By The Australian Human Rights Commission 

This report contains six case studies from Australia and around the world that are examples of evidence-based approaches to reforming child justice systems. It shows how primary prevention, early intervention, integrated services and therapeutic community-based approaches that emphasise family and cultural connections can transform outcomes for children.

By Araceli Vázquez-Ocaña and Alan Alberto Ramírez-Guevara

This study proposes a non-linear analytical framework, inspired by phase-transition theory, to explain abrupt regime shifts in organized violence within weak institutional systems.Using Mexico (2000-2024) as a primary case, we demonstrate that criminal violence does not escalate linearly but undergoes a "phase transition" once specific thresholds are crossed. We introduce the Criminal Nucleation Framework to model the emergence and persistence of criminal cells through three dimensions: the institutional activation barrier (ΔG), the critical organizational size (r*), and the growth constant (k). Empirical validation shows a structural rupture between 2007 and 2010, where homicide rates shifted from a stable regime (8.5–10 per 100k) to a chronic state (25–29 per 100k). By operationalizing a comparative Kinetic Risk Index (R = k/ΔG), the framework classifies cities into distinct systemic states rather than providing point predictions. The findings suggest that once a system exhibits hysteresis, reactive force is structurally insufficient; instead, policy must focus on increasing the activation barrier to prevent spontaneous criminal formation.

By Alex Knorre , John MacDonald 

 Background: Firearm homicide is a leading cause of death in the United States, with substantial racial disparities documented over time. Black Americans experience disproportionately higher rates of firearm homicide compared to White Americans, reflecting long-standing social, economic, and structural inequities. This study contributes to understanding the magnitude and trends of this disparity. Objective: We investigate the Black-White population-level disparity in firearm homicide rates over 45 years in the United States and estimate the fraction of excess deaths in the Black population attributable to firearm homicides. Methods: We measure racial disparities in firearm homicides as the ratio of ageadjusted rates between Black and White populations. Using annual national firearm homicide and population data from CDC WONDER (1979–2023), disaggregated by race, age, and sex, we calculate age-adjusted Black–White mortality ratios by year and sex, as well as the number of excess Black firearm homicide deaths attributable to these disparities. Results: After a steady period of 1990-2010, the Black-White disparity began increasing and peaked in 2020 when the firearm homicide rate in males was 10.38 times higher in Blacks than Whites. There were 31,202 excess firearm homicides of Black people attributed to the Black-White racial disparity in 2021-2023. Conclusions: Despite significant declines in firearm homicides during the 1990s, the relative racial gap in firearm homicide has persisted and grown, reflecting the unequal burden of violence borne by the Black population during both declines and surges of violence.

By PHILIP J. COOK

Approximately 75,000 people in the United States were shot by a criminal assailant in 2024, yet most of those shootings did not result in an arrest.

In this HFG Research and Policy in Brief, Philip J. Cook, professor emeritus at Duke University, explores the gap between the minority of shootings that are solved and those that go unsolved.

“There is a strong argument for improving police performance in investigating serious crimes of violence,” Cook writes in Unsolved Shootings: Why and How to Boost Clearance Rates. “What is at stake is public safety and the basic duty of the police to serve the public.”

Cook examines the importance of arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of serious violence, the validity of “clearance rates” as a performance indicator for police departments, and what can be done by police to increase the success rate for criminal investigations—citing examples from Chicago, Denver, and other cities.

by Jo Phoenix

Debates about prostitution law often pivot around two broad approaches. One favours full decriminalisation, arguing that removing all criminal penalties for selling and buying sex empowers women and improves safety. The other, sometimes called the “Nordic model,” criminalises the purchase of sex while decriminalising the seller, aiming to reduce demand and shift policing away from women. Ash Regan’s Prostitution (Offences and Support) (Scotland) Bill, now defeated in the Scottish Parliament, followed the Nordic model. It proposed to decriminalise soliciting and loitering while criminalising the purchase of sex, alongside providing statutory support for women in prostitution. The Bill offered an opportunity to examine how this approach could function in Scotland and what it might mean in practice for women in prostitution. On 29 October 2025, I gave oral evidence to the Scottish Parliament’s Criminal Justice Committee in support of Ash Regan’s Bill. For nearly two decades, I opposed the Nordic model of criminalising the purchase of sex. My opposition was not based on fixed political slogans like “sex work is work” or “prostitution is all male violence”. In my research, I have always held both truths in view, because women describe prostitution as a way to make money while also recognising it as sex-based violence and victimisation. I avoid abstract debates about consent. These debates skim past poverty, tend towards a facile interpretation of constraint and choice, and are not capable of holding in view the relentless realities of male violence and how this shapes women’s and girl’s ‘choices’. I initially opposed criminalising buyers because more urgent problems demanded action. Having studied Ash Regan’s Bill and the evidence base, my view has changed. Despite major legal and policing reforms over the last 15 years, some of the most intractable harms of prostitution and male violence remain unaddressed. While no law can remove all risks, the Nordic model, as reflected in this Bill, represents a realistic policy approach whose implementation could make things a little better for women caught up in prostitution.

By CECILIA FARFÁN-MÉNDEZ

Gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime offers the opportunity to explore some biases and stereotypes with respect to gender roles in organized crime and explore some promising practices in gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the Convention. There are several implications of not mainstreaming gender into legislation, policies and practices to combat organized crime. These implications include jeopardizing the effective implementation of the Organized Crime Convention and implementing ineffective or even counterproductive practices to prevent and combat organized crime. Not mainstreaming gender into policies, legislation and practices can lead to a continuation of differential treatment in society and within criminal justice systems, including secondary victimization and revictimization. This can lead to higher levels of violence and perpetuate the cycle of organized criminal activity. In policies, legislation and practices into which gender has not been mainstreamed, men are seen predominantly as perpetrators and rarely as victims, which can lead to them being denied the assistance and protection they would need in order to be able to collaborate with criminal justice systems to help bring to justice those who lead and direct organized criminal groups. Women are seen predominantly as victims and rarely as perpetrators.

Moreover, such policies, legislation and practices do not recognize that the categories of perpetrator and victim in organized crime are not mutually exclusive and that the roles of perpetrators and victims can be fluid and, at times, overlap. This can lead to impunity or unjust treatment by criminal justice systems. The composition of the workforce of the criminal justice system has an impact on the treatment of individuals within the system, as accused persons, prisoners, witnesses or victims. Criminal justice institutions cannot provide equal and equitable responses if the composition of the workforce is not representative of the broader population, or if discriminatory human resources policies persist. If victims and witnesses do not feel comfortable coming forward and collaborating with the justice system, the quality of investigations, prosecutions and adjudications is compromised. In terms of legislation and policy development, there are fundamental questions to ask to address the gender dimensions in policies to prevent and combat organized crime.

Who makes law and policy (representativeness)? What evidence do they draw on? Are gender-disaggregated data available and used? Whose voices do legislators and policymakers hear in consultations? What is the gender composition of the criminal justice workforce? Can gender bias be identified in pretrial detention and sentencing? In terms of looking at investigation, prosecution and adjudication through a gender-sensitive lens, some key points should be addressed. What is the gender selectivity, or assumptions as to who is a perpetrator and who is a victim, in investigations and prosecutions? Who benefits in reality from the proceeds of organized crime? Is the distinction between perpetrator and victim clear cut?

Are gender-sensitive victim assistance and witness protection provided to victims and witnesses, to encourage and enable them to collaborate with the criminal justice system? Is such protection extended, in appropriate cases, to their relatives and other persons close to them to take into account the caregiver roles? Are victims and witnesses protected from intimidation and retaliation in a gender-sensitive manner? Are vulnerable individuals protected from revictimization and secondary victimization?The present issue paper concludes that gender mainstreaming is not a parallel effort or a “women’s issue” separate from the implementation of the Organized Crime Convention but that it is an integral part of full implementation of the Convention. Significant data challenges still exist: gender statistics, including sexdisaggregated data, need to be collected, disseminated and used to inform policy, legislation and practices in order to improve understanding of gender and organized crime and to prevent and combat organized crime more efficiently

By R. Evan Ellis

The security environment in Mexico is characterized by a dangerous fragmentation of and competition among criminal groups that pushed the nation’s homicide rate to a record high of 22.5 per 100,000 in 2017, a 27.5 percent increase over the prior year.1 The nation, whose security and prosperity strongly impacts the United States through geographic proximity and associated flows of people, money, and goods (both licit and illicit), is at a critical juncture in its fight against transnational organized crime. Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched the “war against the cartels” in December 2006 with the deployment of the Mexican army into the state of Michoacán, the nation’s security forces have taken down the leaders of multiple powerful criminal groups and debilitated their organizations.2 In the process, the Mexican military, police, and other security institutions have evolved their institutional structures, modified both their strategy and their doctrine, and strengthened their ability to combat transnational organized crime. Yet as with the experience of the United States in combatting terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexico’s fight against the cartels, both despite and because of its successes, has created a more chaotic criminal landscape, with both a higher level of violence and a broader range of criminality.

Complicating Mexico’s security challenge is the disposition of the Trump administration to act aggressively against illegal immigration from Mexico (among other countries) into the United States, along with U.S. renegotiation and possible abandonment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These actions increase stressors on Mexico, including the prospect of expanded deportations of immigrants to Mexico, the loss of remittance income, and impeded access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market. The Trump administration’s actions, magnified by rhetoric that many Mexicans perceive as an insult to their country and people, have combined with Mexican frustration over the persistence of violence and corruption to create the real prospect that leftist populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador could win the July 2018 presidential election, potentially taking Mexico on a course of more distant political relations and decreased security cooperation with the United States and expanded engagement with extra-hemispheric rivals of the United States such as Russia and China.

This article examines Mexico’s serious and evolving security challenges, and the key initiatives and critical issues confronting the nation’s security forces. It argues that the Mexican government has made important progress against a range of criminal groups and in innovating and strengthening its own capabilities to combat such entities and associated flows of illegal goods—capabilities that deserve to be recognized, further refined, and exploited in partnership with the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. It concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy makers regarding the importance of strong and respectful support for Mexico at the present critical juncture.

2028. 13p.

Women and Illicit Finance in Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine Orly Stern Olivia Allison

Addressing police and military involvement in serious organised crime (Research Paper 39)

By The Sentry

The first Wagner Group fighters arrived in Bamako in January 2022 to assist the Malian military junta in its counterterrorism campaign.1 Three and a half years later, the group has announced its withdrawal from Mali to make space for Africa Corps with the statement “Mission accomplished.”2 But as the number of Wagner fighters in Mali will stay roughly the same, since many had already signed contracts with the Russian state prior to the announcement,3, 4 the group’s claim to success—and their overall strategy in Mali—merits scrutiny. Despite the Wagner Group possessing a reputation for being battle-ready and claiming occasional public triumphs in Mali, its strategy has been plagued by a series of failures.5 Wagner forces have been unable to take control of areas in the north and center of the country where armed terrorist and separatist groups are challenging the authority of the Malian state. There has been a significant increase in attacks on civilians and in civilian casualties since Wagner’s arrival in Mali, and this, in turn, has severely undermined relations between the Malian military and the Malian public. Faced with challenges such as insufficient air support, a lack of trust, and a lack of reliable information from informants, the Wagner Group has become more reactive and violent—allowing the very terrorist groups they were hired to neutralize to gain more control and increase recruitment in Mali. Wagner’s playbook in Mali has not only affected the civilian population; it has also helped perpetuate insecurity and has paved the way for the fragmentation of the Malian state. Wagner fighters have created chaos and fear within the Malian military hierarchy, forcing the Forces Armées Maliennes (Malian Armed Forces, or FAMA) to remain silent in cases of civilian abuse. In addition, the lack of order and communication within the chain of command has led to the progressive deterioration of the FAMA’s ranks. Abuses against the Malian armed forces by Wagner troops have increased, as have complaints from Malian soldiers. Within the Malian military junta itself, the varying degrees of partnership with Russian actors are contributing to a shift in power relations in Bamako, as Malian leaders regard one another with suspicion. Despite official discourse suggesting that Wagner and Russia are reliable partners in the Malian conflict, the Wagner command in Mali has demonstrated a reluctance to intervene militarily—even in cases where the capital is directly threatened—without first having assurances of financial compensation. At the outset of its Malian venture, Wagner was seeking to secure mining concessions that would likely replicate the group’s self-funding arrangements in other countries. However, the Malian junta appears unwilling to allow Wagner to control the mining sector, and Wagner’s forays into that sector have thus far been limited. Ultimately, the Wagner Group has failed in its task of eliminating terrorist groups in Mali. The Russian presence is instead creating upheaval amid the Malian military and causing rifts within the Malian junta. And as Wagner has seemingly gone unpaid for months and failed to obtain access to lucrative natural resources, its deployment in Mali has not been a worthwhile investment for any party involved. Wagner is not an infallible actor. If anything, the Malian example illustrates that the group can fail, and this should be a warning to other African clients who are considering hiring Wagner—or its more officialoffshoot, Africa Corps. At the same time, policymakers in the Global North should see Wagner’s failures as an opportunity for alternative policy approaches in the Sahel region. Key recommendations • The Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) should open an investigation into war crimes perpetrated by Wagner troops in Mali and prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses. Alternatively, the United Nations Security Council should refer Wagner abuses in Mali to the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC. • The government of Mali should take steps toward criminal accountability and reparations for the victims of massacres such as Moura, as well as for the abuses against and displacement of civilian populations following attacks by the Wagner Group in the north and west of the country. • The EU, the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia should investigate and, if appropriate, designate for sanctions the network of individuals and entities in Sadio Camara’s inner circle who enable, support, or benefit from Wagner’s presence in the country, as well as those involved in corruption and human rights abuses. They should coordinate sanctions to increase their impact. • International mining companies operating in Mali and foreign refineries processing Malian gold should conduct comprehensive audits of their operations to ensure that they are not conducting business with sanctioned Wagner Group entities or individuals, such as Ivan Maslov. • The Algerian government should facilitate renewed negotiations on a peace agreement between Bamako and the northern rebel groups. As the political and security landscape has changed since the 2015 agreement, which was facilitated by Algeria, including as a result of the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping operation MINUSMA, new terms will need to be agreed.

The Sentry, 2025. 55p.

By Europol

All EU Member States and 17 of Europol’s partner countries contributed data to identify the most threatening criminal networks in Europe. This resulted in a unique dataset of 821 most threatening criminal networks, with extensive information on all aspects that describe them and help assess their threat.

This mapping report is one of the key deliverables of the Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union, which strongly encouraged the efforts of Europol in this respect. It will be an essential tool to fight organised crime going forward, which is a top EU priority, as outlined in the recent roadmap presented by the European Commission.

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2024. 60p.

By Katarzyna Jaskoa, Gary LaFree, James Piazzac , and Michael H. Beckerd

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies, it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self-reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in Western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States, we find no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerge on the global level, with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts.

Political violence in the United States has increased in recent years and shows no signs of declining.1 This trend was underscored in September 2025 by the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. In the two weeks before and after Kirk’s killing, shooting incidents in Colorado, Minneapolis, and Dallas seized public attention.2 Executive Summary Amid growing concern about the relationship between online rhetoric and real-world violence, this report examines how violent extremist actors across the ideological spectrum use digital platforms to respond to, amplify, and exploit acts of political violence in the United States. Drawing on opensource intelligence (OSINT) gathered initially from March 24 to June 6, 2025, and then extended to include a period following Kirk’s assassination, this analysis reveals sophisticated cross-platform strategies employed by far-right, far-left, violent Islamist, and nihilistic violent extremist (NVE) actors. This report uses “violent extremist” to refer to individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals, as well as those who commit violence driven by generalized hatred rather than a coherent ideology. Key Findings • Violent extremist groups systematically exploit trigger events—high-profile incidents of violence—to recruit supporters, justify their ideologies, and call for retaliatory action. • These groups employ multi-platform strategies, using mainstream sites like X for visibility and recruitment while maintaining a presence on private or semi-private platforms for coordination and more extreme content. • Far-right groups capitalized on cases like the Austin Metcalf stabbing and the Iryna Zarutska killing to advance narratives of White victimhood and justify threats against perceived enemies. • Activities of both far-left and far-right networks revealed a troubling convergence around antisemitic targeting. • Violent Islamic groups are more aggressively monitored than domestic groups espousing similar levels of violence. • Violent Islamist groups, facing stricter moderation than domestic extremists, have migrated to decentralized platforms like Rocket.Chat while disseminating symbolic propaganda elsewhere. • Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) communities glorify violence across ideological lines for shock value and digital notoriety, making their threats harder to predict based on political triggers. This report aims to bring clarity to a conversation clouded by vagueness and partisanship. It first maps the domestic threat landscape, offering timely examples of online violent discourse from across the ideological spectrum targeting US individuals or institutions, and sets out a clear definitional framework for types of speech that carry legal significance under US constitutional doctrine. It closes with practical recommendations for online service providers and policymakers.

PNAS 2022 Vol. 119 No. 30 e2122593119

By Phil Williams and Sandra Quincoses

The economic and political environments in Latin America have been advantageous for local, regional, and transnational threat networks. Specifically, technology, increased international trade and economic interdependence, heightened interest in natural resources for profit, synthetic drug production, economic disparities, corruption, impunity, and unstable political conditions have led to a complex web of opportunities that requires new, progressive ways to address criminal activities. The creativity of threat networks along with their entrepreneurial strategies have resulted in increasing power and influence. Despite efforts by the United States and some governments in Latin America to combat these networks, the everchanging global environment has worked in their favor. Indeed, some countries in Central and South America are in danger of transforming into what Jorge Chabat described as “criminally possessed states.” Furthermore, gangs in Central America, especially in Honduras where MS-13 has become more closely linked to drug trafficking, have reduced local extortion, become more aware of their nascent political power and have even engaged in rudimentary social welfare provision.

By Daniela Marggraff

From piracy to illegal fishing, maritime threats in the region demand urgent, coordinated policy action.



The Western Indian Ocean contains a multitude of threats to inhabitants’ maritime security, ranging from climate change and pollution to piracy, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime violence and increasing militarisation. This report emphasises a policymaking approach that addresses issues through a cyclical rather than linear lens, recognising how one threat can lead to the emergence of another.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 24p.

By Kathryn Westmore

Within a relatively short period of time, Chinese money laundering organisations (CMLOs) have become one of the pre-eminent global money laundering threats. Using centuries-old techniques, modern-day CMLOs have evolved into multi-billion-dollar operations, providing quick, cheap and efficient money laundering services to transnational organised crime groups (OCGs). In some countries, such as the US, CMLOs have come to dominate the market, and their activities are growing in the UK and Europe. This paper seeks to explore the reasons why CMLOs have become so successful and how their activities have developed. It identifies that the imposition of strict capital controls by China has created a demand from wealthy Chinese individuals for ways in which they can move money out of the country to access Western currencies. CMLOs are able, for a fee, to provide this from the funds that they launder on behalf of transnational crime groups. CMLOs also take advantage of large Chinese diaspora populations both as potential clients and as part of their operations; for example, through the recruitment of “money mules” to deposit criminal proceeds into bank accounts controlled by the CMLOs. These factors, combined with OCGs’ increasing demand for “professional” money laundering services and the involvement of Chinese groups in the fentanyl drug trade, have created the perfect conditions for CMLOs to flourish. This paper goes on to apply a “state threats” lens to the activities of CMLOs, building on the work of researcher and risk consultant Matthew Redhead,1 to inform readers how countries in the West could respond to the threat. Ultimately, the research concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that the activity of CMLOs is being directed by the Chinese state. While there is evidence that Chinese money laundering schemes can, and do, involve Chinese government officials and members of the Chinese Communist Party, that is very clearly not the same as saying that the schemes are state directed. This conclusion, therefore, prompts a follow-up question, which the paper explores, as to the prospect of collaboration between the West and China in tackling CMLO activity. 

SOC ACE Research Paper 36. University of Birmingham. 2025. 34p.

By Anthony A. Braga, Cory Schnell Brandon C. Welsh

 Broken windows theory suggests that police can prevent serious crime by addressing social and physical disorder in neighborhoods. In many U.S. cities, recent increases in disorder, fear, and crime have initiated calls for an intensification of disorder policing efforts. Disorder policing programs can be controversial, with evaluations yielding conflicting results. Further, a growing number of descriptive analyses of aggressive order maintenance programs raise concerns over varied negative consequences, such as increased racial disparities in arrests of citizens. Systematic review and meta-analytic techniques were used to conduct an updated analysis of the effects of disorder policing on crime. Fifty-six eligible studies including 59 independent tests of disorder policing interventions were identified, representing almost twice the number included in the previous review. As part of the meta-analysis, new effect size metrics were used. The updated meta-analysis suggests that policing disorder strategies are associated with overall statistically significant crime reduction effects that spill over into surrounding areas. The strongest program effect sizes were generated by community and problem-solving interventions designed to change social and physical disorder conditions at crime  hot spots. Conversely, aggressive order maintenance strategies did not generate significant crime reductions. Policy Implications: The types of strategies used by police departments to address disorder seem to matter in controlling crime, and this holds important implications for police–community relations, justice, and crime prevention. Further research is needed to understand the key programmatic elements that maximize the capacity of these strategies to prevent crime

Criminology & Public Policy. 2024;23:745–775 

By Abby Córdova and Helen Kras

 With a focus on the implementation of women’s police stations (WPS), we posit that local policies that address violence against women can result in positive feedback effects on institutional legitimacy. We theorize that WPS increase police legitimacy among women by improving perceptions of personal safety and government responsiveness. To test our hypotheses, we rely on municipal and public opinion data from more than 100 municipalities in Brazil. The results of our multilevel analysis indicate that WPS produce positive feedback effects among women, resulting in higher trust in the police among women than men and closing the gender gap in perceptions of police effectiveness. Incorporating an instrumental variable in the analyses yields similar results, suggesting that these effects are not endogenous. Moreover, the results of our mediation models show that WPS’ positive effects on women’s views of police legitimacy are driven by improved perceptions of personal safety, and not perceptions of government responsiveness. 

Comparative Political Studies 2020, Vol. 53(5) 775–808 

By Piotr Bąkowski

 As law enforcement agencies carry out lawful interception of electronic communications, they face numerous challenges stemming from rapid technological advancements. The growing use of messaging services and the development of 5G networks, which feature enhanced privacy and security measures such as encryption, have had the unintended consequence of hindering law enforcement's access to crucial data. Policymakers and regulators are working to strike a balance between meeting law enforcement needs and protecting the privacy of communications and cybersecurity. In 1994, the Council of the EU adopted a resolution on the lawful interception of telecommunications, but relevant EU laws also encompass broader rules on data protection and electronic communications, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Law Enforcement Directive, the ePrivacy Directive, and the European Electronic Communications Code. In recent years, a lively debate has emerged on how best to address the operational needs of law enforcement agencies. The EU faces unique challenges, including the fragmentation of national rules and specific issues related to roaming. To address these concerns, a High-Level Group on access to data for effective law enforcement was established, providing recommendations that informed the Commission's Roadmap for law enforcement access to data, presented in June 2025. This is one of four publications that explore different aspects of the roadmap for effective and lawful access to data for law enforcement. These include a summary of the roadmap, and briefings on lawful interception, data retention and digital forensics.   

Brussels:  EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025.

By Europol, Innovation Lab

This report from Europol's Innovation Lab explores how the police can adapt to the increasingly digital lives of European citizens. Online worlds are increasingly perceived as lawless, and while community police officers play a key role in the physical world, community policing equivalents are often in their infancy or absent in virtual worlds.

Discover an overview of online policing principles and current initiatives across Europe, including case examples from specific countries to facilitate learning for similar initiatives

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2025. 21p.

By Zhuoying Fan, Xuewei Zhang, Guangwen Song &Chunxia Zhang 

• Targeted police stops are frequently carried out by police in response to real-world needs. The effectiveness of various purpose-driven police stop tactics on crime prevention and control varies. However, existing research has neither identified the associated factors of police stops nor explored their impact on crime with different factors. Therefore, this study focuses on the main urban areas of megacities along the southeast coast of China. The space is partitioned using hierarchical clustering after applying the XGBoost and SHAP algorithms to determine the factors related to police stops. Lastly, this study explores the causal effects of police stops with different associated factors on crime, using causal forests within double machine learning. There are three conclusions. First, there is a strong correlation between police stops and four variables: alarm, visiting population, criminal, and government agencies. Second, by clustering based on different associated factors of police stops, existing police stops can be classified into five categories according to their purposes: (i) composite stops positively associated with “Alarm, Visiting Population, Criminals” (AVC-CPS); (ii) composite stops positively associated with “Alarm, Visiting Population, Bus Station” (AVB-CPS); (iii) random stops with no significant positive association (NA-RPS); (iv) single police stops positively associated with “Alarm” (A-SPS); and (v) single stops positively associated with “Visiting Population” (V-SPS). AVC-CPS corresponds to the highest number of grids in the study area. Third, the influence of police stops on crime varies significantly depending on the factors that are associated with them. Among all categories, AVC-CPS has the best overall inhibitory effect on crime, while single police stops and random police stops have minimal or insignificant effects. In summary, the conclusions of this study can provide a basis for optimizing the spatial deployment of police forces, aiming to improve the effectiveness of stop operations and crime prevention and control capabilities.

  • Humanit Soc Sci Commun 12, 1026 (2025)

By Christopher Williams

 This article reflects on the impact of the Ferguson protests over the past decade, sparked by the 2014 death of Michael Brown. I engage with S. David Mitchell’s 2015 question, Ferguson: Footnote or Transformative Event?, and illustrate how Ferguson inspired the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, campus activism, and policy changes such as the abolition of cash bail under the SAFE-T Act in Illinois. This article also explores the dual nature of Ferguson’s legacy—acknowledging its role in empowering racial justice movements while simultaneously fueling opposition, including attacks on Critical Race Theory (CRT). I underscore Ferguson’s enduring resonance in the fight for justice, the resounding calls for continued vigilance, and heartfelt advocacy to ensure its transformative promises are fulfilled—even amid continuous challenges.

  Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, Volume 78 • Issue 1 • 2025 

By Maureen Taylor ahd Lesley McMillan 

  There is a significant body of research that illustrates the emotional demands of policing and the physical and psychological toll this takes on officers and staff. However, the management of these demands, particularly in more specialist roles such as those in public protection policing where the demand may be higher, are less well understood. This research explores the experiences of public protection police officers in Police Scotland through a lens of emotional labour..  The aims of this research were to: • Critically review the literature around the emotional impacts of policing on officers and the role of emotional labour in policing; • Establish the experience of, and impact on, officers involved in the investigation of public protection cases; assess how police officers in roles where emotional labour may be heightened, manage their emotions and the strategies they develop to do so; and • Examine how emotions and emotion management are mediated by organisational, departmental and role values, demands and culture In doing so, the research sought to answer the following research questions: 1. What is the emotional experience of police officers in public protection roles and what impact does it have on them? 2. What emotional labour do officers undertake, and what strategies of emotion management do officers employ? 3. To what extent does the theory of emotional labour explain the experiences of public protection police officers? 4. What role does the prevailing organisational culture play in the emotion management strategies of public protection policing? This report presents the findings from this research and a potential framework for understanding the factors that contribute to resilience within the context of public protection policing    

Edinburgh: Scottish Institute for Policing Research 2025. 32p.