By Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, Karen Bozicovich and Pier Angelli De Luca

This article presents the results of a pilot test conducted with a group of experts on existing challenges and emerging and future threats that the region faces regarding illicit trade in firearms and ammunition. The pilot test was carried out within the framework of designing a methodology for the Hemispheric Study on Illicit Trafficking of Firearms and Ammunition, mandated by paragraph 66 of Resolution 2945 (XLIX-O/19) on Advancing Hemispheric Security: A Multidimensional Approach, passed on the 49th Regular Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). This mandate falls under the responsibility of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, specifically the Department against Transnational Organized Crime and the Department of Public Security. The pilot test was conducted by the latter. The findings from the pilot test reveal a possible road to follow. Out of the 95 challenges identified, 39 were classified as “high priority.” Among these, challenges requiring low resource investment and capable of being implemented in the short to medium term—while producing effective and tangible results—were identified. On the other hand, preventing and mitigating the identified threats will require, mainly, efforts in the public sphere, including coordination among state institutions and branches of government, intersectoral coordination (especially with manufacturing, importing/ exporting, intermediary, transport, and technology companies), and international cooperation with multilateral organizations and between countries. The lack of secure and protected information generation, analysis, and exchange was identified in at least four of the seven dimensions into which the threats were grouped. This finding is also positive for states, as anticipating such information related threats could be achieved in the short and medium term, and in some cases without the need for signification budget modifications.

Washington, DC: Organization of American States - OAS, 2025. 18p.

By Mahesh Nalla and Graeme Newman

When the first edition of A Primer in Private Security was published, its principal purpose was to demonstrate that private policing was not a mere auxiliary to public law enforcement but a robust and rapidly growing institution with its own organizational forms, priorities, and traditions. At that time, the Hallcrest Report had just confirmed that private security personnel outnumbered public police officers in the United States, a landmark finding that set the tone for debates about the privatization of policing .

Nearly four decades later, the central argument remains as relevant as ever, but the field itself has changed dramatically. Private security is now not only a supplement to public policing but a global, technologically sophisticated industry involved in nearly every sector of modern life. While we think that the original book still remains relevant to security today, we suggest in this preface that the reader approach the content from the point of view of four major perspectives that dominate security  (the word “private” seems old fashioned and less appropriate given that what is public and what is private have become incredibly and interwoven largely as a result of media, especially social media). 

The four perspectives are:

1.     the domestic sphere of home and family,

2.     the economic sphere of business,

3.     the public sphere of local and state government, and

4.     the international sphere of global security and climate-related risk.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 183p.

By U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

Summary:

This Commission Spotlight examines how China-linked scam centers are fueling corruption and violence in Southeast Asia, paving the way for greater Chinese influence in the region, and directly harming Americans in the process. Its findings are based on the Commission’s March 2025 hearing on “Crossroads of Competition: China in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands”; fact-finding trips to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia; and open source research.

Key Findings:

Chinese criminal networks operate industrial-scale scam centers across Southeast Asia that steal tens of billions of dollars annually from people around the world—a massive criminal enterprise that rivals the global drug trade in scale and sophistication.

The Chinese criminals behind scam centers have built ties—some overt, some deniable—to the Chinese government by embracing patriotic rhetoric, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and promoting pro-Beijing propaganda overseas. As a result, Chinese crime syndicates have expanded across Southeast Asia with, at a minimum, implicit backing from elements of the Chinese government.

The spread of China-linked scam compounds in Southeast Asia is fueling corruption and violence, promoting human trafficking, undermining the ability of governments in the region to control what happens in their territory, and promoting human trafficking.

China is exploiting the problem of scam compounds to increase its leverage over Southeast Asian governments, conduct intelligence and influence operations, and expand its security footprint in the region.

Beijing has selectively cracked down on scam centers that target Chinese victims, leading Chinese criminal organizations to conclude that they can make greater profits with lower risk by targeting citizens of wealthy countries such as the United States.

Americans are now among the top global targets of China-linked scam centers, with an estimated $5 billion lost to online scams in 2024 alone—a 42 percent increase over the previous year.

Washington, DC:

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

2025. 12p.