as a logical extension of the government’s racist and classist language surrounding ‘gangs’, knife crime and youth violence. Policies implemented in the name of safeguarding the vulnerable also act as a gateway for criminalisation not just under drugs laws but also modern slavery legislation. The government’s discovery of, and responses to, ‘county lines’ hinge on a moral crisis in the making, which ultimately deepens the state’s pre-emptive and violent criminalisation of the ‘Black criminal other’ at a time of deep political crisis.

First published online November 15, 2023., Race & Class, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/03063968231201325

By The U.K. Home Office

Purpose - This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies:

• A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm

• That the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

• That the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)

• A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory

• A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and

• If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

London: Assets Publishing Service, 2022. 84p.

By Emma Louise Blondes, Emma Disley, Shann Corbett, Fook Nederveen, Jirka Taylor, Ilia Gaglio, Antonino Sorrenti, Francesco Calderoni

This study looks at three ‘tools’ that Member States can deploy in the fight against serious and organised crime. First, this study assesses whether the Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA – legislation that aims to ensure that all Member States criminalise participation in a criminal organisation – has achieved its objectives, supports effective cooperation to tackle cross-border serious organised crime and is fit for purpose. Second, this study assesses the extent to which the current legislative framework on the use, protection and handling of crown/principal witnesses and collaborators of justice supports effective cooperation to tackle cross-border serious organised crime. Third, this study explores whether Member States have operational and strategic approaches to identify the links between offences that are ‘enablers’ of serious organised crime (money laundering, document fraud, online trade in illicit goods/services, and corruption) and the broader picture of serious organised crime. Based on interviews, an EU-wide survey, workshops and a document review, the study describes the state of play in relation to these topics and outlines possible policy solutions to the address key challenges identified.

Brussels, Belgium: Publications Office of the European Union, and RAND Europe, 2022. 

By Daniel Egel, Gabrielle Tarini, Raymond Kuo, Eric Robinson, Anthony Vassalo

The mystery surrounding the so-called Havana Syndrome — an unexplained illness first experienced by U.S. Department of State personnel stationed in Cuba in late 2016 — illustrates the challenge of mustering a response to a national security threat when the threat, the underlying method, and the actor behind the threat are not understood with certainty. This report explores the applicability of existing concepts for deterrence and compellence using brief case studies. In addition to Havana Syndrome, the authors explore the SolarWinds cyberattack, in which hackers linked to Russian intelligence conducted a massive cyberattack against American companies and government agencies, and the Chinese Communist Party's connections to organized crime syndicates around the world.

The core finding is that few of the standard response options are effective against these types of threats. Without certainty about who is conducting the actions, strategies that rely on threats of punishment, normative taboos, or rallying of international condemnation are largely ineffective. Denial-by-defense strategies are thus likely to be the most effective but may be difficult to design effectively if the method underlying the attacks is poorly understood.

Key Findings

The ability of the United States to respond effectively to a threat is limited when the attribution, nature, and method of the threat are ambiguous.Maintaining this level of ambiguity likely constrains the scale at which U.S. adversaries can deploy these approaches, but the costs the approaches impose can be large.Despite the appeal of other deterrence or punishment strategies, denial-by-defense is likely to be the only approach capable of reducing the efficacy of these threats.

Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 2023. 20p.

By Marcos Alan Ferreira, Oliver P. Richmond

This article analyses how criminal governance creates blockages that prevent peace formation in Latin America. Two blockages emerge where criminal governance prevails: criminal structures do not reduce violence and also take advantage of cultural and structural violence; their legitimacy pushes the state away from citizens. Consequently, civil society usually responds in two ways: promoting alternative forms of political praxis against violence; fostering dialogue between political actors and civil society while building broader networks. Our argument shows that local agency has potential competences and the knowledge necessary to address criminal governance discursively, but its capacity to effect structural change is limited in direct terms.

Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding Volume 15, 2021 - Issue 2

By Oluwole Ojewale

This study examines the governance framework for regulating fishing generally in the Republic of the Congo. Specifically, it analyses the drivers and enablers of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) shark fishing and the networks engaged in the criminal economy. The illicit activities linked to shark fishing and fin trading negatively impact ocean biodiversity, the local and national economies. New ways of thinking are needed for effective responses to IUU shark fishing in the country. Key findings • The illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing of sharks is driven by local and international demand for shark products. It is further enabled by a lack of state capacity to oversee and enforce legislation and control. • Actors in the criminal supply chain of shark products include artisanal fisherfolk, foreign industrial trawlers, middlemen traders from African countries and Asia, and local women. • The exploitation of shark species negatively impacts environmental biodiversity and has disrupted the ecosystem in the Republic of the Congo’s ocean. • Overfishing of sharks is resulting in juvenile catches, especially of species of conservational concern 

ENACT Africa, 2024. 29p.

By Renato De Almeida Arão Galhardi

Historically, Mexicans deported from the United States tend to be overwhelmingly adult men, where the Mexican borderscape of Tijuana is and continues to be the primary site (and sight) where the majority of deported Mexicans are sent to when deported from the United States. Consequently, the semiotic social topography of Tijuana is peopled through the experiences of deportation. How, then, do Mexican deportees negotiate, mediate and articulate their lived experiences of migration? Working with my ethnographic research in Tijuana, during August 2021 and March 2022, I address the ontopological conditioning of living as a deportee in a borderscape such as Tijuana, assessing how their phenomenographic experiences are shaped by the bordering of the Border, and how Mexican deported men are often “unjustly suffering” and enduring “the bare life.” Through discussions on coloniality of Being, I build off Nicolas de Genova’s “border spectacle,” and argue that deportation is better described through its own “spectacle,” the “deportation spectacle,” highlighting how deportees perform and negotiate their agency between the tensions of suffering and resiliency as a consequence of the practices of imposed by deportation. I posit that deportation is not the end of a process, but reshapes migrancy continuity within new constraints, challenges and obstacles. Finally, I conclude by emphasizing the need to recognize misrepresented, misinterpreted and misdiagnosed populations such as deportees in borderscapes such as Tijuana, in order to better attend to the challenges that deportation creates. (Working Paper)

Toronto: Toronto Metropolitan Centre for Immigration and Settlement (TMCIS) and the CERC in Migration and Integration 2023. 23p.

By KPMG Australia  

The Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) set a new standard for modern slavery disclosures in Australia. The Act required entities with a consolidated annual revenue of $100 million or more to disclose their efforts in identifying and addressing modern slavery risks within their operations and supply chain. The objective of the Act was to provide a framework to assist with proactively and effectively addressing modern slavery. 

The 2023 independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, commissioned by the Australian Government (Review), found that the Act had not resulted in meaningful change for people affected by modern slavery.  The review made 30 recommendations to strengthen modern slavery obligations for reporting entities, including the introduction of a positive requirement to conduct due diligence and the introduction of a federal Anti-Slavery Commissioner. The Government has highlighted that many of the Review’s recommendations are in line with key election commitments and introduced a Bill in November 2023 to establish an Anti-Slavery Commissioner. 

KPMG Australia, 2024. 31p.

By Lucía Dammert and Mary Fran T. Malone
In a region plagued by high rates of violent crime and repressive policing practices, Nicara-
gua has earned a reputation as exceptional. Despite poverty, inequality, and a historical legacy

 of political violence and repression, Nicaragua has defied regional trends. It has regis-
tered low rates of violent crime while deploying policing practices that emphasized preven-
tion over repression. April 2018 marked an end to this exceptionalism. Police attacked anti-
government protestors, and launched a sustained campaign against dissidents that continues
to the present day. While the Nicaraguan police had long cultivated a reputation as commu-
nity-oriented and non-repressive, they appeared to quickly change into a repressive, political
force. In this paper, we trace how the Nicaraguan police have evolved over time. Relying
upon longitudinal data from 1996-2019 from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, we
trace the process of police reform in Nicaragua, and analyse public attitudes towards the
police as these reforms unfolded. 

European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, No. 110 (July-December 2020), pp. 79-99 (21 pages)

By Wilson Hernández, Lucía Dammert, and Lilian Kanashiro

Latin America is a violent region where fear of crime is well spread but still not fully understood. Using multilevel methods for a large and subnational representative household survey (N = 271,022), we assess the determinants of fear of crime in Peru, the country with the highest fear of crime and crime victimization in the region. Our results show that body-aimed victimization (physical or sexual abuse from a member of their household, and sexual offenses) is the strongest driver of fear of crime, even higher than armed victimization. Moreover, safety measures based on social capital are negatively related to fear of crime, suggesting that they are palliatives rather than real protections. Finally, our study shows that people in a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to fear more because they have more (resources) to lose. Policy implications address Latin America as a whole and punitive policies against crime are common in the region, while evidence-based decisions are scarce.  Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 2020, Vol. 53(4) 515–535

By  Mary Fran T. Malone & Lucia Dammert 

 Over the past two decades, most Latin American countries have struggled to create or reform their police forces while simultaneously confronting sharp increases in violent crime. Reformers have gravitated towards community-oriented policing practices, which aim to rely on preventive tactics and build closer ties between police officers and the public. The implementation of such policing practices can be daunting, particularly for countries with authoritarian histories of policing and/or military repression. When confronting rising crime rates, some new democracies are tempted to revert to authoritarian policing practices and circumvent constitutional safeguards on human rights and civil liberties. Still, some countries have resisted such temptations, and seriously invested in community-oriented policing practices. However, do these communityoriented policing practices lead citizens to trust the police more? Or does public trust depend more heavily on results – particularly in countries undergoing crises in public security? To answer these questions, we analyze public trust in the police in 17 Latin American countries through a series of regression analyses of the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 2016–2017 survey data. We find that community-oriented policing practices tend to garner more public trust, but that perceptions of police effectiveness are equally important.  

POLICING AND SOCIETY, 2020.