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Posts tagged human rights
Human Rights and Organised Crime Agendas: Four Areas of Convergence for Policymaking

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Summary As a global challenge, organised crime is increasingly threatening the safety and security of citizens. Despite the real-world impact, there is an apparent disconnection between international human rights laws and policies, and responses to transnational organized crime. Even though the regulatory frameworks may have different objectives and scopes, human rights and responses to organised crime are not concepts at odds. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive or comprehensive account of all human rights issues deriving from the workings of organised crime, this briefing note identifies four areas that justify greater attention to the fundamental rights of natural persons, and convergence in the human rights and crime agendas. It draws on a review of Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s research and programming, and the author’s own experience as a lawyer working on organised crime issues for the past five years.

Briefing Note 29

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) , 2024. 10[p.

Haiti: A Path to Stability for a Nation in Shock

By The International Crisis Group Latin America and Caribbean

What’s new? The assassination in July of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, perpetrated with no apparent resistance from his elite security detail, and a bout of natural disasters weeks later have further destabilised an already fragile Haiti and intensified its humanitarian crisis at a time of extreme insecurity. Why does it matter? Coming amid intersecting political, human rights, economic and humanitarian crises, Moïse’s killing and other recent events have exposed the chronic failings of state authorities and difficulties in ensuring that foreign support is deployed effectively. Growing insecurity is also driving instability and increased migrant flows within and outside the country. What should be done? Funnelling aid to vulnerable people hit by recent natural disasters, preferably through local civil society, is the imperative. International back ing for prosecuting high-level crimes, police reform and support for a broad-based representative and inclusive interim government stand a better chance than a rush to elections of helping restore stability.

Bogotá/New York/Brussels, The International Crisis Group, 30 September 2021 24p.

Uzbekistan: Corruption and anti-corruption

By Lasha Gogidze

Under the current government, Uzbekistan is undergoing reforms to shift from a Soviet-style governance system to an open-market economy. Despite progress, the country remains an authoritarian state, marked by pervasive corruption in sectors like healthcare and education. Key institutions, influenced by the executive branch, lack due process, enabling arrests of activists and journalists on questionable charges. The civic space is restricted, with human rights defenders and journalists facing persecution for exposing government corruption. While reforms are underway, challenges persist in establishing transparency and democracy in Uzbekistan's governance model.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 22p.

South Sudan: Corruption and anti-corruption

 By Khachik Harutyunyan and Caitlin Maslen   

After a protracted conflict and a period of self-rule from 2005, South Sudan is now the world’s most recent sovereign country. The young state faces considerable governance challenges; it regularly ranks at or near the bottom of international corruption indices. Corruption is systemic across all levels of government and pervades nearly every economic sector, and perpetrators enjoy widespread impunity. As such, it takes a heavy toll on the populace by diverting the wealth from the country’s extensive oil reserves into private pockets instead of public service provision or gross fixed capital formation. This kleptocratic dynamic is embodied in scandals such as the Cash Grab and Dura Saga scandals. The international community has called on the South Sudanese government to take stronger action to tackle corruption. However, progress has been slow, and corruption remains a major challenge for South Sudan's future development  

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

Sierra Leone: Corruption and anti-corruption

 By David Olusegun Sotola and Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka  

Corruption in Sierra Leone remains a pervasive challenge. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, successive governments have made efforts to tackle corruption and hold perpetrators, especially those from the previous government, accountable, but challenges remain. Anti-corruption efforts have focused on amending laws, institutional frameworks and the establishment of a special anti-corruption judicial division but concerns about the backsliding of democracy in the country, weak checks on the power of the executive and the politicisation of the anti-corruption cause make it difficult to counter corruption effectively.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.

The Philippines: Corruption and anti-corruption

By Lasha Gogidze

The election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr, nicknamed “Bongbong”, as the President of the Philippines in May 2022 has sustained fears of state capture by oligarchic family clans, widespread grand corruption and human rights abuses, all of which marred the rule of his father, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the country’s former dictator who ruled from 1965 until 1986. Those fears appear to have been substantiated by continued extrajudicial killings, arrests of communist-linked leaders and activists, as well as the Marcos families’ unpaid taxes and damages to U.S. courts from human rights cases, leading to fears that this means further entrenchment of impunity.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

Mozambique: Corruption and anti-corruption within the research sector and higher education system

By Caitlin Maslen  

There has been a rapid rise in the number of Mozambican universities in the past two decades, but corruption risks in these institutions and the research sector more broadly remains an under-examined area. Identified risks include political manipulation of university affairs by government, mismanagement of research grant funds and a lack of independence of the country’s quality assurance body. There are also reports of other forms of corruption such as bribery, plagiarism, academic fraud and sextortion for grades within universities. Several mitigation measures can be put into place to strengthen the integrity of the system, and these include accountability mechanisms within universities and research institutions, independence and increased capacity of the CNAQ, anti-plagiarism policies and tools, sanctions for academic dishonesty, anti-corruption clauses in research grant agreements, compliance assessments of universities and research institutions, and enhanced whistleblower protection.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.

Nigeria: Corruption and anti-corruption

By Jackson Oldfield   

Corruption is widespread in Nigeria, where patronage networks and foreign actors play a significant role. Drivers of corruption include neo-patrimonialism and the “resource curse” – referring to the country’s abundance of natural resources. Bribery and other forms of corruption occur in many sectors, including public administration, the judiciary, the electricity sector, and extractive industries. Although several new anti-corruption laws have recently been introduced, weaknesses in relevant institutions have undermined their effectiveness. Despite these challenges, anti-corruption actors, such as civil society organisations, continue addressing corruption as a priority and have had notable achievements, particularly in the area of asset recovery.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023). 25p.

Yemen: Corruption and anti-corruption

By Mathias Bak

Yemen's ongoing conflict has transformed into an economic battle, with various factions fighting over crucial resources, such as aid flows and control over state resources. The war economy has intensified existing corruption challenges and created avenues for illicit wealth accumulation for new power brokers and previously less powerful networks. However, this takeover of the state has not fundamentally changed the nature of the systematic corruption that has plagued Yemen long before 2014.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2024:1)

Zimbabwe: Corruption and anti-corruption: Tracking developments and progress

By Vaclav Prusa   

In 2023, President Mnangagwa secured a second term amid allegations of election irregularities and corruption in Zimbabwe. Despite anti-corruption efforts, challenges include political interference and resource constraints, hindering transparency. Though there have been efforts to address corruption in the natural resources sector, progress in prosecuting politically exposed persons and recovering stolen assets has been uneven. Likewise, hopes for reform since Mnangagwa's 2017 presidency have been tempered by enduring corruption, economic challenges, and human rights abuses. And illicit financial flows, notably linked to corruption in mining, timber, and wildlife, pose a significant international threat as they have drained billions of dollars from the country. Though civil society and independent media play crucial roles in exposing corruption, initiatives such as The Patriot Act, introduced in 2023, raises concerns about suppressing dissent and investigative journalism.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway ; Berlin: Transparency international, 2023. 26p.

Militarized Transformation: Human Rights and Democratic Controls in a Context of Increasing Militarization in Mexico

by Stephanie Brewer and Ana Lucia Verduzco

Mexico’s federal government is increasingly militarizing civilian tasks within and outside the realm of public security. Previous presidents presented militarization as a temporary measure that would allow time to strengthen civilian institutions—though in practice, military deployment became the permanent model, largely at the expense of prioritizing other security and justice strategies and institutions. The current government, however, promotes a broad militarization of civilian tasks in the long term, including through the militarization of the National Guard. The power and roles of the armed forces are growing without effective civilian controls over their actions. While the levels of serious human rights violations attributed to the military have fallen following the end of former president Felipe Calderón’s term, such violations continue to occur. More broadly, Mexico continues to experience historic levels of violence, and the vast majority of crimes go unpunished. Without minimizing positive reforms and steps forward, access to justice remains a fundamental challenge. In this context, it is crucial to improve criminal investigations and strengthen the capacities and accountability of the country’s police institutions. The military’s growing list of civilian tasks is a trend that will not be easily reversed, but demilitarizing public security and consolidating civilian institutions is the necessary route to strengthen the rule of law. In the meantime, the government must install effective civilian controls over the armed forces.

Mexico: WOLA- Adovcacy for Human Rights in Mexico, 2023, 61p.

Targeted Sanctions and Organized Crime: Impact and Lessons for Future Use

By Cathy Haenlein, Sasha Erskine, Elijah Glantz and Tom Keatinge

Sanctions are increasingly being used to tackle a range of specific issues. These include sanctions that respond to human rights abuses, combat corruption and address malicious cyber activity. As sanctions use has broadened, the question of their application to organised criminal activity is increasingly raised; yet the use of sanctions for this reason has remained limited to a specific set of issuers, notably the US, and more recently, the UN. In the UK, the government has advanced its vision of an ambitious post-Brexit independent sanctions regime, with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 allowing sanctions use ‘in the interests of national security’ (HMG, 2018). New regimes addressing human rights and corruption have emerged. With serious and organised crime deemed a national security threat by the UK government, there is a case to add a sanctions regime to address this particular threat (HMG, 2018). The National Crime Agency itself has called for a legislative amendment to reference serious and organised crime as grounds for sanctions use (HMG, 2021). However, little research or evaluation has been undertaken to assess the impact of sanctions on organised crime. With US sanctions used over almost three decades to disrupt cross-border trafficking, the lack of a body of rigorous relevant research is a key shortcoming. Similarly, few past initiatives have sought to assess the lessons these experiences hold for future sanctions issuers in this space. With interest mounting in the potential use of organised crime-related sanctions, this represents a critical limitation. In seeking to address the gap, this paper reviews existing evidence on the use and impact of sanctions to disrupt organised criminal activity. It focuses on two case studies, Colombia and Libya, in differing regions of the world and with different exposure to organised crime-focused sanctions. While Colombia tops the list of states globally for organised crime-focused sanctions on individuals and entities in its territory (with the third-highest number of relevant listings since 2016), Libya’s exposure is more recent and limited. Libya nonetheless has experience of listings under UN and US country regimes relating to fuel smuggling, people smuggling and human trafficking. Here, it differs markedly from Colombia, which is the epitome of the historic US approach to narcotics-related sanctions. This paper analyses organised crime-related sanctions data, examines the current state of knowledge relating to the implementation and impact of these sanctions, and draws on the tw wo case studies. It identifies a number of factors that influence the effectiveness of organised crime-focused sanctions, including:

  • The extent to which the host government of the sanction’s target is willing to cooperate with the sanction’s issuer.

  • The extent to which the issuance of sanctions is embedded within a coherent broader strategic approach.

  • The overarching focus of the regime within which relevant designations are made.

  • The need for clear objectives when applying sanctions.

  • Resourcing and engagement of key agencies in both the country of issuance and the target’s host country.

  • Divergent levels of vulnerability of key actors across the related illicit trade chain. With these factors and the broader findings of the research in mind, this paper concludes with a set of ten considerations for those countries that may, in the future, consider introducing organized crime-focused sanctions.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 1. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. . 2022. 51p.

Borderline: Impact of the Ukraine War on Migrant Smuggling in South Eastern Europe

By Tihomir Bezlov | Atanas Rusev | Dardan Koçani

The war in Ukraine has spurred the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. According to EU border and coastguard agency Frontex, by the end of 2022, 15 million Ukrainian citizens had fled to Europe since the beginning of the war, with roughly 3 million choosing to stay.

While the unforeseen scale of the refugee crisis meant that much of the border authorities’ efforts and resources were occupied, people smuggling networks took advantage of the situation, and the number of irregular migrants from the Middle East travelling along the Western Balkan route soared. There are many contributing factors to this trend, but migrant smuggling has indeed resurfaced as the fastest-growing market for organized crime in the Balkan region. At the start of September 2022, Frontex reported that they had documented the highest number of irregular entries since 2016, with a 75% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. Thus, in 2022, the Western Balkan route became the most active European migration route, surpassing the Central and Western Mediterranean routes.

This paper assesses the factors that contributed to the emergence of the Western Balkan route as the most critical for irregular migration to the EU during 2022, focusing in particular on the impact of the war in Ukraine on refugee flows from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and its implications for the future. It analyzes how, if anything, refugee flows from Ukraine have affected pre-existing movements of migrants from MENA countries on the Western Balkan route indirectly, exacerbating dynamics and network operations. It also estimates the overall number of irregular migrants smuggled along the Western Balkan route since 2016, describes the evolution of smuggling networks in 2022 and assesses the implications for South Eastern Europe.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 3p.

Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal. Assessment Tool.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Section

The present toolkit deals with trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal, as defined by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, (Trafficking in Persons Protocol), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Organized Crime Convention). Terms like ‘organ trafficking’, ‘illegal organ trade’, ‘transplant tourism’, ‘organ purchase’ and others are often used interchangeably with trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal, even where they would not refer to the same phenomenon. Any conduct described by such terms will only be within the scope of this toolkit, if it meets the definition provided by the Trafficking in Persons Protocol.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015. 149p.

Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle

Edited by Cynthia J. Arnson and Eric L. Olson

In early May 2011, dozens of gunmen entered a farm in Guatemala’s Petén region, murdering and decapitating 27 people. Guatemalan authorities as well as speculation in the press have blamed the Zetas, a violent Mexican drug trafficking cartel increasingly active in Guatemala and other parts of Central America . Whether a vengeance killing following the murder of a presumed drug lord, or a struggle amongst the Zetas and Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel for the control of territory and smuggling routes, the massacre underscores the vulnerability of the civilian population in unsecured border areas between Mexico and Guatemala, where narcotics and human trafficking flourish. In response, the government of President Álvaro Colom declared a state of siege similar to the one declared from December 2010-February 2011 in the department of Alta Verapaz. This incident and others like it underscore the serious threat to democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law posed by organized crime in Central America. The international community has begun to address the burgeoning crisis and commit significant resources to the fight against crime and violence; indeed, not since the Central American wars of the 1980s-1980s has the region commanded so much attention in the international arena. To better understand the nature, origins, and evolution of organized crime in Central America, and thereby contribute to the efforts of policymakers and civil society to address it, the Latin American Program commissioned a series of case studies that looked at the countries of the so-called Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras— and at the broader regional context affecting national dynamics. Our interest was to understand more fully how organized crime has evolved in Central America, and to examine the links between organized crime and traffickers in Central America, Mexico and Colombia. What role does Central America play in the supply chain for illegal goods between the Andes and the United States, and how have trafficking organizations from these areas related to one another over time? The growing presence and activities of organized crime groups in Central America has worsened an already alarming crisis of citizen security. In mid- 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that Latin America had the highest levels of youth violence in the world . UN figures indicate that the rate of youth homicide in Latin America is more than double that of Africa, and 36 times the rate of developed countries . An oft-referenced study by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) noted in 2009 that the seven countries of Central America—Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—register the highest levels of non-political violence in the world; this observation has been echoed in statements by the U.S. Department of Defense . The situation is most acute in the countries of the Northern Triangle6 . In El Salvador alone, sixty-eight percent of homicide victims are between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four, and nine out of ten victims are male7 . Countries such as Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Belize are also witnessing rising rates of insecurity associated with the increased presence of organized crime.

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2011. 254p.

Human Trafficking And Organised Crime: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and organised procuring in Finland

By Minna Viuhko and Anniina Jokinen.

Research on human trafficking and organised crime is relatively rare in Finland. During the recent years human trafficking, procuring and prostitution have been studied i.a. in a legal perspective (Roth 2007a; 2007b; 2008), in relation to cross-border prostitution (Marttila 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2006; 2008), and in the context of commercialisation of sex (Jyrkinen 2005). The problems of identifying the victims of human trafficking (Putkonen 2008) and trafficking in women and illegal immigration (Lehti and Aromaa 2003) have also been examined, as well as the effects of globalization on the sex industry in Finland (Penttinen 2004). In addition, Finnish sex-workers (Kontula 2008), prostitution in Northern Finland (Skaffari and Urponen 2004; Korhonen 2003), sex bars (Lähteenmaa and Näre 1994; Näre and Lähteenmaa 1995; Näre 1998), and sex buyers (Keeler & Jyrkinen 1999) have been the focus of recent research. Also organised pandering and prostitution in Finland was studied in the beginning of the 2000s (Leskinen 2003). Organised crime is scrutinised by Junninen (2006) and Bäckman (2006). However, the connection between human trafficking and organised crime has not been a central focus of any specific recent study in Finland. It also seems that prostitution and procuring markets have changed during the recent years and because of this, new studies on the issue are needed. Although human trafficking, prostitution and organised crime have been researched extensively in the global context, in this report we refer mainly to the earlier Finnish studies. The aim is to provide a comprehensive view of the Finnish prostitution-related human trafficking situation in the context of organised crime. We approach the topic from a sociological perspective and with qualitative methods. This study covers the first decade of the 21st century.

Helsinki: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI), 2009. 143p.

The Organizational Aspects of Corporate and Organizational Crime

Edited by Judith van Erp.

Corporate crimes seem endemic to modern society. Newspapers are filled on a daily basis with examples of financial manipulation, accounting fraud, food fraud, cartels, bribery, toxic spills and environmental harms, corporate human rights violations, insider trading, privacy violations, discrimination, corporate manslaughter or violence, and, recently, software manipulation. Clearly, the problem of corporate crime transcends the micro level of the individual ‘rotten apple’ (Ashforth et al. 2008; Monahan and Quinn 2006); although corporate crimes are ultimately committed by individual members of an organization, they have more structural roots, as the enabling and justifying organizational context in which they take place plays a defining role. Accounts of corporate fraud, misrepresentation, or deception that foreground individual offender’s motivations and characteristics, often fail to acknowledge that organizational decisions are more than the aggregation of individual choices and actions, and that organizations are more than simply the environment in which individual action takes place.

Basel: MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, 2018. 152p.