UNITED STATES. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

From the document: "A recent nationally representative survey (n=1,271) found that the majority of U.S. adults or their family members (54%) have experienced a firearm-related incident. Among all respondents, 21% have personally been threatened with a firearm, 19% have a family member who was killed by a firearm (including by suicide), 17% have witnessed someone being shot, 4% have shot a firearm in self-defense, and 4% have been injured by a firearm (Figure 2). 'Nearly 6 in 10 U.S. adults say that they worry 'sometimes,' 'almost every day,' or 'every day,' about a loved one being a victim of firearm violence.' Such high levels of exposure to firearm violence for both children and adults give rise to a cycle of trauma and fear within our communities, contributing to the nation's mental health crisis. This Advisory describes the public health crisis of firearm violence in America and describes strategies for firearm injury and violence prevention, with a focus on the health and well-being of children, families, and communities."

United States. Public Health Service. Office of the Surgeon Genera. . 2024. 49p.

By Rosanna Smart

Background

Despite growing evidence about how state-level firearm regulations affect overall rates of injury and death, little is known about whether potential harms or benefits of firearm laws are evenly distributed across demographic subgroups. In this systematic review, we synthesized available evidence on the extent to which firearm policies produce differential effects by race and ethnicity on injury, recreational or defensive gun use, and gun ownership or purchasing behaviors.

Main body

We searched 13 databases for English-language studies published between 1995 and February 28, 2023 that estimated a relationship between firearm policy in the USA and one of eight outcomes, included a comparison group, evaluated time series data, and provided estimated policy effects differentiated by race or ethnicity. We used pre-specified criteria to evaluate the quality of inference and causal effect identification. By policy and outcome, we compared policy effects across studies and across racial/ethnic groups using two different ways to express effect sizes: incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and rate differences. Of 182 studies that used quasi-experimental methods to evaluate firearm policy effects, only 15 estimated policy effects differentiated by race or ethnicity. These 15 eligible studies provided 57 separate policy effect comparisons across race/ethnicity, 51 of which evaluated interpersonal violence. In IRR terms, there was little consistent evidence that policies produced significantly different effects for different racial/ethnic groups. However, because of different baseline homicide rates, similar relative effects for some policies (e.g., universal background checks) translated into significantly greater absolute differences in homicide rates among Black compared to white victims.

Conclusions

The current literature does not support strong conclusions about whether state firearm policies differentially benefit or harm particular racial/ethnic groups. This largely reflects limited attention to these questions in the literature and challenges with detecting such effects given existing data availability and statistical power. Findings also emphasize the need for additional rigorous research that adopts a more explicit focus on testing for racial differences in firearm policy effects and that assesses the quality of race/ethnicity information in firearm injury and crime datasets.

Inj Epidemiol. 2023; 10: 67.

By V A Pear , J P Schleimer , A J Aubel , S Buggs , C E Knoepke , R Pallin , A B Shev , E Tomsich , G J Wintemute , N Kravitz-Wirtz

Extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs) provide a civil mechanism to temporarily remove firearm access from individuals at high risk of harming themselves or others. Evidence and theory suggest that ERPOs can prevent firearm-related harm, but the policy's impact on racial/ethnic equity is largely unknown. To examine potential inequities by race/ethnicity in public perceptions and use of California's ERPO law, we drew on two complementary data sources: 1) a 2020 state-representative survey of California adults, and 2) ERPO court documents for the first 3 years of policy implementation (2016-2018). Majorities (54-89%) of all racial/ethnic groups reported that ERPOs are at least sometimes appropriate, and 64-94% were willing to ask a judge for an ERPO for a family member. However, Black and Hispanic/Latinx survey participants less often perceived ERPOs as appropriate and were less willing to serve as petitioners, with Black participants citing lack of knowledge about ERPOs and not trusting the system to be fair as their top reasons for unwillingness. Similarly, review of ERPO court documents revealed that no family or household members served as petitioners for Black and Hispanic/Latinx ERPO respondents. Additionally, Black respondents were the least likely to have documented access to a firearm and legal representation in court. Racial/ethnic equity in ERPO use may be improved by reducing barriers to petitioning, incorporating non-law enforcement intervention professionals like behavioral health specialists into the ERPO process, providing legal assistance to respondents and petitioners, and investing in the social safety net.

Prev Med. 2022 Dec;165(Pt A):107181. doi: 10.1016/j.ypmed.2022.107181. Epub 2022 Aug 6. PMID: 35940474.

By Avneet Bhullar, Jonathan Shipley, […], and Jeffry Nahmias, , et al,

Background

In January of 2019, Washington State (WA) passed Initiative 1639 making it illegal for persons <21 years-old to buy assault weapons (AWs). This study aimed to evaluate the effects of WA-1639 on firearm-related incidents involving AWs by those <21 years-old in WA, hypothesizing a decrease in incidents after WA-1639.

Methods

Retrospective (2016-2021) data on firearm violence (FV) events were gathered from the Gun Violence Archive. The rate of FV was weighted per 100,000 people. Total monthly incidents, injuries, and deaths were compared pre-law (January 2016-December 2018) vs post-law (January 2019-December 2021) implementation. Mann-Whitney U tests and Poisson’s regression were used for analysis.

Results

From 4091 FV incidents (2210 (54.02%) pre-law vs 1881 (45.98%) post-law), 50 involved AWs pre- (2.3%) and 15 (.8%) post-law. Of these, 11 were committed by subjects <21 years-old pre-law and only one occurred post-law. Total incidents of FV (z = −3.80, P < .001), AW incidents (z = −4.28, P < .001), and AW incidents involving someone <21 years-old (z = −3.01, P < .01) decreased post-law. Additionally, regression analysis demonstrated the incident rate ratio (IRR) of all FV (1.23, 95% CI [1.10-1.38], P < .001), all AW FV incidents (3.42, 95% CI [1.70-6.89], P = .001), and AW incidents by subjects <21 years-old (11.53, 95% CI [1.52-87.26], P = .02) were greater pre-law vs post-law.

Discussion

Following implementation of WA-1639, there was a significant decrease in FV incidents and those involving AWs by individuals <21 years-old. This suggests targeted firearm legislation may help curtail FV. Further studies evaluating FV after legislation implementation in other states is needed to confirm these findings.

The American SurgeonTM. 2024;0(0). doi:10.1177/00031348241244644 (Online First)

By Greg Berman

HFG’s ‘At the Crossroads’ series concludes with the publication of  “Behind the Rise in Gun Violence in New York and Other American Cities,” a compilation of the twelve interviews conducted by Harry Frank Guggenheim Distinguished Fellow of Practice Greg Berman with an essay illuminating common themes and practical approaches to ending such violence.

United States, Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. 2022, 152pg

By Brady United Against Gun Violence

Understanding the source of America’s gun violence epidemic is essential to building effective solutions to prevent it. For decades, laws passed at the behest of the gun industry have shielded important information from public view, making it nearly impossible to understand how, and from where, guns are funneled into the criminal market. Brady has used Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to uncover information in an attempt to better understand how guns make their way from the legal marketplace to ultimately being used in crime. This report examines federal records that identify gun dealers subject to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) Demand Letter 2 program — a program created to identify firearms dealers that sell the most crime guns and to aid law enforcement investigations. Only 2% of gun dealers nationwide are subject to this program, which includes dealers who have sold at least 25 guns that were recovered in crime during the past year that were found to have taken less than three years to make it from point of sale to being recovered in that crime. The ATF had identified that this low “time-to-crime” is a strong indicator of gun trafficking. This report, and its underlying national data, are the clearest look we’ve had in two decades as to which gun dealers sell the most crime guns. Absent complete transparency into the gun industry’s role in supplying firearms that fuel our nation’s gun violence epidemic, this data is the best indicator we have as to which gun dealers are fueling crime.

Washington, DC: Brady Campaign, 2024. 20p

By United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services

From the document: "At the request of then Uvalde Mayor Don McLaughlin, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on May 29, 2022, that it would conduct a Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the law enforcement response to the mass shooting. [...] A full understanding of the response of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and personnel is critical for addressing many unanswered questions, identifying crucial lessons learned, enhancing prevention initiatives, and improving future preparation for and responses to mass shootings in other communities. In providing a detailed accounting and critical assessment of the first responder actions in Uvalde, and the efforts since to ameliorate gaps and deficiencies in that response, the CIR is intended to build on the knowledge base for responding to incidents of mass violence. It also will identify generally accepted practices for an effective law enforcement response to such incidents. Finally, the CIR is intended to help honor the victims and survivors of the Robb Elementary School tragedy."

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services . 2024. 62p.

By Pew Research Center

In an era marked by deep divisions between Republicans and Democrats, few issues are as politically polarizing as gun policy. While a few specific policy proposals continue to garner bipartisan support, the partisan divisions on other proposals – and even on whether gun violence is a serious national problem – have grown wider over the last few years.

Today, just over half of Americans (53%) say gun laws should be stricter than they currently are, a view held by 81% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents but just 20% of Republicans and Republican leaners. Similarly, while nearly three-quarters of Democrats (73%) say making it harder to legally obtain guns would lead to fewer mass shootings, only 20% of Republicans say this, with most (65%) saying this would have no effect.

The new national survey by Pew Research Center, conducted from April 5-11, 2021 among 5,109 adults, finds that 73% of Democrats consider gun violence to be a very big problem for the country today, compared with just 18% of Republicans who say the same. The current partisan gap on this question is 11-percentage-points wider than in 2018 and 19 points wider than in 2016.

Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2021. 29p.

By Emile LeBrun and Aline Shaban

The fight against illicit firearms proliferation and misuse in the EU and its neighbors is a multifaceted challenge. This challenge encompasses the diversion of arms from national stocks and actors; trafficking from inside and outside the region; the illicit manufacture or transfer of parts, components, accessories, and ammunition; and the conversion of alarm, signal, acoustic, and air guns.

An equally important dimension is the administration, management, and control of legally held small arms through civilian firearms registries. Ensuring national authorities have visibility and insight into the import, sale, use, export, or destruction of all legally held firearms across their life cycle is essential in preventing civilian firearm movement into the illicit market and subsequent misuse or violence.

Effective and Innovative Practices among European Civilian Firearm Registries—a new report co-published by the Survey and its REGISYNC project partners Arquebus, the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD), and Ecorys—provides an assessment of current civilian firearm registry standards and practices, and identifies particularly innovative and effective measures to enhance firearms registries beyond common standards in the EU.

Sofia, Bulgaria: Centre for the Study of Democracy , 2023. 75p.

By Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, Aaron Karp, and Matt Schroeder

The Caribbean region suffers from some of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths, with firearms used in the majority of these crimes. Although most homicide victims are men, the Caribbean as a region also faces one of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths among women. While much emphasis has been placed on firearms control at both the political and operational levels, illicit firearms and the dynamics of illicit arms markets in this region have received little research attention. In response, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) partnered with the Small Arms Survey to carry out a comprehensive evidence-based study of illicit arms trafficking to and within the Caribbean, and the socio-economic costs of firearm-related violence in the region. This Report examines these issues by drawing on data and information collected from 13 of the 15 CARICOM member states and from 22 Caribbean states in total. The study also incorporates the results of original fieldwork undertaken by regional partners, including interviews with prison inmates serving firearm-related sentences, and research in selected hospitals related to gunshot wounds and the associated medical costs and productivity losses for patients..

Geneva, sWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 178p.

By Scott R. Kegler, Thomas R. Simon, Steven A. Sumner,

The rate of firearm homicide in the United States rose sharply from 2019 through 2020, reaching a level not seen in more than 2 decades, with ongoing and widening racial and ethnic disparities (1). During 2020–2021, the rate increased again (2). This report provides provisional firearm homicide data for 2022, stratified by race and ethnicity, presented both annually and by month (or quarter) to document subannual changes.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023;72:1149–1150.

By The Small Arms Survey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically over the last decade. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict areas in West and Central Africa, and their designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the region—helping to increase their use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians.

Out of Control: The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa—a new report from the Small Arms Survey’s Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in West Africa project—analyses data from more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, and stresses the importance of coordinated regional approaches in eliminating illegal IED use in West and Central Africa.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 124p.

By Patrick Sharkey and Megan Kang

Background:

The recent rise of gun violence may lead to the perception that the problem of gun mortality in the United States is intractable. This article provides evidence to counter this perception by bringing attention to the period spanning from 1991 to 2016 when most US states implemented more restrictive gun laws. Over this period, the United States experienced a decline in household gun ownership, and gun-related deaths fell sharply.

Methods:

The main analysis examines the conditional association between the change in gun regulations at the state level and the change in gun mortality from 1991 to 2016. We include a range of robustness checks and two instrumental variable analyses to allow for stronger causal inferences.

Results:

We find strong, consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that restrictive state gun policies reduce overall gun deaths, homicides committed with a gun, and suicides committed with a gun. Each additional restrictive gun regulation a given state passed from 1991 to 2016 was associated with −0.21 (95% confidence interval = −0.33, −0.08) gun deaths per 100,000 residents. Further, we find that specific policies, such as background checks and waiting periods for gun purchases, were associated with lower overall gun death rates, gun homicide rates, and gun suicide rates.

Conclusion:

State regulations passed from 1991 to 2016 were associated with substantial reductions in gun mortality. We estimate that restrictive state gun policies passed in 40 states from 1991 to 2016 averted 4297 gun deaths in 2016 alone, or roughly 11% of the total gun deaths that year.

More Americans were killed by gunfire in 2021 than in any previous year on record.1 This single statistic encompasses several social problems and challenges, including violent crime, the rise of suicides, mass shootings, intimate partner violence, and police shootings. But all of these problems are connected to each other by a common feature: guns.

Epidemiology 34(6):p 786-792, November 2023.

By Terry L. Schell, Samuel Peterson, Brian G. Vegetabile, Adam Scherling, Rosanna Smart, Andrew R. Morral

To understand how rates of firearm ownership may be affected by public policy and how they may affect crime rates or other key outcomes in the United States, researchers need measures of firearm ownership at the state level. As part of the Gun Policy in America initiative, RAND researchers developed annual, state-level estimates of household firearm ownership by combining data from surveys and administrative sources. First, they used a small-area estimation technique to create state-level ownership estimates for each of 51 nationally representative surveys assessing household firearm ownership rates. They then used structural equation modeling to combine these survey-based estimates with administrative data on firearm suicides, hunting licenses, subscriptions to Guns & Ammo magazine, and background checks into the final measure of household firearm ownership. The resulting measure represents the proportion of adults living in a household with a firearm for each state in each year between 1980 and 2016. Other researchers can use these annual, state-level measures to test theories about the relationship between firearm ownership and crime, injury, and public policy.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020. 78p.

By Connor Brooks

This report is the 18th in a series produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. It details the number of applications for background checks for firearm transfers and permits received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state and local checking agencies. It also describes the types of permits or checks used by each state, the number of denials issued by these agencies, and the reasons for denial.

Highlights

• The FBI and state and local checking agencies received about 16.7 million applications for firearm transfers and permits in 2019 and 25.0 million applications in 2020.

• About 243,000 (1.5%) applications for firearm transfers and permits were denied in 2019, and 398,000 (1.6%) were denied in 2020.

• The FBI received about 12.8 million applications in 2020 and denied 185,000 (1.5%), while state and local checking agencies received more than 12.2 million applications and denied about 212,000 (1.7%).

• In 2020, state checking agencies denied 2.7% of purchase permits, 1.8% of instant checks, 1.2% of exempt carry permits, and 0.2% of other approvals.

Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2023. 33p.

By Susan P. Liebell

Understanding the persistence of public gun violence and resistance to restrictions on firearms requires unmasking a pernicious armed rebellion narrative that masquerades as the “original intent” of the American framers. Promoted by the National Rifle Association (NRA), constitutional scholars of the Second Amendment, public officials, and the conservative press, the narrative insists that guns uphold freedom and rights, maintain order, and prevent tyranny. Wrapped in symbols of the American Revolution, this narrative has been used to justify the January 6 U.S. Capitol insurrection, private-citizen policing during the #BLM protests of 2020, and calls to kidnap or assassinate public officials as tyrants. This article uses John Locke (the 17th-century thinker who inspired American revolutionaries and the Constitution’s writers) to demonstrate how the armed rebellion narrative disrespects “original” understandings and distorts the meaning of the Second Amendment. First, Locke, the founders, and the original understanding of the Constitution do not justify radical individual gun rights, private-citizen policing, or subversion of the government by individual citizens. Our foundational documents insist on redress through institutions like courts and legislatures and create high bars for armed insurrection (based on the views of the majority rather than small groups of individuals). The armed rebellion narrative replaces a collective decision with the views of the individual. Second, this dangerous and distorted lens should not be used to justify false equivalences between #BLM (a mass call for social change with some violence) and January 6 (an armed insurrection with violence at its core). Locke’s ideas about individuals, the public, and the social contract — claimed by both violent insurrectionists and #BLM protesters — clarify the big lie that perpetuates our gun-saturated politics.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 8p.

By Bertrall Ross

On January 6, 2021, men and women, some of them armed, stormed the U.S. Capitol to try to undo a fair and legitimate presidential election. For the insurrectionists, the election results meant something more than one candidate winning and another one losing. It represented a tyrannical threat to their racialized conception of American republicanism, one that President Donald Trump promoted and sought to legitimate. For those Americans, guns reemerged as an instrument of self-defense against tyranny, just as guns have throughout U.S. history. Yet those individuals’ actions — ones that they understood as resisting tyranny — in fact threatened to destabilize American democracy through violence.

The racialized conception of American republicanism has historically served as psychological ballast for many poor and working-class Americans, including many of those involved in the insurrection. Underlying that conception is an extreme economic inequality that has left many of the insurrectionists marginalized and alienated — and that itself represents the real tyranny that threatens all poor and working-class people’s ability to participate fully in democratic processes.

This essay explores the economic inequality that lies at the foundational core of American republicanism. It then argues that violent threats to the stability and sustainability of the American republic will persist until we confront economic inequality. Otherwise, extreme economic inequality will lead to a future in which the marginalized increasingly resort to guns and violence, and the government is forced to turn to repression to ensure the republic’s survival.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 8p.

By Aziz Z. Huq

This essay identifies and explores the intellectual roots of the Second Amendment as they have been imagined and deployed not just by the U.S. Supreme Court but also by contemporary insurrectionary movements of the right. The Court has recognized but sidelined a political understanding of the Second Amendment in its two main encounters with the amendment’s operative clause. That understanding, however, was on ample display during the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol insurrection, where it was featured on banners and performed through the actual possession and threat to use arms. The idea of the armed citizen as a cornerstone of the republic can be traced back to the work of the Florentine scholar-diplomat Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli. This essay shows that across his three main book-length works, Machiavelli developed a concept of citizenship that was closely tied to the political, and potentially insurrectionary, possession and use of arms. “Good laws” and “good arms” on his account could not be separated. This vision of a politically active populace, one seemingly at odds with its elites and leaders, can be traced forward to the January 6 insurrection. But it also has a left-of-center genealogy that today yields various forms of radically democratizing proposals for institutional reform. The intellectual past, in short, is not just still alive but surprisingly fertile.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 10p.

By Mary B. McCord

The insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, culminated a year of increasing private militia engagement with the public — sometimes in forcible opposition to government policies or, in the case of January 6, in an attempt to “stop the steal,” and sometimes in supposed augmentation of law enforcement’s role to provide protection for persons and property against what the militias deemed “violent anarchists.” These groups, often dressed in military uniforms, armed with semi-automatic assault rifles, and bearing a full accoutrement of military gear, pose a threat to public safety, stifle the constitutional rights of others, and undermine our democracy.

Why have such private paramilitary organizations gone largely unchallenged? The answer lies in part in the widespread mythology that they are protected by the Second Amendment, a mythology promoted by those who attempt to rewrite history to support an insurrectionist view of the Second Amendment. But this view is not supported by history, the text of the Second Amendment, or its interpretation by the Supreme Court. Far from enabling private militias to be a check on a tyrannical government, as modern private militia members would have us believe, the founders intended the militia — all able-bodied men available to be called forth by the governor in defense of the state — to be subordinate to and governed by the state. Indeed, as this essay explains, private militias are not authorized under federal or state law, are not protected by the Second Amendment, and are unlawful in every state.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. 2021. 10p.

By Justine Fleischner

Since the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have sought to tighten their control over arms possession among their provincial commanders, the men under them, as well as civilians, and to rein in smuggling activity. Despite these efforts, however, smuggling continues, influenced by local dynamics in the provinces and long-standing clandestine arms trafficking networks.

Smuggling Dynamics under Taliban rule a new Situation Update co-authored by the Small Arms Survey and Afghan Peace Watch - reports on the recent field investigations in the country, and the risks for arms proliferation under the Taliban.

KEY FINDINGS • Fieldwork in Afghanistan under the Taliban confirms the presence of weapons markets in key border areas, significantly increasing the risks of arms proliferation in the region. Of particular concern is smuggling in border areas with Pakistan, where the state faces the growing threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP).1 • Weapon trafficking dynamics under the Taliban appear to be highly localized owing to internal Taliban dynamics; commercial, political, and security interests; and longstanding cross-border ties between armed groups, fighters, and for-profit smuggling networks. • While weapon seized weapons among rank-and-file Taliban fighters. Weapon prices have since regained most of their value, as the Taliban have consolidated their control over former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) stockpiles. • The Taliban have taken steps to formalize the process of buying, selling, and transporting weapons internally. Taliban officials in each province issue weapon permits and licences for a tax or fee, which generates additional revenue for, and enhances the governance authority of, local officials. The Taliban’s intelligence apparatus, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), has also seized hundreds of weapons following door-to-door searches of civilian and former ANDSF homes, as well as from weapons smugglers operating without the authorization of the Taliban. • Anecdotal reporting suggests that the Taliban have been particularly careful to assert control over remaining stockpiles of US-manufactured M4 and M16 assault rifles, night vision and thermal sights, and other high-value items not normally in circulation in the region. M4s and M16s are valued at roughly two to three times the price of an AK-pattern assault rifle. Nevertheless, groups allied with the Taliban, including the TTP, continue to gain access to US weaponry. These supply patterns indicate an inability or unwillingness to block these transfers, further complicating relations with Pakistan.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 8p.