By Bethany Jackson, Esther Weir, Meghan Alexander, Kimberley Hutchison, Jolaade Olatunbosun, Vicky Brotherton, and Doreen Boyd , Mary Alexander

Realigning Modern Slavery and Climate Change for Equitable Governance and Action’ is part of a larger collective of research projects aiming to understand the intersections between climate change and modern slavery and generate new evidence on how policies can recognize, address and positively influence these linkages between modern slavery and climate change. This project focuses on how modern slavery and climate change can be jointly integrated in UK Government and devolved administrations' policies. This pursuit is to demonstrate how modern slavery can be ‘mainstreamed’ into climate change action, and vice versa. The project and this report are the result of collaboration between the Rights Lab (University of Nottingham), Transparentem, and International Justice Mission (IJM) UK. Context Modern slavery and climate change intersect through complex, direct and indirect pathways that span borders and propagate through interconnected human-environmental systems. Climate change can increase vulnerabilities to modern slavery through the occurrence of changing environmental conditions and slow-onset events (such as drought), or rapid-onset events, both of which can cause climate-induced displacement or longer-term migration and heighten vulnerabilities that can be exploited (both in home and receiving countries). In response to changing environmental conditions, people may be forced to enter exploitative situations or engage in exploitative activities to provide alternative livelihoods and survive. In this regard, climate change can exacerbate pre-existing risk factors for modern slavery and disproportionally affect certain groups, notably women and girls. However, climate change action may also be a driving factor. For instance, planned relocations of communities as part of adaptive, risk management approaches can also create or exacerbate vulnerabilities to modern slavery, particularly if rights and/or livelihood opportunities are limited in receiving locations. Likewise, the ‘race to net zero’ could prompt new businesses to engage in modern slavery and human rights abuses, while the loss of certain industries could create new vulnerabilities in the absence of just transitions. The intersections and cascading risks that exist between climate change and modern slavery make it paramount that the two agendas be addressed together; yet to date, these issues have largely been treated as policy silos. Research methods This research examines the policy intersections and opportunities for strengthening alignment between modern slavery and climate change through UK policies and devolved administrations (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). The research addresses the following questions: 1. To what extent are anti-slavery efforts currently integrated into UK Government and devolved administrations’ climate change policies? 2. How can anti-slavery actions be better aligned and integrated (if at all) into climate change policies through existing and/or new mechanisms (i.e., ‘mainstreaming’)? To address these questions, we undertook a comprehensive evidence review, alongside policy and legal analyses, both domestically and internationally to identify potential transferable lessons. This was accompanied by in-depth interviews with governance actors (n = 17) and a focus group (October 2023) with those working on modern slavery and/or climate change policies (n = 4).

Findings and recommendations Three key emerging findings were identified as part of the study. First, policy silos currently exist because of inaction, a lack of ability and willingness to incorporate combined activities in work and disconnects of scale mean activities to combine modern slavery and climate change action are further ahead in the anti-slavery sector, than the climate change space. Second, there are perceived and real barriers associated with resource and capacity strain which mean the research community should work to support governance actors and provide evidence for the development of new streams of policy action. Finally, domestic and international legislative action can be used as a baseline for combined action addressing modern slavery and climate change. For example, the inclusion of decent work within Scotland and Northern Ireland’s climate change policies demonstrates integrated policy achievements. Our findings highlight several ways through which modern slavery and climate change agendas could be more strongly aligned and strengthened through governance mechanisms. Seventeen (17) overarching recommendations are identified according to four core themes – governance, knowledge-to-action, capacity building and finance, and support, lived experience and inclusion, and have been assigned an urgency score. The urgency scoring adopts a similar approach to that used by the latest Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA3) (HM Government, 2022), taking into account current levels of risks or opportunities, how this is currently being managed and the benefits of further action in the next five years. More action is needed for most recommendations, meaning that new, stronger or different government action is required over and above that already planned in the next five years. It is vital that governments step-up action to address these dual challenges simultaneously to ensure a rights-based, socially just response to climate change. Summary of recommendations Governance  G1: Strategic oversight of Greater strategic oversight is needed between the leading departments focused on modern slavery (Home Office and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, FCDO), to include and address intersecting issues of modern slavery and climate change at domestic and international scales.  G2: Problem framing and recognition o An overarching human rights lens should be centred at the core of public policy and should be integrated across all departments (national and devolved) and their mandates.  G3: Enhanced cross-departmental collaboration of Mechanisms are needed to overcome current siloed approaches throughout the UK government and devolved administrations, including cross departmental sub-groups and establishing internal networks.  G4: Legislative change o Consider the development of new combined legislation addressing modern slavery and climate change concerns, and in the interim update current legislation to strengthen UK response to modern slavery and climate change.  G5: Alignment of Inclusion of climate change as an issue of concern in relation to modern slavery as part of the agenda pursued by the Global Commission on Modern Slavery.  G6: Intergovernmental collaboration o The UK should revive its reputation as a multi-lateral governance actor and provide international leadership around climate change and modern slavery through its role within the UN multilateral systems, the new Global Commission on Modern Slavery, through the FCDO Modern Slavery Envoy and other multi-lateral systems  (continued)   

Nottingham, UK: University of Nottingham, Rights Lab, 2024. 53p.

By Kori Cordero,  Suzanne M. Garcia, Lauren van Schilfgaarde

Intergovernmental Collaboration is intended to assist Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts interested in building intergovernmental collaborations, including tribal-state collaborations. Whether a Wellness Court has been operational for decades or is still in the planning process, collaboration is essential. This resource frames the subject by providing a brief history of Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts, discusses some common traits found in existing collaborations, and then uses those common traits to discuss actual collaborations that are operating in the Tribal Wellness Court context. (2021

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute. 2021. 46p.

By Carrie Garrow and Catherine Retana

Using traditional storytelling as a guide,Tribal Judicial Leadership in Healing to Wellness Courts looks at leadership from a tribal perspective. Tribal Healing to Wellness team leaders and tribal judges are faced with numerous responsibilities. Tribal judges are expected to actively participate with team members, participants, and ensure the sustainability of the Tribal Healing to Wellness Court within the Judicial Branch. This publication looks to traditional stories to provide a guide for tribal judges for effective tribal judicial leadership within Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts by discussing the responsibilities of Tribal judges, the cultural components of Tribal judicial leadership, and how they interact with the Tribal Healing to Wellness Court Ten Key Components.

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute. 2024. 230p.

By Alyssa Harrold and Grace Carson

Promising Strategies for Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts: Peer to Peer Learning through Mentor Courts describes The Tribal Law and Policy Institute’s Mentor Court Program, which was conceived to address a critical gap in the provision of Tribal specific technical assistance. While Federal and State mentor court programs offer valuable insights, they often lack focus on Tribal-specific issues such as jurisdictional complexities, limited access to resources, heightened rates of substance abuse, co-occurring disorders, cultural values, and historical trauma. Furthermore, the unique sovereign status of Tribal nations, each with its own customs, laws, and cultural needs, necessitates tailored approaches to the development and sustainability of Tribal Healing to Wellness programs. The peer-to-peer learning that occurs between Mentor Courts and Sister Courts (or mentee courts) is representative of the interconnectedness of indigenous peoples and the significance of shared knowledge. We believe that the Mentor Court/Sister Court model promotes Tribal sovereignty and self-determination within Indigenous justice systems.

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute. 2024. 54p.

By Lauren van Schilfgaarde

Formalizing Healing to Wellness Courts in Tribal Law (2022) tracks the ways in which Tribes have drafted Wellness Courts into tribal law. Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts are restorative justice components of the Tribal Court. To the extent they operate a docket, adjudicate cases, and most critically, heal and restore members and the community, some Tribes have noted their existence in the Tribal code. Because each Tribe is structurally and culturally unique, there is no one correct way to promulgate a Wellness Court into Tribal law, or if that exercise is even necessary. This publication identifies the considerations for code drafting, identifies variations, and pushes Tribes to contemplate how the Wellness Court operates in relation to other parts of the Tribal judiciary and Tribal law.

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute , 2023. 179p.

By Nicole Gelinas 

During Mayor Eric Adams’s first seven weeks in office, soaring violent crime in New York City’s subway system dominated the local news. Public fear and frustration peaked in mid-January, with the murder of 40-year-old Michelle Go, who was shoved from a Times Square subway platform onto the tracks in the middle of the day. Go’s alleged killer, an apparently mentally ill and homeless man who had repeatedly violated parole for a 2017 violent felony conviction, was yet another example of the city and state’s failure to treat and supervise violent mentally ill people, or to incarcerate violent offenders. Go’s death was a tragic instance of a now nearly two-year-old phenomenon. When subway ridership fell precipitously in March 2020, to as low as 6.5% of the pre-Covid normal level of 5.6 million riders each weekday, violent felonies did not fall with passenger numbers. Violent felonies rose sharply, not only on a per-rider basis but in absolute numbers. A beneficial “safety in numbers” effect, supplemented by the legacy of decades of proactive policing, had disappeared. Now the full data for 2021 are in, and a new, longer-term trend persistent through the second year of Covid has become clear. As ridership has gradually returned, to an average of 59% of normal from early November until Christmas Eve 2021, violent crime has not gradually declined in tandem. Violent crime, both per passenger and, in some categories, in raw numbers, has remained persistently higher than it was in 2019. Where there was safety in numbers before Covid and grave peril in desolation beginning in March 2020, there now exists an unhappy medium. Modest-size crowds—though larger than those in 2020—are not by themselves helping to deter violent crime. This stagnation of both crowd size and public safety is unlikely to fix itself: as people fear taking trains because of violent crime, they keep crowd levels low, thus enabling violent crime to persist at elevated levels. At the same time, the NYPD and prosecutors have not stepped in to fill the vacuum. Preventive policing, in terms of arrests and civil summonses for alleged low-level law violations, remains far below pre-Covid levels. In January 2022, before Go’s murder, new Mayor Eric Adams and Governor Kathy Hochul announced a joint state-city plan to secure the subways. (The city-run NYPD is generally responsible for public safety in the subways, not the state-run Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which runs the trains.) As of mid-March 2022, however, the plan has not yet achieved results: for the year through March 13, transit crime was up 80.3% compared with the same period in 2021. To restore order on the subways, the city must go beyond the improved mental-health treatment that the plan promises. Rather, police have to return to proactive and preventive policing and deterrence—and prosecutors need to follow through on these cases. In 2019, New York City and tristate residents depended on mass transit for three-fourths of their daily commutes into Manhattan. Without safe transit, Manhattan and the city cannot recover economically from Covid.4 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2022. 17p.

By David Bright, Chad Whelan and Carlo Morselli

A large volume of criminal offending involves two or more individuals acting collaboratively. In recent years, much contemporary research on group crime has integrated research on co-offending with the study of criminal networks. However, while this research (mostly from the United States and Canada) is generating significant insights into co-offending, there is a notable absence of research on co-offending and co-offending networks in Australia. This report presents the findings of a study into co-offending using arrest data from Melbourne, Australia. The study sought to extend previous work on co-offending by analysing the range of crime types committed by individuals and co-offenders across co-offending networks.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 597. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 21p.

By  Debbie Scott, Cherie Heilbronn, Kerri Coomber, Ashlee Curtis, Foruhar Moayeri, James Wilson, Sharon Matthews, Rose Crossin, Alex Wilson, Karen Smith, Peter Miller and Dan Lubman

The acute association between interpersonal violence, alcohol and drug use, self-harm, and mental health issues is relatively unexplored. Violence-related ambulance attendances were analysed, differentiated by type of violence and by victim or aggressor of violence, as well as the co-occurrence of alcohol and drug use, self-harm, and mental health issues. Ambulance attendances related to victims of violence had few co-occurring issues beyond alcohol and drug misuse. In contrast, attendances related to aggressors were more complex, with high proportions of co-occurring mental health, self-harm, and alcohol and drug issues. These findings demonstrate the utility of ambulance data for surveillance of interpersonal violence  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 595. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 17p.

By The Refugee Council

When the new Government came into power following the general election, they inherited an asylum system in meltdown. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Rwanda Plan had brought the system to a near-standstill, as the number of people waiting for an initial decision once more started to rise. This paper sets out the state of the asylum system that new ministers faced, and the early steps taken to address the resulting cost, chaos, and human misery. It presents key recommendations for the next steps the new Government should take to ensure the asylum system is fair and effective and to make it safer for people to seek protection in the UK.

Our key findings include:

• Due to the previous Government’s Illegal Migration Act 2023, in the months leading up to the general election, the productivity of the asylum system was at its lowest since the height of the COVID-19 pandemic

• As a result, the work undertaken by the previous Government to reduce the backlog had stalled with the numbers waiting for a decision increasing

• Without intervention, they are projected to have reached record levels in January 2025 with a projected 177,063 people waiting for an initial decision.

• Removing the blockages created by the Illegal Migration Act 2023, there would be an estimated 59,000 fewer people waiting for a decision by the end of January 2025 compared to if no action had been taken, saving between £151 million and £240.7 million as a result.

Our key recommendations for the government span all key areas of asylum policy and include:

• An immediate repeal of the Illegal Migrant Act and the Safety of Rwanda Act

• Introducing a clear and transparent plan for how the backlog of asylum claims will be processed and prioritised

• Moving away from the current system of private accommodation contracts and instead empowering local councils to provide value-for-money housing

• Extending the move-on period from 28 days to 56 days after someone receives a positive decision on their asylum claim

• Putting in place a team within the Home Office to review all asylum refusals that have been appealed to ensure the correct decision was made the first time

• Limiting the conduct of age determinations to staff with relevant training

• Expanding safe routes, including by making a clear commitment to refugee resettlement

• Implementing a more effective voluntary returns program.

London:   Refugee Council, 2024. 24p.

By SIQI LI and JUN LU

The data set comprises cross-sectional and panel data on different types of crime for 32 London boroughs from 2012 to 2022. It has been hand-curated to match with data on a wide range of air pollutants. The data set has been analyzed using spatial econometric modeling to measure the impact of air pollution in London on the occurrence of different types of crime. The results indicate that air pollution in London has gradually improved, having previously been the most polluted city in the world. Air pollution exerts diverse effects on the occurrence of different crimes. Among these, the occurrence of theft crime is significantly and positively affected by air pollution, while the occurrence of dangerous driving crime is slightly inhibited by air pollution. This inhibitory effect is estimated to be related to the inhibitory effect of air pollution on traveling. However, there is no significant effect of air pollution on the occurrence of weapon possession crime. This study makes recommendations for the further development of emissions reduction policies in London in the future, as well as for the prevention of crime through the control of air pollution

By Dallas Augustine, Noah Zatz, Naomi Sugie

This study addresses whether employers are using criminal records as a valuable source of information for risk management or if general stigma impacts employer hiring practices. The study finds that employer aversion to hiring people with criminal records was driven not only by concerns with future criminal behavior or other associated risks but also, in significant part, by the stigma that accompanies a criminal record. Consequently, permitting decision-makers unrestricted access to and use of criminal records allows for forms of exclusion that are based, at least in part, on stigma and stereotypes associated with contact with the criminal justice system rather than purely practical business concerns. Report authors conclude that regulating employers’ access to and use of criminal history through Ban the Box policies and other variants can both combat hiring discrimination and advance broader socioeconomic equality.

Los Angeles: The UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2020. 9p.

By Stephanie Brooks Holliday, Elizabeth Marsolais, Samantha Matthews

The Los Angeles County Rapid Diversion Program (RDP) is a pretrial mental health diversion program that was established in 2019. RDP serves individuals whose mental health diagnoses (which can include substance use disorders) played a role in the criminal charges that they are facing. The concept for RDP was developed with several local departments at the table, including public defense, prosecution, behavioral health services, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The program is now overseen by the Justice, Care and Opportunities Department (JCOD). When RDP launched, it focused on people facing low-level, nonviolent misdemeanor charges. RDP has expanded from one courthouse to seven in its first five years of operation. It now diverts qualifying people facing misdemeanor or felony charges. In addition to mental health and/or substance use disorder treatment, RDP clients receive case management services to help them address other needs (e.g., housing, obtaining benefits). Successful completion of RDP leads to the dismissal of charges. The figure depicts the RDP process.

Evaluating the Rapid Diversion Program

RAND researchers aimed to understand how RDP is being implemented, the successes and challenges that the program faces, and the characteristics of clients served by the program. The research team reviewed relevant documents, observed courtroom proceedings, conducted interviews with program implementation partners and graduates, and analyzed program data. In their assessment, the researchers found both strengths in implementation and challenges to consider while contemplating the expansion of RDP. Overall, public defenders, prosecutors, and clinicians support expanding the program.

Key Findings

Building a Diversion Program

RDP was developed on the foundation of three guiding principles that have helped address limitations to the traditional pretrial mental health diversion process under the California Penal Code, Section 1001.36: (1) identifying a set of charges that the defense, prosecution, and courts can agree are appropriate for diversion; (2) embedding clinical staff directly in the courts, which avoids the lengthy process of retaining a forensic evaluator to assess the client and then developing a treatment plan; and (3) providing case management to both address additional client needs and help ensure program compliance.

Rapid Diversion Program Client Characteristics and Outcomes

Among the findings on client characteristics and outcomes:From March 2022 to April 2024, more than 4,300 people were evaluated, and more than 1,200 were diverted.Most clients are Hispanic (about 47 percent) or Black (28 percent).About 35 percent are unhoused and 42 percent are in temporary housing when they enter the program.About one-half of the individuals approved for diversion are facing misdemeanor charges, and one-half are facing felony charges.As of April 2024, more than 660 clients had graduated from the program, and 91 percent had avoided having a new case filed for an offense occurring after graduation.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 2p.

By Alexandra Kimmons   

One in six people in England and Wales have a criminal record. But 27% of UK employers wouldn’t hire someone with a conviction. Employment is a key factor in preventing future offending. However, people with criminal records are often trapped in the past, unable to find stable work and contribute their talents to society because of their record. Other countries, like the US, have begun taking steps to solve the issue. How do we compare? Researchers examined five scenarios in which someone with a previous conviction is seeking employment and compared what would appear on their criminal record in England and Wales and five US states: California, Connecticut, Utah, New Jersey, and Oklahoma.1 Key Findings • In three out of five scenarios, the England and Wales system is more punitive than any of the five US states. • In two scenarios, the England and Wales system is similarly punitive to certain states and more punitive to others. • In all five states, convictions can often be expunged (deleted), meaning that a background check will not reveal them. • In some states, employers cannot access information on childhood convictions and many offences are expunged automatically after a set period. For example, Rich was convicted of drug possession 12 years ago. In all five US states explored, he can delete the conviction from his record after a maximum of 10 years and move on with his life. In England and Wales, Rich’s conviction will show for the rest of his life on the detailed checks required for many roles. He will constantly face the fear, and very real prospect, that employers will discriminate against him based on his record. Conclusion Researchers at Reed Smith concluded: “It is clear that criminal record disclosure requirements in England and Wales are much more punitive than the five U.S. states we have researched. In Oklahoma, Utah and New Jersey, convictions can often be expunged or pardoned, meaning that a background check will not reveal them. In other states, such as California and Connecticut, employers cannot access information on childhood convictions and many offences are sealed automatically so that employers cannot see them. This allows individuals with past convictions a degree of comfort in knowing that future career prospects will not be hindered by the past. Neither position is replicated in England and Wales.” Recommendations FairChecks is calling for a full review of the criminal records disclosure system in England and Wales. In the short-term, FairChecks has three stepping-stone policy recommendations which would free thousands of people from the enduring impact of a criminal record: 1. Wipe the slate clean for childhood offences 2. Remove cautions from criminal record checks 3. Stop revealing short prison sentences forever  

2024. 15p.

By Atsushi Inoue, Ryuichi Tanaka

Does the relative wealth of students’ households affect the incidence of risky behaviors of students in school? We estimate the effect of the rank of the socioeconomic status (SES) of the students’ household within a class on the incidence of school bullying and school absence. We exploit the variation of SES rank within a class generated by the almost random assignment of students to classes. Using the data from middle-school students in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), we find that although the absolute level of SES is negatively associated with these incidences, students with a high SES rank within a class are more likely to be the victims of school bullying and to be absent from school.

IZA DP No. 16975 Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 44p.

Edited By Morena Tartari, Cosimo Marco Scarcelli, Cirus Rinaldi

Folk Devils and Moral Panics in the COVID-19 Pandemic analyses the phenomena of moral panics surrounding so-called folk devils in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this volume, internationally recognized moral panic scholars from disciplines including sociology, media studies, criminology, and cultural studies examine case studies of moral panics related to the COVID-19 pandemic. These analyses consider the different social, political, economic, organizational, and cultural contexts within which such moral panics emerged and assess how the concept of moral panic can be deployed to offer novel insights into sociocultural responses to the outbreak. By utilizing both classical approaches to moral panic analysis and more recent trends, chapters discuss the utility of the concept of moral panic that is, for the first time, applied to a global-scale event like the COVID-19 pandemic.

London: Routledge, 2024. 

By Vicky Mei , Felix Owusu, Sam Quinney, Anita Ravishankar, Daniel Sebastian 

In response to the increase in violent crime and specifically gun crime in Winston-Salem, the Winston-Salem Police Department (WSPD) established a crime gun intelligence center. The WSPD Crime Gun Intelligence Center activities were supported by the Fiscal Year 2019 Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) grant from the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance. To meet the requirements under this grant, the WSPD CGIC Initiative was created. This initiative has been supported by a cohesive infrastructure that includes technology, specialized investigation, ballistic evidence collection & processing, and partnership with external agencies. The majority of these initiative components resulted from WSPD’s CGIC Strategic Action Plan, which created an actionable design for implementing key CGIC elements. The Strategic Action Plan included establishing policies and procedures, additional training information sharing, and new personnel. The Strategic Action Plan was reviewed and approved by an external team of training and technical assistance providers who partner with the Bureau of Justice Assistance. During the grant period, progress was monitored through monthly meetings attended by WSPD personnel and team members from the technical assistance providers. This report provides a chronological narrative of the grant-funded WSPD CGIC Initiative along with data and statistics relevant to the project. All CGIC data and statistics were collected and maintained by WSPD’s crime analyst assigned to this project. The original project period for this grant was October 2019 through September 2022. The site visit from technical assistance providers for developing the Strategic Action Plan and the procurement of a gunshot detection system (per federal and local procurement requirements) took several months. Because of this, the tracking of statistics was not able to begin until August 2021 when the project was fully operational. Furthermore, because several performance metrics had not been tracked before the awarding of this grant, and therefore pre-award and post-award data was not available for those metrics. Among the key findings in this report are: • Consistent performance measurement. The recommendations addressed in the Strategic Action Plan, along with the required tracking and reporting of performance metrics necessitated the need to track and capture data, which gave WSPD opportunities to re-examine its approach to gun violence based on this data. Metrics in this analysis report will allow the Department to continue revising and developing policies and procedures that will enhance gun violence reduction efforts. • Improved case load summaries and overall investigation. The CGIC Initiative has created a more streamlined and cohesive approach to incident response, investigation, and the possible prosecution of offenders. This grant has allowed additional technology, regular intelligence sharing with external partners, and additional personnel dedicated to all aspects of this initiative, including investigative work, administration, and the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN). With additional personnel  dedicated to NIBIN activities, WSPD has had consistently high percentages of NIBIN acquisitions within 10 days of the offense. Between January 2020 and September 2023, 38 of the 86 months reported 80% or higher for acquisitions entered within the 10-day mark. • Benefits from the use of a gunshot detection system. WSPD has been using ShotSpotter gunshot detection technology since August 2021. Performance data shows multiple benefits from the use of this technology: ▫ Enhanced response. Dispatch delay was significantly less with ShotSpotter alerts compared to Priority 2 calls. Dispatch delay for ShotSpotter alerts averaged only 3.85 minutes, compared to 10.7 minutes with Priority 2 Calls. Officer travel time for ShotSpotter alerts was faster, averaging 6.25 minutes compared to 9.08 minutes with Priority 2 calls. An average of 44.4 minutes were spent by officers at crime scenes generated by ShotSpotter, compared to 37.10 minutes spent at crime scenes prompted by Priority 2 calls. ▫ Increase in reported gunshot incidents. The majority of gunshot incident responses within the ShotSpotter coverage area were initiated from ShotSpotter alerts versus citizen 911 calls. Of the 3,014 ShotSpotter alerts between August 2021 and September 2023, only 644 of these alerts were also reported via citizen 911 calls. To put this data into percentages, only 21.4% of the ShotSpotter alerts between August 2021 and September 2023 also had citizen 911 calls. ▫ Increase in evidence collection & NIBIN Leads. ShotSpotter’s technology of “pointing” to where shots are fired has made it easier to locate ballistic evidence. The increase in evidence collection is also a result of a more thorough processing of crime scenes. The increase in evidence collection also resulted in more NIBIN leads and connecting incidents that would not have been linked without the evidence. ▫ Lives saved. In two instances, had the ShotSpotter system not alerted law enforcement to the shooting, the victims would most likely have died, since neither of these incidents were reported by citizen 911 calls. When officers responded to the ShotSpotter alerts, they were able to render aid and request EMS, which ensured both victims were transported to a local hospital, where the person was treated for (and survived) life-threatening injuries. ▫ Community Engagement is a fundamental tenet within the guiding philosophy of the Winston-Salem Police Department. WSPD actively encourages the community’s involvement in addressing the prevalent issue of violence. Under the CGIC Initiative, the Department has embraced a multifaceted approach that implements various technologies and establishes numerous avenues for community involvement in combating crime. With the integration of ShotSpotter, officers are now promptly informed of gunfire in the coverage area, which means a significant increase in police responsiveness, approximately 80% more responses than before. Consequently, residents who may have hesitated to report gunfire are witnessing a greater police presence each time such incidents are detected. Moreover, officers, upon response, are actively engaging with residents by exiting their vehicles and initiating discussions about the incidents. This approach has led to a notable upswing in positive police-citizen interactions during times of heightened gun violence in the community. ▫ Cost Benefits. A 2022 report presented to Winston-Salem City Council estimated the use of the ShotSpotter gunshot detection system may save the community between $5 million and $8 million annually. This is based on an annual implementation cost of $230,000 - $350,000. Based on these estimates, savings would be a return of between $15 and $25 for each dollar spent. (A cost savings analysis has not yet been completed for 2023.)   

Washington DC:  The Lab @ DC, Office of the City Administrator, 2019. 67p.

By Matteo Vergani,  Angelique Stefanopoulos, Alexandra Lee, Haily Tran, Imogen Richards, Dan Goodhardt, Greg Barton

Bias indicators – that is, facts, circumstances, or patterns that suggest that an act was motivated in whole or in part by bias – can be a useful tool for stakeholders working on tackling hate crimes. Government and non-government agencies can use them to improve and standardise data collection around hate crimes, which can have a cascade of positive effects. For example, they can help to demonstrate in court the prejudice motivation of a crime – and we know that this is often hard in Australia, because the legislation has a very high threshold of proving hateful motivation. They can also improve the precision of measurements of the prevalence of hate crimes in communities, which is necessary for planning appropriate mitigation policies and programmes and for assessing their impact. Bias indicators can also be useful for non-government organisations to make sure that their data collection and research is reliable, consistent and a powerful tool for advocacy and education. We acknowledge that bias indicators can be misused: for example, our lists are not to be read as exhaustive, and users should take them as examples only. Also, incidents can present bias indicators from multiple lists, and coders should not stop at trying to code the incident as targeting one identity only. Importantly, our bias indicators lists should not be used by practitioners to make an assessment of whether an incident is bias motivated or not. The absence of bias indicators does not mean that an incident is not hate motivated – if a victim or a witness perceives that there was a prejudice-motivation. At the same time, the presence of a bias indicator does not necessarily demonstrate that an incident is bias motivated (as the term ‘indicator’ implies). Ultimately, a judge will make this decision. In the Australian context, we are proposing that bias indicators should be used to support data collection, and to make sure that all potentially useful evidence is collected when an incident is reported. This report is structured in two parts: in Part 1, we introduce and discuss the concept of bias indicators, including their uses, benefits, and risks. In Part 2, we present a general list of bias indicators (which might be used to code a hate  motivated incident), followed by discrete lists of bias indicators for specific target identities. We also present a separate list for online bias indicators, which might apply to one or more target identities. We are keen to engage with government and non-government agencies that plan to use bias indicators and find this report useful. We welcome opportunities to share additional insights from our research on how 

Melbourne: Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. 2022. 40p.

By Maria Cleary, David O’Loughlin, Rebecca Higgins, and Jessica Nolan.

Executive Summary This report examines the attitudes of employers in Ireland to hiring people with convictions(s) (PWCs) and the experiences of PWCs in employment. Employment remains a key protective factor on the desistance journey and supports the development of an inclusive, fair, and equal society (Carr et al., 2015; Healy, 2017; Reich, 2017). Successful reintegration can partially be measured by employment outcomes for PWCs (Ramakers, 2021). There is evidence that employers are broadly open to hiring PWCs, but raise concerns based on perceptions of risk in doing so. The absence of guidance and uncertainty about evidence-based approaches and legal requirements leads to inconsistent policies and practices while PWCs continue to face intersecting barriers to employment and reintegration. This report draws on a multi-method study of employers’ attitudes to hiring PWCs and experiences of employment pathways for PWCs, comprised of a survey (n = 55), interviews (n = 23), and a participatory symposium of key stakeholders in the summer of 2023. The report presents 10 recommendations based on the key findings listed below. – Perceptions of risk without an evidence base underpinned employer concerns about hiring PWCs including but not limited to safeguarding, reputational damage, reoffending, personality, qualifications, job performance, and lack of support. – Opportunities for progress emerged, with employers broadly willing to hire PWCs, but seeking guidance, information, and support to do so. – Half of the survey participants did not have specific policies or practices that require disclosure of criminal convictions but Garda Vetting and GDPR requirements are not clearly understood by all employer participants or PWCs. – Persistent barriers to employment for PWCs include stigma, lack of transparency in hiring processes, demands on resilience, motivation and desistance, and narrowing job opportunities. – The imperative of shifting mindsets from moral censure to inclusive policies and practices was highlighted, with the need for clear communication and messaging

Dublin: Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2024.  48p.

By Program on Extremism staff, including Lorenzo Vidino, Lara Burns, Sergio Altuna, Rosa Cabus, Cynthia Martinez and Jake Gilstrap.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and its network of proxies (often identified as Axis of Resistance) have a long history of activities targeting the United States, as opposing America constitutes one of their foundational dogmas. Said activities range from influence operations and propaganda to terrorist and military attacks. Tensions between the two sides have substantially escalated in the wake of the October 7, 2023 attacks in Israel and the conflict that followed making an assessment of these activities and their possible future developments highly relevant. While most of the anti-American activities by Iran and its proxies have been carried out in the greater Middle East, some of them have taken place inside America. Iran and its proxies have, in fact, been operating inside the United States for decades, engaging in a broad array of nefarious activities that can be divided into three main categories: lethal operations, procurement and propaganda.

• Lethal operations:

  • Iran has a history of carrying out assassinations inside America that dates back to 1980, when it commissioned the assassination of an Iranian dissident in Bethesda, MD.

  • While in recent years dissidents have been targeted with increasing frequency, Iran has also escalated its target selection by including US-based foreign diplomats and, even more brazenly, high ranking US officials.

  • Most of these plots appear to have been outsourced to hired guns, a choice largely dictated by necessity, but that also offers the Iranian regime the advantage of plausible deniability. The proxies so far used by Tehran to carry out assassinations inside the US have tended to be elements who were not ideologically aligned (mostly from the criminal underworld) and who displayed relatively low levels of professionalism.

• Procurement: Iranian-linked networks have also been active on American soil for decades to procure sensitive goods (high- tech equipment, dual-use tech, software, etc.), and conduct financial activities in violation of US sanctions. Schemes used have at times been very elaborate, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.

• Propaganda: America is home to a broad web  of entities (mosques, Islamic centers, schools, student groups) and individuals with close personal, financial, organizational, and ideological links to the Iranian regime and its proxies. They spread Iran’s religious and political worldview, glorifying the regime and its allies, undermining America and disseminating antisemitic views.

  • The New York-based Alavi Foundation is arguably the most prolific actor in the spread of Iranian regime influence in the United States. With its multimillion-dollar budget, it either directly owns or funds through grants, no-interest loans, and donations a broad array of mosques and entities nationwide that disseminate Tehran’s viewpoint. In 2008, the Department of Justice filed a civil forfeiture complaint against Alavi, arguing that it “secretly served as a front for the Iranian government and as a gateway for millions of dollars to be funneled to Iran in clear violation of U.S. sanctions laws.” In 2017, a jury found Alavi guilty, but the judgment was overturned by the appellate court due to procedural errors in the district court’s rulings. The legal battle is ongoing.

  • This report identified more than a dozen organizations that disseminate pro- Iranian regime and pro-Hezbollah viewpoints and operate schools and mosques nationwide that host radical preachers who weave anti-US and antisemitic sentiments throughout their teachings. Some of the most important ones are based in Houston, New York and Potomac, Maryland. Additionally, Dearborn, Michigan is a particularly important hub, as it hosts several prominent institutions disseminating Tehran’s worldview.

  • Many of the key individuals behind this web of entities maintain close connections to the Iranian regime, frequently traveling to Iran and actively participating in Iranian soft power organizations like Ahlul Bayt World Assembly and Al-Mustafa International University.

  • Many of the Iran-aligned institutions identified in the report host events like commemorations of the anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the anniversary of the death of Iran’s first post-revolution Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini; ceremonies memorializing the lives of IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah spiritual leader Hussein Fadlallah; and Quds Day, a day of protest against Israel declared by Khomeini in 1979 and commemorated the last Friday of every Ramadan.

  • Particularly troubling is the presence in the suburbs of various American cities of Islamic schools—some of which receiving state funding—that teach the Iranian regime’s interpretation of Islam and political worldview to scores of American children.

US authorities have repeatedly highlighted that “Iran typically relies on individuals with preexisting access to the United States for surveillance and lethal plotting” and, similarly, that “the arrests of individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Hezbollah's main overseas terrorist arm and their intelligence collection and procurement efforts demonstrate Hezbollah's interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in our homeland.” In substance, the possibility that Iran and its proxies could mobilize known and trusted assets based in the US rather than hired guns to carry out some kind of violent action in the future is a concrete one. In light of these dynamics, procurement and propaganda networks should be seen as natural recruitment pools for Iranian security apparatuses and their proxies seeking to plan attacks. Hezbollah is the oldest and most established of Iran’s proxies. It has long operated in the US, and Program on Extremism research has identified 142 US- based individuals who have been prosecuted for Hezbollah-related activities since 2000. Most individuals provided financial assistance to the group as money launderers/ bundlers/fraudsters and goods smugglers. About 13% of the prosecutions related to individuals who provided operational support as human smugglers, weapons procurers, and surveillance operatives. Clusters of friends or family members, some of them based out of Michigan, New York, California and North Carolina, play a central role in Hezbollah’s activities in the United States, particularly in fundraising operations. Iran and its proxies are also active in Canada and many Latin American countries. Exactly as in the US, their activities in those countries range from the creation of extensive propaganda centers to networks engaged in procurement and other financial activities and, occasionally, terrorist attacks (most recently, Brazil thwarted an alleged Hezbollah attack against Jewish targets in 2023). Many Latin American countries constitute a highly permissive environment that allows Tehran and its proxies to operate almost undisturbed. This dynamic poses a security challenge, not just to those countries, but also to the United States, given their geographical proximity. Given the heightened geopolitical tensions that have followed the October 7, 2023 attacks and Iran’s unrelenting commitment to highly adversarial positions towards the United States, an in-depth understanding of its networks inside the US and throughout the Western Hemisphere is of paramount importance. This required awareness applies not just to actors who are directly engaged in violent actions, but also to procurement and propaganda networks, as they not only serve useful roles for Tehran in and of itself, but can also potentially be utilized to support or carry out attacks.


Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University,2024. 126p.

By Stuart Wexler,  Jon Lewis,  Jessa Mellea,  M.B. Tyler

This report traces the evolution of the Christian Identity milieu in the United States. From its origins in 19th-century Great Britain through its subsequent transnational spread, the Christian Identity movement has long enjoyed a small but fanatical following within the American far right. A racist and antisemitic theology whose followers believe that white people are God’s chosen ones, the Christian Identity ideology has long influenced a wide range of white supremacist and anti-government extremist movements in the United States.[1] Christian Identity militants have engaged in terrorist violence since at least the late 1950s, working under the idea that God will endorse an end-times racial holy war against “demonic” Jews and the sub-human minority groups they have manipulated for centuries.[2] In contextualizing the Christian Identity movement within the broader domestic violent extremist landscape, this report finds that Christian Identity militants often sought to downplay their apocalyptic, genocidal goals to infiltrate, appropriate, and influence more “mainstream” religious extremists, enabling individuals like white Christian nationalists to engage in provocative acts of dangerous violence. In assessing this movement, this report examines the prevalence of two well-worn tactics used by Christian Identity extremists — propaganda of the deed and entryism — and offers a new strategy of necessity evidenced by the movement: co-optive extremism. Through this effort, this report argues that Christian Identity extremists are likely to attempt co-optive extremism to manipulate or provoke larger and more robust (but less outwardly violent) groups, such as militant, white Christian nationalists, into potential acts of mass violence. It also explores the modern strands of Christian Identity ideology that has emerged in a range of domestic extremist movements and ideologies as a result of the mainstreaming of antisemitism within this ecosystem.    

Washington DC:  Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 37p.