By: Ghaleb Krame, Amanda Davies, Magdalena García & Noé Cuervo Vázquez 

This paper explores the power struggle between the Chapitos and Mayiza factions of the Sinaloa Cartel and its implications for U.S. and Mexican law enforcement. Employing scenario analysis, payoff matrices, and Nash equilibria, the study evaluates potential outcomes of this conflict and their impact on cartel power dynamics. While the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) is poised to exploit instability and expand its influence over fentanyl trafficking and key territories, for the United States of America (U.S.A.), this internal fragmentation complicates efforts to control the opioid crisis. In Mexico, Omar García Harfuch faces the challenge of stabilizing cartel-affected regions and countering CJNG’s growth. A Mayiza victory is seen as the most favorable outcome, reducing violence and curbing CJNG’s expansion. Coordinated intelligence-sharing and strategic responses are essential for regional stability.

Security Journal (2025) 38:57

By Eduard Ballesté-Isern & Carles Feixa 

This paper is based on an ethnographic study of the arrests and the subsequent trial and sentencing of a group of Latin Kings and Queens from Barcelona between 2015 and 2020. We analyze the actions carried out by the police, judicial institutions and media to reestablish the “hard handed” discourse in relation to these youth street groups in a time of crisis and precariousness. The concept of a “space of youth street groups” is used to construct a tool for mapping the agents who interact with these groups and the position they occupy in the social space. The interactions between these agents in Barcelona configure a new form of security governance through the creation of subjective insecurity and the promotion of punitive policies against youth street groups.

Crit Crim 30, 741–756 (2022)

By  Lucia Bird | Saša Đorđević | Fatjona Mejdini 

Western Balkans criminal groups, comprising both Albanian- and Slavic-speaking networks, have become dominant players in the global cocaine trade. While their influence in Europe and Latin America has been well documented, their growing role in West Africa has largely flown under the radar. Since 2019, these groups have expanded their operations in West Africa, using the region as a critical logistical, storage and redistribution hub for cocaine shipments en route to European consumption markets and beyond. This expansion has been shaped by their effective leverage of geography, governance weaknesses and infrastructure, both hard and digital. Initially limited to occasional trafficking links, the Western Balkan groups have deepened their presence across West Africa’s coastal states, including Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde. This growing focus on West Africa was driven by rising demand for cocaine in Europe, increased enforcement on direct routes to Europe and strengthened partnerships with Latin American cartels, especially Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). Western Balkan groups now operate through multiple trafficking methods in West Africa, exploiting fully containerized routes, non-containerized shipments (i.e. shipments not stored in containers, but hidden elsewhere on vessels) by other types of vessels, trans-shipments at sea and in-region containerization to conceal the cocaine’s origin. They have embedded brokers in West African countries who organize logistics, establish infrastructure and liaise with local actors. In Sierra Leone, for example, they have reportedly established companies to launder funds and warehouses to store and repackage cocaine, coordinating onward shipments through formal seaports using legitimate cargo. These brokers are key to operations and are often shared among the different groups. The groups’ structures are flexible and typically consist of small, trusted units supported by collaborators. Groups leverage local vulnerabilities to build relationships with corrupt law enforcement, port operators and security services. Particularly significant Western Balkan groups in West Africa include the Montenegrin Kavač clan and its rival, the Škaljari clan. The Kavač clan’s operations have been linked to ports in Brazil and Sierra Leone, with brokers overseeing logistics from Freetown. As we explain in this report, in some cases a single broker will work with more than one group from the Western Balkans. In parallel, Albanian-speaking groups, which have a strong presence in Spain and Brazil, have been operating through countries including Senegal and Gambia, sometimes collaborating with the Italian ‘Ndrangheta or the PCC. The example of an Albanian national who, according to Brazilian law enforcement investigations, is a major European supplier coordinating shipments through West Africa from Brazil, exemplifies the growing use of multi-tonne cocaine operations routed through the Gulf of Guinea. Looking ahead, Western Balkan groups are likely to further entrench themselves in West Africa, gradually relying less on their alliances with the ‘Ndrangheta, the PCC and other Western Balkan groups and instead investing directly in infrastructure and protection mechanisms. As in Latin America, their growing presence is likely to be accompanied by deeper corruption, potential violence and fragmentation into more autonomous cells. To address the growing role of Western Balkan criminal groups in West Africa, a coordinated response should focus on three key pillars. First, strategic cross-continental partnerships should be built with law enforcement, port authorities and international actors, underpinned by a political-economy analysis, to strengthen cooperation and to identify aligned priorities. Second, an enhanced data picture, drawing on a wider range of formal and informal sources, is needed to map trafficking routes and financial flows more effectively and to empower regional and international actors to tailor their risk assessments of specific routes, to profile criminal actors and to develop viable strategies for detection and disruption. Third, smart targeting strategies that prioritize brokers should be adopted, supported by parallel financial and criminal investigations. 

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime   2025. 61p.

By The International Crisis Group

Born of Port-au-Prince’s most powerful gangs, Viv Ansanm has raised the criminal threat overhanging Haiti’s state and civilians to alarming heights. The gang coalition announced itself to the world by besieging the Haitian capital in early 2024, triggering former Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation. After consolidating its hold on much of the city, Viv Ansanm has expanded into neighbouring departments, tightened its grip on the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country and mounted attacks on the airport, essentially cutting Haiti off. Gangs’ violent offensives have killed over 16,000 people since 2022. But a rising death toll and diversifying criminal portfolio, now including extortion, piracy and drug trafficking, have not stopped gangs from claiming to represent the country’s downtrodden, especially on social media. UN approval of a new foreign force to combat the gangs could shift the balance of power. But it is vital that plans are in place not just to overpower the gangs but also to persuade them to demobilise. Haitian business and political elites have relied on paramilitary forces to protect their interests since the 1950s dictatorship of Francois Duvalier, or “Papa Doc”. But in the wake of the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gangs have mutated, evolving from tools in the hands of the most powerful to overlords of Haiti. Two main gang groupings – the G-9, whose most public figure was Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and the Gpèp, under Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as “Ti Gabriel” – fought for supremacy after Moïse’s murder. Even as the two faced off, gang leaders discussed whether to strike agreements to scale down the death toll among their members and spare resources. Mediators managed to craft several pacts among local groups to divvy up coveted turf. Late in 2023, reports emerged that the country’s two main gang coalitions had merged into one platform; their first joint offensive began months later replace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. Alongside its violent expansion, Viv Ansanm has sought to transform its public profile from that of a predatory criminal force into that of an ideological crusader. Crime bosses say their mission is to protect the poorest Haitians from rapacious elites and colonial powers that historically have oppressed this black Caribbean nation. Chérizier and other gang leaders have even announced the creation of a new political party, albeit without taking the steps needed to register it formally. While continuing to enrich themselves at the expense of Haitians rich and poor, their message has nevertheless become more overtly political: they appear intent on guaranteeing that their allies are part of the next administration, which should be formed by 7 February 2026 toreplace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. A well-resourced, properly informed and expertly commanded Gang Suppression Force could help change the balance of force on the ground and push the gangs onto the back foot. Port-au-Prince and its foreign counterparts, however, must take care to mitigate the dangers of civilian casualties and violations of human rights, ensuring that robust accountability systems are in place. Once the force is up and running, the Haitian government should also overcome the coordination failures that have plagued previous security campaigns. In particular, the government should appoint members to the National Security Council and ask them to design a strategy that lays out each institution’s role in fighting the gangs. Even so, it remains unlikely that force aone will entirely extricate gangs from the communities they control or sever the nexus with politics that has bedevilled Haiti for over half a century. Though informal negotiations with gangs take place on a regular basis – to gain access to people in need of humanitarian aid or to keep businesses open – many Haitians oppose the idea of formal dialogue with the perpetrators of crimes they consider unforgivable. Government officials have correctly said the Haitian state cannot engage in talks from a position of weakness. But if the new multinational force and revamped Haitian security forces allow the authorities to gain the upper hand and broadcast their armed superiority, state officials should look to use dialogue as a means of convincing the gangs to cut their losses, reduce violence against civilians and, eventually, demobilise

While that happens, the administration, with the support of donors, should expand the program that is now providing exit ramps for minors in the gangs’ ranks. In cooperation with international experts, it should also start to design a transitional justice system that provides benefits and a measure of judicial reprieve to those who disarm and cooperate with the authorities, while also guaranteeing that there will be no general impunity. It is hard to understate the damage gangs have wrought in Haiti, killing and raping thousands, creating the hemisphere’s worst humanitarian crisis and destroying the lives of millions. Understandably, many Haitians refuse to contemplate responding to the horrors they have endured with anything less than crushing retaliation. But even if the Gang Suppression Force lives up to its promise, it is hard to compute the possible cost in lives and resources of a campaign to destroy the gangs. At some stage, negotiations from a position of strength aimed at protecting civilians and disarming the gangs would serve Haiti far better as a first step on the long path to stability.

Port-au-Prince/New York/London/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 49p.

By Kate Weisburd

Scholars and advocates have long argued that a person's consent to a warrantless police search is often so inherently coerced, uninformed, and shaped by race, class, gender, citizenship status, and disability that to call it a "choice" is fiction. This critique is not limited to police searches based on consent. Waiving rights and consenting to otherwise unconstitutional state action permeates criminal procedure. The definition of a seizure, the third-party doctrine, custodial confessions, plea bargains, and agreements to alternatives to incarceration (such as GPS ankle monitoring) all hinge on the idea of voluntary choices-choices that are often just as coerced and uninformed as the choice to consent to a search.Given these concerns, this Article asks: What would happen if consent were eliminated from criminal procedure doctrines? This question is not merely academic. In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have substantially limited or eliminated traditional police searches based on consent. These reform efforts allow us to consider if there is something uniquely coercive or inequitable about consent searches that makes them especially amenable to reform or if we should consider eliminating consent in other criminal procedure doctrines as well.This Article takes on these questions. Drawing on both an original national survey of recent consent-search reforms and a transsubstantive analysis of consent and waiver in a range of criminal procedure doctrines, this Article analyzes the potential ramifications of eliminating (or limiting) consent. In doing so, this Article reveals the extent to which consent plays a pivotal role in upholding—and justifying—the entire operation of the criminal justice system.

.California Law Review (2025), UC Law San Francisco Research Paper Forthcoming,

By Bernard Harcourt

Fifty years after its publication, Discipline and Punish (1975) remains as controversial as ever. Anyone writing about the prison today, in no matter what discipline, feels obliged to position themselves vis-à-vis Michel Foucault’s book. As a result, new studies and books regularly criticize Discipline and Punish, most often for misleading the reader about the history of the prison. As Adam Gopnik recently writes in the New Yorker, scholars are “turning decisively against Foucault,” contending “that incarceration may be a facet of every hierarchical, complex society. In other words, it’s always been with us.”However, Discipline and Punish was never intended to be a history of the prison. It was instead a genealogy of a particular mode of governing in modern times—what Foucault called “disciplinary power” or “panopticism.” And rather than trace the history of the prison, the book proposed a contemporary way to understand how power circulates in society and it paved the way for the study of contemporary modes of governing.  Drawing on a wealth of new Foucault archives, public lectures, manuscripts, and historical documents that have surfaced over the past 50 years, it is possible now to identify the true import of Foucault’s book. Just as the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes captured the turn in modern political philosophy to theories of sovereignty and representation, Discipline and Punish marked the end of modern political theory and launched a new approach to analyze relations of power in society. In this essay, I redefine the central contribution of Discipline and Punish and explore how to use Foucault’s book today—and also, how to go beyond it.

 Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 6044574,

By James Lewis, Sarah Marsden, James Hewitt, Chloe Squires, Anna Stefaniak

Reliability and Validity of Risk Assessment Tools for Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review

By Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Ghayda Hassan, Wynnpaul Varela, Emmanuel Danis, Sarah Ousman, Pablo Madriaza, Inga Lisa Pauls, Deniz Kilinc, David Pickup, Robert Pelzer, Eugene Borokhovski, the CPN-PREV team

Assessment of the risk of engaging in a violent radicalization/extremism trajectory has evolved quickly in the last 10 years. Guided by what has been achieved in psychology and criminology, scholars from the field of preventing violent extremism (PVE) have tried to import key lessons from violence risk assessment and management, while bearing in mind the idiosyncrasies of their particular field. However, risk tools that have been developed in the PVE space are relatively recent, and questions remain as to their level of psychometric validation. Namely, do these tools consistently and accurately assess risk of violent extremist acting out? To answer this question, we systematically reviewed evidence on the reliability and validity of violent extremism risk tools. The main objective of this review was to gather, critically appraise, and synthesize evidence regarding the appropriateness and utility of such tools, as validated with specific populations and contexts. Searches covered studies published up to December 31, 2021. They were performed in English and German across 17 databases, 45 repositories, Google, other literature reviews on violent extremism risk assessment, and references of included studies. Studies in all languages were eligible for inclusion in the review. We included studies with primary data resulting from the quantitative examination of the reliability and validity of tools used to assess the risk of violent extremism. Only tools usable by practitioners and intended to assess an individual's risk were eligible. We did not impose any restrictions on study design, type, method, or population. We followed standard methodological procedures outlined by the Campbell Collaboration for data extraction and analysis. Risk of bias was assessed using a modified version of the COSMIN checklist, and data were synthesized through meta-analysis when possible. Otherwise, narrative synthesis was used to aggregate the results. Among the 10,859 records found, 19 manuscripts comprising 20 eligible studies were included in the review. These studies focused on the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), the Extremism Risk Guidance Factors (ERG22+), the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG-V2), the Identifying Vulnerable People guidance (IVP guidance), and the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)—all structured professional judgment tools—as well as Der Screener—Islamismus, an actuarial scale. Studies mostly involved adult male participants susceptible to violent extremism (N = 1106; M = 58.21; SD = 55.14). The types of extremist ideologies endorsed by participants varied, and the same was true for ethnicity and country/continent of provenance. Encouraging results were found concerning the inter-rater agreement of scales in research contexts (kappas between 0.76 and 0.93), but one of the two studies that examined it in a field setting obtained disappointing results (kappas ranging between of 0.47 and 0.80). Content validity studies indicated that PVE risk tools adequately cover the risk factors and offending processes of individuals who go on to commit extremist violence. Construct validity analyses were few and far between, with results indicating that empirical divisions of scales did not match their conceptual divisions. The internal consistency of subscales was lackluster (Cronbach's alphas between 0.19 and 0.85), whereas full scales demonstrated acceptable internal consistency when assessed (0.80 for the ERG22+ and 0.64 for the IVP guidance). Only one study examined convergent validity, and it revealed a lack of convergence, primarily due to particularities of the scale under study (the MLG-V2). Discriminant validity analyses were exploratory in nature, but suggested that PVE risk tools might not be ideology-specific and may apply to both group and lone actors. Finally, although the TRAP-18 showed a relatively strong postdictive effect size (pooled r = 0.62 [0.35–0.77], p = 0.000), the results were highly heterogeneous (I2 = 86%), and all studies used retrospective designs, meaning the outcome was already known at the time of assessment. As such, no included study evaluated true predictive validity (i.e., the ability to forecast future violent extremist outcomes based on prospective risk assessment). This represents a significant evidence gap. Threats to validity were substantial: (a) Many studies were case studies or had very small samples, (b) nearly all samples were constituted through the triangulation of publicly available data, and (c) convenience outcome measures were often used. Although having imperfect data is better than having no data, the current state of empirical validation precludes the recommendation of one tool over another for specific populations and contexts, and calls for higher-quality validation studies for PVE risk assessment tools. Nevertheless, these tools constitute useful checklists of relevant risk and protective factors that could be taken into account by evaluators who wish to assess the risk of violent extremism and identify intervention targets.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume21, Issue4

December 2025, 2025.

By Rasmus Munksgaard, Kim Moeller & Theresa Dyrvig Henriksen

Sex workers in Europe are increasingly of nonnational origin. The Schengen cooperation allows internal migration within the European Union, but many migrant sex workers originate from outside the EU. While sex workers are already in precarious positions, nonnationals risk deportation, dependent on their citizenship status, and may have debts to smugglers. Consequently, they may be more likely to work longer hours to increase short-term profits. Using a dataset of sex work advertisements from one Danish website (n = 2,594), we estimate the association between inferred citizenship status and a) advertised hours on shift using ordinary least squares regression, and b) the probability of advertising 24/7 availability using a linear probability model. Compared to Danish sex workers, we find migrants advertise almost twice as many hours on shift and are more likely to advertise 24/7 availability. These results shed light on the inequalities that persist between national and nonnational sex workers.

Global Crime, Volume 26, 2025 - Issue 1

By Caroline Shubel , Mary Ava Nunnery , Grace Marley, Bayla Ostrach , Delesha M. Carpenter

Background: Methadone, an evidence-based medication for opioid use disorder (MOUD), is available through prescription at community pharmacies in countries like Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, but not in the United States (U.S.). The objective of this scoping review was to summarize barriers and facilitators related to dispensing methadone in community pharmacies to inform future implementation efforts in the U.S. Methods: A scoping review was conducted using PubMed, Embase, SCOPUS, and CINAHL. Original research articles related to barriers and/or facilitators around community pharmacy-based methadone dispensing were included. No search limits (year of publication, geographic boundaries) were applied to the search strategy. Two independent researchers screened all articles for eligibility, extracted data, and met to reach consensus. Data were extracted on 12 items, with a particular focus on barriers and facilitators to dispensing methadone in community pharmacies. Results: Forty-one articles were included in the review. The most common barriers to methadone dispensing were workload (n = 14), safety concerns for staff and property (n = 13), concern about patient behavior and interactions (n = 12), financial hardship (for pharmacists and patients) (n = 11), and stigma and discrimination towards patients (n = 11). The most common facilitators were pharmacist training and education (n = 14), positive pharmacist-patient relationships (n = 14), and privacy (n = 10). Conclusions: The findings from this review can be used to address barriers and incorporate known facilitators into future protocols or practice of pharmacy-based methadone dispensing. Further research is needed to identify U.S. and state-specific anticipated needs for pharmacy-based methadone dispensing

:Drug Alcohol Depend Rep. 2026 Jan 29;18:100413. doi: 10.1016/j.dadr.2026.100413. PMID: 41695144; PMCID: PMC12906019

By Andrew P. Bontemps, Elizabeth S. Hawes, Bailey E. Pridgen, William P. Wagner, Dominique Black, Karen L. Cropsey

Background:Cannabis use has increased in the United States as legalization has spread. While Δ-9 THC remains the most-used federally illegal substance, use of other psychoactive hemp-derived products (Δ-8 THC, Δ-10 THC, HHC, THC-O) has grown. The current study investigated patterns of cannabis use and perceptions of harm and benefit of cannabis across states with differing cannabis laws.

Method

Participants (N=639) were adults endorsing past-90-day cannabis use who lived in one of 15 states selected based on cannabis laws (recreational use, medical use, illegal). Participants completed self-report questionnaires endorsing types of cannabis used, methods of consuming and acquiring cannabis, and ranking of potential harm and benefit of consumption methods.

Results

The majority (N=573; 89.7% of participants) endorsed past-30-day use of Δ-9 THC, regardless of legal status. There was significantly greater use of alternate cannabis forms in states where Δ-9 THC remains illegal (past-90-day: χ2(2)=16.78, p<.001; past-30-day: χ2(2)=9.50, p=.009). Individuals from states with legal recreational cannabis most frequently purchased cannabis legally (52.0%), but high levels of non-legal purchase existed regardless of legal status (47.5%). Participants reported primarily consuming Δ-9 THC through smoking (86.1%), CBD through ingestion (50.5%), and alternative cannabis types through vaping (43.8-57.7%). Average harm rankings were lower for smoking if it was the primary method of consumption.

Conclusions

Individuals purchased and consumed cannabis regardless of legal status and legal status was not significantly associated with harm or benefit rating, controlling for demographic and use data. Individuals appear more likely to purchase through legal means, if available.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports

Available online 14 March 2026, 100431

By Steven Dudley, et al.

Although traditional synthetic opioid strongholds like the United States and Canada appear to be experiencing a stabilization of their illicit fentanyl market—evidenced by a historic reduction in overdose deaths 1—synthetic opioids continue to expand across the globe, creating widespread health and security concerns. Existing explanations for the rise and stabilization of these markets focus on economic incentives, supply-chain disruption, precursor controls, consumption patterns, and public-health interventions. But the role of organized crime in structuring retail distribution has been largely overlooked. The experience of Mexico’s northern border illustrates that local criminal governance can be a decisive factor in determining where and how new drug markets take root. Fentanyl, for example, has quietly reshaped drug markets in Mexico and upended some widely held assumptions of how larger criminal groups interact with these markets. As local criminal organizations became major producers and exporters of the synthetic opioid to the United States, domestic consumption also emerged in key trafficking corridors. In Tijuana and Mexicali in Baja California, Hermosillo and Nogales in Sonora, and Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua, the transnational fentanyl economy has taken root locally, generating unprecedented public health and security pressures. This expansion, however, has been uneven, and the criminal actors who control local drug economies are far from monolithic. Across northern Mexico, fragmented local factions—sometimes linked to larger organizations, sometimes operating with considerable autonomy—determine what reaches consumers and under what conditions. Retail fentanyl markets have therefore expanded not simply in response to demand or price signals, but according to thestrategic decisions of local criminal groups. In Baja California, these groups actively promoted fentanyl sales, enabling the market to consolidate. In Sonoran cities and Ciudad Juárez, they restricted distribution, confining consumption to specific user niches.Overall, the impact on the ground has been substantial. The introduction of fentanyl triggered waves of overdose deaths and serious health effects among users. Although there are signs that the crisis may have stabilized in some areas, the risks persist, and the problem remains underestimated in official statistics, limiting the effectiveness of institutional responses that are already ill-equipped to address it. This report aims to provide a deeper understanding of this issue. It examines fentanyl consumption dynamics in the cities mentioned, traces the evolution of the market, and outlines the distribution networks that sustain it. Additionally, it analyzes the models of criminal control over local drug markets and assesses the state’s response to date. A central question running through the analysis is why fentanyl did not spread uniformly across these cities and what role local criminal structures played in that divergence.

Washington DC: Insight Crime, 2026. 66p.

By Lucia Dammert

Extortion is a phenomenon that can be understood from various disciplines, such as economics, criminology, the political sciences, and sociology. Each of these fields of knowledge emphasizes either the system or economic models under which extortionists and victims operate, the short- or long-term relationship sought by establishing simple or complex extortion mechanisms, the political relationship between extortionists and victims, or citizens’ perceptions of the institutional framework, which can serve as a gateway for criminal groups to create ties of protection through extortion. The complexity of extortion, given the different forms it can take and the ease with which it can be confused or linked with other crimes, such as kidnapping or corruption, calls for an open discussion and the establishment of research agendas. This report sheds light on the importance of extortive practices in Latin America. It is based on qualitative research since 2019 that includes 36 interviews of academics, public officials, police, professionals, and victims of extortion in 10 countries,5 along with a review of all official public information and newspapers in five countries during 2019.6 The research also focuses on working groups and reviews official and civil society documents related to extortion as a criminal phenomenon throughout Latin America. The report is part of a long-term research project that focuses on the importance of this criminal activity, its possible links to organized crime organizations, and the policies designed to tackle its impact on businesses and citizens alike.

The report shows that extortive practices are a regionwide trend, albeit with national, specific characteristics. Although it is primarily a non-violent crime, an increasing tendency— specifically linked to practices against women—should make it a priority for the public security agenda. Furthermore, extortion could be depicted as the “perfect crime” since it is hardly reported, let alone investigated. High levels of impunity have allowed for this practice to move into criminal organizations, prisons, and street gangs; also, state officials and even business partners use extortive practices to finance their activities. There is a clear impact on democracy since corruption, fear of crime, and a general sense of freedom from punishment corroborate the idea that there is no rule of law. Efforts toward understanding extortion remain limited and need to take a central role in most national and regional public security policies. 

By Pilar Lizana , Maria Nizzero and Carlos Solar

This paper highlights the critical need for Chile to strengthen its asset-recovery frameworks to combat the growing threat of organised crime and money laundering. It provides an in-depth analysis of the structural challenges hindering Chile's ability to trace, seize and recover illicit assets, and situates these findings within the broader Latin American and global security context. The authors identify key obstacles, including limited risk understanding, weak state governance, gaps in cooperation and information sharing and deficiencies in asset recovery systems. The paper offers actionable recommendations to enhance Chile's institutional resilience and contribute to regional and international security efforts.

Key Recommendations

• Establish a centralised asset-management office to ensure effective administration and preservation of confiscated assets.

• Invest in training and capacity building to improve risk understanding and investigative capabilities across public and private sectors.

• Strengthen public–private cooperation to enhance information sharing and risk mitigation strategies.

• Increase human, financial and technological resources for agencies combating organised crime and recovering assets.

• Update legislation to include extended confiscation and non-conviction-based confiscation mechanisms, aligning with international standards.

This paper underscores the importance of sustained reforms and international cooperation to disrupt transnational criminal networks and safeguard democratic governance in Chile and beyond.

By Sou Lee 

The purpose of this study is to gain a holistic understanding of the Asian gang phenomenon through the application of a meta-synthesis, which is seldom utilized within the criminal justice and criminology discipline. Noblit and Hare’s (1988) seven step guidelines for synthesizing qualitative research informed this methodology. Through this process, 15 studies were selected for synthesis. The synthesis of these studies not only identified prevalent themes across the sample, but also provided the basis for creating overarching metaphors that captured the collective experience of Asian gang members. Through the interpretive ordering of these metaphors, a line of synthesis argument was developed in which three major inferences about the Asian gang experience were made. First, regardless of ethnic and geographic differences, the experiences of Asian gangs and their members are similar. Second, although extant literature has applied different theories to explain gang membership for individual ethnic gangs (e.g. Chinese, Vietnamese), this synthesis revealed that the dominant theory for explaining the onset and persistence of Asian gangs is Vigil’s (1988) multiple marginality theory. Finally, in comparison to the broader literature, Asian gangs are more similar than they are different to non-Asian gangs because of their overlap in values.

Thesis, 2016. 127p.

By Crest Advisory

Crest Advisory was commissioned by the Accelerated Capability Environment (ACE) on behalf of the Office of the Police Chief Scientific Adviser (OPCSA) to conduct research examining the social and psychological impacts of deepfakes on victims, with a focus on violence against women and girls (VAWG). This rapid evidence review compiles relevant literature which informed our lines of enquiry and refined the scope of our primary research and engagement, including a public attitudes survey. This document has been iterated throughout the commission to ensure it is up to date at the time of writing (July 2025) and captures relevant emerging literature. Deepfakes refer to any audio, image or video which has been digitally altered using machine learning methods. This includes fraudulent, political, or humorous content, as well as intimate images and pornography. However, in line with the focus of this commission, our evidence review focuses on deepfake violence against women and girls (VAWG). This focus reflects evidence that the vast majority of deepfake videos are sexualised in nature, with women being the disproportionate target of this abuse.

By

María Fernanda Rodríguez, Nicolás Espejo Yaksic

The IBA assumed the challenge of contributing to a profound and urgent transformation, under the conviction that protecting the rights of children is not only a legal and ethical obligation, but also an essential investment in strengthening the rule of law.

As such, this report highlights existing challenges as well as good practices and proposes a roadmap to advance toward a child-centered justice system, as part of the commitment to leave no one behind within the framework of the 2030 Agenda.

Likewise, the report seeks to be a tool for articulation. A meeting point for governments, the judiciary, ombudsmen, prosecutors, civil society, academia, international organizations, but most importantly, for the voices of children and adolescents.

The preparation of this report involved participants from the justice ecosystem across the region. In line with this collective effort, the report includes a detailed analysis of the drafting process of the Ibero-American Common Rules on Restorative Juvenile Criminal Justice, led by the main justice networks and regional bodies.

The report is divided up into the following sections:

Section 1–Regional Context

Section 2–Access to Justice and the Development Agenda: People-Centered and Child-Centered Justice

Section 3–Principles of Child-Centered Justice: Progress in the Region

Section 4–Vision and Regional Agenda

By Sarah Picard, Leah Nelson, Rae Walker, Kasey Eickmeyer, and Ellie Wilson

Every year, courts across the United States impose millions of dollars in fines, fees, and restitution on people convicted of traffic violations, misdemeanors, and felonies. Collectively, monetary sanctions and other criminal justice fees are referred to as legal financial obligations or simply court debt. Ostensibly, court debt is intended to sanction offenders, recover the costs of running a court system, raise revenue, and compensate victims of crime. In most jurisdictions, however, court debt is assessed without considering an individual’s ability to pay, and much of what is owed goes uncollected. Estimates suggest that there are approximately $27.6 billion in outstanding obligations. In addition to being an unreliable source of revenue, court debt can have severe and long-standing consequences for those who owe, exposing them to increasing debt, future incarceration related to unpaid debt, and the suspension of voting rights, among other collateral consequences. In jurisdictions across the country, court debt also has a disproportionate effect on the economically disadvantaged, as well as Black and Latino individuals and communities. Many of the equity and collateral consequences described above hold true for court debt assessment and collection in Jefferson County and across Alabama, as documented in a 2018 survey with over 800 Alabama residents who owed court debt. This research attracted the attention of judges in the Tenth Circuit Court in Jefferson County (home to Birmingham) who worked with Leah Nelson, lead researcher on the 2018 survey, and MDRC to develop the Jefferson County Equitable Fines and Fees (JEFF) Project, a multidisciplinary study of the scope and consequences of court debt in the county. With funding from Arnold Ventures, the JEFF Project began in 2022. The findings in this report reflect multiple lines of inquiry, including descriptive and inferential analyses of five years of case-level court data, in-depth interviews with court practitioners, and focus group discussions with individuals who have direct experience with court debt in Jefferson County. Taken together, these analyses point to a system that is neither effective in generating revenue for the court, nor fair, given its outsized impact on Black and indigent people living in poor communities. Over the five years of the study, just under half of the individuals who owed court debt paid in full, with many seeing their debt burden grow over time. The research team also isolated some of the major factors that contribute to debt growth, which include race and economic disadvantage, in addition to factors related to how debt is collected, most notably the practice of assessing a 30 percent late fee on those who do not submit a payment within 90 days. Both court practitioners and individuals who are directly affected viewed the current system as broken, with the latter describing serious financial, emotional, and collateral consequences. Findings from the JEFF Project have already prompted the reconsideration of current practices in Jefferson County, including a pilot project to reduce debt burdens and encourage payments, and the creation of a statewide task force that will examine fines and fees across Alabama. Finally, given that Jefferson County is home to a midsized  city situated in a fiscally and socially conservative state, its social and geographic characteristics make it a useful reference for many cities and counties looking to make changes in their fines and fees systems.

Nobody ever spoke to me like that before.” Improving Interactions Within the Justice System. Recommended practices from national clinical experts convened by the NYC Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice & Center for Justice Innovation

By The New York City Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice

Most people who are arrested in New York City are not rearrested while they wait for a decision about the outcome of their case. However, a small group are rearrested at substantially elevated rates. And despite their clear need for supportive services, most of this group never receive intensive mental health, emotional health, or behavioral health interventions at any point during their time in the justice system. Instead, most interactions people experience as they journey through the justice system are limited to a series of brief mandated encounters—check-ins, needs assessments, reminders, hearings. Despite their brevity, these encounters represent key intervention points1 with the potential to change individuals’ future well-being and behavior, either negatively or positively, through inevitable influences on their emotional and psychological well-being. As New York City grapples with how to adequately serve people at highest need and highest risk of justice involvement, the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice and the Center for Justice Innovation convened a national roundtable of clinical experts in Manhattan on October 12, 2023. Participants were asked to distill their expertise and apply it to the range of processes that practitioners most frequently navigate within the criminal court system context. The goal was to identify key opportunities for making these processes as therapeutic and impactful as possible under the constraints of system-based practice—in New York City and across the country. This roundtable focused on the interactions most system-involved people actually have on a daily basis. Specifically, intake screenings, routine monitoring appointments, and other brief mandated interventions are critical opportunities for providing trauma-informed care, which recognizes and responds to the high rates of trauma that people involved in the justice system experience.2 Often, this trauma is experienced both prior to3 and as a result of their involvement in the system.4 Making use of these opportunities could go a long way toward increasing court appearances, reducing rearrests, and increasing engagement in longer-term supportive and therapeutic services. As the city continues to wrestle with the twin challenges of reducing crime and incarceration and improving behavioral health care in the city, this roundtable could not come at a more critical moment. The roundtable sought to connect overall principles to concrete practices. While practitioners often refer to principles such as being trauma-informed, meeting people where they’re at, strengths based, and non-judgmental, what does that actually look like in practice? And how can staff reconcile these most effectively with accountability? What specific words or actions generate increased engagement and connection with people who do not trust systems of any kind, much less the justice system? This brief provides a list of concrete recommendations for providers, distilled from the roundtable discussion. It should be noted that none of these recommendations should be taken as conclusive or unequivocally endorsed by the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice. Instead, MOCJ is providing a summary of the recommendations provided by experts based on their experiences in the field.

By Galen Lamphere-England

Gaming is now the most profitable form of entertainment worldwide, with over 3.42 billion people playing some form of games, accounting for a market of $187.7 billion engaging across consoles, PCs, and mobile devices.1 Nearly nine in ten children in middle and upper-income countries play online games2 . While online multiplayer games foster social connection, creativity, and communitybuilding, they are also increasingly exploited by violent organizations, ranging from non-state armed groups in conflict-affected settings to hybrid criminal networks. These actors use gaming spaces to propagandize, groom, recruit, and organize, leveraging gaming platforms' social and technical features to target children and young players. This policy brief examines how gaming ecosystems are being exploited to socialize and recruit children to participate in organized violence and provides recommendations for policymakers, practitioners working with children, and the gaming industry to safeguard children in online gaming environments. Online gaming is neither inherently harmful nor a direct cause of violence, but its social and technical infrastructure is being exploited at scale by malign actors. 3 Indeed, as the American Psychological Association framed the issue in a 2020 resolution, “attributing violence to violent video gaming is not scientifically sound and draws attention away from other factors.”4 At the same time, specific harms are affecting children via online gaming today. To protect children and young players, industry leaders, regulators, law enforcement, and practitioners working with children must act now, establishing robust prevention, detection, and response strategies that ensure children can enjoy their right to play and their right to be protected from violence. Gaming’s prosperous future depends on ensuring its spaces remain safe, inclusive, and free from children being targeted by violent actors and organizations. This report provides a series of recommendations to help achieve that aim.

By Tobias Auer and Tom Kirchmaier

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.