By CECILIA FARFÁN-MÉNDEZ

Nearshoring offers an opportunity to improve security conditions in Mexico. The historic trend of de-risking by U.S. manufacturers leaving China will produce a generational shift that will bring some manufacturing closer to the United States. This creates opportunities for new investment and economic growth that could potentially benefit Mexico. Yet, nearshoring investment to Mexico is not guaranteed and will depend on a variety of factors including but not limited to the security situation in the country. The American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico (AMCHAM) reports that 13% of its member companies are now spend- ing more than 8% of their entire operational budgets on security. Official data also shows that in 2021 the cost of crime for firms was equal to 0.67% of Mexico’s GDP. Most of this cost is from expenses incurred on preventive measures ranging from changing locks to hiring private security. In 2011 the percentage spent in preventive measures, as a measure of cost of crime, was 41.4%.

By 2021 that percentage increased to 58.1%. This means that most of the cost of crime in Mexico for the private sector derives from trying to protect their businesses from violence and insecurity in the country. Notably, Baja California was the state with the highest costs incurred due to crime in 2021 with an average cost of $5,180 compared to the national average of $3,246. The private sector has an important role to play in improving security, including: • Recognizing the crime-corruption nexus that feeds illicit activities beyond the alluring but incomplete narco-narratives (i.e. a small group of violent drug traffickers are solely responsible for violence and criminality in the country) • Rethinking security not only as the protection of physical infrastructure but also of personnel and in relation to the broader environments in which they operate. Five key ideas should be at the center of corporate decision making for future nearshoring investment in Mexico: • Too often, there are links between criminal actors and corrupt government officials, which undermines citizen security and the rule of law. Companies, whether national or international, cannot buy themselves out of this problem through private security companies.

Companies can improve security conditions in the communities where they currently operate or are considering relocating to through partnerships that help to fund and sustain evidence-based programs effective in mitigating violence and preventing recruitment into criminal groups and recidivism. • While it is an understandable decision to hire private security companies, it should be clear that doing so is not free of negative outcomes. Firearms and ammunition trafficking, particularly from the United States to Mexico, feeds the cycle of violence in Mexico and erodes business-friendly environments. • In order to promote citizen security and successful nearshoring, the private sector should advocate for public policies aimed at stemming the flow of illicit firearms and ammunition trafficking, particularly from the United States to Mexico, including supporting the Stop Arming Cartels Act that will prevent military-grade weapons from being sold and trafficked to illicit actors. • States with high levels of business victimization are also states with some of the main highways in the country critical for cross-border trade and commerce. • Latin America is the world’s most vulnerable.

By Tinenenji Banda and Marja Hinfelaar

Zambia is a significant source of critical minerals including copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel and graphite. Interest in Zambia’s minerals is growing, particularly from Western countries and China. Unfortunately, due to governance weaknesses, there is ample corruption and illicit financial flows at several transaction levels in the value chain. This U4 Issue therefore identifies government interventions Zambia can use to curtail corruption considering existing political pressures.

Main points

• Intense competition for critical mineral value chains results in an increased risk of revenue leakage due to corruption and tax evasion. Illicit financial flows (IFF) threaten Zambia’s economic development and undermine its fiscal systems.

• Zambia has formal commitments in place, such as laws, regulatory institutions and international commitments, to battle corruption and IFFs, but the institutional architecture is fragmented and inadequately enforced. Inter-agency collaboration is required to address these challenges.

• Through a literature review, including a law and policy review, and a stakeholder mapping exercise with 21 key informant interviews with government, civil society, academic and industry representatives, we constructed a qualitative understanding of the key risk factors for corruption and IFFs.

• Significant factors are the lack of a transparent, coherent and disciplined mining licensing system; a non-transparent bidding process; public-private collusion across value chains; abuse of intermediaries and agents; and weak regulation in the sector.

• Opportunities for interventions are enhanced systems for disclosure and due diligence, reform of the Mining Cadastre, support for evidence-based policymaking, support for the organisation of the artisanal mining sector, enhanced quality of civil society organisation public discourse, and enhanced collaboration in anti-corruption agencies, while keeping political pressures in mind.

By Tássio Franchi

The text discusses, in an exploratory way, how the environmental issue related to the Brazilian Amazon attracts international attention and potentially serves as a mechanism of external constraint in Brazil’s internal affairs. Complaints of environmental crimes and crimes against indigenous peoples are debated in the international political environment, without considering Brazilian sovereignty on these and other topics. In some cases, such debates are used, as pretexts, to halt negotiations of trade agreements beneficial to the country. In summary, the text explores the concept of national sovereignty in the face of global pressures and the impacts of international agendas on Brazilian government action, pointing out that there are complexities and nuances of this geopolitical interaction, in addition to the common good of environmental preservation or the protection of indigenous peoples. 

By Yen Zhi Yi
SYNOPSIS
In recent months, heightened media scrutiny has drawn attention to the proliferation of scam centres along Myanmar’s border towns and the subsequent crackdowns on them. Concurrently, Singapore has also witnessed a significant increase in scam-related incidents, with the government urging vigilance and taking precautionary measures to safeguard its citizens. Against this backdrop, it is imperative for ASEAN countries to work collaboratively to tackle this growing cross-border scourge. Doing so calls for stepped-up action at home to enhance awareness and enforcement collaboration abroad among regional partners to check this transnational security challenge.
 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Mahesh Nalla and Graeme Newman

When the first edition of A Primer in Private Security was published, its principal purpose was to demonstrate that private policing was not a mere auxiliary to public law enforcement but a robust and rapidly growing institution with its own organizational forms, priorities, and traditions. At that time, the Hallcrest Report had just confirmed that private security personnel outnumbered public police officers in the United States, a landmark finding that set the tone for debates about the privatization of policing .

Nearly four decades later, the central argument remains as relevant as ever, but the field itself has changed dramatically. Private security is now not only a supplement to public policing but a global, technologically sophisticated industry involved in nearly every sector of modern life. While we think that the original book still remains relevant to security today, we suggest in this preface that the reader approach the content from the point of view of four major perspectives that dominate security  (the word “private” seems old fashioned and less appropriate given that what is public and what is private have become incredibly and interwoven largely as a result of media, especially social media). 

The four perspectives are:

1.     the domestic sphere of home and family,

2.     the economic sphere of business,

3.     the public sphere of local and state government, and

4.     the international sphere of global security and climate-related risk.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 183p.

By Jonathan Lusthaus

Human Element in Cybercrime: The book emphasizes the human aspect of cybercrime, using the story of Roman Seleznev to illustrate how cyber criminals operate within specific social settings.

Industrialization of Cybercrime: Cybercrime has evolved from individual hackers to a sophisticated, profit-driven industry with specialized roles and professionalization.

Trust and Cooperation: Despite the anonymity and inherent distrust among cybercriminals, they have developed ways to cooperate and build trust, often through online forums and referrals.

Research and Methodology: The book is based on extensive field research over seven years, including 238 interviews, to provide a detailed overview of the cybercrime industry.

Harvard University Press, 2018, 289 pages

By Frances Thomson, Patrick Meehan & Jonathan Goodhand (02 Apr 2024):

his article and the forum it introduces examine illicit drug crop (IDC) economies from agrarian perspectives. Examining IDCs as a group implies analysing how prohibition distinguishes them from other (licit) crops. We identify seven mechanisms through which prohibition shapes the agrarian political economy of IDCs and explore how these mechanisms and their effects generate distinctive patterns of development and political action amongst ‘illicit peasantries’. We also examine connections between illicit and licit crops, including how licit crop crises and illicit crop booms intertwine. We argue that IDC economies provide a bulwark for smallholders but are by no means peasant idylls.

The Journal of Peasant Studies. 2024. 39p.

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Availability remains high across the main drugs used in Europe, evidenced by the large and in some cases increasing quantities that continue to be seized in the European Union. In addition, the market for illicit drugs is characterised by the diversification of consumer products and the widespread availability of a broader range of drugs, including new psychoactive substances, often of high potency or purity. Specialised equipment may be required to meet the detection and monitoring challenges posed by this diversification.

The recent emergence of highly potent opioids, particularly benzimidazoles (nitazenes), poses a particularly complex threat to public health due to their increased risk of life-threatening poisoning. The potential emergence of new patterns of consumption in Europe is also a key threat, due to the availability of cheap and highly potent or pure drugs. This is particularly the case for cocaine, which has seen unprecedented levels of availability

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 39p.

By A&A Multiprime

As part of our commitment to contribute to loss prevention in Colombia and across the region, our team regularly engages in meetings with representatives of the Colombian Highest Maritime Authority (DIMAR) and the officers in charge of anti-narcotic policies in the ports. We gather updated informa tion about new practices and precautions to be aware of, as well as relevant recommendations and measures to adopt while visiting any of our ports. This ongoing engagement has culminated in our 2024 report, which reflects the latest insights and strategies in combating the challenges faced by the maritime industry

Recent events highlight the ongoing challenges in countering cocaine trafficking. For example, on February 8, 2024, British authorities announced a historic seizure of over 12,500 pounds of cocaine concealed in a banana shipment from the Port of Turbo, Colombia, to Southampton. This incident, marking the largest single drug seizure in UK history, emphasizes the advanced techniques used by cartels to transport substantial drug quantities into Europe and the UK, thereby confirming the global impact of Colombian narcotics. This report results from our efforts and experience over the last years, successfully assisting in several drug smuggling-related incidents and administrative investigations for breaches of shipping regulations, including the ISPS Code. We trust that this report will serve as a valuable resource for all P&I Clubs, their Members, the Masters and crews, and, in general, the entire marine industry with an interest in Colombian ports to mitigate incidents associated with drug smuggling activities

Bogota: A&A Multiprime. 2024. 18p.

By Colleen King

In December 2023, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) offloaded approximately 18,219 pounds of cocaine from the USCG Cutter Waesche. The estimated street value of the cocaine was more than $239 million. The offload occurred as a result of six separate maritime interdictions, performed by separate cutters, taking place over a 17-day period off the coasts of Mexico and Central and South America. The interdictions were performed as part of the USCG’s counternarcotics mission. While interdictions of this size may seem out of the ordinary, the USCG routinely interdicts a variety of vessels, including Go-Fast Vessels and semi submersibles, with massive amounts of drugs (usually cocaine), moving from the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of South America northward to Mexico, the Caribbean, and eventually the United States. One can imagine that prosecuting interdictions like these may raise a variety of questions: could the United States assert jurisdiction over the suspected traffickers; would the maritime location of the interdiction matter; and would it make a difference if the ship carrying the contraband was flagged—registered—by another country? What about the transit time to a U.S. court for an initial appearance where the interdiction occurred over a thousand miles from the United States? The dizzying array of issues confronting a federal prosecutor following a high seas interdiction may not be typical of land-based legal challenges. Fortunately, a body of both federal law and international authorities is instructive on these questions. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) is the United States’ principal statute addressing high seas drug trafficking and has supported thousands of prosecutions for decades. The MDLEA, as it re lates to controlled substances,5 prohibits the distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute or manufacture, controlled sub stances aboard a “covered vessel.” Its prohibitions apply “outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” and include both attempt and conspiracy liability. And, where an interdiction occurs outside of the United States, venue may be appropriate in your district. This article is intended to serve as an MDLEA primer. It will provide a brief his tory of the MDLEA, identify the MDLEA’s core definitional provisions, discuss its key criminal prohibition, detail its jurisdiction and venue pro vision, describe the MDLEA’s position on the use of international law as a defense, and finally, address its sentencing provisions.

March 2024 DOJ Journal of Federal Law and Practice

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.

In this issue, we focus on three cases where criminal groups from the region have been active in recent years: the Netherlands, Ecuador and parts of Africa.

These examples illustrate the growing involvement of Balkan criminal groups in some of the world’s hotspots for illicit activity. Research for these articles is facilitated by the Global Initiative’s network of contacts with local investigative journalists, as well as close cooperation between regional observatories of illicit economies, namely South Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America.

As part of the GI-TOC’s analysis of the risks of firearms trafficking from Ukraine, in this issue we show that the Western Balkans remain the main source of illegal weapons in Europe. At present, weapons are still cheap and plentiful in the region, and stockpiles have been augmented by inflows from Turkey via Bulgaria, particularly of gas and alarm guns. More on this topic can be found in a forthcoming GI-TOC report on trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

In this issue, we also report on a major crackdown by Serbian authorities in late 2023 on increasingly violent smugglers operating along the border between Serbia and Hungary, and examine how this has displaced migration flows towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Risk Bulletin No. 18. Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 25p.

By Vlado Vivoda, Ghaleb Krame and Martin Spraggon

Oil theft refers to the exploitation of crude oil or refined petroleum products for criminal purposes. In Mexico, oil theft—referred to as huachicolero—is endemic and widespread. By framing it within the energy security and transition context, this paper offers a new perspective on the problem of oil theft in Mexico. Focusing on crude oil and refined petroleum, the paper demonstrates that Mexico’s energy security—as framed around the 4As (availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptance)—has deteriorated over the past decade. Application of the 4As framework in the Mexican context shows that the increasing frequency of oil theft has contributed to this deterioration. The proposed solution to the energy security and oil theft problems is centred on Mexico moving from gasoline and diesel to electrification in the transportation sector. The paper demonstrates that, while transport electrification in Mexico has been lagging behind other countries, recent developments in the country point to growing momentum among the country’s political and business elites, in tandem with US partners, in support for the energy transition. Areas where further emphasis should be placed to accelerate Mexico’s energy transition in the transportation sector are identified. Finally, the feasibility of and potential limitations associated with implementing the transition are evaluated.

Resources 2023, 12(2), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/resources12020030

By Yuhyeong Jang1 ·Raanju R. Sundararajan1 ·Wagner Barreto-Souza2 · Elizabeth Wheaton-Paramo

The article presents a robust quantitative approach for determining significant economic factors for sex trafficking in the United States. The aim is to study monthly counts of sex trafficking-related convictions and use a wide range of economic variables as covariates to investigate their effect on conviction counts. A count time series model is considered along with a regression setup to include economic time series as covariates (economic factors) to explain the counts on sex trafficking-related convictions. The statistical significance of these economic factors is investigated, and the significant factors are ranked based on appropriate model selection methods. The inclusion of time-lagged versions of the economic factor time series in the regression model is also explored. The authors’ findings indicate that economic factors relating to immigration policy, consumer price index and labor market regulations are the most significant in explaining sex trafficking convictions

Empirical Economics. 2024, 18pg

By Robert D. Crutchfield 

Are the unemployed more likely to commit crimes? Does having a job make one less likely to commit a crime? Criminologists have found that individuals who are marginalized from the labor market are more likely to commit crimes, and communities with more members who are marginal to the labor market have higher rates of crime. Yet, as Robert Crutchfield explains, contrary to popular expectations, unemployment has been found to be an inconsistent predictor of either individual criminality or collective crime rates. In Get a Job, Crutchfield offers a carefully nuanced understanding of the links among work, unemployment, and crime.

Crutchfield explains how people’s positioning in the labor market affects their participation in all kinds of crimes, from violent acts to profit-motivated offenses such as theft and drug trafficking. Crutchfield also draws on his first-hand knowledge of growing up in a poor, black neighborhood in Pittsburgh and later working on the streets as a parole officer, enabling him to develop a more complete understanding of how work and crime are related and both contribute to, and are a result of, social inequalities and disadvantage. Well-researched and informative, Get a Job tells a powerful story of one of the most troubling side effects of economic disparities in America.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2014. 303p.

By Osborne Jackson and Thu Tran

The “hidden tax” resulting from larceny crime refers to the higher prices paid by consumers to producers who raise prices in order to pass on some of the associated cost of such theft. In the same vein, consumers who are victimized by larceny theft could pass along some of the associated cost that they bear by spending less. This study analyzes larceny crime as a hidden tax in order to examine its welfare implications. Using traditional tax theory, the authors first characterize how larceny crime might create distortions in a given product market. Employing a sample covering 17 US states during the 2000–2015 period, they then use the enactment of higher felony larceny thresholds to generate exogenous variation in larceny crime by product market. A felony larceny threshold is the dollar value of stolen property at or above which a larceny offense may be charged in court as a felony rather than a misdemeanor. Focusing on the subset of larceny crime that is likely most affected by raising the larceny threshold, the authors calculate baseline hidden tax rates and then examine how changes in larceny rates related to higher thresholds affect this tax. They use these estimated changes in the hidden tax rates to compare the associated welfare costs of larceny crime across product markets.''

Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Research Department. 2020, 33

By Matt Hopkins, Rachel Keighley, Teela Sanders

  Thinking about organised crime as an ecosystem is not only novel but also offers much potential to add to the theoretical and policy-based literature in this area. While organised crime is often analysed as relationships between criminal groups and consumers of illicit goods/services, little work has analysed specific forms of organised crime activities as ecosystems where different constituent parts are dependent upon each other for the crime activity to occur. This paper analyses the organisation of sexual exploitation by entrepreneurial organised crime groups sell ing sex in the United Kingdom. Based upon 30 interviews with 23 law enforcement forces in England and Wales and five interviews with Adult Service Website Opera tors; it identifies how an ecosystem is built that ensures (a) profit generation and (b) avoidance of legal prosecution. Our analysis not only illustrates how a market ‘sup ply’ and ‘demand’ ecosystem is generated through mutually convenient ‘organiser’, ‘marketer’ and ‘buyer’ relationships, but also how the roles of these actors ensure sexual exploitation continues. Keywords Organised crime · 

Trends in Organized Crime, trends in Organized Crime. 2024, 20pg

By Manuel Alejandro Salazar Mendoza

In this paper, I use aggregate data from Mexican municipalities to research the effect of shocks on the unemployment rates of Mexican migrants residing in the United States on crime rates in Mexico. Heterogeneous effects are anticipated depending on the migrants’ income level, so the impact of the shocks is studied according to the educational quartile to which they belong as an approximation of their income level. I find that unemployment shocks for migrants in the lowest educational quartile lead to increases in the theft rate, while, for migrants in the highest quartile, shocks are associated with reductions in this rate. These findings inform the literature on economic and migration mechanisms behind crime rates.

Unpublished paper, March. 2024, 46pg

By Jonathan Goodhand, Patrick Meehan, Camilo Acero, and Jan Koehler

This research paper is the second in a three-part series analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. This research challenges the idea that paramilitaries are symptomatic of state breakdown, flourishing in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’; and that they can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems.

In this research paper, a set of detailed case studies are presented that explore coercive brokerage in Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar that seek to address these ideas, drawing upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-disorder.soas.ac.uk), and other relevant research.

Birmingham, UK:  University of Birmingham. 2023, 65pg