By lnternational Crisis Group

What’s new? Nigeria has seen a proliferation of vigilante organisations to fight crime and protect the public. These range from small bands of volunteers in villages and city neighbourhoods to large structures established by state governments. Some have mandates to safeguard particular regions or ethno-religious groups. Why did it happen? New organisations are emerging largely because the federal government and police force are increasingly unable to curb insecurity across the country. Many ethnic groups and communities feel a sense of siege, prompting them to resort to self-defence. Why does it matter? In many parts of the country, vigilante groups are filling security gaps. With poor training and supervision, however, their members are prone to human rights abuses and vulnerable to capture by politicians and other elites. In some cases, their activities could aggravate intercommunal tensions, heightening risks of conflict. What should be done? To provide better security and counter impunity, the federal government should pursue police reform and bolster judicial capacity. Some devolution of policing powers to state and local levels is needed. Federal and state authorities should develop regulations to better manage vigilante groups and risks associated with their operations.

Brussels: International Crisis Group 2022. 35p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Right-wing extremists have been one of the largest and most consistent sources of domestic terror incidents in the United States for many years, a fact that has not gotten the attention it deserves. n The Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism has compiled a list of 150 rightwing terrorist acts, attempted acts, and plots and conspiracies that took place in the United States during the past 25 years (1993-2017). These incidents were perpetrated by white supremacists, anti-government extremists, anti-abortion extremists and other types of right-wing extremists. n The vast majority of right-wing terror incidents have stemmed from white supremacists and anti-government extremists (such as militia groups and sovereign citizens), with the two broad extremist movements being responsible for almost the same number of incidents (64 related to white supremacists, 63 to anti-government extremists). n Most acts were committed by small number of extremists acting on their own rather than at the behest of organized extremist groups. About half of the 150 incidents were actually committed by lone wolf offenders. n Right-wing extremists have killed 255 people in these attacks and injured over 600 more. n Overwhelmingly, firearms and explosives were the most common weapons chosen: 55 of the incidents involved use or planned use of firearms; 55 involved use of explosives. Overall, incidents involving firearms were more likely to be deadly. n Right-wing terror incidents have involved a wide array of targets, with government, law enforcement, racial and religious targets the most common. n Right-wing terror incidents occur consistently because the movements from which they emanate are mature extremist movements with deep-seated roots. The Internet has made it easier for extremists to meet each other (and thus engage in plots), as well as to self-radicalize and become lone wolf offenders. n Right-wing terrorism is a subject under-covered by the media, in part perhaps because so many right-wing terror incidents take place far from major media centers and urban areas. One consequence of this relative lack of coverage has been an inadequate awareness among policy-makers and the public alike of the threat that violent right-wing extremists pose. n If the United States does not treat right-wing extremism as a real threat, the list of right-wing terror incidents can only grow.

New York: ADL, 2022. 28p.

By ADL Center on Extremism

Every year people with ties to a variety of extreme movements and causes kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, in the service of a group or gang they may belong to, or while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2021, domestic extremists killed at least 29 people in the United States, in 19 separate incidents. This represents a modest increase from the 23 extremist-related murders documented in 2020 but is far lower than the number of murders committed in any of the five years prior (which ranged from 45 to 78). The 2021 murder totals were low primarily because no high-casualty extremist-related shooting spree occurred this past year. Such sprees are the main contributor to high murder totals. Most of the murders (26 of 29) were committed by right-wing extremists, which is usually the case. However, two killings were committed by Black nationalists and one by an Islamist extremist—the latter being the first such killing since 2018. Most of the 2021 murders were committed by people associated with longstanding extremist movements, such as white supremacy and the sovereign citizen movement. However, 2021 continued the trend of recent years of seeing some murders from newer types of extremism, including QAnon adherents, people associated with the toxic masculinity subculture of the “manosphere” and anti-vaccination extremists. White supremacists killed more people in 2021 than any other type of extremist, though not an outright majority, as is often the case. An in-depth look at white supremacist killings over the past 10 years demonstrates the dangers posed by alt right white supremacists and white supremacist prison gangs.

New York: Anti-Defamation League. 2022. 38p.

By Christina Schori Liang

Keypoints • There are growing links between terrorist and organised crime groups who are sharing expertise and are cooperating in kidnapping, arms, drugs and human trafficking, as well as drug production, cigarette smuggling, extortion and fraud. • The growing nexus of shared tactics and methods of terror and crime groups is due to four major developments: globalization, the communication revolution through the Internet, the end of the Cold War, and the global “war on terror”. • Both terrorist and organised crime groups are leveraging the Internet for recruitment, planning, psychological operations, logistics, and fundraising. The Internet has become the platform for both organised crime and terrorists to conduct cybercrimes ranging from video piracy, credit card fraud, selling drugs, extortion, money laundering and pornography. • The growing nexus has facilitated terrorists to access automatic weapons, including stand-off weapons and explosive devices, empowering them to challenge police, land and naval forces with the latest sophisticated weaponry and intelligence. • The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime is exacerbating efforts in war-fighting and peacemaking in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, West Africa in general and the Sahel in particular have become a dangerous new trafficking hub uniting both terrorists and organised crime cartels across a wide and mostly ungoverned land mass. • The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime groups is challenging international and national security by weakening democratic institutions, compromising government institutions, damaging the credibility of financial institutions and by infiltrating the formal economy, leading to increased crime and human security challenges.

Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011. 6p.

By Christina Schori Liang and Matthew John Cross

Right-wing extremists (RWEs) are using the current protests over police brutality in the United States as a cover to commit terroristic acts and to grow their numbers. They present a significant danger to public safety and security and are a growing threat in the West. Despite this, the rise of right-wing extremism (a homogenized term for white ethnonationalists, alt-rights, white supremacist groups, male supremacist groups, and rightwing anti-government extremists) has not been afforded the priority and attention it justly deserves. There are three reasons for this. First, the global narrative maintains that terrorism rests almost exclusively in the hands of a balaclava-clad Salafi-jihadist holding a Kalashnikov. Second, Western right-wing media has largely pushed back against covering the rise of right-wing extremism and the media as a whole has failed to contextualize the systematic threat RWEs present. Third, the global pandemic has forced governments to focus their attention on maintaining public health and socioeconomic order and have consequently failed to see how RWEs are subversively using the pandemic to support and expand their own agenda. RWEs have utilized the lawless and unmoderated internet to reach broader audiences, disseminate literature, and target vulnerable people. They have done so quietly, pushing an ideological campaign that manifests itself under the surface of popular internet discourse, rather than the aggressive proselytizing of Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State. These efforts can be understood as a kind of subversive exposure, where memes and fake news dominate discourse. This paper will analyse the scope of the RWE threat, describe their latest modus operandi, and explore how the pandemic is being instrumentalized by such groups and how the internet has become their principal tool and battleground. The paper will then provide theory and evidence for how counter-narrative programs, especially through digital disruption, can help neutralise the threat.

Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2020. 27p.

By Seth G. Jones

Right-wing extremism in the United States appears to be growing. The number of terrorist attacks by far-right perpetrators rose over the past decade, more than quadrupling between 2016 and 2017. The recent pipe bombs and the October 27, 2018, synagogue attack in Pittsburgh are symptomatic of this trend. U.S. federal and local agencies need to quickly double down to counter this threat. There has also been a rise in far-right attacks in Europe, jumping 43 percent between 2016 and 2017.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2019. 9p.

Chairman: The Rt Hon. Dr Julian Lewis MP

This report highlights the significant close working relationship between our security and intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism policing. It is through this regular collaborative approach that we can keep our citizens safe from all forms of terrorism. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our agencies and counter-terrorism policing for their excellent work to better understand and disrupt the threat from extreme right-wing terrorism.

London: Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2022. 137p.

By Kacper Rekawek, Alexander Ritzmann, and Hans-Jakob Schindler

This study titled “Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism – Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures” focuses on the transnational connections of the violent extreme right-wing milieus in six countries: Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. It was commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office, Division “International Cooperation against Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Corruption”, in 2020. CEP is grateful for the constructive support and critical feedback received throughout the process by the Federal Foreign Office. We would also like to thank the renowned external project experts engaged in the production of this study, without whom this work could not have been as comprehensive. The positions presented in this study only reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily correspond with the positions of the German Federal Foreign Office.

New York; London;Germany: Counter Extremism Project, 2020. 158p.

By The Soufan Center

The self-styled Islamic State is an accident of history, emerging from multiple social, political, and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. It has challenged the territorial divisions imposed on the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by carving out for itself a large area of territory.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2014. 80p

By The Soufan Center

From Pittsburgh to Poway and Charleston to El Paso, white supremacist extremists (WSEs) pose a clear terrorist threat to the United States. And while extremist groups operating on American soil are often labeled or categorized as domestic terrorist organizations, this report will demonstrate that they maintain links to transnational networks of like-minded organizations and individuals, from Australia, Canada, Russia, South Africa, and elsewhere. The danger of terrorism is growing in the United States, just as it is elsewhere in the world, with white supremacist extremists strengthening transnational networks and even imitating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). These networks share approaches to recruitment, financing, and propaganda, with Ukraine emerging as a hub in the broader network of transnational white supremacy extremism, attracting foreign recruits from all over the world.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2019. 79p.

By The Soufan Center

A May 2019 intelligence bulletin from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Phoenix office labeled conspiracy theories as a domestic terrorism threat for the first time. The bulletin mentioned QAnon by name specifically and described the broader movement of “conspiracy theory-driven domestic extremists” as deserving particular attention. “Conspiracy theories promoting violence” was designated one of the most serious aspects of the domestic violent extremism threat in a recently released unclassified report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). QAnon is a far right conspiratorial movement that creates and co- opts “theories” to fit an evolving narrative underpinned by the core notion that the “Deep State,” led by a cabal of elitist pedophiles, is leading the United States. These ideas are fueled by occasional messages from an anonymous individual, known as Q.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 46p.

By The Soufan Center

Over the past twenty years, al-Qaeda has proven to be resilient and adaptive in its efforts to survive the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Twenty years after the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, perpetrated by al-Qaeda, the organization looks much different than it did at the time. “We are no longer dealing with the same terrorist threat, or even the same al-Qaeda, as we did on September 11,” says Ali Soufan. “What we have today is something more complex and resilient, and an organization that has learned lessons from our policies and counterterrorism approaches. We did a lot to secure the U.S. homeland, but in our handling of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we may have shown terrorist groups that all it requires to outlast a superpower is patience.”

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 47p.

By The Soufan Center

In the last three years, Indonesia and the southern Philippines have seen something new: women carrying out suicide bombings – some with their husbands, some with their children, and some avenging slain husbands – targeting churchgoers, police officers, and soldiers.1 In Malaysia, during the May 2018 general election, a 51-year-old housewife planned to use a car filled with gas canisters and explosives to mow down voters at a polling station, raising the spectre of women killing not only with their families, but also perpetrating “self-directed” or “lone wolf” terrorist acts themselves.2 More recently, the suicide bombing of a church in Makassar, Indonesia, and a shooting at a police headquarters in Jakarta have once again highlighted the potential of female terrorist operatives. Like suicide bombing, it was once assumed that women’s involvement as perpetrators of terrorist violence was culturally and ideologically anathema to terrorist groups in the region.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 38p.

By Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, and Mollie Saltskog

The Capitol Insurrection in the United States on January 6, 2021, sent shockwaves around the world. From London to Canberra, and Ottawa to Auckland, millions watched as a mob of far-right violent extremists stormed the U.S. Capitol seeking to overturn the results of a free and fair presidential election that had already been certified many times as both legitimate and credible. Dozens of Capitol Police officers were injured and attacked with racist slurs by the crowd; chants could be heard throughout the crowd to “hang Mike Pence,” then Vice President. The day after the attack, one of the Capitol Police officers died of a stroke linked by many to the attacks. Members of the crowd even erected makeshift gallows—not a prop that was hastily constructed, but rather a deliberate sign of the mob’s intentions. As of mid-September 2021, 608 federal cases have been brought against individuals involved in the January 6 attack.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 62p.

By Pete Simi, Steven Windisch, Karyn Sporer

This report presents findings from a two-year study, “Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists.” This investigation examines multiple aspects of recruitment and radicalization, such as the quality and quantity of exposure to right-wing ideologies prior to extremist involvement; types of recruitment; pre-entry risk factors for extremist participation; and the extremists’ perception about why he/she was unable to progress beyond the planning stages of a terror plot. The empirical analysis is divided into four distinct but overlapping reports. Report one consists of a comprehensive thematic assessment, which focuses on family socialization prior to extremist involvement; entry processes into extremism; recruitment strategies and the extremist subculture of violence. In terms of socialization, although only a small segment of our sample (n=3, 9.7%) were raised by parents who were members of extremist groups, a vast majority (n=28, 90.3%) were exposed to racist/anti-Semitic beliefs during childhood. Regarding motivation for entry into violent extremism (VE), our findings indicate a variety of non-ideological factors increased the appeal of these groups such as acceptance from peers, attraction to the group’s forbidden social image and the ability to increase ones’ level of personal significance. In addition, participants also felt the group offered protection from bullies at school and rival gangs in their neighborhoods. In terms of recruitment, extremist groups relied on a variety of marketing strategies (e.g., leafleting and house parties) in order to promote their political agenda. Our data suggest these groups targeted marginalized youth who were angry and looking for solutions to their problems. However, the most effective recruitment tool was extremist music. Music provided recruiters with opportunities to introduce potential recruits to the extremist subculture in venues and through mediums with decreased monitoring from agents of formal social control. In addition, report one also examines the violent subculture of right-wing extremist groups. As part of this discussion, we highlight the role of various cultural practices such as violent rituals which were used to increase commitment to the group and to distinguish strong members from weaker ones. As our data indicates, however, there does seem to be a threshold for violence. That is, some extremists condemned violence when it was directed towards “defenseless” targets. Overall, these findings underscore the similarities individuals experience throughout their extremist careers.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 260p.

By Pete Simi and Steven Windisch

In 1969 Travis Hirschi published Causes of Delinquency which assessed the status of existing criminological theory and outlined his own version of social bond theory. Hirschi argued, among other things, that criminological theory should focus more on asking “why don’t we do it” rather than the more common question “why do they do it?”(Hirschi, 1969) In this respect, Hirschi advocated for a focus on the constraints or barriers that prevent or reduce the likelihood of crime. The importance of this twist in thinking is the emphasis on the elements of the social fabric, which compel conformity rather than deviation by limiting certain types of human behavior. Following Hirschi, we examine violent radicalization where the expected end point is committing an act of mass casualty terrorism (MCT). For purposes of the current study, MCT can be distinguished from more common types of interpersonal violence along two dimensions (Rutherford et.al., 2007, Tilly 2003). First, as compared to interpersonal violence, which is characterized by close physical proximity between the perpetrator and victim (s), MCT typically involves a greater physical distance between the aggressor and the target (Black, 1996, Senechal de la Roche 1996). Second, MCT typically involves the potential for a large number of fatalities whereas interpersonal violence is much more likely to result in fewer victims (Arnold et.al., 2002, Quillen 2002). Bombings and shooting rampages are common examples of MCT while interpersonal violence includes acts such as fistfights, attacks involving blunt objects (e.g. bats) and stabbings.

Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, The Extreme Right, Hate Crime and Political Violence, University of Oslo, 2017. 28p.

Edited by Paul Burke, Doaa’ Elnakhala, and Seumas Miller

This insightful book provides a unified repository of information on jihadist terrorism. Offering an integrated treatment of terrorist groups, zones of armed conflict and counter-terrorism responses from liberal democratic states, it presents fresh empirical perspectives on the origins and progression of conflict, and contemporary global measures to combat terrorist activity.

Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. 352p.

Edited by Michael A. Sheehan, Erich Marquardt, and Liam Collins

This handbook comprises essays by leading scholars and practitioners on the topic of U.S. counterterrorism and irregular warfare campaigns and operations around the globe. Terrorist groups have evolved substantially since 9/11, with the Islamic State often described as a pseudo-state, a terrorist group, and insurgency all at the same time. While researchers', analysts', and policymakers’ understanding of terrorism has grown immensely over the past two decades, similar advancements in the understanding of counterterrorism lag. As such, this handbook explains why it is necessary to take a broader view of counterterrorism which can, and often does, include irregular warfare. The volume is divided into three thematic sections: Part I examines modern terrorism in the Islamic world and gives an overview of the major terrorist groups from the past three decades; Part II provides a wide variety of case studies of counterterrorism and irregular warfare operations, spanning from the 1980s to the irregular warfare campaign against the Islamic State in northern Syria in 2018; Part III examines the government instruments used to combat terrorism and wage irregular warfare, such as drones, Theater Special Operations Commands, and Theater Commands. The handbook fills a gap in the traditional counterterrorism literature by its inclusion of irregular warfare and by providing analyses from academic experts as well as practitioners. It will be of much interest to students of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, U.S. national security, military affairs, and International Relations.

London; New York: Routledge, 2022. 537p.

Edited by Seumas Miller, Adam Henschke, and Jonas Feltes

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License. It is free to read, download and share on Elgaronline.com. This insightful book provides an analysis of the central ethical issues that have arisen in combatting global terrorism and, in particular, jihadist terrorist groups, notably Al Qaeda, Islamic State and their affiliates. Chapters explore the theoretical problems that arise in relation to terrorism, such as the definition of terrorism and the concept of collective responsibility, and consider specific ethical issues in counter-terrorism.

Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. 214p.

By Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov

In this monograph, the authors offer compelling research that reminds government and military officials of the moral, legal, and ethical dimensions of protecting cultural antiquities from looting and illegal trafficking. Internationally, states generally agree on the importance of protecting antiquities, art, and cultural property not only for their historical and artistic importance, but also because such property holds economic, political, and social value for nations and their peoples. Protection is in the common interest because items or sites are linked to the common heritage of mankind. The authors make the point that a principle of international law asserts that cultural or natural elements of humanity’s common heritage should be protected from exploitation and held in trust for future generations. The conflicts in Afghanistan, and especially in Iraq and Syria, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State (IS), have brought renewed attention to the plight of cultural heritage in the Middle East and throughout the world.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016. 112p.