By Spencer Chainey Nathalie Alvarado Rodrigo Serrano–Berthet

Hot spots policing (HSP) is an effective approach for decreasing crime. This guide is designed to help police agencies better understand and make practical use of this policing strategy. The guide explains how HSP works in helping to decrease crime, and describes the processes involved in implementing a successful program in Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC). It also offers practical advice on how to address many of the challenges involved in implementing HSP, how to evaluate its impact, and how to complement it with other policing approaches to help sustain decreases in crime. Included throughout the publication are case studies from the region that help illustrate how HSP is applied. The guide also answers questions that are often asked about HSP, such as issues associated with the displacement of crime.

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank - IDB 2024. 149p.

By Sarah Pedersen,  Natascha Mueller-Hirth, Leia Miller

COVID-19 exacerbated challenges that already existed in the policing of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in remote and rural northern Scotland. Victims’ direct access to the police and third-sector organisations was impeded by social distancing while the pandemic exacerbated extant issues relating to staffing, particularly in relation to female police officers. On the positive side, the flexibility that already characterised rural and remote policing continued, and police officers and third-sector organisations worked together to support victims. The move to videoconferencing was hailed as a positive move in an area where travel to meetings or court can be difficult and expensive. A lack of training for officers with no specific GBV role was identified as particularly problematic during the pandemic when officers on the ground in rural and remote Scotland had to take over work usually undertaken by specialist task forces.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2023. 12p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? The theft and illicit sale of fuel, known in Mexico as huachicoleo, experienced an enormous spike after 2010. Rising fuel prices and other unintended effects of energy reforms and security policies have attracted organised crime into this domain, driving up murder rates.

Why does it matter? President Andrés Manuel López Obrador made fighting fuel theft a central item on his anti-crime agenda. But although he has had some success, enduring progress toward stopping huachicoleo could be elusive, largely due to pervasive official corruption and the failure to promote licit alternatives for earning a living.

What should be done? The government should tackle collusion between state officials and criminal outfits by introducing external oversight over state energy and security institutions. Conflict mitigation plans tailored to violent regions should offer legal alternatives to illicit livelihoods, protect civilians through focused police or military deployments, and support local security and justice institutions.

Mexico City; New York: Brussels: International Crisis Groupm, 2022. 22p.

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By R. Evan Ellis.

Since his election in 2013, Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez has made significant changes in the strategy and institutions of the country in combating the interrelated scourges of organized crime and violent gangs, which have prejudiced Honduras as well as its neighbors. Principal among these are the creation of a new inter-agency structure, de la Fuerza de Seguridad Interinstitucional Nacional (the National Inter-Agency Security Force [FUSINA]), integrating the military, police, prosecutors, special judges, and other state resources to combat organized crime and delinquency in the country. More controversially, he has created a new police force within the military, the Policía Militar del Orden Público (Military Police of Public Order [PMOP]), which has been deployed both to provide security to the nation’s principal urban areas, Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela and San Pedro Sula, and to participate in operations against organized crime groups. In the fight against narcotrafficking, he has advanced a concept of three interdependent “shields”:

1). An air shield to better control Honduran airspace, enabled by January 2014 enabling the shoot-down of suspected drug flights and the acquisition of three radars from Israel to support intercepts by the Honduran air force;

2). A maritime shield, with new naval bases on the country’s eastern coast, and new shallow-water and riverine assets for intercepting smugglers; and,

3). A land shield, including enhanced control of the border with Guatemala through the Task Force “Maya Chorti.”

Beyond FUSINA, the Hernandez administration has also sought to reform the nation’s national police, albeit with slow progress. It is also reforming the penitentiary system, dominated by the criminal gangs MS-13 and B-18.

The new security policies of the Hernandez administration against transnational organized crime and the gang threat, set forth in its Inter-Agency Security Plan and “OPERATION MORAZÁN,” have produced notable successes. With U.S. assistance, FUSINA and the Honduran government dismantled the leadership of the nation’s two principal family-based drug smuggling organizations, the Cachiros and the Los Valles, and significantly reduced the use of the national territory as a drug transit zone, particularly narco flights. Murders in the country have fallen from 86.5 per 100,000 in 2011, to 64 per 100,000 in 2014.

This monograph focuses on the evolution of the transnational organized crime and gang challenges in Honduras, the strategy and structures of the Hernandez administration in combating them, associated challenges, and provides recommendations for the U.S. military and policymakers to support the country in such efforts.

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2016. 104p.

By John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker.

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent,” a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Books, 2013. 72p.