By Eric Ruben

What is an “arm” under the Second Amendment? The Supreme Court has signaled that arms encompass more than just guns, including less lethal alternatives to guns. But for many Americans, the term signifies guns alone. This essay explores the role of the gun rights movement in equating arms and guns, describes how it reflects neither law nor weapons practices, and contends that it could contribute to unduly expansive gun rights. On the eve of the next big Second Amendment case at the Supreme Court, New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Corlett, the time is now to put guns and gun rights into a broader perspective.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 9p.

By Susan P. Liebell

Understanding the persistence of public gun violence and resistance to restrictions on firearms requires unmasking a pernicious armed rebellion narrative that masquerades as the “original intent” of the American framers. Promoted by the National Rifle Association (NRA), constitutional scholars of the Second Amendment, public officials, and the conservative press, the narrative insists that guns uphold freedom and rights, maintain order, and prevent tyranny. Wrapped in symbols of the American Revolution, this narrative has been used to justify the January 6 U.S. Capitol insurrection, private-citizen policing during the #BLM protests of 2020, and calls to kidnap or assassinate public officials as tyrants. This article uses John Locke (the 17th-century thinker who inspired American revolutionaries and the Constitution’s writers) to demonstrate how the armed rebellion narrative disrespects “original” understandings and distorts the meaning of the Second Amendment. First, Locke, the founders, and the original understanding of the Constitution do not justify radical individual gun rights, private-citizen policing, or subversion of the government by individual citizens. Our foundational documents insist on redress through institutions like courts and legislatures and create high bars for armed insurrection (based on the views of the majority rather than small groups of individuals). The armed rebellion narrative replaces a collective decision with the views of the individual. Second, this dangerous and distorted lens should not be used to justify false equivalences between #BLM (a mass call for social change with some violence) and January 6 (an armed insurrection with violence at its core). Locke’s ideas about individuals, the public, and the social contract — claimed by both violent insurrectionists and #BLM protesters — clarify the big lie that perpetuates our gun-saturated politics.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 8p.

By Jennifer Carlson

The summer of 2020 was a summer of mass unrest. Protesting the thousand-plus, disproportionately Black and Indigenous lives taken every year by police violence, millions of Americans mobilized for racial justice and police accountability under the banner of Black Lives Matter. Their message was not new — the Black Lives Matter movement was founded years earlier in the aftermath of George Zimmerman’s acquittal for the murder of Trayvon Martin — but its urgency felt renewed amid egregious cases of anti-Black racism, police violence, growing political polarization, and white supremacist extremism. The killings of Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, Dion Johnson, and Breonna Taylor — a handful among thousands — yet again spotlighted police complicity with and perpetuation of anti-Black violence, invigorating months of protests and calls for police accountability, police demilitarization, police defunding, and even police abolition. The demands themselves differed in substance; some focused on closing down police departments altogether, while others emphasized the fiscal necessity of redirecting public funding from police to other agencies.1 But the gist of these calls was unanimous: they insist that to transform rather than merely reform the institutions within American society that perpetuate anti-Black racism, police must be decentered as the go-to institution for solving not just problems of crime but social problems more generally. Anti-Black racism within policing is one slice of the entrenched tendency in 20th- and 21st-century America to treat a wide panoply of social problems as problems of crime and bloat the criminal justice system as the catchall state apparatus to address those problems — a dynamic that legal scholar Jonathan Simon describes as “governing through crime.”2 The protests, the demands, and the community organizing of 2020 may have been immediately focused on the criminal justice system, but because that system has so thoroughly penetrated vast realms of American society as a core vector of anti-Black racism, the message carried by the protesters reached far and wide — including gun politics. Often buttressing the well-worn terms of the gun debate, those in favor of increased gun regulations declared that “police violence is gun violence,” while others promoted gun ownership as a way to put the message to “defund the police” into practice. But the challenge that the summer 2020 Black Lives Matter protests have posed to American gun politics goes far beyond rehashing the usual sides of the gun debate in the key of anti-Black police violence. Rather, this challenge invites those invested in the gun debate to consider their own complicity with the criminal justice system and how, by decentering crime and criminalization within the gun debate, that debate might be transformed. In short, the summer 2020 protests challenge us to imagine anti-racist gun politics.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 10p.

By Public Safety Canada

Overall crime rates in Canada have been decreasing over the past several decades. Despite this, there has been a marked increase in recent crime trends involving gun and gang violence (GGV). For example, between 2013 and 2020, Canada experienced a 91% increase in firearm-related homicides. At Canada’s borders, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has reported an overall increase in firearms seizures over the last five years. GGV-related issues are complex, cross-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral. Given the nature of gang violence and the knowledge that organized crime groups are involved in a variety of criminal activities and illegal commodities, interventions must be comprehensive and include activities across the spectrum of prevention, intervention, and enforcement. While provinces and territories (PTs) are responsible for the administration of justice, including policing, in their jurisdictions, there is also a federal role for supporting a multi-faceted coordinated approach to address GGV. To respond to these increased crime trends, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada was mandated to work with provincial, territorial and municipal counterparts to develop a strategy for the federal government to best support communities and law enforcement in their ongoing efforts to make it tougher for criminals to secure and use handguns and assault weapons and to reduce GGV in communities across Canada. From this, Budget 2018 committed funding over five years to establish the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV). This horizontal initiative supports Public Safety Canada (PS) (as the lead agency), the CBSA, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) with investments across three themes.

Ottawa: His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Ministers of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2023. 40p.

By André Desmarais

Forensic science institutions have a key role to play—not only in criminal investigations, but also in the broader fight against illicit arms proliferation. However, their ability to play this role depends on their capacities, which are not well understood. A new Briefing Paper on the forensic services in Guinea aims to fill this gap.

Building on previous case studies on forensic services in Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, Arms Monitoring in Guinea: A Survey of National Forensic Services by ballistics specialist André Desmarais—co-published by INTERPOL and the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—examines capabilities, limitations, and needs of Guinea’s forensic services. It finds that information on calibres, models, and ammunition types of seized weapons is limited, and that the country lacks a central firearms database. Based on this analysis, the study provides tailored suggestions for areas of improvement, as a way to support Guinea in significantly reducing illicit arms flows.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2020. 12p.

ByHugh Griffiths and Matt Schroeder

For more than a decade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in defiance of UN sanctions, has found ways to systematically smuggle arms and other illicit goods in and out of the country. This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey provides a detailed overview of how the DPRK evades sanctions by employing its diplomatic resources and exploiting key loopholes relating to transport, logistics, and proliferation finance.

Covert Carriers: Evolving Methods and Techniques of North Korean Sanctions Evasion emphasizes the importance for UN member states, logistics companies, and global banks to adequately screen and monitor North Korean activities and transactions. The study also highlights how new information-sharing mechanisms would strengthen the ability of states, private industry, and the UN Panel of Experts to better detect ongoing North Korean violations and dismantle existing sanctions evasion networks.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2020. 20p.

ByGergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate

The year 2018 was characterized by a decrease in lethal violence in several of the world’s hotspots, primarily due to a significant de-escalation of the armed conflicts in Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Syria. The homicide rate also decreased marginally due to population growth outpacing the nominal increase in killings between 2017 and 2018. These two trends jointly resulted in a modest positive change in the rate of violent deaths globally in 2018 which, at 7.8 violent deaths per 100,000 population, is at its lowest since 2012.

Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–30, a Briefing Paper by the Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project provides an updated trend analysis of global violent deaths and develops global-level scenarios for the years leading to 2030. Based on 2018 figures from the Small Arms Survey’s Global Violent Deaths (GVD) database, the paper also includes a specific analysis of developments in Northern Africa and the five nations of the G5 Sahel region. It finds that under a business-as-usual scenario, Northern Africa’s violent death rate would remain relatively stable by 2030. By contrast, under the same scenario, the fatality rate in the G5 Sahel region would increase significantly. The paper also looks at how, for the first time, the GVD database now permits the analysis of disaggregated data for female victims of firearm killings for the period 2004–18, further increasing its gender relevance.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2021. 16p.

By Fiona Langloisa, Damien Rhumorbarbea, Denis Wernera, Nicolas Florquinb, Stefano Caneppelea and Quentin Rossy

Using a crime script analysis, this research aims to document how smugglers operate when they traffic arms from the US to foreign countries. Our study is based on an analysis of 66 cases that have been judged by US courts (2008–2017). The criminal activities involved are detailed in a series of distinct scenes, according to Cornish’s theory. Five scripts have been developed, based on the means of transport used by the traffickers: road transport, commer-cial airlines, postal services, freight transport and crossing the border on foot. Results suggest that most criminals prefer to operate according to an established modus operandi. This commonality suggests that the potential exists for the professionalisation of this criminal activity. Indeed, offenders are likely to maintain it to reduce effort and risk. Complementary sources of information would help to enrich the approach proposed in this study and to address the challenges posed by complex cases.

Global Crime, 2022, VOL. 23, NO. 3, 284–305

ByAnne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, Aaron Karp, and Matt Schroeder

The Caribbean region suffers from some of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths, at almost three times the global average, as well as one of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths among women. Firearms are used in more than half of all homicides, with this proportion reaching 90 per cent in some countries. While much emphasis has been placed on firearms control at both the political and operational levels, illicit firearms, and the dynamics of illicit arms markets in this region have received little research attention. The multiple impacts of these realities on the region can be seen via human consequences, socio-economic implications, and security challenges.

Weapons Compass: The Caribbean Firearms Study—a joint report from the Small Arms Survey and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)—examines firearm holdings, illicit arms and ammunition, trafficking patterns and methods, and the socio-economic costs of firearm-related violence in the region. This Report examines these issues by drawing on data and information collected from 13 of the 15 CARICOM member states and from 22 Caribbean states in total. The study also incorporates the results of original fieldwork undertaken by regional partners, including interviews with prison inmates serving firearm-related sentences, and research in selected hospitals related to gunshot wounds and the associated medical costs and productivity losses for patients.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, and Trinidad and Tobago:CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, 2023. 178p.

By Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey's annual report provides an overview of the Survey's work from the previous year. It highlights the main activities undertaken by our projects and units, the publications that were released, the Survey's outreach work, as well as important institutional and financial developments.

Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2023. 15p.

By Justine Fleischner

Since the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have sought to tighten their control over arms possession among their provincial commanders, the men under them, as well as civilians, and to rein in smuggling activity. Despite these efforts, however, smuggling continues, influenced by local dynamics in the provinces and long-standing clandestine arms trafficking networks.

Smuggling Dynamics under Taliban rule a new Situation Update co-authored by the Small Arms Survey and Afghan Peace Watch - reports on the recent field investigations in the country, and the risks for arms proliferation under the Taliban.

KEY FINDINGS • Fieldwork in Afghanistan under the Taliban confirms the presence of weapons markets in key border areas, significantly increasing the risks of arms proliferation in the region. Of particular concern is smuggling in border areas with Pakistan, where the state faces the growing threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP).1 • Weapon trafficking dynamics under the Taliban appear to be highly localized owing to internal Taliban dynamics; commercial, political, and security interests; and longstanding cross-border ties between armed groups, fighters, and for-profit smuggling networks. • While weapon seized weapons among rank-and-file Taliban fighters. Weapon prices have since regained most of their value, as the Taliban have consolidated their control over former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) stockpiles. • The Taliban have taken steps to formalize the process of buying, selling, and transporting weapons internally. Taliban officials in each province issue weapon permits and licences for a tax or fee, which generates additional revenue for, and enhances the governance authority of, local officials. The Taliban’s intelligence apparatus, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), has also seized hundreds of weapons following door-to-door searches of civilian and former ANDSF homes, as well as from weapons smugglers operating without the authorization of the Taliban. • Anecdotal reporting suggests that the Taliban have been particularly careful to assert control over remaining stockpiles of US-manufactured M4 and M16 assault rifles, night vision and thermal sights, and other high-value items not normally in circulation in the region. M4s and M16s are valued at roughly two to three times the price of an AK-pattern assault rifle. Nevertheless, groups allied with the Taliban, including the TTP, continue to gain access to US weaponry. These supply patterns indicate an inability or unwillingness to block these transfers, further complicating relations with Pakistan.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 8p.

By The Digital Citizens Alliance

Digital platforms enabled the disturbing rise of domestic extremism, culminating with the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Militia groups use social media networks to plan operations, recruit new members and spread anti-democracy propaganda, a new Digital Citizens Alliance (Digital Citizens) and Coalition for a Safer Web (CSW) investigation has found.

Taking a page from Jihadists, these extremist groups operate along the fringes of where platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram will let them. Federal prosecutors investigating the Capitol riot revealed how militia groups used social media platforms to coordinate and prepare for possible conflict with Antifa. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995.

Washington, DC: Digital Citizens Alliance, 2021. 56p.

By Hanny Purnama Sari and Muhammad Syauqillah

This research aims to compile data and information that will contribute to understanding the online radicalization phenomenon through translation. There are many studies on using the internet and propaganda in a terrorism context. However, only a handful studied the correlation between translation and terrorism propaganda, especially in Indonesia. There was little discussion on the role of translation in bridging communication between different nations, cultures, and languages and using it to propagate radical/propaganda narratives worldwide and amplify those messages to its target audience. The research method is descriptive qualitative using primary and secondary data; the sample is taken from the book of Nadharat Fi Al Ijma' Al Qath'i and previous findings and news. This research revealed at least ten roles of translation in the online radicalization phenomenon; among others, translation in the target language can be used to identify the target audience of the propagandist, and many terrorist sympathizers were willing to volunteer to translate the propaganda. However, although the translation is used to leverage the spread of propaganda, it can also assist law enforcement officers in combating terrorist/propaganda narratives. Indonesian law enforcement officers may use translation to counter-terrorism as Indonesia has hundreds of vernacular languages that can be used to 'encrypt' and disseminate their extremist narratives.

International Journal of Science and Society, 4(4), 319-336.

By Moustafa Ayad, Nadeem Khan and Aymenn al-Tamimi

his report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.

London: IDS - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. 22p.

by Oluwole Ojewale

This study explores the complex relationships between urbanisation and transnational organised crime, focusing on how illicit arms shape urban violence and are leveraged by criminal groups. It maps the nexus between arms trafficking actors and criminal groups operating in other organised markets in urban contexts and proposes interventions that engage with diverse layers of urban governance and stakeholders in the cities. The study focuses on Bamako and Lagos as urban centres in which arms trafficking and urbanisation intersect. Key points l There are multiple drivers and enablers of arms trafficking. l Armoury theft is a major source of illicit weapons and ammunition. l Arms trafficking is highly segmented and spatially concentrated. l Illicit firearms enter cities through various entry points. l Organised crime groups operate across multiple illicit businesses. l Elite support to ethnic militias drives private armament outside of state control. l The centralised governance framework on security forecloses potential collaboration from subnational governments to address urban arms trafficking.

OCWAR-T Research Report 2 . ECOWAS Commission, 2023. 38p,

By Nelson Alusala

This policy brief reviews the state of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in Central and Southern Africa as at 2022. Africa’s most progressive legally binding instruments for controlling small arms and light weapons can be found in these regions. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Convention became legal in 2017 and the Southern African Development Community Protocol was revised in 2020. However, compliance with these instruments requires commitment from all stakeholders, including civil society. Key findings ∙ The region’s long-term stability depends on good principles of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). Until ECCAS members enforce policy and implement steps to improve the PSSM of arms and ammunition in government possession, leakage and diversion to non-state actors will continue undeterred. ∙ Implementation should be next. The Kinshasa Convention, like the Arms Trade Treaty and UN Agenda 2030, are considered some of the latest instruments on disarmament, human security and development. The review of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Firearms Protocol in 2020 aligned the SADC region with the latest developments, and the African Union (AU) vision for silencing the guns by 2030. ∙ A review of other regional instruments is required. This is vital, especially for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States.

ENACT Africa, 2022. 11p.

By Nelson Alusala

Without effective security and stockpile management systems, the wave of political instability in the two regions is likely to endure.

This policy brief reviews the state of the physical state of security and stockpile management (PSSM) in West Africa and the Sahel as at 2022. Through desk research and policymaker interviews, it explores key policies and practices. It questions whether governments struggle to maintain their arms and ammunition because they bite off too much, encounter unforeseen consequences that lead to the exposure and diversion of weaponry, or are just negligent. Regardless, loss of life and the destruction of property continue unabated as criminals, violent extremists and other non-state actors take advantage of the armouries’ sub-standard security.

Key findings ∙ The region (West Africa and the Sahel) implemented several PSSM measures from 2011 to 2020; and the African Union (AU) decided in December 2020 to extend the Silencing the Guns initiative until 2030. ∙ Interventions in the region were not harmonised and were short-lived, making their impact difficult to quantify. Most initiatives were programmes and capacity-building training rather than disarmament and/or practical steps to secure the safety and security of national stockpiles. ∙ The movement of people between countries oblivious of borders is a tradition linked to pastoralism and transhumance. However, the corridor proclaimed for this purpose has been subsumed by human settlement, leading to herder-farmer conflicts that have exacerbated the demand for illegal arms. These have put excess pressure on national stockpiles.

ENACT Africa, 2020. 12p,

By Eleanor Beavor

This report examines how motorbikes are drivers of both stability and instability in the Sahel region of West Africa. Specifically, it examines how variants of motorbike crime contribute to destabilization at a local economic level and in the broader Sahelian conflict. In that regard, the practices of both motorbike theft and motorbike trafficking are examined. The involvement of the Sahel’s armed groups in trafficking is closely explored, and it is argued that motorbike trafficking is critical to the operations and mobility of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel (IS Sahel). It is difficult to overstate the importance of motorbikes to the daily life of residents of the Sahel region.1 Motorbikes are an essential means of transport in both urban and rural settings in these three countries, and the lynchpin of many local economies. This is because they represent the cheapest, and often most reliable, means of transport for citizens who cannot or do not want to rely on public transport, or who cannot afford a car. They have very often replaced donkey carts, camels or bicycles as forms of transport, and have become a staple in business and family life in the Sahel.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2023. 37p.

Edited By Olivier J. Walther, William F.S. Miles

Since the end of the Cold War, the monopoly of legitimate organized force of many African states has been eroded by a mix of rebel groups, violent extremist organizations, and self-defence militias created in response to the rise in organized violence on the continent. African Border Disorders explores the complex relationships that bind states, transnational rebels and extremist organizations, and borders on the African continent. Combining cutting edge network science with geographical analysis, the first part of the book highlights how the fluid alliances and conflicts between rebels, violent extremist organizations and states shape in large measure regional patterns of violence in Africa. The second part of the book examines the spread of Islamist violence around Lake Chad through the lens of the violent Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram, which has evolved from a nationally-oriented militia group, to an internationally networked organization. The third part of the book explores how violent extremist organizations conceptualize state boundaries and territory and, reciprocally, how do the civil society and the state respond to the rise of transnational organizations. The book will be essential reading for all students and specialists of African politics and security studies, particularly those specializing on fragile states, sovereignty, new wars, and borders as well as governments and international organizations involved in conflict prevention and early intervention in the region.

London: Routledge, 2018. 230p

By Bailey K. Roberts, Colleen P. Nofi, Emma Cornell, Sandeep Kapoor, MD, MS-HPPL,b,c,d,e Laura Harrison, MPH,c,d Chethan Sathya

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In 2020, firearm injuries became the leading cause of death among US abstract children and adolescents. This study aimed to evaluate new 2021 data on US pediatric firearm deaths and disparities to understand trends compared with previous years. METHODS: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research was queried for firearm mortalities in children/adolescents from 2018 to 2021. Absolute mortality, death rates, and characteristics were reported. Death rates were defined per 100 000 persons in that population per year. Death rates across states were illustrated via geographic heat maps, and correlations with state poverty levels were calculated. RESULTS: In 2021, firearms continued to be the leading cause of death among US children. From 2018 to 2021, there was a 41.6% increase in the firearm death rate. In 2021, among children who died by firearms, 84.8% were male, 49.9% were Black, 82.6% were aged 15 to 19 years, and 64.3% died by homicide. Black children accounted for 67.3% of firearm homicides, with a death rate increase of 1.8 from 2020 to 2021. White children accounted for 78.4% of firearm suicides. From 2020 to 2021, the suicide rate increased among Black and white children, yet decreased among American Indian or Alaskan Native children. Geographically, there were worsening clusters of firearm death rates in Southern states and increasing rates in Midwestern states from 2018 to 2021. Across the United States, higher poverty levels correlated with higher firearm death rates (R 5 0.76, P < .001).

Pediatrics, August 21, 2023.