by Sierra Smucker, Max Griswold, Amanda Charbonneau, Rose Kerber, Terry L. Schell, Andrew R. Morral

Among researchers, policymakers, and advocates, momentum is growing to better understand the impact of firearm laws on a variety of outcomes (e.g., suicide, crime, defensive gun use, homicide). There is also a growing interest in data that can shed light on these relationships. One source of these data is the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). This system includes information used in background checks, the number and type of background checks processed, and details on the number of and reason for denials when NICS finds that an individual is prohibited from purchasing a firearm. In this tool, researchers provide detailed information about data associated with NICS and discuss the data's strengths and weaknesses for various gun policy evaluation objectives. The researchers also outline the substantial limitations to interpreting these data to assist researchers in this field. Finally, they provide these data to researchers to encourage further exploration and evaluation of how NICS data might be used for policy analysis.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 65p.

By Christoph Koenig and David Schindler 

  Do firearm purchase delay laws reduce aggregate homicide levels? Using variation from a 6-month countrywide gun demand shock in 2012/2013, we show that U.S. states with legislation preventing immediate handgun purchases experienced smaller increases in handgun sales. Our findings indicate that this is likely driven by comparatively lower purchases among impulsive consumers. We then demonstrate that states with purchase delays also witnessed comparatively 2% lower homicide rates during the same period. Further evidence shows that lower handgun sales coincided primarily with fewer impulsive assaults and points towards reduced acts of domestic violence.   

Discussion Paper 20 / 730  

Bristol, UK: Bristol University, School of Economics, 2020. 70p.

By Jonathan Colmer, Jennifer Doleac:

Gun violence is a major problem in the United States, and extensive prior work has shown that higher temperatures increase violent behavior. In this paper, we consider whether restricting the concealed carry of firearms mitigates or exacerbates the effect of temperature on violence. We use two identification strategies that exploit daily variation in temperature and variation in gun control policies between and within states. Our findings suggest that more prohibitive concealed carry laws attenuate the temperature–homicide relationship. Additional results suggest that restrictions primarily decrease the lethality of temperature–driven violent crimes, rather than their overall occurrence, but may be less effective at reducing access to guns in more urban areas.

 Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2023. 67p,  

Benjamin L. Cavataro

This article argues that the status quo is unacceptable, and proposes a clear, workable solution. Congress should empower the Commission to regulate the safety of guns as products, without granting the Commission authority over "gun control" as traditionally understood. This approach resolves the inadequacies of industry self-regulation, tort, and state consumer law; appropriately leverages the existing Consumer Product Safety Act framework; and is consistent with the Commission’s longstanding oversight of holsters, gun locks, and gun safes. Under this approach, the firearms industry would be obligated to report safety defects, recall dangerously defective firearms, and offer remedies to consumers. The Commission could also consider adopting common-sense product safety standards (such as regulations to ensure that new firearms have functional safety devices, and do not discharge without a trigger pull), just as the Commission adopts safety standards for many other consumer products. But the Commission would be precluded from regulating guns to curtail gun violence or suicide, or to reduce guns’ prevalence.

This approach is fully compatible with the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022). And lifting the firearms industry’s immunity from product safety law—thereby regulating guns as products—has helpful implications for broader debates on gun law and policy. By establishing that Commission regulation could simultaneously protect the public from harm and facilitate the right to lawful self-defense, this Article’s proposal demonstrates that some gun regulations can concurrently respect gun rights, uphold consumers’ rights, and protect lives—and, in doing so, reveals fissures between the interests of the gun industry and gun owners.

 Forthcoming in George Washington Law Review, Vol. 92 (2024),

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen | Kwesi Aning  

Since the initial rise in violent extremist and terrorist groups in the Sahel in the mid-2000s, the number of such groups in the region has continued to grow. This is reflected in the nature of the opportunistic alliances that have developed among different groups, with varying interests and memberships. Furthermore, these groups have changed their operational tactics over time and, since 2019, began a gradual expansion of their activities towards the littoral states of West Africa. This paper focuses on two of the most important extremist groups in the Sahel: Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State in Greater Sahel (ISGS). In discussing the origins of both groups, this paper argues that their establishment was not borne out of religious rationales alone. Rather, ISWAP’s and ISGS’s formation and expansion were based on their fractured relationships with the organizations from which they split and to a certain extent transformed, as well as their pursuit for new allegiances and competition for preeminence in the leadership as they battled to expand and establish Islamic states in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and the Sahel. Ideologically, this paper identifies the adoption of Takfiri doctrines as the driving force resulting in more draconian interpretation and implementation of Islamic laws implemented by the hisba relating to zakat, hudud, ta’zir, and qisas. This paper argues that factionalism and splits from the original organizations represent fundamental splits from their original members and that the alliances formed by these originally distinct groups constitute a fundamental split and shift in operational tactics. ISWAP and ISGS operations are characterized by opportunism and exploitation of local grievances that enables them to build specific narratives for support….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 20p.  

By Edmund Fitton-Brown and Bakary Sambe 

  This short paper explores how Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the predominant coalition of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates in the region, is structured and financed and how its component parts relate to one another. The paper will outline how the various groups constituting JNIM train and operate jointly and the extent of their use of trafficking routes and overlap with regional organized crime. It addresses the extent to which the spillover of JNIM activity from Mali and Burkina Faso into the Atlantic/Gulf of Guinea littoral states represents a threat to their stability. It also addresses the impact of political instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere on counterterrorism (CT) activity and the impact on terrorism of external state and non-state assistance. The paper seeks to diagnose the challenges posed by JNIM considering its local and regional circumstances on the ground and to provide operationally relevant recommendations both for actions within the region itself and through the use of international resources. The recommendations seek to integrate CT with measures aimed at preventing and countering extremism, conflict resolution, and development goals. They also highlight that the needs vary between different countries in the region. For example, measures applied to Mali cannot easily be transferred to mitigate the challenges in Burkina Faso  

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. , Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 14p.

By Ini Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. ● The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. ● In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. ● JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 16p.

By Theo Clement and Hans-Jakob Schindler  

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization. This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population. Therefore… 

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  , tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently. This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable. In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL’s West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities. 

Berlin:  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program 2023. 16p 

By Europol

  Terrorism remains a significant threat to the internal security of the European Union. Terrorists operate across borders, leveraging new technologies and modi operandi to target innocent people. EU law enforcement authorities, in particular the counter-terrorism community, remain vigilant and united in countering the threat. The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2023 contributes to this effort, by presenting prevalent terrorism trends in the EU. Terrorism constitutes an attack on our society intending to create fear and chaos among EU citizens. In 2022, 16 terrorist attacks took place in the EU and an additional 12 attacks failed or were foiled. While the attacks directly affected seven Member States, more Member States arrested suspects in terrorism-related cases. Tragically, four people were killed in terrorist attacks in the EU, two resulting from jihadist attacks and two from a right-wing terrorist attack. We honour the memory of all those lost to terrorism in 2022 and in previous years.

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  Member States continue to view jihadist terrorism as the most prominent terrorist threat to the EU despite the fact that the number of jihadist attacks has decreased compared to 2021 and 2020. The threat from right-wing terrorist lone actors, radicalised online, remains significant. Left-wing and anarchist terrorists and violent extremists continue to pose a threat to public safety and security in the EU. Additionally, the spread of propaganda online and its potential for radicalisation remains a key concern. Social isolation and the lack of a solid support system remain key vulnerabilities which terrorists take advantage of in order to propagate their messages and to recruit new followers. This is particularly worrying with the increasing number of young people, including minors, exposed to online terrorist propaganda. Furthermore, the terrorist and violent extremist environment is becoming more decentralised and volatile. Diffuse actors connect and inspire one another, uniting behind grievances beyond ideology or group affiliation. This context is ripe for self-radicalisation and for lone actors to begin engaging in attack planning, and poses significant challenges for preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism in the EU.   

  Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2023. 94p. 

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this  process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),    2023. 22p.

By Paul Thomas

How should we understand home-grown terrorism like the 7/7 London bombings? This is a classic monograph focusing on recent British attempts to 'prevent violent extremism', their problems and limitations, and what lessons this can offer for more effective policy approaches in future. Paul Thomas's extensive research suggests that the Prevent policy approaches, and the wider CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, have been misguided and ineffective, further alienating British Muslim communities instead of supporting longer-term integration. He argues that new, cohesion-based approaches encouraging greater trust and integration across all communities represent the best defence against terrorism.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. 190p.

By Olaizola Rosenblat, Mariana; Barrett, Paul (Paul M.)

From the document: "This report draws on existing literature; fresh interviews with gamers, gaming company executives, and experts; and findings from a multinational survey of gamers conducted in January 2023. [...] A growing body of evidence shows that bad actors exploit basic features of video games and adjacent platforms to channel hate-based rhetoric, network with potential sympathizers, and mobilize for action--sometimes with deadly consequences. The relative ease with which extremists have been able to manipulate gaming spaces points to the need for urgent action by industry actors to avoid further harm. Although some gaming companies have made recent investments in content moderation technologies and systems, most companies are still far behind in terms of adequately governing and mitigating abuse of their platforms. This call to address extremist exploitation became more urgent in April 2023 in the wake of media reports that the large gaming-adjacent platform, Discord, had been used by a young U.S. air national guardsman for the reckless and allegedly illegal sharing of top-secret military documents, which then were spread to other online sites. [...] Yet another reason to pay attention to the ways gaming spaces have been misused is that the technologies that help make video games so appealing are poised to become far more common. [...] Heeding the popularity of gaming, these companies are pouring billions of dollars into the creation of a fully immersive 3-D [three-dimensional] Internet. Addressing the extremist exploitation of gaming spaces today will better prepare the industry to usher in new technologies while preventing harm to individuals and societies."

New York University. Stern Center for Business and Human Rights. 2023. 40p.

By Parsons, Chelsea; Bengali, Ruhi; Zale, Courtney; Geller, Lisa; Cantrell, Spencer

From the document: "Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) laws create an opportunity to intervene and prevent firearm violence when there are warning signs that an individual poses a risk of harm to self or others. While ERPO laws are relatively new, a growing body of research demonstrates the potential for these laws to prevent firearm violence, particularly firearm suicide, and multiple victim/mass shootings. Interest in ERPO laws has increased in recent years, with 16 states having enacted these laws between 2018 and 2023. Implementation varies widely across and within states. As a result of strong ERPO implementation efforts in some jurisdictions, more information is now available for state and local leaders about how to implement and adapt ERPO laws for their own communities. In addition, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022 included $750 million in new federal grant funding for states, some of which is designated to support ERPO implementation. To meet this moment, the Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund and the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions have partnered to compile this guide of the best available practices and promising approaches to effective implementation of extreme risk laws. These recommendations are informed by conversations with individuals who are pioneering ERPO implementation, in addition to the best practices shared at a December 2022 convening of ERPO leaders from around the country."

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Everytown for Gun Safety. 2023. 52p.

Corrigan, Jack; Flagg, Melissa; Murdick, Dewey

From the document: "This brief aims to provide a framework for a more systems-oriented technology and national security strategy. We begin by identifying and discussing the tensions between three strategic technology and national security goals: '1. Driving technological innovation. 2. Impeding adversaries' progress. 3. Promoting safe, values-driven deployment.' We go on to provide a brief overview of 15 levers of power through which policymakers can pursue these goals. These proposed levers fall into two categories: 'direct levers of power' (there are nine), which are focused on discrete functions and issue sets; and 'enabling levers of power' (there are six), which are more general-purpose and can be used to enhance the effect of the direct levers. These proposed categories are based on our own analysis, and while the list is non-exhaustive, it provides a useful framework for characterizing government actions and aligning them to particular goals of technology policy. [...] This adaptable framework, suitable for any country or international body, emphasizes the importance of creative problem-solving and having a comprehensive understanding of the policy landscape to achieve strategic goals. This framework is intended for decision-makers and stakeholders in the realms of technology, national security, and economic policy."

Georgetown University. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Center for Security and Emerging Technology. 2023. 33p.

By Gary Peters

From the document: "At the direction of U.S. Senator Gary Peters, Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), and following the Committee's initial review of the security, planning, and response failures in advance of and during the January 6th attack, Majority Committee staff conducted a subsequent review focused on the intelligence failures leading up to the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. This review included assessments of documents and information provided to the Committee pursuant to its original February 2021 request for information from relevant agencies, as well as documents, interview transcripts, and supporting materials related to the House Select Committee's investigation and final report. This report assesses federal intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination processes and interagency coordination in advance of January 6th. The report finds that FBI and I&A [Office of Intelligence and Analysis] obtained large amounts of intelligence indicating the potential for violence on January 6th. However, neither FBI nor I&A issued sufficient warnings to their law enforcement partners based on that intelligence, partially because these agencies were biased toward discounting the possibility of such an unprecedented event. Federal agencies also suffered from a lack of coordination as they prepared for January 6th."

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2023. 106p.

By  Eric Ruben

Gun rights supporters appear to be on the cusp of achieving a decades-long goal: defanging licensing laws nationwide for carrying handguns in public. More than twenty states have removed all licensing requirements for concealed carry, and most of the others now require little more than a background check.  At oral argument in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, meanwhile, the Supreme Court seemed poised to strike down policies in the remaining states that limit licenses to those who can show a heightened need, or “proper cause,” to carry a gun. If that happens, what comes next?

More people carrying guns in public can have negative consequences. Among other things, additional gun carriers might engage in more serious crimes than they otherwise would and might threaten the public sphere in ways beyond deaths and injuries. Under those circumstances, regulation will remain a priority in much of the country. With strong licensing regimes off the table, a key focal point will be how criminal law otherwise governs gun carry and use.

This Essay highlights two intersections between criminal law and public carry beyond licensing: the “he was going for my gun” defense invoked in several recent, high-profile trials and the deadly weapon doctrine. These intersections show how criminal law can both grant legal benefits to and erect legal hurdles for those who chose to carry a gun in public. On one hand, the “he was going for my gun” defense advantages armed defendants with greater legal leeway to use deadly defensive force, lest they be disarmed. On the other hand, the deadly weapon doctrine disadvantages such defendants by allowing juries to infer requisite mens rea for murder from the use of a gun in a homicide. If the ability to restrict public carry directly through meaningful licensing regimes becomes politically or constitutionally infeasible, judges, policymakers, and scholars will need to consider the propriety and efficacy of criminal law mechanisms like these to achieve optimal outcomes in a world where many more people will be armed.

Harvard Law Review, VOLUME 135. ISSUE 8. JUNE 2022

By  Katharina Krüsselmann, Pauline Aarten, Marieke Liem, Sven Granath, Janne Kivivuori, Nora Markwalder, Karoliina Suonpää, Asser Hedegaard Thomsen, Simone Walser

Detailed, comparative research on firearm violence in Europe is rare. Using data from the European Homicide Monitor, this paper presents the prevalence and characteristics of firearm homicides in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland between 2001 and 2016. Furthermore, we compare firearm to non-firearm homicides to assess the degree of uniqueness of firearms as modus operandi. We find that the firearm homicide rate varies across our sample of countries. We also identify two country profiles: in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, most firearm homicides take place in public and urban areas, involving male victims and perpetrators. In these countries, the use of firearms in homicides is largely concentrated in the criminal milieu. In Finland and Switzerland, firearms are mostly used in domestic homicides, with a higher share of female victims. We explore these findings in relation to firearm availability in each country.

GLOBAL CRIME                                               2023, VOL. 24, NO. 2, 145–167

By Sarah Watson

Mass shootings are one example of a focusing event that has particular significance for firearms legislation. Mass shootings shock, disturb and provoke enormous and controversial debate, often causing significant public and media resonance, becoming the subject of intense discussion politically. At times providing an impetus for legislative amendments, often in distinct ways that routine gun violence does not. If certain events highlight the need for reform, policy change becomes more likely. Cases with the lowest number of victims are likely to generate the least amount of attention and are most likely to be missed in data collection, rendering them the least noteworthy, least important in terms of lethality and social and political consequence. Various problems come to the attention of people in and around government, necessitating an understanding of why such problems occupy officials’ attention and appear to be more ‘deserving’ of attention.

Criminology & Criminal JusticeOnlineFirst, July 19, 2022

By Everytown Research

The gun industry has long attempted to avoid taking responsibility for the use of its products in crime. The industry has even successfully fought for protections like federal immunity from most lawsuits and a rule that makes it difficult for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to share information about the guns that are used in crimes. To combat this head-in-the-sand approach to gun violence, Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund embarked on a city-by-city collection of data on recovered crime guns, specifically seeking to answer the question of which gun manufacturers’ weapons are showing up at America’s crime scenes. The data collection was made possible by Everytown’s long-standing coalition of mayors fighting to end gun violence — Mayors Against Illegal Guns. The data received included 171,501 crime guns recovered across 31 U.S. cities, including recoveries from 2017 to 2021. Guns recovered in connection to crimes — referred to as “crime guns” — are important to our understanding of gun violence, trafficking and public safety solutions.

Our analysis finds that Glock has the dubious distinction of being the gun manufacturer with the most crime guns. On average, over 1.5 times more Glocks were recovered at crime scenes than the second-leading manufacturer across the collected data. In 2021, four gun manufacturers accounted for over half of the recovered crime guns in the dataset: Glock, Smith & Wesson, Taurus, and Ruger.

New York: Everytown Research, 2023. 13p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

In an average year, gun violence in America kills 40,000 people, wounds twice as many, and has an economic consequence to our nation of $557 billion. Without a doubt, the human cost of gun violence—the people who are taken from us and the survivors whose lives are forever altered—is the most devastating. In addition to this human impact, examining the serious economic consequences of gun violence offers a wider lens for understanding just how extensive and expensive this crisis is. …This $557 billion problem represents the lifetime costs associated with gun violence, including three types of costs: immediate costs starting at the scene of a shooting, such as police investigations and medical treatment; subsequent costs, such as treatment, long-term physical and mental health care, earnings lost to disability or death, and criminal justice costs; and cost estimates of quality of life lost over a victim’s life span for pain and suffering of victims and their families. As survivors, families, communities, employers, and taxpayers, we all pay for the enormous costs associated with this violence, whether we own a gun or not. The daily toll is staggering….The large variation in rates of gun deaths and injuries in the 50 states and Washington, DC, translates into substantial differences in the economic burden from this violence. 

New York: Everytown Research, 2022. 9p.