By Jonathan Kenyon,  Jens Binder, and Christopher Baker-Beall

This study explored the role of the Internet in radicalisation pathways of convicted extremist offenders in England and Wales, continuing the work previously reported in Kenyon et al. (2021b). Specific considerations included technological advances and changes in online activities, exploring the relevance of mental health including specific types of difficulties and disorders, and focusing on the sub-group of convicted extremist offenders identified as attackers. Methodological approach and interpreting findings The study built on an existing data set of 269 individuals from the study by Kenyon et al. (2021b) but expanded the numbers substantially by adding those with a completed initial Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+) report from January 2018 to December 2021. This resulted in a data set of 490 individuals who had been convicted of an extremist offence, equating to nearly all offenders who have been subject to either a Structured Risk Guidance (SRG) or initial ERG22+ report from October 2010 up to December 2021. The analysis focused on 437 individuals who were identified as ‘Radicalised Extremists’ following a review of all reports. Online behaviours commonly associated with radicalisation, demographic information and offence characteristics were coded for all cases. Professional ratings for overall levels of engagement, intent and capability to commit violent extremist acts were also included. Future offence data was obtained for all individuals by accessing up-to-date offending information and reviewing their current location. Statistical analyses were used to compare three radicalisation pathway groups: those who primarily radicalised online; those who primarily radicalised offline; and those subject to radicalising influences in both the online and offline domain  

London: Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series , 2022. 70p.

By Ronald C. Slye

This paper provides a framework for policymakers to tailor more effective negotiation and transitional justice strategies to address root causes, break cycles of violence, and strengthen the rule of law in settings affected by violent extremism. This paper draws on an earlier paper authored by me and Mark Freeman of the Institute for Integrated Transitions (also published here on SSRN), the three case studies commissioned for that first paper (ISIS in Iraq, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria), and three newly-commissioned case studies on negotiations with violent extremist groups (Libya and the Libya Islamic Fighting Group, Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army, and Afghanistan and the Taliban). All six case studies can be found on the website of the Institute for Integrated Transitions (https://www.ifit-transitions.org).

Barcelona: Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT), 2020. 204p.

By Lorand Bodo and Inga Kristina Trauthig

  The World Wide Web, since its development by Sir Tim Berners‑Lee in 1989, has steadily evolved into an ecosystem in which billions of users have become dependent on relatively few but large corporations. Using a search engine, posting on social media, communicating with others, or storing data in the cloud, for example, these companies have benefited billions of users positively. However, as the user base has grown over the years, so too has their power. Shifting the power from these few, large corporations back into the hands of users is critical to adherents of the Decentralised Web (DWeb). This ‘re‑decentralisation’ should also give the user more control over their data. As extremist actors try to innovate and find inventive ways to spread their propaganda and be more resistant to account and content removals, the DWeb is on their radar. This report gives a brief overview of the current status of the DWeb and ties it to existing and possible future exploitation of the DWeb by extremists. We focus on right‑wing extremist (RWE) and the so‑called Islamic State (IS) as these two strands of extremists are accredited with the highest threat potential in many parts of the world. We analyse a sample of thirty Telegram channels that fulfil our categorical features as being attached to the RWE spectrum. The second dataset, which was provided by UN‑supported Public‑Private Partnership Tech Against Terrorism (TAT), subjects the so‑called Islamic State’s exploitation of the DWeb to critical scrutiny.  

London:  Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2022. 44p.

By Daniel Allington

The purpose of this report is to explore the role that conspiracy theories, especially as disseminated through social media, may play in the process of radicalisation, and to make recommendations about how to minimise their occurrence. As it will show, there is clear evidence: • That conspiracy theories are disseminated through social networking and media sharing platforms • That conspiracy theories have historically played an important role in radicalisation, terrorism, persecution and genocide • That belief in conspiracy theories is psychologically associated with bigotry, extremism and willingness to break the law • That the perpetrators and alleged perpetrators of many recent mass shooting events were motivated by belief in conspiracy theories • That conspiracy theories have played a key role in recent political violence in the USA, including the insurrection of 6 January 2021 • That actions taken by social networking and media sharing platforms are inadequate to solve the problems associated with conspiracy theories, in part because the platforms themselves are designed in a way that serves to nurture and protect conspiracy beliefs  

London:  Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2021.  48p.

By Paul Thomas

This book is available as open access through the Bloomsbury Open Access programme and is available on www.bloomsburycollections.com. How should we understand home-grown terrorism like the 7/7 London bombings? This is a classic monograph focusing on recent British attempts to 'prevent violent extremism', their problems and limitations, and what lessons this can offer for more effective policy approaches in future. Paul Thomas's extensive research suggests that the Prevent policy approaches, and the wider CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, have been misguided and ineffective, further alienating British Muslim communities instead of supporting longer-term integration. He argues that new, cohesion-based approaches encouraging greater trust and integration across all communities represent the best defence against terrorism.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. 190p.

By  Hannah Rose and AC

• Young people – politicised, active and highly connected – are no longer just passive consumers of online terrorist content by adult groomers but are themselves propaganda creators, group organisers, peer recruiters, extremist financers and terrorist convicts.

• This process, called “youth‑on‑youth radicalisation”, emphasises the agency that young people have in a digital era in which the information hierarchy is increasingly flattened.

• Noting the formation of several new young extreme‑right groups and a series of terrorist convictions across Western Europe, this paper takes first steps to investigate the specific nature of this emerging threat.

• Ten extreme‑right youth groups from across Western Europe will be analysed to evidence the independence of extremist youth activism: Bastión Frontal, Eisenjugend, Junge Revolution, KS Nuoret, Sonnenkrieg Division, Blutkrieg Division, Feuerkrieg Division, Junge Tat, National Partisan Movement and The British Hand.

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  groups included have emerged since 2018, have an average membership age of under 25 and are associated with arrests for hate crimes, incitement to violence or acts of violence. These groups demonstrate racial nationalist ideologies with a youth‑centric focus, often using unique framings that differentiate them from other, older groups. While the role of social media on young people’s lives is self‑evident, an overview of the platforms to which young extreme‑right groups are attracted and the nature of their external communications will be provided, emphasising the role of Instagram, Twitter, TikTok and Telegram. Instagram is a useful tool for young racial nationalists, providing them with a powerful opportunity to recruit, reach young audiences and present striking visual content. Young extremists use different platforms for different purposes, dedicating themselves to maintaining presence on mainstream platforms through second accounts and circumventing platforms’ content moderation algorithms. As such, they “funnel” users to accounts on platforms with increasingly extreme content and ecosystems.. Offline presence continues to be a vital tool for the majority of extreme‑right youth groups, who engage in fitness or martial arts and organise community service in order to foster an in‑group identity. They incite against out‑groups through expertly styled propaganda and aggressive, often racist rallies, protests and banner drops. The threat posed by extreme‑right youth will be emphasised through exploration of incitement to violence and analysis of hate crimes and terrorist convictions.

London: ICSR King’s College London , 2021. 68p.

By Marc-André Argentino, Blyth Crawford, Florence Keen, Hannah Rose  

This report provides an overview of domestic extremism in the United States. It examines the various groups and movements that gained momentum under the administration of former President Donald Trump, the key discourses and motivations of those that were a part of the 6 January insurrection, and how these have evolved in the first 100 days of the Biden administration. • Through analysis of the MAGA movement and some of its various components, including the Oath Keepers, the Boogaloo Bois, Three Percenters, Proud Boys, and QAnon, this report reveals a country contending with a persistent domestic extremist threat which, despite Trump’s defeat, is unlikely to dissipate any time soon. • The 100 days that followed the inauguration of President Biden revealed a number of common narratives under which previously distinct groups have begun to converge, including anti-government ideologies, COVID conspiracy theories, election misinformation, racism, antisemitism, misogyny and transphobia. This report considers how these have evolved, and how they may continue to be a threat in the coming months and years. • The authors applied a mixed methods approach, leveraging data scientific methods and digital ethonography, in an effort to better understand MAGA-related groups, movements, and narratives both prior to and after Biden’s inauguration.  

London: ICSR King’s College London , 2021. 94p.

By Jared Holt

Domestic extremist movements have evolved and adapted their strategies, infrastructure, and messaging in the year since the insurrection at the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021. Such movements were initially jubilant at the sight of extremist groups and former President Donald Trump’s most ardent supporters crashing through windows and brawling with police, temporarily halting the US Congress as it certified the 2020 election results. But, resulting arrests and scrutiny soured that cheer into a wicked brew of paranoia and fear that played out among these movements, both online and offline. After a short period of relative inactivity, some radical movements began to resurface publicly. By the summer of 2021, other movements reorganized, making strategic adjustments along the way. This report by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) provides an overview and analysis of the shifts observed in domestic extremist movements since the 2021 Capitol attack. As noted in the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, domestic extremist threats include groups and individuals “whose racial, ethnic, or religious hatred leads them toward violence” and those who incite “imminent violence in opposition to legislative, regulatory, or other actions taken by the government,” including self-proclaimed militias, “sovereign citizen” movements, and others promoting fringe ideological grievances.

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  This research is informed by continued online monitoring and analysis of extremist individuals, groups, and movements, and how their online behavior influences offline activities. Daily monitoring efforts, primarily comprising open-source and investigative reporting, began in the latter half of 2020 and continued through the entirety of 2021, producing a comprehensive record of extremist movements online that informed this report, as well as other efforts to combat the threats that domestic extremist movements pose to democracy and public safety. These findings portray a domestic extremist landscape that was battered by the blowback it faced after the Capitol riot, but not broken by it. In fact, the sentiments espoused by domestic extremist causes are as public and insidious as ever, making their way into mainstream conservative discourse. This underscores the importance of periodic accounting and strategizing of methods to confront threats. Just as extremist movements adapt and evolve, so should approaches to preventing the harms they produce.  

Washington, DC: Atlantic Defense Council, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). 2022. 47p.

By André Bank / Yannick Deepen / Julia Grauvogel / Sabine Kurtenbach

This Working Paper examines the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on state and non-state violent actors in the Global South. We provide an ACLED-based interregional map-ping of trends in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. Cross-regional case comparisons shed further light on the similarities and differences of countries characterised by long-term armed conflict (Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria) or having transitioned from authoritarianism but facing inequality and political exclusion (Chile, Tunisia, South Africa). We identify a temporal variation: Initially, state armed actors’ new responsibilities to implement COVID-19–related control measures led to an increase in violence against civilians, but over time there was a decrease. We also find that COVID-19 had an early demobilising effect vis-à-vis protest and mob violence, a consequence of lockdowns and mobility restrictions. Yet, protest has quickly returned to pre-pandemic levels in many countries, underlining continued – sometimes aggravated –grievances. Moreover, different violent actors’ responses to the pandemic were decisively shaped by their respective conflict histories.

Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2022. 56p.

By Maura Conway

This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) and responses to them in the 13-month period from 1 December 2018 to 31 December 2019. It is divided into two parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of the extreme right, with a particular emphasis on the Christchurch attacks, and Part II on violent online jihadism, particularly the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (hereafter IS). The Conclusion provides a summing-up and identifies issues in this realm that bear watching in 2020. Those familiar with our previous reports will know that the structuring of these was slightly different, with analysis of violent jihadi activity preceding discussion of extreme right online activity in all instances. The March 2019 Christchurch attacks and a series of subsequent attacks in the United States and Germany put extreme right online activity firmly centre stage however, which is reflected in the structuring of the present report.

Dublin: VOX-POL Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2919. 26p.

Edited by Bharath Ganesh and Jonathan Bright

Extreme digital speech (EDS) is an emerging challenge that requires co-ordination between governments, civil society and the private sector. In this report, a range of experts on countering extremism consider the challenges that EDS presents to these stakeholders, the impact that EDS has and the responses taken by these actors to counter it. By focusing on EDS, our consideration of the topic is limited to the forms of extreme speech that take place online, often on social media platforms and multimedia messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Furthermore, by focusing on EDS rather than explicitly violent forms of extreme speech online, we (as Matti Pohjonen writes in this report) ‘depart’ from a focus on violence and incorporate a broader range of issues such as hateful and dehumanising speech and the complex cultures and politics that have formed around EDS. This focus brings into view a much broader range of factors that help assemble extremist networks online.  

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  This perspective is necessary, given the role that hate speech plays in extreme right-wing networks and the complexity of Daesh propaganda which uses videos to synthesise utopic images of life in the so-called ‘Khilafa’. Following JM Berger’s recent book, Extremism (2018), we can think of EDS as a core practice that produces an archive of online extremist resources that reinforce the sense of in-group belonging across a network of geographically dispersed users, whether this be the networks of jihadists connected on Telegram, or right-wing extremists that use trolling tactics to hack mainstream opinion on Twitter. All the same, while it is well-known that EDS is prolific online, there is little understanding of what kind of impact participation in these networks actually has on the likelihood of an individual’s engagement in political violence. Moreover, very little is known about what methods are being used to challenge EDS and what solutions are  best suited for this problem. This report seeks to provide policymakers, researchers and practitioners with an overview of the context of EDS, its impact, and the responses and solutions being mobilised to counter it. In order to do this, this report assembles a set of ten brief essays intended to serve as a starting point for further exploration of a range of topics related to the management of EDS across government, civil society and the private sector.

Dublin: VOX-POL Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2019. 123p.

By  Dounia Mahlouly

Gathering empirical evidence from interviews and focus groups, this study highlights some of the ethical dilemmas faced by the academic community tasked with developing new methodological tools and conceptual frameworks for the study of violent online political extremism. At the same time, it examines how academics position themselves in relation to a broad range of non-academic stakeholders involved in the public debate about where violent extremism, terrorism and the Internet intersect. It argues that these external actors are introducing a multisectoral ‘market’ for research on online violent extremism, which creates both opportunities and limitations for the academic community. Finally, it analyses how academics from across a range of disciplines will be able to secure access to data and competitive research tools, while also engaging in a critical reflection about the ethical considerations at stake.

Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2019. 35p.

By Reem Ahmed and Daniela Pisoiu

Violent right-wing extremism is a growing threat to Western liberal democracies. At the same time, radical right-wing populist parties and figures across Europe are succeeding electorally by way of increased representation in national parliaments. These gains have been achieved against a backdrop of anti-refugee sentiment, austerity, and disillusionment with the European project, with populists on the left and right promising to deliver an alternative and using effective slogans and ‘people’ politics. Ordinarily, we differentiate between the extreme right and radical right: the former posing a threat to the democratic system with their fascist links and overt racism; the latter respecting the democratic system whilst offering a ‘sanitised’ version of far-right politics – namely, adopting a ‘new master frame’ that emphasises culture rather than race. Recent analyses of the far right, however, have indicated social and discursive overlaps between the ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ right-wing parties and groups. The findings reported herein challenge this traditional separation within the far-right spectrum, and potentially have deeper theoretical and methodological implications for how we study the far right. The Internet adds another dimension to this threat, as far-right discourse becomes more visible on social media and messaging applications, potentially attracting more people to the cause as well as mainstreaming and legitimising particular narratives prominent in the scene.

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  Existing literature has specifically examined the online sphere, and social media in particular, and these scholars have communicated interesting findings on how the social networks and discourses overlap, for example identifying the co-occurrences of certain hashtags or analysing retweets and transnational cooperation. The aim of this report is to determine the overlaps apparent in the far-right scene on Twitter, and specifically, to ascertain the extent to which different groups on the scene are indeed talking about the  same issues in the same way, in spite of apparent differences in tone and underlying ideologies. We utilise a mixed-methods approach: first, gaining a cursory insight into the extreme right-wing scene on Twitter across Europe; and then applying a detailed frame analysis to three selected groups in Germany to determine the implicit and explicit overlaps between them, thus complementing the quantitative findings to offer an in-depth analysis of meaning.   

Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2019  209p.

By William Assanvo, Baba Dakono, Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni and Ibrahim Maïga  

This report analyses the links between violent extremism, illicit activities and local conflicts in the Liptako-Gourma region. Addressing regional instability in the long term requires empirical data that helps explain the local dynamics that fuel insecurity. This is the first of two reports, and is based on interviews conducted in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The second report assesses the measures aimed at bringing stability to the region.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2019. 24p.

Edited by Joel Busher and Lee Jerome

This open access book explores the enactment, impact and implications of the Prevent Duty across a range of educational contexts. In July 2015 the UK became the first country to place a specific legal requirement on those working in education to contribute to efforts to ‘prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. Drawing on extensive research with staff, children and young people, the editors and contributors provide new insight into how this high-profile – and highly contentious – policy has shaped educational practice in Britain today. It will be a valuable resource for researchers, policymakers and others interested in the design, implementation and on-the-ground effects of Prevent or similar programmes internationally that place education at the heart of efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 180p.

By Jon Lewis, Seamus Hughes, Oren Segal and Ryan Greer

“Basically, they’re domestic terrorists. That's why we’re here,” stated a Georgia Assistant District Attorney on February 14, 2020. The prosecutor was attempting to explain to a judge why two members of The Base, a violent white supremacist group, should not be let out on bond. Prosecuting domestic terrorists through the state court system instead of the federal system may seem unusual, but it is a result of the mosaic of different approaches federal and state prosecutors use to address the increasing threat of domestic extremism. Cases like these demonstrate the need to examine whether the government is using all the tools at its disposal to address the threat of white supremacist violence. It also underscores the need to ensure that government and law enforcement officials have the resources and knowledge they need to track the criminal activities of violent extremists and, whenever possible, prevent terrorist acts. The United States has struggled to adapt to a changing domestic terrorism landscape. In the last two months alone, more than a dozen Americans were arrested as part of wideranging investigations into a growing domestic terrorism threat stemming from individuals and groups that have a number of international ties. In response to the upsurgence of these groups, the seriousness of the threat they pose, and the manner in which they operate, U.S. officials have raised alarms. For example, Elizabeth Neumann, the Assistant Secretary for Threat Prevention and Security Policy at the Department of Homeland Security, recently told a Congressional committee that, “it feels like we

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  are at the doorstep of another 9/11…we can see it building and we don’t quite know how to stop it.” This policy paper focuses on the recent arrests of domestic extremists, as well as current efforts by law enforcement to disrupt and counter the growing influence of racially motivated violent extremist ideology—specifically white supremacy—and analyze the current state of enforcement actions against two domestic networks: The Base and Atomwaffen Division. In the accompanying policy recommendations, the authors outline administrative actions, legislative and policy changes, and other possible federal and state legal and prosecutorial powers that could allow for a more comprehensive and effective approach to countering these threats.   

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 35p.

By Pete Simi

A hypothetical “lone gunman” walks into a reproductive health care clinic spraying bullets from his assault rifle screaming that “abortion is murder!” and “the Army of God seeks revenge for the unborn fetuses murdered every year!” The shooting rampage leaves three individuals dead and 11 others injured. Additional weapons and explosives are discovered in the shooter’s van parked outside the clinic. Inside the van, a slew of literature explains how abortion is part of a liberal, feminist initiative to “enslave white Americans.” During the shooter’s interview with law enforcement later that day, he explains his motive was to “intimidate the general public by enforcing God’s law while sending a message to any other abortion killers that they might want to find another line of work.” In the days following the attack, scattered media coverage describes the gunman as “deranged,” “crazed,” and “unstable.” Few, if any, note the clear political and religious motivation nor do any of the articles describe the incident as “terrorism” or the shooter as a “terrorist.” What should we conclude about this scenario? The fact that the shooter was driven by ideological concerns seems obvious, yet the response suggests the link is apparently not so obvious. Understanding the relationship between ideas and violence presents several substantial challenges. These challenges are magnified given our tendency toward employing a highly inconsistent assessment of when and how ideas influence violence.

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  We tend to perceive a close connection between ideas and violence when the incident involves a Muslim perpetrator, while relying on a far different metric when the perpetrator is not Muslim. And the consequences are tremendous with major differences in terms of public perceptions and legal treatment.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 12.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Blyth Crawford, Valentin Wutke

Salafi-jihadism and right-wing white supremacist extremism are two of the most visible, active, and threatening violent extremist movements operating in the West today, responsible for dozens of attacks throughout North America and Western Europe. With the increased threat of white supremacist terrorism in the West have also come questions about its relationship to jihadist terrorism. This study provides an assessment of the ideological similarities between the two movements, concluding that they share key traits and political outlooks, some of which have become increasingly widespread over recent years in the Western world and beyond. Firstly, these forms of extremism are the most violent iterations of their respective movements. Jihadists are the ideological fringe of the wider Islamist movement, while white supremacist extremists emerge from more mainstream, right-wing white identity and supremacist politics. They are both reactionary political movements. They treat any form of social or political progress, reform, or liberalization with great suspicion, viewing these chiefly as a threat to their respective ‘ingroups’. In this sense, jihadists too are extreme right-wing actors even if they are rarely referred to in such terms. Both movements share a similar underlying diagnosis for the ills of their respective societies, placing blame primarily on the forces of liberal progress, pluralism, and tolerance.  

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 103p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

The boogaloo movement has risen to national prominence as a new and dangerous subset of the extreme right in the United States. Boogalooers focus on and fantasize about a supposedly imminent second civil war, referred to as the “boogaloo,” wherein the corruption they see in the political system will be overthrown. This is still an emergent movement, but its ideological core centers around guns and distrust of authority, whether that be the government, police, or political institutions. The movement originated on the internet forum 4chan, and adherents to the boogaloo movement continue to be active online in various forums and social media platforms. Many media portrayals have focused on the seemingly quixotic traits of boogalooers, like their habit of wearing Hawaiian shirts, communicating via internet memes, or their name being derived from the 1984 break-dancing movie Breakin’ 2: Electric Boogaloo. But make no mistake, the boogaloo movement is inherently violent, well armed, and organized around preparations for a civil war purportedly coming to America’s streets. Individuals tied to the boogaloo movement have already plotted attacks and committed violence, and intelligence and law enforcement agencies have pointed to a growing threat emanating from the movement. As previous research from Everytown has demonstrated, an entire extreme-right ecosystem serves as a breeding ground for individuals aliated with far-right movements such as the boogaloo, providing both inspiration and motivation—whether political, conspiratorial, or racist—for them to act.

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2021.   10p.

By Hans-Georg Betz 

Radical right-wing populist parties have been a fixture of Western European party systems for several decades. Once considered “flash parties” they have become part of the political establishment. A number of factors account for their staying power. For one, radical rightwing populist parties offer an attractive mixture of anti-establishment rhetoric (populism) and an exclusionary policy program (nativism) which appeals to a diverse range of constituencies. At the same time, they evoke and play to a range of strong emotions engendered by large-scale structural changes, which threaten to disrupt the lives of a substantial number of citizens in advanced capitalist societies. When in a position of power, however, these parties largely fail to meet the needs of their core constituencies.  

London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, 2020. 42p.