By David Bartlett, Janet Ransley, Lucy Forrester and Kristine Middendorp

Government and public concern about corporate wrongdoing in Australia is arguably at an all-time high. However, the extent and nature of corporate crime is largely unknown; it is concealed by regulatory agency reporting practices and the absence of a single data source which combines data across all regulators. This study addresses the problem by examining corporate offending by 33 of the country’s top companies, and their wholly owned subsidiaries, over a five-year period. The results indicate that corporate offending is patterned and unevenly distributed across the business community. Drawing on the findings and on their experience of conducting the research, the authors make recommendations for improving policy and practice, including the establishment of a national database of corporate offending.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 613. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 17p.

By David Bartlett,  Janet Ransley and Lucy Forrester

   Corporate crime is increasingly becoming a topic of importance for the Australian Government and public. Recent inquiries have highlighted the extent of wrongdoing by some corporations and within some industries. However, the overall extent of corporate offending in Australia is largely unknown and unable to be ascertained due to the absence of centralised reporting. This study examines 33 of Australia’s largest corporations and their subsidiaries over a five-year period. Drawing upon publicly available data, the findings highlight that offending is concentrated in particular industry sectors, with some specific corporations accounting for a substantial proportion of offences. The type and extent of enforcement action taken against those corporations is examined and reveals differences, in part based upon the different enforcement styles of regulators. The findings from this study have important implications for regulatory practice and emphasise the need for a centralised corporate crime data collection in Australia.  

Report to the Criminology Research Advisory Council

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 56p.

By Paul Andon and Clinton Free 

  Although serious fraud is typically perpetrated over a prolonged time frame, fraud research has been heavily focused on the decision to commit fraud rather than the way it is sustained. Based on an analysis of 42 interviews with offenders who have committed serious fraud, we examine how fraud perpetrators continue to offend over extended periods. We find that fraudulent offending is frequently associated with strain for offenders including fear of detection, guilt and shame. We present a typology of strategies used by offenders to cope with this strain over the course of their offending comprising (1) problem-focused coping, (2) emotion-focused coping, (3) meaning-focused coping and (4) social-focused coping. While notions of rationalisation are germane for initial decisions to engage in fraud, we find limited recourse to rationalisation in the latter stages of offending. Offenders have often considerable scope for managing diverse, fragile, perhaps even contradictory, understandings of their selves. Control system implications for addressing organizational precipitators of fraud, including controlling situational prompts, pressures, work-based permissibility and provocations are discussed.  

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 52p.

By Paul Andon and Clinton Free 

   Research across a range of disciplines has generally focused on the decision to commit fraud rather than how fraud is sustained over time. This study uses interviews with serious workplace fraudsters to examine enablers of sustained offending. We present coping strategies offenders use to manage strain and sustain offending. We highlight that while rationalisation is germane for first-time offending, coping may be a more useful construct for understanding how offending is sustained over time

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 596. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 14p.

By Tom Sullivan Emily Faulconbridge Samantha Bricknell Merran McAlister

The first data from the new Australian Sexual Offence Statistical (ASOS) collection shows:

• There were 8,326 unique alleged sexual offenders proceeded against by police in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory in 2021–22.

•  The male sexual offending rate in these six jurisdictions was 75.64 per 100,000 and the female sexual offending rate was 5.12 per 100,000.

• The largest proportion of offenders proceeded against for sexual offences in 2021–22 were alleged to have committed penetrative or non-penetrative sexual conduct offences (77%, n=6,450), followed by handling of unlawful sexual material offences (24%, n=2,024), enabling unlawful sexual conduct offences (8%, n=656) and persistent sexual abuse offences (1%, n=82).

• Around one-third of offenders in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Northern Territory were a non-family member known to the victim (32%, n=1,891), 15 percent (n=886) were an intimate partner, 19 percent (n=1,124) were other family and 21 percent (n=1,267) were a stranger.

Statistical Report no. 47. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 65p.

By Mieke Snijder

How, for whom, and under what conditions does Participatory Action Research (PAR) generate innovation to tackle the drivers of the worst forms of child labour (WFCL)?

This paper presents the findings of a realist evaluation that investigated how PAR groups facilitated children who work in exploitative and harmful labour and business owners in the leather industry in Bangladesh and the adult entertainment sector in Nepal to generate innovative actions. These PAR groups were facilitated over a period of 18 months to two years by non-governmental organisation professionals trained in PAR approaches.

PAR is defined as a knowledge-, action-, and innovation-generating intervention that enabled a group of children or business owners to meet over a period of time to build evidence, generate theories of change, develop and implement innovative solutions, and reflect on and evaluate how these solutions were working (or not). Our evidence showed that PAR generated innovative solutions to WFCL through raising group members’ critical consciousness of the underlying causal dynamics that drive WFCL. This critical consciousness-raising was done through gathering their own evidence and reflecting on their own experiences, as well as through developing their own theory of change through which they could identify on which part of the causal chain they could take action. Furthermore, PAR processes allowed groups of individuals, who because of their experience of marginalisation in urban settings did not have opportunities to come together, to build a collective identity that was grounded in their shared experiences and a common goal to take action to tackle these issues. This collective identity allowed them, as a new collective that was more than the sum of its parts, to develop innovative actions. Finally, by taking action and reflecting on these actions, PAR group members were able to harness their experiential knowledge on causal and power dynamics that underpinned and perpetuated their issues and use this new knowledge to develop further innovative actions.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 14

Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 60p.

DOI: 10.19088/CLARISSA.2024.009

By Jason Eligh

  I n recent years, the global landscape of illicit synthetic drug markets has undergone profound transformations, driven by a complex interplay of factors ranging from decentralized production models and deepening geopolitical schisms to open source databases and other technological advancements. From the proliferation of dark web marketplaces to the emergence of new and novel psychoactive substances (NPS), these trends have generated significant and sometimes contradictory challenges to law enforcement agencies, public health systems and policymakers worldwide. Rapid, unregulated expansion of the global pharmaceutical and chemical sectors has been a fundamental driver behind what has become, over the last 10 years, but particularly in the last two years, a global explosion in illicit synthetic drug production, trafficking and use. A mass proliferation of chemists and firms producing and vending synthetic substances and their many precursors has helped propel an unprecedented propensity for licit industrial production channels and supply chains being diverted into illicit economic activity. One consequence of all this is the realization that synthetic drugs have become the future of drug trafficking. One of the most notable trends in illicit synthetic drug markets has been the rapid expansion of online platforms, particularly on the dark web. These anonymous marketplaces provide a convenient and relatively secure environment for the sale and distribution of illicit substances, allowing vendors and buyers to operate with a degree of anonymity. Cryptocurrencies, some boasting of their untraceable digital footprint, have facilitated transactions, enabling actors to evade basic anti-money laundering requirements and law enforcement efforts. Moreover, the globalization of supply chains has enabled the widespread dissemination of synthetic drugs across borders. Production hubs in countries with lax regulations and enforcement mechanisms serve as primary sources of supply for a diverse array of substances to markets around the world. The decentralization of production and distribution networks complicates efforts to disrupt these illicit activities. The proliferation of NPS is a major concern. These synthetic compounds are often chemically modified versions of existing drugs, developed to mimic their effects while evading legal restrictions because of their chemical composition. Through its Early Warning Advisory on NPS, and in partnership with voluntary reporting by member states, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified over 1 200 NPS from 141 different countries.2 The rapid pace of innovation in this domain  challenges regulatory frameworks, as authorities struggle to keep pace with the emergence of these new synthetic substances, their potential health risks and their potential contribution to wider illicit drug market dynamics. The escalation in the use of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl and its analogues in North America, and tramadol in Africa, is a particularly alarming trend within illicit drug markets. These substances, vital to public health institutions for pain relief and palliative care purposes, but too often also produced clandestinely in makeshift laboratories, have been responsible for a significant increase in drug-related morbidity and mortality worldwide. Their potency and availability pose unprecedented challenges to public health systems and law enforcement agencies.  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

By Maria Khoruk

  More than two years after the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, the country is once again high on the UN’s agenda. The levels of conflict-related violence may have significantly decreased compared to the Taliban’s time as an insurgent group, but extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and other gross human rights violations have continued, targeting in particular women, ethnic minorities, former state officials and people who use drugs (PWUD). The security situation has been further undermined by the alleged presence and escalating activities of non-state armed groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq, the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – although the Taliban has repeatedly denied the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan. In March 2024, the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) will be reviewed. It follows the release (on 8 November 2023) of the independent assessment of the international response in Afghanistan, which the UN Security Council (UNSC) requested in Resolution 2679 (2023). The independent assessment’s recommendations for the international community’s activities in Afghanistan include a structured engagement strategy to address the basic needs of the Afghan people, cooperation on issues affecting regional and global security, and political engagement with the state of Afghanistan and Afghan stakeholders. On 29 December 2023, subsequent to the independent assessment, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2721, in an attempt to balance a call to reintegrate Afghanistan into the international community and the need to meet international obligations. The UNSC’s request for a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, with robust expertise on human rights and gender, sent a call from the main security body that these issues should be front and centre in a coordinated international response. The independent assessment lists the country’s counter-narcotics strategy as a key reason to engage with the Afghan government, noting the Taliban’s success in significantly reducing the ‘cultivation, processing and trafficking of narcotics’ in Afghanistan. It indicates that ‘[m]any stakeholders expressed interest in exploring greater international cooperation in this area, in particular on alternative crops and livelihoods for the hundreds of Afghans that have relied on the production and trade of narcotics for income’, and that counter-narcotics efforts are linked to addressing the basic needs of the Afghan people through livelihoods programmes. The country’s potential to become a source of uncontrolled outmigration is also listed as a risk factor for regional security  Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban has established and enforced stricter controls of the country’s vast informal economy. Some of the economies have been absorbed by the Taliban, while others have been strictly enforced against – the major trend has been consolidation in one way or the other from more heterogeneous markets. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has reported a major reduction in opium cultivation (estimated at 95 per cent year-on-year).8 This short-term success in significantly reducing illicit opium cultivation has had dire implications for the Afghan population and exacerbated the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country. Over time, the country’s illicit economy has diversified to include a range of markets – from the trafficking of arms, mineral resources, timber, antiquities and licit commodities to human trafficking. This brief traces changes in the regulatory landscape and enforcement efforts by the Taliban in relation to various illicit markets within the context of the Taliban’s consolidation and centralization of power in Afghanistan. Its objective is to outline developments in illicit economies since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 and transformed from an insurgency group into a de facto government. In doing so, its aim is to provide the UN, member states and other stakeholders with a better understanding of the potential security risks and obstacles to sustainable development linked to the recent trends in the operations of Afghanistan’s illicit economies.  

: 

UNSC Illicit Economies Watch series

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024. 27p.

By  Edith Nyabichi

The report examines the regulatory and legal framework governing Kenya's mining industry and offers an in-depth exploration of the challenges and gaps in implementing and enforcing beneficial ownership in the country.

The report offers an analysis of Kenya's corporate income taxes, mining royalties, and other mining taxes, providing insight into the complex dynamics and possible risks of illicit financial flows (IFFs) within the sector. The GFI research outlines key deficiencies in the current system and offers practical recommendations to enhance transparency and accountability.  

Key findings of the report include:

• Regulatory and Legal Framework: An assessment of Kenya's current policies and regulations concerning the mining sector, emphasizing the need for reforms to reduce the risks associated with IFFs.

• Corporate Income Taxes and Mining Royalties: An analysis of the existing tax frameworks, with a focus on the identification of potential vulnerabilities and loopholes that could facilitate illicit financial activities.

• Beneficial Ownership Implementation Challenges: An examination of the legal, administrative, and operational challenges that hamper the enforcement of beneficial ownership transparency.

• Recommendations: Strategic recommendations designed to strengthen the regulatory framework, improve enforcement mechanisms, and promote greater transparency in the mining sector.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity (GFI), 2024. 33p.

By Sarah Pedersen,  Natascha Mueller-Hirth, Leia Miller

COVID-19 exacerbated challenges that already existed in the policing of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in remote and rural northern Scotland. Victims’ direct access to the police and third-sector organisations was impeded by social distancing while the pandemic exacerbated extant issues relating to staffing, particularly in relation to female police officers. On the positive side, the flexibility that already characterised rural and remote policing continued, and police officers and third-sector organisations worked together to support victims. The move to videoconferencing was hailed as a positive move in an area where travel to meetings or court can be difficult and expensive. A lack of training for officers with no specific GBV role was identified as particularly problematic during the pandemic when officers on the ground in rural and remote Scotland had to take over work usually undertaken by specialist task forces.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2023. 12p.

 By Virginia Comolli   

Building and expanding on the analysis in the Global Organized Crime Index, the GI-TOC has undertaken to map trends in organized criminality in the Pacific (Oceania). The resulting papers contribute to filling some of the gaps in a region where crime-related data can be scarce. In turn, these analyses allow us to identify vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for intervention and mitigation. The Pacific islands now occupy a more prominent place on the international strategic chessboard as a result of the proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security engagements in the region in the 21st century.  This is due to greater foreign presence and influence in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, and intensifying geopolitical competition among external partners. This reality, alongside greater connectivity and market trends, is also drastically  transforming the criminal landscape. Pacific islands have traditionally been considered as mostly immune from high levels of criminality due to their geographic remoteness.  However, highly pernicious illicit markets are taking hold, and the islands are becoming increasingly vulnerable to new threats in the form of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes and the introduction of new narcotics, to mention just two examples. Who is behind these activities? There are multiple criminal actors present and active in the Pacific islands, but the most pervasive are foreign actors.  And within the foreign actor sub-set, there are a diverse array of nationalities and sectors. The one thing they have in common is their pivotal role vis a vis evolving crime dynamics. Across the series of papers, we map their different typologies. The emerging pictures suggest that, possibly contrary to expectations, business operators are often responsible for the bulk of organized criminality. This is particularly evident in the extractive industries, but also in sectors such as real estate and financial services. Yet, more ‘obvious’ criminal actors such as cartels and triads have also made their way to the islands and intensified their operations.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 29p.

By Insight Crime

  At least 117,492 people were murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean during 2023, putting the median homicide rate around 20 per 100,000 people. But homicide data in many countries is missing or unreliable, so the actual number is likely higher. Here, InSight Crime dives into our yearly round-up, analyzing the organized crime dynamics behind the violence in each country of the region.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 52p.  

By Jeanne Batalova, Andriy Shymonyak, and Michelle Mittelstadt

  Although international migrants account for just 3.5 percent of the world’s population, their number—almost 272 million people as of 2019—is far from insubstantial. Current and historical research shows that immigration brings significant and long-lasting benefits to countries of destination and origin and to migrants and their families alike. But it also shows that immigration often comes with tremendous challenges for individuals, communities, and institutions. In the United States, a country with a long and complex immigration history, public and political debates that started well back into the 18th century about the size and type of immigration, as well as its socioeconomic impacts, show no sign of abating. And as other countries around the world become migrant-sending, receiving, or transit places (or frequently a combination), migration—whether voluntary or forced—has arguably earned a prime and enduring spot on national and international policy agendas. It also continues to capture significant public and media attention. What is often missing from these conversations is accurate, complete data about who these immigrants are, why they come and leave, and what places they occupy in the socioeconomic hierarchies of their sending and destination countries. In this edition, Immigration Data Matters, which updates an earlier Population Reference Bureau - Migration Policy Institute guide, we have significantly expanded a list of online resources that provide authoritative migration-related data and statistics to help inform understanding of this phenomenon in the United States and globally. As before, our main guiding principle is to offer data from population censuses and surveys, administrative datasets, and new analyses that can help our audience understand the size of immigrant populations and inflows and outflows, enforcement actions, public opinion, historical trends, citizenship acquisition, and many other aspects. Here we list and describe more than 250 data resources, half U.S., half international. These resources are collected or compiled by a wide range of sources, including government statistical agencies, international organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and reputable research organizations. We use these resources in our own research, and while the list is by no means exhaustive, our goal is to share the most accurate, relevant, publicly available migration-related data, in one user-friendly and accessible guide. We hope this guide helps bring more knowledge to an issue area where the facts are often missing  

Migration Policy Institute and The   Population Reference Bureau , 2020. 49p.

By María Calderón

 When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by co-opting government employees. 

Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2024. 6p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? With its “total peace” policy, the Colombian government aims to engage all the country’s armed groups in talks, but it has no dialogue underway with the largest armed criminal outfit, the Gaitanista Self-Defence Force. This gap is significant, given the Gaitanistas’ deep pockets and their drive to expand. Why does it matter?From their Atlantic coast stronghold, where they run some of the country’s main drug trafficking routes as well as migrant smuggling rackets, the Gaitanistas exercise coercive control of numerous communities. If they remain outside peace talks, they could undermine negotiations with other groups or capitalise on their demobilisation. What should be done?Bogotá should start down a path of progressively more substantive discussions with the Gaitanistas aiming, first, to reduce violence against civilians and, secondly, to discuss legal conditions for laying down arms. In parallel, the police and military should continue operations to protect civilians and press the group toward talks. Latin America Report N°105

Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group 2024. 52p.

By Glenn Farley & Kamryn Brunner

CSI estimates that the costs of the epidemic in Arizona reached an all-time high last year: $58 billion. This staggering figure includes not only hospital, law enforcement, and other public service costs of dealing with this crisis, but also loss of quality of life and productivity amongst those suffering with addiction.

The costs of this crisis have continued rising due to ongoing medical and other price inflation, law enforcement strains, the severity of fentanyl relative to other opioids, and the continued crisis on Arizona’s southern border enabling the primary pathway for fentanyl into America.

While the roots of the opioid crisis go back to the mid-90’s, its severity in terms of both human and social costs didn’t really take off until after 2015. This surge is attributable to the particular severity of fentanyl abuse, its low cost, and its relatively high availability. An unfortunate fact of three independent but concurrent policy changes whose roots can be traced to the late-2010’s – the overprescribing and subsequent crackdown on prescription drugs, the relaxation of criminal enforcement of America’s drug laws, and the collapse in security along the border with Mexico – has been to enable both supply and demand for fentanyl and other illegal opioids. This experiment in hindsight was clearly a failure.

Over the last decade, fatal opioid overdoses in Arizona have more than doubled. Seizures of fentanyl and other opioids inside Arizona remain at record levels. The DEA has identified the greater Phoenix area – whose violent crime is up about 50% over the past decade – as a central distribution hub for fentanyl into the greater United States.

This update to CSI’s  2022 study of what led to this crisis, and how it has continued evolving over the past two years, continues to be about not repeating the mistakes of the past and better-informing policy going forward.

Key Findings

• CSI estimates that the cost of the fentanyl crisis to Arizona’s economy today is $58 billion – for context, the annual GDP of the state of Arizona is $521 billion. In 2017, the CDC estimated the national opioid epidemic cost nearly $1 trillion – or $22 billion in Arizona alone. But since then, the problem has only gotten worse.

• While opioid-related fatal overdoses appear to have peaked, they remain near all-time highs; declines have been modest and it is premature to assume success in dealing with this crisis. In fact, despite opioid-related deaths in Arizona falling last year, CSI estimates the cost of this epidemic reached a new high.

• Total seizures of feal to the current crisis.

• In 2015, Arizona’s Department of Health Services reported 41,400 opioid-related encounters by Arizona hospitals, resulting in $305 million in encounter costs. By 2019, though, encounters had risen to 56,600 (+372019[i] to more than 29,200 pounds today[ii] – a 320% increase. Given that as little as 2 mg of pure fentanyl can be fatal, DEA seizures in Arizona alone lntanyl in the United States by the DEA have increased from approximately 6,800 pounds in ast year were enough to kill every Arizonan 14 times over. Because it is a border state, Arizona is centr%) but encounter costs had increased a staggering 120% (to $676 million).

Phoenix: Common Sense Institute Arizona, 2024. 18p.

 By Susan L. Stewart a, Rose M.C. Kagawa b, Shani A.L. Buggs b, Mona A. Wright b, Garen J. Wintemute 

  Background: There is evidence linking use of controlled substances with perpetration of interpersonal violence. While the United States constitution protects the right to own a firearm, federal law prohibits firearm purchase and possession by persons believed to be at high risk for violence, including those who use controlled substances unlawfully. Methods: We report here the results of a 13-year prospective observational study on the risk of violent crime associated with a history of criminal drug charges in a cohort of 79,678 legal purchasers of handguns in Cali fornia in 2001. The main outcomes were post-purchase charges for any violent crime, violent Crime Index crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault), and firearm-related violent crimes. The main exposure of interest was a history of pre-purchase charge(s) for drug-related offenses; we examined as a secondary exposure a history of marijuana-related charges. We estimated adjusted hazard ratios (aHR) with 95 % confidence intervals (CI) using Cox proportional hazards multiple events models. Results: We found that legal handgun purchasers in California with a history of drug-related charges, even those with marijuana charges only, had triple the risk of a post-purchase violent crime charge compared to purchasers with no criminal charges (drug charges only: aHR=2.9, 95 % CI 2.2–3.8; marijuana charges only: aHR=3.3, 95 % CI 1.8–6.0). In addition, a criminal history of drug charges only vs. no criminal history was associated with increased risk of one or more violent crime charges after the first post-purchase arrest event (aHR=1.6, 95 % CI 1.2–2.3). Conclusion: It is incumbent on researchers and policy makers to understand the nature and causes of this risk in order to take effective steps towards mitigation.

International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104413 

By Kennedy Kipkoech Mutai , Jack Stone , Andrew Scheibe , Hannah Fraser , Leigh F. Johnson , Peter Vickerman 

  Background: Illicit drug use results in considerable global morbidity, but there is little data on its trends and factors associated with it in sub-Saharan Africa. We consider these questions using national data from South Africa for 2002–2017. Methods: We analysed data among individuals aged 15 years or older from five national population-based household surveys in South Africa (2002–2017; n = 89,113). Recent drug use was defined as the last three- months use of illicit drugs, i.e., any use of cannabis, cocaine, amphetamine, inhalants, sedatives, hallucinogens, opioids, and/or other illicit drugs. Time trends in recent drug use were assessed using logistic regression. Multivariable logistic regression assessed the association between recent drug use and socio-demographic factors and between drug use and sexual risk behaviours, HIV-related and other well-being variables. Results: The prevalence of recent drug use increased from 1⋅5% to 10⋅0% from 2002 to 2017, driven by increases in cannabis use (1⋅5% to 7⋅8%) and use of opioids (0⋅01% to 1⋅6%), cocaine (0⋅02% to 1⋅8%), or amphetamines (0⋅1% to 1⋅5%). In adjusted analyses, male gender, younger age, living in urban areas, mixed-ancestry or white ethnicity (compared to black-African), and unemployment were positively associated with recent drug use. Recent drug use was associated with: multiple sexual partners (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 2⋅13, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1⋅80–2⋅51); sexual debut before 15 years old (aOR 1⋅70, 95%CI: 1⋅29–2⋅23); hazardous/harmful alcohol use (aOR 2⋅50, 95%CI: 2⋅14–2⋅93) or alcohol dependence (aOR 3⋅33, 95%CI 2⋅92–3⋅80); ever experiencing intimate partner violence (aOR 1⋅56, 95%CI 1⋅12–2⋅17); psychological distress (aOR 1⋅53, 95%CI: 1⋅28–1⋅82); and lower chance of ever testing for HIV (aOR 0⋅89, 95%CI 0⋅80–1⋅00). Recent drug use was not associated with HIV positivity, condom use or being on antiretroviral therapy. Conclusion: Illicit drug use has increased substantially in South Africa and is associated with numerous socio- demographic characteristics, higher sexual risk behaviours and other well-being variables.

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395924000379  

  International Journal of Drug Policy 125 (2024) 104352

By Sarh Clifford, Cassandra J.C. Wright, Peter G. Miller, Kerri Coomberd, Kalinda E. Griffiths, James A. Smitha, Michael Livingston

Background: - During 2017-18, the Northern Territory (NT) introduced a Banned Drinker Register (BDR) and Minimum Unit Price (MUP) NT-wide; Police Auxiliary Liquor Inspectors (PALIs) in three regional towns; and restrictions on daily purchases/opening hours (DPOH) in one regional town. The BDR is an individual-level alcohol ban; MUP is a pricing policy; and PALIs enforce bans on restricted areas at takeaway outlets. This study examines the impact of these policies on adult domestic and family violence (DFV). Methods: We examined DFV assaults and breaches of violence orders from January 2014 – February 2020 using interrupted time series models for NT, Greater Darwin, Katherine, Tennant Creek, and Alice Springs. To account for increasing numbers of individuals on the BDR we tested two timepoints (Sept 2017, March 2018). Findings: Following DPOH, assaults (78 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (92 %) decreased in Tennant Creek. After PALIs, assaults (79 %) in Tennant Creek, and breaches (39 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (58 %) in Katherine decreased. After MUP, assaults (11 %), alcohol-involved assaults (21 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (21%) decreased NT wide. After MUP/PALIs in Alice Springs, alcohol-involved assaults (33 %), breaches (42 %), and alcohol-involved breaches (57 %) decreased. BDR (Sept 2017) found increases in assaults (44 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (39 %) in Katherine and assaults (10%) and alcohol-involved assaults NT-wide (17 %). There were increases of 21 %-45 % in breaches NT-wide, in Darwin, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Following March 2018 found increases in assaults (33 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (48 %) in Katherine. There were increases - from 20 % to 56 % - in breaches in NT-wide, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Conclusion: PALIs and DPOH were associated with some reductions in DFV; the BDR was associated with some increases. The upward trend commences prior to the BDR, so it is also plausible that the BDR had no effect on DFV outcomes. Although MUP was associated with reductions in the NT-wide model, there were no changes in sites without cooccurring PALIs. 

International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 127, May 2024, 104426

By the UK Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunals Service

  1 The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is headed by the Lord Chancellor and is accountable to Parliament for the efficient and effective functioning of the courts. Its three priorities are: to protect the public from serious offenders and improve the safety and security of our prisons; reduce reoffending; and deliver swift access to justice. HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS), an executive agency of the MoJ, reports jointly to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice and to the Senior President of Tribunals. It is responsible for supporting the independent judiciary in the administration of criminal courts, civil courts, family courts and tribunals in England and Wales, and non-devolved tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The judiciary, headed by the Lady Chief Justice, is constitutionally independent from the government. 2 Criminal cases are heard in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court. Cases enter the criminal justice system when a defendant is charged with an offence. The case is allocated a court date through the judicial process of listing. Cases generally go to magistrates’ courts first, where over 90% of criminal cases are dealt with. The remaining cases, usually more serious and complex offences, transfer to the Crown Court. 3 The MoJ and HMCTS measure and report on the outstanding caseload in the Crown Court, including the number of cases awaiting trial and being tried, and those awaiting sentencing. The caseload is determined by the respective rates of cases coming to the Crown Court (receipts) and completed cases (disposals). When the rate of receipts exceeds the rate of disposals, the outstanding caseload increases. The MoJ and HMCTS do not specify a minimum or optimal caseload at which the Crown Court functions most efficiently – below which there is a risk that judges and courtrooms are available but do not have enough cases to try, and above which cases on average take longer from listing to completion – because the optimal level is dependent on the nature of cases and the capacity available to hear them, both of which vary. Therefore, the MoJ does not distinguish between cases that form part of the expected caseload and additional cases that constitute a backlog. Because the MoJ has not quantified its expected caseload, we cannot quantify the backlog separately. When we are presenting data, we refer to the total number of cases as the ‘outstanding caseload’. Otherwise, we refer to it as the ‘backlog’.

4 In April 2021, the MoJ produced the Criminal Justice Action Plan that recognised a need for a whole-system approach to responding to systemic issues within the criminal justice system. It brought together work already underway across the system, focusing on three priority areas: improving timeliness, improving victim engagement and reducing backlogs. In the October 2021 Spending Review, the MoJ was provided with £477 million over 2022-23 to 2024-25 for the criminal justice system’s recovery from COVID-19, including reducing court backlogs, and a total budget settlement of £34.5 billion over the same period. 5 In October 2021, we published Reducing the backlog in criminal courts, which examined the reasons for the growth in the backlog in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court, both before and during the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 We reported that HMCTS had responded quickly to the impact of the pandemic, launching a recovery programme in May 2020, and successfully increasing court capacity. We concluded that, while the backlog in magistrates’ courts was expected to return to pre-pandemic levels swiftly, significant risks to reducing the backlog in the Crown Court remained, which were likely to persist beyond 2024. Scope of this work 6 We undertook this investigation in response to the Crown Court backlog reaching its highest ever level. This report describes what action the MoJ, HMCTS and other parts of the criminal justice system have taken to address the backlog of cases in the Crown Court. It examines: • the scale, nature and impact of the Crown Court backlog; • the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s understanding of the impact of actions to reduce the Crown Court backlog; and • how the MoJ and HMCTS are attempting to manage the Crown Court backlog. 7 We refer to, but did not examine in detail, the work of other parts of the criminal justice system, such as the judiciary, police, magistrates’ courts and HM Prison and Probation Service, that are relevant to managing the Crown Court backlog. We do not comment on the wider reform programmes in the system such as the court reform programme, which is the focus of our 2023 report Progress on the courts and tribunals reform programme. 2 We do not comment on other major projects unless directly relevant to the Crown Court backlog. We do not seek to examine and report on value for money of the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s work to date to reduce the backlog.   

London: The National Audit Office (NAO) , 2024. 54p.