by Lucy C. Sorensen, Montserrat Avila-Acosta, John Engberg, Shawn D. Bushway

U.S. public school students increasingly attend schools with sworn law enforcement officers present. Yet little is known about how these school resource officers (SROs) affect school environments or student outcomes. Our study uses a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design with national school-level data from 2014 to 2018 to estimate the impacts of SRO placement. We construct this discontinuity based on the application scores for federal school-based policing grants of linked police agencies. We find that SROs effectively reduce some forms of violence in schools, but do not prevent gun-related incidents. We also find that SROs intensify the use of suspension, expulsion, police referral, and arrest of students. These increases in disciplinary and police actions are consistently largest for Black students, male students, and students with disabilities.''

By Brent R. Klein,

Joshua D. Freilich and

Steven M. Chermak

The American School Shooting Study (TASSS) is an ongoing mixedmethod project funded by the National Institute of Justice to catalog US school shootings. It has amassed data based on open sources and other public materials dating back to 1990. This brief presents new insights from TASSS, diving deeper into the database’s potential to examine the locations, timing, and student involvement of youth-perpetrated gun violence.

Although statistically rare, fatal and nonfatal shootings in the United States at elementary, middle, and secondary schools remain important crime problems with significant public policy implications. Indeed, the impact of such violence exceeds the devastating fatalities and immense sorrow that survivors, families, and communities experience. Even one gunshot fired at a school can subject numerous individuals to the traumas of gun violence.1 Recent polls indicate that school shootings can also sway broader public views on crime, including attitudes toward violence reduction.2 As a result, school shootings have become a focal point of US politics, sparking crucial debates on the most effective strategies for preventing and responding to gun violence, both inside and outside K-12 schools.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2023. 21p.

By Sarah Watson

Mass sho are otingsone example of a focusing event that has particular significance for firearms legislation. Mass shootings shock, disturb and provoke enormous and controversial debate, often causing significant public and media resonance, becoming the subject of intense discussion politically. At times providing an impetus for legislative amendments, often in distinct ways that routine gun violence does not. If certain events highlight the need for reform, policy change becomes more likely. Cases with the lowest number of victims are likely to generate the least amount of attention and are most likely to be missed in data collection, rendering them the least noteworthy, least important in terms of lethality and social and political consequence. Various problems come to the attention of people in and around government, necessitating an understanding of why such problems occupy officials’ attention and appear to be more ‘deserved>

Criminology & Criminal JusticeOnlineFirst, July 19, 2022

By Josh Levine

The firearms debate in the United States often pits public health against freedom. This false dichotomy implies that gun laws, even wise ones, inherently erode individual liberty. Indeed, this appeal to liberty finds fertile ground in the United States, where many Americans intuitively reject any incursion on their freedom. Yet this one-sided conception of liberty is, at best, incomplete: while the government can certainly encroach on our freedom, so too can our fellow citizens.

A historically grounded conception of liberty in the United States includes the sense of security that fosters self-expression without fear of arbitrary constraint. That is, when citizens feel safe, they can properly exercise their will. But this tranquility doesn't exist naturally. To achieve it, the government must exercise a monopoly of force and ensure that citizens do not fear other citizens. Only then can people act and express themselves without fear of reprisal.

Yet when civilians openly wield their guns in public, they impose an arbitrary constraint on others that represses others' ability to exercise their will. Armed goers change the risk calculations for their fellow citizens—often forcing them to avoid areas where guns are present or arm themselves in self-defense. As this Note discusses, each of these options begets a compounding harm to our liberty. And the resulting proliferation of civilian defensive arms in the United States—the modern arms race—does not represent peace, only détente.

By this understanding, open carrying itself subverts liberty, and its regulation upholds it. Although an individual's arms may constitute a productive solution to his own fear, the externalities on others are substantial. The state must prevent these costs to the liberty of others by regulating those wielding firearms in public spaces.

18 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar–265 (Arlington, VA: National Policing Institute 2022.

Edited by Gian Ege, Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Trafficking in arms and weapons material is, perhaps, one of the most notorious forms of organised crime. Fuelled by both the movie industry as well as real world examples, criminal organisations are widely believed to engage in the trafficking of firearms and weapons material, including nuclear material. This illicit trade is further facilitated by corruption and other forms of collusion with government entities as well as by links between the criminal elements and the arms industry. As part of a joint teaching programme on transnational organised crime, students from the Universities of Queensland, Vienna and Zurich researched the topic of arms trafficking in a year-long course. Some of their academic papers are compiled in this volume, addressing topics ranging from international and national legal frameworks to levels and characteristics of this phenomenon in selected places, and enforcement and industry measures adopted to prevent and suppress this illicit trade.

Berllin: Carl Grossman Verlag, 2022. 300p.

By Laura Bailey, Vincent Harinam and Barak Ariel

Knife crime is a source of concern for the police in England and Wales, however little published research exists on this crime type. Who are the offenders who use knives to commit crime, when and why? Who are their victims, and is there a victim-offender overlap? What is the social network formation for people who are exposed to knife crime? Using a multidimensional approach, our aim is to answer these questions about one of England and Wales’ largest jurisdictions: Thames Valley. We first provide a state-of-the-art narrative review of the knife crime literature, followed by an analysis of population-level data on central tendency and dispersion of knife crimes reported to the police (2015–2019), on offences, offenders, victims, victim-offender overlaps and gang-related assaults. Social network analysis was used to explore the formations of offender-victim networks. Our findings show that knife crime represents a small proportion of crime (1.86%) and is associated largely with violence offenses. 16–34 year-old white males are at greatest risk of being the victims, offenders or victim-offenders of knife crime, with similar relative risks between these three categories. Both knife offenders and victims are likely to have a criminal record. Knife crimes are usually not gang-related (less than 20%), and experienced mostly between strangers, with the altercation often a non-retaliatory ‘one-off event’. Even gang-related knife crimes do not follow ‘tit-for-tat’ relationships—except when the individuals involved have extensive offending histories and then are likely to retaliate instantaneously. We conclude that while rare, an incident of knife crime remains predictable, as a substantial ratio of offenders and victims of future knife crime can be found in police records. Prevention strategies should not be focused on gang-related criminals, but on either prolific violent offenders or repeat victims who are known to the police—and therefore more susceptible to knife crime exposure.

PLoS ONE 15(12):2020.

By Jaclyn Schildkraut and H. Jaymi Elsass

An Updated Look at Mass Public Shootings in America Over the last two years, there have been a number of high-profile mass public shootings in the United States that have dominated the headlines and captured the attention of the public and policymakers alike—from Buffalo, New York (May 14, 2022; 10 dead) to Uvalde, Texas (May 24, 2022; 21 dead), Highland Park, Illinois (July 4, 2022; 7 dead), Monterrey Park, California (January 21, 2023; 11 dead), and Louisville, Kentucky (April 10, 2023; 5 dead). Although mass public shootings rarely made headlines during the height of the pandemic, the frequency of events has since rebounded to pre-COVID levels. Consequently, these and other mass public shootings have reinforced the need to do more to prevent these tragedies from occurring and to mitigate the harms to individuals and communities if and when they happen. To achieve these goals, it is important to understand the trends associated with the phenomenon of mass public shootings.

The Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium (the Consortium) first published a report in 2018 analyzing 51 years (1966–2016) of mass public shootings data.1 In order to better understand the phenomenon of mass shootings, the report presented information on the location of shootings, weapons used, and demographics of the perpetrators. A follow-up report released in 2021 integrated an additional four years of data (2017–20).2 These reports were based on a comprehensive database of US mass public shootings from researchers Jaclyn Schildkraut and H. Jaymi Elsass.3 As the United States continues to face record rates of gun violence,4 with mass public shootings also increasing in frequency, the need for evidence-based policies is all the more important. A starting point, however, is understanding the different contexts and characteristics of various forms of firearm violence. Mass public shootings, although among the rarest forms of gun violence, require different strategies for prevention and response from other incidents. These shootings often involve considerable planning, which can provide important opportunities for identification, intervention, and de-escalation of the threat before it is carried out, unlike other forms of more spontaneous gun violence.5 Additionally, mass public shootings often are random in nature and occur in large, open public spaces, which present different challenges— including preventative security measures and law enforcement responses—from targeted incidents and those that occur in private locations.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2023. 28p.

By Elise White, Basaime Spate, Javonte Alexander, and Rachel Swaner

In 2020, while the world was wrestling with how to keep safe from a new contagious respiratory virus, many young, urban Americans were navigating how best to protect themselves from another public health crisis: a steep increase in gun violence. Long before these dual pandemics came to dominate media coverage, researchers at the Center for Justice Innovation [the Center] had been grappling with understanding gun violence in cities around the country: Why are young people carrying and using guns? What factors—social and structural—are creating and impacting gun culture? What cultural strategies do youth develop in response to gun culture, and how can those strategies be leveraged to stem the violence? To answer these questions and build on the Center’s previous study of New York City youth gun carrying (Swaner et al. 2020), the Center received funding from the National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research to conduct an exploratory, participatory action research study of the socio-cultural roots of gun violence in four cities (Brooklyn, NY; Wilmington, DE; Philadelphia, PA; Detroit, MI) that will each produce site-specific findings. This report focuses on the findings from the Brooklyn, NY site, where we conducted interviews with 103 youth ages 15-24 who had carried a gun in the previous year. Data were collected between February 27, 2020, and March 30, 2021.

New York: Center for Justice Innovation , 2023. 72p.

By Leslie M. Barnard, Erin Wright-Kelly, Ashley Brooks-Russell; Marian E. Betz

The US has more than 10 times the number of mass shooting events as other developed countries.1 Mass shootings in the US have increased in frequency, with more than half occurring since the year 2000.2 These events have a direct toll on individuals injured or killed, as well as a psychological impact on families, friends, and society.3 Little research has examined the types and distribution of mass shooting events across the US.4 A geographic analysis by type may inform if specific events have disproportionately occurred in particular states or regions of the US. This may generate hypotheses about the contextual (policy, environmental, or sociocultural) factors that may be associated with the distribution of types of mass shooting events and may suggest recommendations for tailored prevention. The purpose of this study was to examine state rates of mass shooting event types and total injuries and deaths in the US.

JAMA Open 2023.

By Ariel Bogle

As mainstream social media companies have increased their scrutiny and moderation of right-wing extremist (RWE) content and groups,1 there’s been a move to alternative online content platforms.2 There’s also growing concern about right-wing extremism in Australia,3 and about how this shift has diversified the mechanisms used to fundraise by RWE entities.4 This phenomenon isn’t well understood in Australia, despite the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advising in March 2021 that ‘ideological extremism’5 now makes up around 40% of its priority counterterrorism caseload.6 Research by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found that nine Australian Telegram channels7 that share RWE content used at least 22 different funding platforms, including online monetisation tools and cryptocurrencies, to solicit, process and earn funds between 1 January 2021 and 15 July 2021. Due to the opaque nature of many online financial platforms, it’s difficult to obtain a complete picture of online fundraising, so this sample is necessarily limited. However, in this report we aim to provide a preliminary map of the online financial platforms and services that may both support and incentivise an RWE content ecosystem in Australia. Most funding platforms found in our sample have policies that explicitly prohibit the use of their services for hate speech, but we found that those policies were often unclear and not uniformly enforced. Of course, there’s debate about how to balance civil liberties with the risks posed by online communities that promote RWE ideology (and much of that activity isn’t illegal), but a better understanding of online funding mechanisms is necessary, given the growing concern about the role online propaganda may play in inspiring acts of violence8 as well as the risk that, like other social divisions, such channels and movements could be exploited by adversaries.9 The fundraising facilitated by these platforms not only has the potential to grow the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but it’s also likely to be a means of building the RWE community both within Australia and with overseas groups and a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests were boosted by foreign actors, continuing Australian RWEs’ history of ‘meaningful international exchange’ with overseas counterparts.

Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, International Cyber Policy Centre 2021.36p.

By Kathryn M. Roberts

Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory counter-narrative, and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given but should it The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic countering violent extremism CVE programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-messaging from their portfolio.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2020. 119p,

By HM Inspectorate of Probation, Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (UK)

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation has led an inspection, alongside HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), and HM Inspectorate of Prisons – looking at the work of the Probation Service’s National Security Division (NSD) and multi-agency arrangements for the management of terrorist offenders in the wake of terrorist attacks.

In response to terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020, by known terrorist offenders who were subject to licence supervision, the NSD was created as a separate division of the Probation Service, working alongside police Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM) arrangements. Together with existing prison and probation services, these bodies are responsible for managing those convicted of terrorist offences or suspected of potential terrorist activity, even if they have no related convictions.

What we found

• This inspection looked at the management and progress of the strategy to supervise these offenders. It found:

• NSD, probation, police and prison services worked well together and are approaching managing counter terrorism cases collectively

• supervision within the community was robust overall, balancing rehabilitative needs with tight risk management

• probation practitioners within NSD were well trained specialist officers, holding a small and restricted caseload, delivering high quality case assessment and supervision

• terrorist offenders were subject to additional oversight throughout their sentences

• the arrangements to protect others from harm from terrorist cases in custody were effective

• there has been significant financial investment to improve services dealing with counter terrorism, and staffing levels were appropriate

• prison governors and directors were clear about the terrorist risk posed in their prisons and were actively managing this

• leadership across the NSD and CTNM was strong, and there were clear lines of accountability, enhanced by national multi-agency governance arrangements.

Manchester: His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2023. 65p.

By Riza Kumar

Protracted insurgencies and the growing threat by local affiliates of the global terrorism networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) throughout Nigeria, Somalia, and Burkina Faso have transformed on-the-ground responses to violent extremism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia continues to grapple with the unrelenting force of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab; Burkina Faso contends with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Ansarul Islam; and Nigeria remains encumbered by Boko Haram’s 14-year insurgency and the increasingly violent Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). As serious and sustained militant and terrorist movements continue to kill thousands and displace millions, the three respective governments have altered their responses to violent extremists and terrorism, integrating civilian-led, community-based security strategies into their national counterterrorism programs. National armies and their international partners have offered some reprieve from enduring violent conflicts, but in many cases have failed to offer comprehensive protections to all civilians. Civilian counterterrorism militias emerged to provide security to vulnerable communities and were quickly recognized as an alternative to state-sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns. However, once these counterterrorism militias were enlisted and absorbed into the national security apparatus, new—albeit long-established—challenges quickly emerged. Localized counterterrorism campaigns have at times devolved into vengeful operations against ethnic rivals as well as opportunities to carry out illicit activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, and looting. The benefits and drawbacks of civilian counterterrorism militias remain consistent across different regions. The strategy is cost-effective and practical as civilian defense forces are often cheaper than formal security units, such as the national army and the police. There is a ready pool of potential local recruits to safeguard vulnerable communities, and they are knowledgeable about the communities they protect. Most importantly, civilian troops establish a level of community loyalty that can be difficult to achieve with national armies. Significant drawbacks of civilian forces are that troops can become unreliable and difficult to control if not properly managed. Furthermore, without strong and effective oversight mechanisms, civilian troops are capable of undermining government authority, rule of law, and governance. Unfortunately, if not carefully executed, civilian forces could deteriorate into armed criminal networks,1 transforming from vanguards of safety into long-term sources of instability and insecurity.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project, 2023. 24p.

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2023. 22p.

By Benjamin V. Allison

Given the potential economic, psychological, and human consequences of such attacks, it seems terrorists would attack US bridges and tunnels regularly. After all, terrorists have attacked such critical infrastructure in other countries; why not in the United States? Shockingly, while there has been some discussion of the risk of such attacks, there is a lack of research addressing why they have not happened. Using foiled plots as case studies, I present several major explanations as to why these plots fail—and, more importantly, what deters terrorists from pursuing them. These include counter-terrorism measures, perceived structural soundness and target hardness, expense, and terrorist preference for high body counts.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2022. 35p.

By Theo Clement | Hans-Jakob Schindler

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization. This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population. Therefore, tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently. This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable. In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL’s West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project Germany GmbH ,2023. 16p

By Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea. There is, however, no indication of either JNIM or ISGS forming a transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other African sub-regions. ● In North, West-Central, East, and Southern Africa, there are also currently no indications that terrorist groups have developed linkages with other terrorist networks beyond their own region. ● Terrorist groups in West Africa are pragmatic in their approach to collaborations. Their choice of network linkages is guided by local dynamics and their own particular agenda rather than ideology. Hence, existing linkages are driven by the involvement in transnational organized crime (TNCO), potential financial gains as well as the potential of financing terrorism via local and international sources, training of fighters, foreign terrorist fighters from other African countries, and weapons smuggling and use of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project Germany GmbH ,2023. 16p.

By Anne R. Bradley , Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall

Abstract: This Element explores the topics of terrorism, counterterrorism, and the US government’s war on terror following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. It draws on insights from Austrian and public choice economics. First, it discusses the foundations of the economics of terrorism, emphasizing that the behaviors of terrorists and counterterrorists are purposeful and goal-oriented. It then considers the economics of counterterrorism policies and the importance of institutional change for reducing demand for terrorism. Next, it focuses on three dilemmas facing liberal societies in relation to counterterrorism efforts. The Element then provides an assessment of the US government’s war on terror. It discusses the origins of the war, whether it can be judged a success or a failure, and some of the main effects both abroad and within the United States. The Element concludes by putting forward several areas for future research.

NY. Cambridge University Press. 2023. 85p.

By James D. Wright, Peter H. Rossi, Kathleen Daly with the assistance of Eleanor Weber-Burdin

FRON THE JACKET: “The United States is one of the most heavily armed private populations in world history; one-half the households in the country possess at least one firearm, and the total number of firearms in private hands is well over 100 million. The rates of criminal violence in the United States are among the highest in the world. What, if anything, is the relationship between these facts? UNDER THE GUN provides -for the first time a comprehensive review and analysis of both the published and the unpublished literature on weapons, crime, and violence in the U.S.

Each chapter explores the issues and trends which have been widely debated over the years. Some of the topics covered include: the number of guns in private hands, recent upward trends in firearms sales, demographic characteristics of gun owners, uses of guns in self-defense, patterns of violent crimes committed in the U.S., characteristics of weapons used in crimes, public opinion on gun control issues, and the effectiveness of gun control laws.”

"Wright/Rossi/Daly bring balanced judgment, the best data available, and careful analysis to each issue. They outline an agenda for research which is sensi ble and critical to the matters at hand. The book is more than 'state of the art.' It separates data from inference, logic from value-based argument, and identifies the sorts of issues which cannot be settled by empirical inquiry..” — James Short.

NY. Aldine Publishing Company. 1983. 350p.

By Konaev, Margarita; Fedasiuk, Ryan; Corrigan, Jack; Lu, Ellen; Stephenson, Alex; Toner, Helen; Gelles, Rebecca.

From the webpage: "This data brief uses procurement records published by the U.S. Department of Defense and China's People's Liberation Army between April and November of 2020 to assess, and, where appropriate, compare what each military is buying when it comes to artificial intelligence. We find that the two militaries are prioritizing similar application areas, especially intelligent and autonomous vehicles and AI applications for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance."

Georgetown University. Walsh School Of Foreign Service. Center For Security And Emerging Technology. 2023.