By William S. Pollack, William.; Modzeleski, and Rooney, Georgeann

In the wake of several high-profile shootings at schools in the United States, most notably the shootings that occurred at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) and the United States Department of Education (ED) embarked on a collaborative endeavor to study incidents of planned (or "targeted") violence in the nation's schools. Initiated in 1999, the study, termed the Safe School Initiative (SSI), examined several issues, most notably whether past school-based attacks were planned, and what could be done to prevent future attacks. The SSI findings highlight that in most targeted school-based attacks, individuals, referred to as "bystanders" in this report, had some type of advanced knowledge about planned school violence. Despite this advanced knowledge, the attacks still occurred. This study aimed to further the prevention of targeted school-based attacks by exploring how students with prior knowledge of attacks made decisions regarding what steps, if any, to take after learning the information. The study sought to identify what might be done to encourage more students to share information they learn about potential targeted school-based violence with one or more adults. Six key findings were identified. Given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of the study, generalization from these findings may be limited. The findings are: (1) The relationships between the bystanders and the attackers, as well as when and how the bystanders came upon information about the planned attacks, varied; (2) Bystanders shared information related to a threat along a continuum that ranged from bystanders who took no action to those who actively conveyed the information; (3) School climate affected whether bystanders came forward with information related to the threats; (4) Some bystanders disbelieved that the attacks would occur and thus did not report them; (5) Bystanders often misjudged the likelihood and immediacy of the planned attack; and (6) In some situations, parents and parental figures influenced whether the bystander reported the information related to the potential attack to school staff or other adults in positions of authority,

Washington, DC: United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education, 2008. 15p.

By Alex P. Schmid

Based on an in-depth literature review, Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the terms “radicalisation”, “de-radicalisation” and “counter-radicalisation” and the discourses surrounding them. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism. This is also reflected in this Research Paper which explores the relationship between radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Historically, “radicalism” – contrary to “extremism” – does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism. Schmid argues that both extremism and radicalism can only be properly assessed in relation to what is mainstream political thought in a given period. The paper further explores what we know well and what we know less well about radicalisation. It proposes to explore radicalisation not only on the micro-level of “vulnerable individuals” but also on the meso-level of the “radical milieu” and the macro-level of “radicalising public opinion and political parties”. The author reconceptualises radicalisation as a process that can occur on both sides of conflict dyads and challenges several widespread assumptions. The final section examines various counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 105p.

Edited by Jan Willem Duyvendak and James M. Jasper.

In this important book, Jan Willem Duyvendak and James M. Jasper bring together an internationally acclaimed group of contributors to demonstrate the complexities of the social and political spheres in various areas of public policy. By breaking down the state into the players who really make decisions and pursue coherent strategies, these essays provide new perspectives on the interactions between political protestors and the many parts of the state—from courts, political parties, and legislators to police, armies, and intelligence services. By analyzing politics as the interplay of various players within structured arenas, <i>Breaking Down the State</i> provides an innovative look at law and order versus opposition movements in countries across the globe.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015. 246p.

By The Federal Commission on School Safety

Communities across the country are responding to school violence with a number of measures, including assigned school resource officers (SRO). School administrations, law enforcement agencies, families, and community stakeholders are diligently working to protect children and education personnel from school attacks. The National Police Foundation (NPF), in collaboration with the COPS Office, created the Averted School Violence (ASV) database in 2015 as a platform for law enforcement, school staff, and mental health professionals to share information about ASV incidents and lessons learned with the goal of mitigating and ultimately preventing future injuries and fatalities in educational institutions. The database includes school incidents beginning with the Columbine High School attack (1999) and continuing to the present day. The NPF has partnered with stakeholder groups National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) and the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) to conduct research and analysis on improving school safety. This report examines a dozen case studies of targeted violence incidents thwarted by the positive and often heroic actions of classmates, school administrators, SROs, and law enforcement agencies. It also includes recommendations and lessons learned from all cases in the ASV database. In addition, a companion publication entitled Targeted Violence Averted: College and University Case Studies presents information on post-secondary averted violence incidents and lessons learned to support student safety.

Washington, DC: Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, 2018. 180p.

By Jaclyn Schildkraut

The first five months of 2021 saw high-profile public mass shootings in cities across the United States of America, like Atlanta, Georgia (March 16, 8 dead), Boulder, Colorado (March 22, 10 dead), Indianapolis, Indiana (April 15, 8 dead), and San Jose, California (May 26, 9 dead). Following a year where such events rarely made headlines as the nation found itself in the throes of the coronavirus pandemic, these incidents revived the public discourse about mass shootings in America, as well as how to prevent and respond to such tragedies. This dialogue raised an important question: As society returns to normal after the COVID-19 pandemic, what does the future of mass shootings look like? To answer this, it is important to understand the trends associated with the phenomenon of mass shootings. The first issuance of this policy brief in 2018 examined 51 years (1966-2016) of mass shootings data based on a comprehensive database from researchers Jaclyn Schildkraut and H. Jaymi Elsass.3 As described below, the researchers developed their own definition that became the foundation of this analysis given deficiencies with existing classifications and data sources. This updated brief provides analyses including an additional four new years of data since the original 2018 policy brief to identify changes in trends and broader considerations for policymakers, particularly given the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact and lessons learned from specific shootings within this period. Specifically, this brief presents and analyzes a total of 55 years of mass shooting data from 1966 to 2020, including frequency, injury and fatality, location type, weapon usage, and perpetrator demographics. The appendix contains information on only the most recent four years of data from 2017 to 2020.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2021. 25p.

By Michael Rocque, Grant Duwe, Michael Siegel, James Alan Fox, Max Goder-Reiser, and Emma E. Fridel

In the past decade, mass shootings, particularly those that take place in public areas, have increasingly become part of the national conversation in the United States. Mass public shootings instill widespread fear, in part because of their seeming randomness and unpredictability. Yet when these incidents occur, which has been with somewhat greater frequency and lethality as of late, public calls for policy responses are immediate. In this policy brief, we review efforts to evaluate the effect of gun control measures on mass public shootings, including a discussion of our recently published study on the relationship between state gun laws and the incidence and severity of these shootings. The findings of this work point to gun permits and bans on large capacity magazines as having promise in reducing (a) mass public shooting rates and (b) mass public shooting victimization, respectively. Interestingly, however, most gun laws that we examined, including assault weapon bans, do not appear to be causally related to the rate of mass public shootings.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2021. 20p.

By International Crisis Group

Once regarded as a minor hub in Mexico’s criminal economy, Veracruz is now confronting the harrowing truths from over a decade of violence and grand corruption. At least 2,750 people are believed to have disappeared in a state whose former governor is wanted for embezzlement on numerous counts. The murders of seventeen journalists from 2010 onwards are the most notorious examples of a whirlwind of killings that targeted, among others, legal professionals, police officers, potential witnesses to crimes and any civilians who dared check the ambitions of a multitude of criminal organisations and their political accomplices. A new governor from the opposition National Action Party (PAN) has promised to clean out the state and prosecute wrongdoers, fostering hopes that peace can be restored. But as economic turbulence threatens the country, and bankruptcy looms over Veracruz, strong international support will be crucial to bolster initiatives aimed at finding the bodies of the disappeared, investigating past crimes, and transforming the state’s police force and prosecution service. Veracruz is emblematic of the challenges facing the country as a whole. Threats by the new U.S. administration to curb Mexican imports and fortify the border to keep out undocumented immigrants imperils its southern neighbour’s economic prospects. Similarly, President Trump’s predilection for armed force to combat cartels ignores the harm produced by the militarisation of public security as well as its proven ineffectiveness. But Mexican voices demanding a stronger national response are hamstrung by the extreme unpopularity of political leaders and public estrangement from government. Corruption and perceived criminal complicity have undermined the legitimacy of the Mexican government at all levels, especially at the tier of the country’s 31 regional states. Baptised “viceroys” as a result of the extraordinary powers granted them during Mexico’s transition from one-party regime to multiparty democracy, state governors have also become some of the country’s most disreputable public authorities. Since 2010, eleven state governors have come under investigation for corruption. In Veracruz, an alliance between criminal groups and the highest levels of local political power paved the way to an unbridled campaign of violence through the capture of local judicial and security institutions, guaranteeing impunity for both sides. Strengthening institutional probity and capacity in Veracruz, as in the rest of Mexico, will require federal and state levels to deliver on vows to work in partnership to staunch corruption, and on their willingness to abjure short-term political and electoral advantage. With the election of the new governor, Miguel Ángel Yunes Linares, the once hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost power in the state for the first time in over 80 years. But the PRI remains in control at the federal level and has shown wavering commitment to Yunes’ reformist plans, not least because of the importance of securing votes from the region, the country’s third most populous, in the 2018 presidential election. The state’s budgetary crisis and the new governor’s two-year mandate make it highly unlikely that the state government could accomplish sweeping reform to Veracruz’s institutions without sustained federal backing.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 41p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Research by International Crisis Group has for the first time quantified the positive impact of the UN’s Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). This report shows how CICIG’s justice reform activities since 2007 helped contribute to a 5 per cent average annual decrease in murder rates in the country. This compares with a 1 per cent average annual rise among regional peers. Why does it matter? Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales has announced that he will end CICIG’s mandate in 2019. But the commission has won widespread public support in Guatemala for its prosecution of previously untouchable elites. It is a rare example of a successful international effort to strengthen a country’s judicial system and policing. What should be done? With U.S. support for the CICIG under seeming strain, the commission’s other supporters should propose a new deal between the Guatemalan government and the UN based on a revised strategy of case selection and continuing support for political and judicial reforms. The U.S. should wholeheartedly back such a reformulated CICIG.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018. 33p.

By lnternational Crisis Group

What’s new? Nigeria has seen a proliferation of vigilante organisations to fight crime and protect the public. These range from small bands of volunteers in villages and city neighbourhoods to large structures established by state governments. Some have mandates to safeguard particular regions or ethno-religious groups. Why did it happen? New organisations are emerging largely because the federal government and police force are increasingly unable to curb insecurity across the country. Many ethnic groups and communities feel a sense of siege, prompting them to resort to self-defence. Why does it matter? In many parts of the country, vigilante groups are filling security gaps. With poor training and supervision, however, their members are prone to human rights abuses and vulnerable to capture by politicians and other elites. In some cases, their activities could aggravate intercommunal tensions, heightening risks of conflict. What should be done? To provide better security and counter impunity, the federal government should pursue police reform and bolster judicial capacity. Some devolution of policing powers to state and local levels is needed. Federal and state authorities should develop regulations to better manage vigilante groups and risks associated with their operations.

Brussels: International Crisis Group 2022. 35p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Right-wing extremists have been one of the largest and most consistent sources of domestic terror incidents in the United States for many years, a fact that has not gotten the attention it deserves. n The Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism has compiled a list of 150 rightwing terrorist acts, attempted acts, and plots and conspiracies that took place in the United States during the past 25 years (1993-2017). These incidents were perpetrated by white supremacists, anti-government extremists, anti-abortion extremists and other types of right-wing extremists. n The vast majority of right-wing terror incidents have stemmed from white supremacists and anti-government extremists (such as militia groups and sovereign citizens), with the two broad extremist movements being responsible for almost the same number of incidents (64 related to white supremacists, 63 to anti-government extremists). n Most acts were committed by small number of extremists acting on their own rather than at the behest of organized extremist groups. About half of the 150 incidents were actually committed by lone wolf offenders. n Right-wing extremists have killed 255 people in these attacks and injured over 600 more. n Overwhelmingly, firearms and explosives were the most common weapons chosen: 55 of the incidents involved use or planned use of firearms; 55 involved use of explosives. Overall, incidents involving firearms were more likely to be deadly. n Right-wing terror incidents have involved a wide array of targets, with government, law enforcement, racial and religious targets the most common. n Right-wing terror incidents occur consistently because the movements from which they emanate are mature extremist movements with deep-seated roots. The Internet has made it easier for extremists to meet each other (and thus engage in plots), as well as to self-radicalize and become lone wolf offenders. n Right-wing terrorism is a subject under-covered by the media, in part perhaps because so many right-wing terror incidents take place far from major media centers and urban areas. One consequence of this relative lack of coverage has been an inadequate awareness among policy-makers and the public alike of the threat that violent right-wing extremists pose. n If the United States does not treat right-wing extremism as a real threat, the list of right-wing terror incidents can only grow.

New York: ADL, 2022. 28p.

By ADL Center on Extremism

Every year people with ties to a variety of extreme movements and causes kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, in the service of a group or gang they may belong to, or while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2021, domestic extremists killed at least 29 people in the United States, in 19 separate incidents. This represents a modest increase from the 23 extremist-related murders documented in 2020 but is far lower than the number of murders committed in any of the five years prior (which ranged from 45 to 78). The 2021 murder totals were low primarily because no high-casualty extremist-related shooting spree occurred this past year. Such sprees are the main contributor to high murder totals. Most of the murders (26 of 29) were committed by right-wing extremists, which is usually the case. However, two killings were committed by Black nationalists and one by an Islamist extremist—the latter being the first such killing since 2018. Most of the 2021 murders were committed by people associated with longstanding extremist movements, such as white supremacy and the sovereign citizen movement. However, 2021 continued the trend of recent years of seeing some murders from newer types of extremism, including QAnon adherents, people associated with the toxic masculinity subculture of the “manosphere” and anti-vaccination extremists. White supremacists killed more people in 2021 than any other type of extremist, though not an outright majority, as is often the case. An in-depth look at white supremacist killings over the past 10 years demonstrates the dangers posed by alt right white supremacists and white supremacist prison gangs.

New York: Anti-Defamation League. 2022. 38p.

By Christina Schori Liang

Keypoints • There are growing links between terrorist and organised crime groups who are sharing expertise and are cooperating in kidnapping, arms, drugs and human trafficking, as well as drug production, cigarette smuggling, extortion and fraud. • The growing nexus of shared tactics and methods of terror and crime groups is due to four major developments: globalization, the communication revolution through the Internet, the end of the Cold War, and the global “war on terror”. • Both terrorist and organised crime groups are leveraging the Internet for recruitment, planning, psychological operations, logistics, and fundraising. The Internet has become the platform for both organised crime and terrorists to conduct cybercrimes ranging from video piracy, credit card fraud, selling drugs, extortion, money laundering and pornography. • The growing nexus has facilitated terrorists to access automatic weapons, including stand-off weapons and explosive devices, empowering them to challenge police, land and naval forces with the latest sophisticated weaponry and intelligence. • The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime is exacerbating efforts in war-fighting and peacemaking in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, West Africa in general and the Sahel in particular have become a dangerous new trafficking hub uniting both terrorists and organised crime cartels across a wide and mostly ungoverned land mass. • The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime groups is challenging international and national security by weakening democratic institutions, compromising government institutions, damaging the credibility of financial institutions and by infiltrating the formal economy, leading to increased crime and human security challenges.

Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011. 6p.

By Christina Schori Liang and Matthew John Cross

Right-wing extremists (RWEs) are using the current protests over police brutality in the United States as a cover to commit terroristic acts and to grow their numbers. They present a significant danger to public safety and security and are a growing threat in the West. Despite this, the rise of right-wing extremism (a homogenized term for white ethnonationalists, alt-rights, white supremacist groups, male supremacist groups, and rightwing anti-government extremists) has not been afforded the priority and attention it justly deserves. There are three reasons for this. First, the global narrative maintains that terrorism rests almost exclusively in the hands of a balaclava-clad Salafi-jihadist holding a Kalashnikov. Second, Western right-wing media has largely pushed back against covering the rise of right-wing extremism and the media as a whole has failed to contextualize the systematic threat RWEs present. Third, the global pandemic has forced governments to focus their attention on maintaining public health and socioeconomic order and have consequently failed to see how RWEs are subversively using the pandemic to support and expand their own agenda. RWEs have utilized the lawless and unmoderated internet to reach broader audiences, disseminate literature, and target vulnerable people. They have done so quietly, pushing an ideological campaign that manifests itself under the surface of popular internet discourse, rather than the aggressive proselytizing of Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State. These efforts can be understood as a kind of subversive exposure, where memes and fake news dominate discourse. This paper will analyse the scope of the RWE threat, describe their latest modus operandi, and explore how the pandemic is being instrumentalized by such groups and how the internet has become their principal tool and battleground. The paper will then provide theory and evidence for how counter-narrative programs, especially through digital disruption, can help neutralise the threat.

Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2020. 27p.

By Seth G. Jones

Right-wing extremism in the United States appears to be growing. The number of terrorist attacks by far-right perpetrators rose over the past decade, more than quadrupling between 2016 and 2017. The recent pipe bombs and the October 27, 2018, synagogue attack in Pittsburgh are symptomatic of this trend. U.S. federal and local agencies need to quickly double down to counter this threat. There has also been a rise in far-right attacks in Europe, jumping 43 percent between 2016 and 2017.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2019. 9p.

By Lucía Miranda Leibe, Bettina Steible, Almudena Díaz Pagés and Natalia Sueiro Monje

Violent right-wing extremism has resurfaced as a worrying phenomenon in Europe, with terrorism being one of its most serious and visible forms. Old and new forms of right-wing based violence have emerged in recent years, as the Utøya attack showed in 2011. This massacre served as a wake-up call for European societies and security authorities, and highlighted the dangers of right-wing terrorism in Europe, particularly for the youth. Furthermore, terrorism is not the sole form of extreme-right and hate-based violence. Conversely, the range of extreme-right related violence also includes hate crime and hate speech, two phenomena that should not be overlooked. The former is especially relevant considering the impact it has on minority groups, on women, but also on the general population. As for the latter, the increasing use of the Internet and social media platforms has facilitated the exponential dissemination of hate speech. While two decades ago, much more effort was required by individuals to gain access to extremist right-wing ideology, nowadays these ideas are spread at a much higher speed and to a much broader audience. This is not a trivial matter. The spread of hate speech has an important impact on minority groups, as the primary victims, but also on society as a whole, as it affects social cohesion and the quality of democratic debate.

Madrid: Observatorio de la Juventud en España, 2020. 98p.

Chairman: The Rt Hon. Dr Julian Lewis MP

This report highlights the significant close working relationship between our security and intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism policing. It is through this regular collaborative approach that we can keep our citizens safe from all forms of terrorism. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our agencies and counter-terrorism policing for their excellent work to better understand and disrupt the threat from extreme right-wing terrorism.

London: Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2022. 137p.

By Mary Ellen O'Toole

This paper presents a systematic procedure for threat assessment and intervention of school shooters. The model is designed to be used by educators, mental-health professionals, and law-enforcement agencies and is intended to help refine and strengthen the efforts of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. Its fundamental building blocks are its threat-assessment standards, which provide a framework for evaluating a spoken, written, and symbolic threat, along with a four-pronged assessment approach, which looks at the personality of the student, the student's family dynamics, the school dynamics, the student's role in those dynamics, and social dynamics. The model is not a profile of the school shooter or a checklist of danger signs pointing to the next adolescent who will bring lethal violence to a school. It discusses misinformation about school shootings; how to assess a threat, including motivations; types of threats; factors in threat assessment; and levels of risk. The document cautions that one or two traits or characteristics should not be considered in isolation or given more weight than the others. The text outlines the intervention process and closes with a number of recommendations. Four appendices list methodologies used in the report, suggested readings, and other information. (RJM)

Quantico, VA: Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), FBI Academy , 1999. 52p.

By Edward Gaughan, Jay D. Cerio, and Robert A. Myers

American public schools are safe places, perhaps even safer than American homes. The tragic school shootings that are the focus of this report have occurred in less than one-hundredth of one percent of schools. The probability of being shot at school is similarly low. But shootings have occurred at schools, have been largely unpredictable, and have raised the anxieties and concerns of students, families, teachers, and the public at large. Between 1974 and 2000, the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) of the United States Secret Service identified 37 incidents. At least 20 incidents have been reported in the national media since 1992, and eight since 1999, and these do not include several planned shootings that were prevented by authorities. Why do these shootings occur? Why do they occur where they do? What can we do to protect our children?

Alfred, NY: Alfred University, 2001. 44p.

By J,M, Nowicki

GAO found that shootings at K-12 schools most commonly resulted from disputes or grievances, for example, between students or staff, or between gangs, although the specific characteristics of school shootings over the past 10 years varied widely, according to GAO’s analysis of the Naval Postgraduate School’s K-12 School Shooting Database. (See figure.) After disputes and grievances, accidental shootings were most common, followed closely by school-targeted shootings, such as those in Parkland, Florida and Santa Fe, Texas.

Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020. 58p.

By Jay Van Kirk

Mass shootings occur on a regular basis in the United States, and depending on the definitions applied to the shootings an argument can be made that mass shootings of all types occur far more often than what is reported in the media as a “mass shooting.” Unfortunately, school shootings are also part of this analysis of mass shootings, and school shootings in the United States have occurred on a recurring basis since at least 1853. In the modern era, however, school shootings have become more frequent and more deadly as demonstrated by the May 24th, 2022, school shooting in Uvalde, Texas. This heinous crime at Robb Elementary School resulted in the deaths of nineteen children, and two teachers. Although there has been extensive research on mass shooters, mass shootings, and mass shootings in schools, there has not been enough emphasis on the application of homeland javascript:void(0);security principles of target hardening in schools as a risk mitigation factor for mass shootings. In fact, there is much that can be done to keep schools safe through basic target hardening measures, and many of these security updates can be immediately undertaken at the state and local level with relatively minor additional cost to schools and the taxpaying public. This paper references the mass shooting on February 14, 2018, at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, and makes policy recommendations toward basic target hardening measures which may be applied as necessary within the public school K-12 environment. The school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School was selected due to the fact that it has been recently investigated regarding the facts and circumstances of the incident, and provides ample information for analysis of effective target hardening measures.

Des Moines, IA: Des Moines Area Community College, 2022. 17p.