ByHugh Griffiths and Matt Schroeder

For more than a decade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in defiance of UN sanctions, has found ways to systematically smuggle arms and other illicit goods in and out of the country. This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey provides a detailed overview of how the DPRK evades sanctions by employing its diplomatic resources and exploiting key loopholes relating to transport, logistics, and proliferation finance.

Covert Carriers: Evolving Methods and Techniques of North Korean Sanctions Evasion emphasizes the importance for UN member states, logistics companies, and global banks to adequately screen and monitor North Korean activities and transactions. The study also highlights how new information-sharing mechanisms would strengthen the ability of states, private industry, and the UN Panel of Experts to better detect ongoing North Korean violations and dismantle existing sanctions evasion networks.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2020. 20p.

By Fiona Langloisa, Damien Rhumorbarbea, Denis Wernera, Nicolas Florquinb, Stefano Caneppelea and Quentin Rossy

Using a crime script analysis, this research aims to document how smugglers operate when they traffic arms from the US to foreign countries. Our study is based on an analysis of 66 cases that have been judged by US courts (2008–2017). The criminal activities involved are detailed in a series of distinct scenes, according to Cornish’s theory. Five scripts have been developed, based on the means of transport used by the traffickers: road transport, commer-cial airlines, postal services, freight transport and crossing the border on foot. Results suggest that most criminals prefer to operate according to an established modus operandi. This commonality suggests that the potential exists for the professionalisation of this criminal activity. Indeed, offenders are likely to maintain it to reduce effort and risk. Complementary sources of information would help to enrich the approach proposed in this study and to address the challenges posed by complex cases.

Global Crime, 2022, VOL. 23, NO. 3, 284–305

ByAnne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, Aaron Karp, and Matt Schroeder

The Caribbean region suffers from some of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths, at almost three times the global average, as well as one of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths among women. Firearms are used in more than half of all homicides, with this proportion reaching 90 per cent in some countries. While much emphasis has been placed on firearms control at both the political and operational levels, illicit firearms, and the dynamics of illicit arms markets in this region have received little research attention. The multiple impacts of these realities on the region can be seen via human consequences, socio-economic implications, and security challenges.

Weapons Compass: The Caribbean Firearms Study—a joint report from the Small Arms Survey and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)—examines firearm holdings, illicit arms and ammunition, trafficking patterns and methods, and the socio-economic costs of firearm-related violence in the region. This Report examines these issues by drawing on data and information collected from 13 of the 15 CARICOM member states and from 22 Caribbean states in total. The study also incorporates the results of original fieldwork undertaken by regional partners, including interviews with prison inmates serving firearm-related sentences, and research in selected hospitals related to gunshot wounds and the associated medical costs and productivity losses for patients.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, and Trinidad and Tobago:CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, 2023. 178p.

By Justine Fleischner

Since the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have sought to tighten their control over arms possession among their provincial commanders, the men under them, as well as civilians, and to rein in smuggling activity. Despite these efforts, however, smuggling continues, influenced by local dynamics in the provinces and long-standing clandestine arms trafficking networks.

Smuggling Dynamics under Taliban rule a new Situation Update co-authored by the Small Arms Survey and Afghan Peace Watch - reports on the recent field investigations in the country, and the risks for arms proliferation under the Taliban.

KEY FINDINGS • Fieldwork in Afghanistan under the Taliban confirms the presence of weapons markets in key border areas, significantly increasing the risks of arms proliferation in the region. Of particular concern is smuggling in border areas with Pakistan, where the state faces the growing threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP).1 • Weapon trafficking dynamics under the Taliban appear to be highly localized owing to internal Taliban dynamics; commercial, political, and security interests; and longstanding cross-border ties between armed groups, fighters, and for-profit smuggling networks. • While weapon seized weapons among rank-and-file Taliban fighters. Weapon prices have since regained most of their value, as the Taliban have consolidated their control over former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) stockpiles. • The Taliban have taken steps to formalize the process of buying, selling, and transporting weapons internally. Taliban officials in each province issue weapon permits and licences for a tax or fee, which generates additional revenue for, and enhances the governance authority of, local officials. The Taliban’s intelligence apparatus, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), has also seized hundreds of weapons following door-to-door searches of civilian and former ANDSF homes, as well as from weapons smugglers operating without the authorization of the Taliban. • Anecdotal reporting suggests that the Taliban have been particularly careful to assert control over remaining stockpiles of US-manufactured M4 and M16 assault rifles, night vision and thermal sights, and other high-value items not normally in circulation in the region. M4s and M16s are valued at roughly two to three times the price of an AK-pattern assault rifle. Nevertheless, groups allied with the Taliban, including the TTP, continue to gain access to US weaponry. These supply patterns indicate an inability or unwillingness to block these transfers, further complicating relations with Pakistan.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 8p.