By  Lisa N. Sacco

The federal government defines domestic terrorism (DT) as ideologically driven crimes committed by individuals in the United States that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence the policy or conduct of a government. Federal definitions of DT are found in the USA PATRIOT Act (18 U.S.C. §2331), the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. §101), and Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (§0.85). Aside from the statutory and regulatory definitions of DT, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has historically emphasized particular qualities inherent to the actors who engage in DT. According to the FBI, domestic terrorists are Americans who commit violence to achieve their goals that stem from domestic, extremist ideological influence and lack of foreign direction or influence. This conceptualization excludes ideologically driven crimes committed in the United States by individuals whose actions are directed or motivated by foreign groups. Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy How the federal government defines conceptualizes and shapes the nation’s understanding of it as criminal conduct and as a policy issue. Domestic terrorists (and the crimes they commit) are labeled as such because their actions are directed against the civilian population and/or U.S. government within the boundaries of the United States. Like foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism involves ideologically driven criminal acts aimed at influencing the government or coercing the population. Unlike foreign terrorism, the federal government does not have a mechanism to formally charge an individual with DT, which sometimes makes it difficult (and occasionally controversial) to formally characterize someone as a domestic terrorist. Further, domestic terrorists may adhere to the ideologies of certain extremist movements or belong to hate or extremist groups, but unlike the formal process involved in designating foreign terrorist organizations, DT movements and groups are not officially labeled as such by the federal government, thereby making it difficult to categorize the threat presented by any group or movement as a DT threat. While some observers may look to terrorism-related incidents, investigations, and arrests to help understand the scope of the DT threat, these data are limited. DT incidents have a low occurrence rate but a high impact, and the federal government has a significant role in combatting the threat of DT. In 2021, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the nation’s first national strategy for countering the DT threat. The strategy identifies DT threats to include potentially unlawful use or threats of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (further broken down to include militia violent extremists, anarchist violent extremists, and sovereign citizen violent extremists), animal rights/environmental violent extremists, and abortion-related violent extremists. How the government defines and combats DT and extremism is complicated for many reasons. Believing in or expressing extremist ideals and/or vocalizing support for DT incidents are not violations of federal law. If an individual in the United States espouses extremist beliefs, such as anarchy or the superiority of the white race, that behavior is generally protected speech under the First Amendment. Expressions of these beliefs sometimes precede DT incidents, and in hindsight, some may question why these incidents could not be prevented. Crossing the line from First Amendment-protected activity, such as a peaceful protest, to DT-related violence can happen quickly; however, there is often little law enforcement can do in response to extremist but protected speech. Despite the statutory definition of DT in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits “domestic terrorism.” While DT is defined in federal statute, the term domestic terrorist is not used to officially label any group (as it is with foreign terrorist organizations). However, federal law enforcement has referred (in some instances such as congressional testimony) to individuals as domestic terrorists and their crimes as DT. Going forward, Congress may consider any number of legislative options regarding the federal government’s approach to defining and confronting DT, including (1) enactment of a DT charging statute; (2) the utility and consequences of applying the DT label in federal policy; (3) allocation of additional, less, or equivalent appropriations to address DT; and (4) adjustments to DT data collection requirements for federal agencies.  

Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023. 27p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Countries across the Near and Middle East have registered an escalation in both the scale and sophistication of drug trafficking operations over the past decade. The destabilizing risks posed by illicit drugs have become increasingly prominent on the regional agenda. Of particular concern for governments and societies across the region is the rising production, trafficking and consumption of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), in particular, tablets containing amphetamine sold under the name “captagon”, and methamphetamine. Iraq and neighbouring countries have documented a sharp increase in the trafficking and use of “captagon” over the past five years. “Captagon” seizures in Iraq increased by almost 3,380 per cent in Iraq from 2019 to 2023. Iraq reported the seizure of over 4.1 tons of “captagon” tablets between January and December 2023 alone. Seizures of amphetamine (mainly in the form of “cap tagon”) in the Near and Middle East doubled from 2020, reaching a record high of 86 tons in 2021. In parallel to “captagon” trafficking, a methamphetamine market is quickly developing in the Near and Middle East, as shown by a rise in seizures.3 UNODC research has found that Iraq is at risk of becoming an increasingly important node in the drug trafficking ecosystem spanning the Near and Middle East. Iraq lies near the intersection of a complex global drug trafficking ecosystem spanning Southwest Asia, Africa, and Europe, notably the Balkan and Southern routes associated with opiate smuggling from Afghanistan to Europe, through Southeastern Europe, and towards the Indian Ocean and Eastern Africa, including through the Arabian Peninsula. Within Iraq, drugs are trafficked along three key internal corridors, in the north, central and southern regions of the country. There are distinct territorial, ethnic, economic, and political factors and differentiated drug market dynamics connected to each route. The main categories of drugs traf f icked through Iraq include opium, heroin, hashish and especially, methamphetamine and “captagon”. While Iraq is not necessarily the most affected country in the region in terms of volumes of drugs seized, there are risks that the situation could deteriorate if drug trafficking, in particular of methamphetamine and “captagon”, keeps intensifying. A particular challenge facing countries across the Near and Middle East are armed groups with cross-border affiliations and transborder economic interests. Alongside a recent history marked by armed conflict and corruption, this situation has contributed to cross-border trafficking. The Government of Iraq and its partners have stressed the need for collective responses to tackle the security, social and economic ramifications of drug trafficking across the Near and Middle East. As seen in different regional contexts, the persistence – and potential reactivation – of armed groups poses a significant threat, not least given their potential involvement in illicit drug production and trafficking. There is growing awareness among governments of how drug trafficking intensifies corruption, undermines governance and legitimate business, degrades services and contributes to violent competition between armed groups. There is also growing concern over evidence of increasing drug use and related social harms, requiring sustained treatment and rehabilitation efforts.6 Practical responses are being implemented but are still at an early stage. Iraq established its first drug law and commission in 2017 and in 2023 launched a National Strategy on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (2023–2025) in 2023. Moreover, Iraq organized the first regional event on the issue in 2023 to accelerate collaboration and coordinate efforts in drug detection and disruption..

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 46p.

Liana W. Rosen

Sanctions play a role in U.S. national drug control strategies to disrupt and deter the illicit production and trafficking of foreign-produced drugs. The 118th Congress has focused on the role of sanctions in combating synthetic opioid production and trafficking (including fentanyl). Opioids are a leading contributor to U.S. drug overdose deaths.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service; 2024

By Jeffrey W. Swanson, April M. Zeoli, Shannon Frattaroli, Marian Betz, Michele Easter, Reena Kapoor, Christopher Knoepke, Michael Norko, Veronica A. Pear, et al..

More than half of suicide deaths in the United States result from self-inflicted firearm injuries. Extreme risk protection order (ERPO) laws in 21 states and the District of Columbia temporarily limit access to firearms for individuals found in a civil court process to pose an imminent risk of harm to themselves or others. Research with large multistate study populations has been lacking to determine effectiveness of these laws. This study assembled records pertaining to 4,583 ERPO respondents in California, Connecticut, Maryland, and Washington. Matched records identified suicide decedents and self-injury method. Researchers applied case fatality rates for each suicide method to estimate nonfatal suicide attempts corresponding to observed deaths. Comparison of counterfactual to observed data patterns yielded estimates of the number of lives saved and number of ERPOs needed to avert one suicide. Estimates varied depending on the assumed probability that a gun owner who attempts suicide will use a gun. Two evidence-based approaches yielded estimates of 17 and 23 ERPOs needed to prevent one suicide. For the subset of 2,850 ERPO respond ents with documented suicide concern, comparable estimates were 13 and 18, respectively. This study’s findings add to growing evidence that ERPOs can be an effective and important suicide prevention tool.

J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 52(3) online, 2024. DOI:10.29158/JAAPL.240056-24

By Jessica H. Beard , Shannon Trombley, Tia Walker, Leah Roberts3, Laura Partain4, Jim MacMillan5 and Jennifer Midberry

Background: Firearm violence is an intensifying public health problem in the United States. News reports shape the way the public and policymakers understand and respond to health threats, including firearm violence. To better understand how firearm violence is communicated to the public, we aimed to determine the extent to which firearm violence is framed as a public health problem on television news and to measure harmful news content as identified by firearm-injured people.

Methods: This is a quantitative content analysis of Philadelphia local television news stories about firearm violence using a database of 7,497 clips. We compiled a stratified sample of clips aired on two randomly selected days/months from January to June 2021 from the database (n = 192 clips). We created a codebook to measure public health frame elements and to assign a harmful content score for each story and then coded the clips. Characteristics of stories containing episodic frames that focus on single shooting events were compared to clips with thematic frames that include a broader social context for violence.

Results: Most clips employed episodic frames (79.2%), presented law enforcement officials as primary narrators (50.5%), and included police imagery (79.2%). A total of 433 firearm-injured people were mentioned, with a mean of 2.8 individuals shot included in each story. Most of the firearm-injured people featured in the clips (67.4%) had no personal information presented apart from age and/or gender. The majority of clips (84.4%) contained at least one harmful content element. The mean harmful content score/clip was 2.6. Public health frame elements, including epidemiologic context, root causes, public health narrators and visuals, and solutions were missing from most clips. Thematic stories contained significantly more public health frame elements and less harmful content compared to episodic stories.

Conclusions: Local television news produces limited public health coverage of firearm violence, and harmful content is common. This reporting likely compounds trauma experienced by firearm-injured people and could impede support for effective public health responses to firearm violence. Journalists should work to minimize harmful news content and adopt a public health approach to reporting on firearm violence.

Beard et al. BMC Public Health, 2024.     

By: Azrael, Deborah and Blocher, Joseph and Cook, Philip J. and Hemenway, David and Miller, Matthew,

For a paper that has not yet been through peer review or even been formally published, William English’s "2021 National Firearms Survey" has been remarkably prominent in gun rights advocacy and scholarship. As of June 2024, it has been cited in roughly 50 briefs, invoked at oral argument in the Supreme Court and multiple courts of appeals, and regularly cited in public writings and published academic work.

This response is offered in the spirit of a peer review. Our focus is on methodological issues, questionable statistical results, and problematic conclusions. Because of serious methodological issues, the draft fails to provide a reliable estimate of the number of defensive gun uses, the stock of AR-15s, or the actual protective value of or frequency with which AR-15 type firearms have been used. The paper should not be used as an authoritative source.

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2024-50

By Antonio Fuentes Díaz

The article compares two important experiences of the emergence and consolidation of armed non-state actors in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Michoacán, Mexico, noting the rise of the groups, their functioning, relationship with the state and involvement in new forms of governance in territorial control, population regulation and profit-making. These phenomena are part of a broader transformation related to political mutations that decentralize the state and generate specific subjective forms that modify the relationships between the individual, the social, the state, and the market

2022, Dilemas, Revista de Estudos de Conflito Controle Social, June 2022, Dilemas 1(4):179-204

By Jorge Mantilla

In this working paper, Jorge Mantilla explores state-criminal cooperation in roadblock politics. His study discusses the way in which, between 2015 and 2023, the bilateral tensions and border closure between Colombia and Venezuela created a political economy of smuggling in which state officials delegated basic state functions to organized crime groups to contain foes, domesticate illegal economies, and maintain social control. Mantilla shows that the fundamentals of this political economy are negotiated mobility instances taking place at checkpoints deployed in the multiple informal trails along the borderland where smugglers, organized crime groups, and state officials interact.

 Copenhagen: DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies 2024. 31p.

ByMaura Conway, Ashley A. Mattheis, Sean McCafferty, and Miraji H. Mohamed.

The report describes and discusses developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 January to 31 December 2023. It accomplishes this by surveying, synopsizing, and integrating the findings of relevant articles and reports produced by academics, think tanks, civil society, and governmental organizations; high-quality press reports; and the first-hand online experience and primary research of the authors.

Dublin: Vox Pol, 2023. 43p.

By The Independent Commission to Investigate the Facts of the Tragedy in Lewiston

At 6:54 p.m. on October 25, 2023, 40-year-old Army Reservist Robert Card II (Card) entered the Just-In-Time Recreation Facility in Lewiston, Maine, armed with a .308 Ruger SFAR4 rifle with a scope and laser. Over 60 patrons and employees, including 20 children, were present. In 45 seconds, Card fired 18 rounds, killing eight people and wounding three others. Additional people suffered injuries while trying to hide or escape. Card then drove about four miles to Schemengees Bar and Grille. He left his car running outside the main entrance and entered the building at 7:07 p.m. In 78 seconds, he fired 36 rounds, killing ten more people and wounding ten others. Additional individuals suffered other injuries during the chaos. In total, Card killed 18 people and wounded 13 in less than two minutes inside those businesses. Card is solely responsible for his conduct. He caused the deaths and injuries inflicted that night. Although he might still have committed a mass shooting even if someone had managed to remove Card’s firearms before October 25, 2023, there were several opportunities that, if taken, might have changed the course of events. The Commission affirms its earlier unanimous finding that in September 2023, the Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO) had sufficient probable cause to take Card into protective custody under Maine’s yellow flag law5 and to initiate a petition to confiscate any firearms he possessed or over which he had control. Several law enforcement officials testified that the yellow flag law is cumbersome, inefficient, and unduly restrictive regarding who can initiate a proceeding to limit a person’s access to firearms. Further, the SCSO is justified in pointing out that the Army Reserve (AR) did not share all the relevant information it had about Card’s behavior. Nevertheless, under the circumstances existing and known to the SCSO in September of 2023, the yellow flag law authorized the SCSO to start the process of obtaining a court order to remove Card’s firearms. The Commission further finds that the leaders of Card’s (AR) Unit failed to undertake necessary steps to reduce the threat he posed to the public. His commanding officers were well aware of his auditory hallucinations, increasingly aggressive behavior, collection of guns, and ominous comments about his intentions. Despite their knowledge, they ignored the strong recommendations of Card’s Army mental health providers to stay engaged with his care and "make [e] sure that steps are taken to remove weapons” from his home. They neglected to share with the SCSO all the information relating to Card’s threatening behavior and actually discounted some of the evidence about the threat posed by Card. Had they presented a full and complete accounting of the facts, the SCSO might have acted more assertively in September. While the AR leaders correctly point out that their authority over a reservist like Card is not as broad as the authority the military has over their active-duty service members, they failed to take advantage of the available opportunities to exercise their authority over him. Finally, we find that the challenges faced by law enforcement in responding to the shootings were unprecedented in Maine: two active shooting sites with dozens killed and injured, multiple reports of other active shooting sites, gathering and preserving evidence for possible criminal prosecution, and a simultaneous state-wide manhunt. Many law enforcement officers demonstrated bravery and professionalism in the face of danger. While the first hours were, at times, “utter chaos” as hundreds of law enforcement officers poured into Lewiston and were dispatched or self-dispatched to numerous scenes, the actions of law enforcement ultimately resulted in the discovery of Card’s body within 49 hours without further loss of life. While the Commission makes some findings about the actions of law enforcement following the shooting, we anticipate that the Maine State Police (MSP) will conduct a full after-action review with an independent evaluation by an entity with policing expertise. The MSP has already completed a "Manhunt Operations After Action Review" focused on tactical operations with an independent evaluation by the Pennsylvania State Police. Not only would a full after-action review allow for professional recommendations about policy, protocol, and other policing improvements, it would likely confirm what this Commission recognizes as positive and successful examples of the law enforcement response.    

Lewiston, ME: The Commission, 2024. 215p.

By Marina Foltia

This book assesses the consequences of Brexit for the control of illicit trade in tobacco products in the UK and EU. Based on the currently applicable legal framework, it examines the significance of a possible non-application of the acquis communautaire in the UK in matters relating to anti-illicit trade in tobacco legislation. It also analyses the modes of future cooperation between the UK and the EU in this area, as well as possible regulatory scenarios and their consequences. The book comprises six main sections. After the introduction (Section 1), Section 2 discusses the state of play of Brexit and the possible outcomes of Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union procedure. Section 3 illustrates the data and trends of illicit tobacco trade in the UK. Section 4 describes the relevant legal (e.g. trade and fiscal measures) and enforcement frameworks in the UK and suggests possible post-Brexit scenarios in control of tobacco illicit trade. Section 5 focuses on the relevance of arrangements between governments and the tobacco industry in the control of illicit trade. Section 6 then analyses the relevance of key EU and global anti-illicit trade initiatives. Lastly, Section 7 of the book offers some recommendations and conclusions on how the UK could control illicit trade in tobacco after Brexit.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2020. 81p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Edited by Samuel Totten William S. Parsons Israel W. Charny

Focus on Genocide: The book, "Century of Genocide," edited by Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, provides eyewitness accounts and critical views on various genocides of the 20th century.

Range of Genocides: It covers genocides such as the Holocaust, Armenian Genocide, Soviet Famine in Ukraine,Cambodian Genocide, and many others, highlighting the diversity and global spread of these atrocities.

Eyewitness Accounts: The book emphasizes the importance of first-person testimonies to provide a human perspective and counteract denial and distortion of historical events.

Scholarly and Activist Efforts: It calls for intensified scholarly study and activist efforts to document, understand, and prevent genocides, stressing the need for a collective response to these crimes against humanity.

Garland Publishing Inc., 1997, 507 pages

By David Frum & Richard Perle

War on Terror: The authors argue that the war on terror is ongoing and emphasize the need for continued vigilance and action against groups like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

Political Challenges: They highlight the political and media elite's wavering commitment to the war on terror, attributing it to political cycles, media bias, and fatigue.

Security Measures: The document discusses the importance of robust security measures, including national identity cards and enhanced surveillance techniques, to prevent terrorism.

International Relations: The authors critique the U.S. government's past complacency and advocate for a stronger stance against countries like Iran and North Korea, which are seen as threats due to their nuclear ambitions.

Random House Publishing Group, 2003 , 284 pages

By Gierenne Berraderi

Philosophical Dialogues: The book features dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, focusing on their responses to the 9/11 attacks and the philosophical implications of terrorism.

Themes: It explores themes like terrorism, globalization, sovereignty, and the legacy of the Enlightenment.

Philosophical Approaches: Habermas and Derrida offer distinct perspectives on terrorism and political philosophy, with Habermas emphasizing democratic legitimacy and Derrida focusing on deconstruction and hospitality.

Personal Context: The book was conceived in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, reflecting the author's personal experiences and the broader impact of the event on New York City.

University of Chicago Press, 2003, 208 pages

By Rahul Mahajan

Introduction to the War on Terrorism: The book discusses the impact of the September 11 attacks, framing them as a pivotal moment in history and the beginning of the 21st century.

Critique of U.S. Policies: It critically examines U.S. foreign policies, including military actions and sanctions, arguing that these have contributed to global resentment and terrorism.

Media and Public Perception: The book explores how the U.S. government and media have shaped public perception of the war on terrorism, often simplifying complex issues.

Historical Context: It provides a historical context for understanding the war on terrorism, comparing it to past U.S. military interventions and policies.

Monthly Press review, 2002 160 pages

Edited by Samuel Totten and Steven Leonard Jacobs

The document contains various technical terms and details, likely related to a specific field or study. It includes numerous references and citations, indicating a well-researched topic.: The language used is complex and may require specialized knowledge to fully understand.

The author learned about the Armenian Genocide's structure and nature from Vahakn Dadrian, who emphasized that genocides require extensive planning and are calculated policies.

The abundance of evidence on the Armenian Genocide is scattered across various international archives, complicating the documentation process.

Father Krikor Guerguerian, an orphan survivor and self-taught scholar, uncovered significant evidence and documentation, fundamentally altering the study of the Armenian Genocide. The U.S. National Archives hold valuable documentation on the Armenian Genocide, providing continuous records and detailed information that corroborate survivor accounts.

Transaction Publishers, 2002, 616 pages