By The Policing Project at NYU School of Law 

  The story of the Chicago Neighborhood Policing Initiative begins in 2019. At that time, the City of Chicago faced a number of serious challenges involving crime and community confidence in the police. Decades-long concerns about discriminatory policing, police accountability, use of force, external oversight, and community responsiveness had reached a critical point that demanded action. Following the police shooting of Laquan McDonald, the United States Department of Justice investigated and found a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing by the Chicago Police Department (CPD), linking a lack of public trust to reduced crime prevention effectiveness. Within this environment, CPD personnel visited New York City to learn about the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) recently developed Neighborhood Policing model. That approach focused on reorganizing patrol activities in police districts to allow officers to engage meaningfully with the community and address local issues. The NYPD credited this method with enhancing community involvement and revitalizing focus on community policing. It is worth noting that Chicago’s original, groundbreaking community policing model, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), shared many features with the NYPD model, such as promoting partnership with community. But CAPS became under-resourced over time and today is a stand-alone program focused on community events rather than crime strategy. Identifying the NYPD model as a promising approach to improving public safety and relationships with the community, CPD leadership asked the Policing Project at New York University School of Law to work with the Department and local communities to develop a strategy to re-imagine the NYPD model to meet the needs and particular challenges of Chicago. Since 2019, the Policing Project has been supporting the development and implementation of the model, made possible by the partnership of a dedicated coalition of Chicago philanthropic organizations. The Neighborhood Policing Initiative (NPI) is a core policing strategy focused on problem-solving and crime reduction activities, undertaken in collaboration with neighborhood residents in a manner that builds trust between police and community. Through NPI, the community and the police share responsibility for addressing public safety issues in communities. NPI’s goal is to transform the community-police dynamic to produce meaningful public safety. Rather than solely relying on traditional police responses, NPI seeks to bring together Chicago communities to identify problems and develop solutions to guide police efforts going forward.  NPI’s vision is for this philosophy to permeate every level of the Department, equipping CPD and the communities it serves to reach a shared understanding of what policing should look like. Under NPI, residents are an ongoing, central part of the actual decision-making process on how they are policed.

New York: NYU University School of Law, Policing Project, 2025. 118p.   

Sandra Walklate , Charlotte Barlow

The purpose of this paper is to develop an understanding of positive policing in relation to domestic abuse by opening up what is meant by this approach through an examination of what is taken for granted about it within much of the academic literature. Using data from a small-scale study involving case file analysis and interviews with police officers, the paper suggests in practice, positive policing involves a wide range of actions on the part of police officers. In exploring this data, the paper introduces the concept of ‘contextual safeguarding’ as a key feature of ‘positive policing’ in relation to domestic abuse. The paper makes the case for understanding ‘positive policing’ in the context of domestic abuse through the lens of ‘contextual safeguarding’ and that this would have beneficial consequences for wider debates on this issue.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Volume 19, 2025,

 By Lokniti in collaboration with Common Cause.Despite the prohibition of torture being a provision of the Indian Constitution, custodial torture by the police remains widespread and under-reported. A strong societal belief in the utility of torture as a response to crime normalises its use by the police. Cases of police brutality are generally brushed away and only come to light when they result in death. Fewer still result in inquiries or punitive actions against perpetrators. This SPIR study aims to address the normalisation of police violence by establishing reliable and accurate data on public perception of police violence. Unlike previous SPIR reports, the 2025 study does not account for the views of the common citizens but rather directly explores the perceptions of those in authority- police personnel. The study explores the patterns and practices of routine policing that eventually contribute to the use of violence by the police in their day-to-day operations, such as detention, investigation, arrest and interrogation. The study is designed to be utilised for policy and advocacy. It offers key insights into personnel’s belief in the rule of law and level of legal training.The study investigates the nature and contexts of custodial torture and police brutality in India. Furthermore, it examines the trends of official denial. To understand the enmeshment of law enforcement and society that creates propensities to violence, the survey data assesses police opinions on various parameters, such as frequent crimes and arrests, crime control measures, moral policing and mob violence. Police perceptions of the criminal justice system and its functioning, trials and justice-seekers are also assessed. The study engages with personnel’s views on justifications for custodial violence and torture during arrests, engagements with witnesses, interrogations, etc. In the same vein, the survey also probes into police personnel’s views of judicial scrutiny and accountability of custodial deaths, brutality and “encounters”. Views of other stakeholders involved in the process, such as lawyers, doctors, and judges, on police and magisterial accountability are recounted in the scope of the SPIR, too. Finally, the report evaluates the quality and status of official records on police torture and violence.The survey was conducted in 17 Indian states with a sample of 8,276 police personnel across rural areas, capital cities and urban areas. Of the respondents, 85 per cent were male respondents and the rest were female. 59 per cent of respondent personnel were of constabulary rank, forty per cent of upper subordinate rank and one per cent of IPS level ranks.

New Delhi: Common Cause and Lokniti - Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) , 2025. 218p.

By Byeongjun Kim

 Most previous research on inequality in policing has been limited to race and gender. To widen the knowledge of inequality in policing, this study took note of the location as a novel domain based on varying crime rates by area. The data for the study were drawn from the Crime Survey for England and Wales in 2007–2008 and 2017– 2018. Also, it used the stop-and-search data from 2015 to 2018 and the key facts and fgures taken from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). The study has been structured into two models. Model 1 examined if there are diferences between regions in citizens’ attitudes towards the police in England. It used one-way analysis of variance as a statistical technique and analysed the efect of the region (independent variable) of England on citizens’ attitudes towards the police (dependent variable). Model 2 analysed the efect of several factors: The stop-and-search rate, residential population, police ofce size, and budget on citizens’ attitudes towards the police to fnd causes of the diferences in the attitudes by region using simple linear regression. The study found that there were spatial diferences in citizens’ attitudes towards the police between regions. In addition, surprisingly, the stop-and-search per 1,000 people had a positive efect on citizens’ attitudes towards the police, which contrasted with previous research suggesting a negative efect of stop-and-search on public support. However, the other factors: Population, police ofce size, and budget did not afect citizens’ attitudes towards the police. In conclusion, there is regional inequality in public opinion of policing, and the public opinion of the police is positively afected by the number of police use of stop-and-search.

  Security Journal (2025) 38:56

By Sami Aftab Abdul , Huan Jiang , .Cayley Russell  , Tara Elton-Marshall ,  et al.

Background

British Columbia, Canada implemented a three-year pilot program on January 31, 2023 decriminalizing personal possession of select illegal drugs. The policy aimed to increase access to health and social services. This analysis evaluated the short-term impacts of decriminalization on clients dispensed opioid agonist treatment (OAT) medications and visits to supervised consumption and overdose prevention services (SCS/OPS).

Methods

Population-based data from 2015 to 2023 were sourced (Pre-decriminalization: Jan 2015–Jan 2023; Post-decriminalization Feb 2023–Dec 2023). Generalized additive models in an interrupted time series design were used to model monthly total and sex-stratified, age-standardized rates of clients and first-time clients dispensed OAT medications per 100,000 population, as well as crude rates of visits to SCS/OPS per 100,000 population. The models tested both immediate level changes (immediate effect at decriminalization) and trend changes (slope changes post-decriminalization).

Results

The models detected no association between decriminalization and changes in clients dispensed OAT medications (Immediate Change β [95 % CI]: −0.001 [−0.012, 0.011]; Trend Change β [95 % CI]: −0.004 [−0.011, 0.003]), first-time clients dispensed OAT medications (Immediate Change β [95 % CI]: 0.115 [−0.049, 0.279]; Trend Change β [95 % CI]: −0.006 [−0.048, 0.035]) or visits to SCS/OPS (Immediate Change β [95 % CI]: 0.048 [−0.100, 0.195]; Trend Change β [95 % CI]: 0.013 [−0.016, 0.043]). Findings for all outcomes remained consistent after stratifying by sex.

Conclusion

Decriminalization was not associated with changes in clients dispensed OAT medications, first-time clients dispensed OAT medications, or visits to SCS/OPS. These findings reflect only the initial eleven months following the implementation of the policy. Given the complexity of factors influencing service utilization, and the introduction of the second amendment which represents a significant rollback of the original exemption, longer-term evaluations are needed to more accurately assess whether decriminalization is contributing to its intended goals.

Journal of Substance Use and Addiction Treatment

Volume 180, January 2026, 209815

By Corentin Cohen

This article looks at the discourses regarding Nigerian confraternities’ expansion to Europe. It analyses how networks of individuals working together for solidarity, economic or political objectives became categorized as organised crime or as a mafia. I use original data and police investigations, interviews with members and victims, judges, police officers, and journalists to show how the work of French and Italian institutions led to the emergence and transformation of discourses regarding the “Nigerian mafia” which, in the context of the 2015 migration crisis, came to designate confraternities. The circulation of these categories and frames cannot only be accounted for by the work of state institutions, but needs to be analysed through the sociology of information production and practices, which explains the effects of circular reporting, imposition of frames and narratives coming directly from investigations on criminal issues instead of other approaches to Nigerian migration.

Trends Organ Crim 26, 340–357 (2023

By Eduard Ballesté-Isern & Carles Feixa 

This paper is based on an ethnographic study of the arrests and the subsequent trial and sentencing of a group of Latin Kings and Queens from Barcelona between 2015 and 2020. We analyze the actions carried out by the police, judicial institutions and media to reestablish the “hard handed” discourse in relation to these youth street groups in a time of crisis and precariousness. The concept of a “space of youth street groups” is used to construct a tool for mapping the agents who interact with these groups and the position they occupy in the social space. The interactions between these agents in Barcelona configure a new form of security governance through the creation of subjective insecurity and the promotion of punitive policies against youth street groups.

Crit Crim 30, 741–756 (2022)

By Raúl Zepeda Gil

Violence rising in Latin America since the early 1990s has puzzled media, policymakers and academia. Characterising high scales of violence in non-political confrontations has been one of the main challenges. The main argument of this essay is that the hybrid criminal nature of violence in Latin America by non-state organisations has pushed the discussion to several misinterpretations and conceptual stretching that produces fog rather than clarity. Instead, this essay proposes a concept of criminal war that can capture the complex nature of violence in Latin America by drawing convergences and divergences from diverse fields of literature and confronting usual mischaracterisations in current Latin American research.

Third World QuarTerly, 2023, Vol. 44, No. 4, 776–794

By : M. Richardson, M. Newman, G. Berry, C. Stansfield, A. Coombe & J. Hodgkinson

• Objective

  To identify and map evaluations of interventions on gang violence using innovative systematic review methods to inform future research needs.

  Methods

  A previous iteration of this map (Hodgkinson et al., (2009). “Reducing gang-related crime: A systematic review of ‘comprehensive’ interventions.”) was updated in 2021/22 with inclusion of evaluations since the original searches in 2006. Innovative automatic searching and screening was used concurrently with a ‘conventional’ strategy that utilised 58 databases and other online resources. Data were presented in an online interactive evidence gap map.

  Results

  Two hundred and forty-eight evaluations were described, including 114 controlled studies, characterised as comprehensive interventions, encompassing more than one distinct type of intervention.

  Conclusion

  This suggests a substantial body of previously unidentified robust evidence on interventions that could be synthesised to inform policy and practice decision-making. Further research is needed to investigate the extent to which using automated methodologies can improve the efficiency and quality of systematic reviews.

•  J Exp Criminol 20, 1125–1146 (2024).

By  Lucia Bird | Saša Đorđević | Fatjona Mejdini 

Western Balkans criminal groups, comprising both Albanian- and Slavic-speaking networks, have become dominant players in the global cocaine trade. While their influence in Europe and Latin America has been well documented, their growing role in West Africa has largely flown under the radar. Since 2019, these groups have expanded their operations in West Africa, using the region as a critical logistical, storage and redistribution hub for cocaine shipments en route to European consumption markets and beyond. This expansion has been shaped by their effective leverage of geography, governance weaknesses and infrastructure, both hard and digital. Initially limited to occasional trafficking links, the Western Balkan groups have deepened their presence across West Africa’s coastal states, including Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde. This growing focus on West Africa was driven by rising demand for cocaine in Europe, increased enforcement on direct routes to Europe and strengthened partnerships with Latin American cartels, especially Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). Western Balkan groups now operate through multiple trafficking methods in West Africa, exploiting fully containerized routes, non-containerized shipments (i.e. shipments not stored in containers, but hidden elsewhere on vessels) by other types of vessels, trans-shipments at sea and in-region containerization to conceal the cocaine’s origin. They have embedded brokers in West African countries who organize logistics, establish infrastructure and liaise with local actors. In Sierra Leone, for example, they have reportedly established companies to launder funds and warehouses to store and repackage cocaine, coordinating onward shipments through formal seaports using legitimate cargo. These brokers are key to operations and are often shared among the different groups. The groups’ structures are flexible and typically consist of small, trusted units supported by collaborators. Groups leverage local vulnerabilities to build relationships with corrupt law enforcement, port operators and security services. Particularly significant Western Balkan groups in West Africa include the Montenegrin Kavač clan and its rival, the Škaljari clan. The Kavač clan’s operations have been linked to ports in Brazil and Sierra Leone, with brokers overseeing logistics from Freetown. As we explain in this report, in some cases a single broker will work with more than one group from the Western Balkans. In parallel, Albanian-speaking groups, which have a strong presence in Spain and Brazil, have been operating through countries including Senegal and Gambia, sometimes collaborating with the Italian ‘Ndrangheta or the PCC. The example of an Albanian national who, according to Brazilian law enforcement investigations, is a major European supplier coordinating shipments through West Africa from Brazil, exemplifies the growing use of multi-tonne cocaine operations routed through the Gulf of Guinea. Looking ahead, Western Balkan groups are likely to further entrench themselves in West Africa, gradually relying less on their alliances with the ‘Ndrangheta, the PCC and other Western Balkan groups and instead investing directly in infrastructure and protection mechanisms. As in Latin America, their growing presence is likely to be accompanied by deeper corruption, potential violence and fragmentation into more autonomous cells. To address the growing role of Western Balkan criminal groups in West Africa, a coordinated response should focus on three key pillars. First, strategic cross-continental partnerships should be built with law enforcement, port authorities and international actors, underpinned by a political-economy analysis, to strengthen cooperation and to identify aligned priorities. Second, an enhanced data picture, drawing on a wider range of formal and informal sources, is needed to map trafficking routes and financial flows more effectively and to empower regional and international actors to tailor their risk assessments of specific routes, to profile criminal actors and to develop viable strategies for detection and disruption. Third, smart targeting strategies that prioritize brokers should be adopted, supported by parallel financial and criminal investigations. 

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime   2025. 61p.

By The International Crisis Group

  Principal Findings : What’s new? In President Nayib Bukele’s first year in office, El Salvador has seen a sharp drop in what long were sky-high murder rates. While the public celebrates his well-known “iron fist” policies, the reasons for success might lie in quiet, informal understandings between gangs and the government. Why does it matter? It is a major feat to reduce killings by the three main gangs in one of the world’s most violent countries. But the precise causes of the decline are complex and often unclear. Recent outbreaks of gang violence and political mudslinging underline the fragility and reversibility of this achievement. What should be done? Sustaining violence reduction is key. The government should prioritise community-focused development, rehabilitation of jailed gang members and more sophisticated policing efforts, including internal checks on security forces. Should gangs keep violence down and cooperate with authorities during the pandemic, Bukele should consider opening channels for local dialogue with them.   

  After decades of harrowing gang crime, homicides have plunged in El Salvador on the watch of the new president, Nayib Bukele. Faced with the growth of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, previous governments resorted to “iron fist” policies to crush them, only to find these fuelled a backlash. Since his 2019 election, President Bukele, a self-styled outsider, has won huge public support by presiding over a 60 per cent fall in murders. Yet prospects that this achievement will endure are in doubt. The collapsing homicide rate may stem not only from the government’s public security policies, but also from the gangs’ own decision to curb bloodshed, possibly due to a fragile non-aggression deal with authorities. In addition, Bukele’s confrontational style, which has been exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, risks entangling his security reforms in political battles. Broadly backed efforts to support affected communities, assist members wishing to leave gangs and encourage local peacebuilding are more likely to end definitively El Salvador’s cycle of violence. The Bukele administration argues that the plummeting murder rate – with daily killings now standing at their lowest rate since the end of the country’s civil war (1980- 1992) – represents the crowning achievement of a new security strategy. In theory, the government’s Territorial Control Plan couples robust law enforcement with violence prevention schemes. It has reinforced joint police and military patrols in 22 municipalities suffering high rates of crime, while toughening confinement measures in jails in a bid to sever communications between inmates and the outside world. At the same time, the government’s goal of building dozens of “cubes” – glass-walled recreational and education centres – represents the flagship effort to brighten the lives of young people growing up under gang dominion and prevent recruitment into their ranks. The precise reasons for the nationwide drop in homicides are hard to pin down. Statistical studies show that the Territorial Control Plan is most likely not the sole cause; specific local falls in murder rates do not correspond precisely to those areas where the plan has been implemented. Instead, in large part, gangs appear to have themselves decided to scale back their use of lethal violence. Unassailable control over communities, declining gang rivalry and increasingly autonomous gang leadership outside jails may explain this decision more than the Territorial Control Plan. Yet other government policies might have played a role: numerous analysts and local activists ascribe the gangs’ move to an informal understanding between them and the authorities, who have allegedly ordered security forces to dial back their clashes with these groups. A sudden killing spree attributed to MS-13 in April illustrated just how precarious the gangs’ commitment to reducing violence can be. Bukele’s reaction to the attacks, which left over 80 dead in a five-day span, reaffirmed his inclination to adopt punitive measures to force gangs into submission. Images shared around the world from inside El Salvador’s high-security jails revealed inmates huddled together or forced into shared cells without any access to daylight. Although murder rates have since fallen again, the risk remains that gangs, now short of extortion income due to lockdown measures and indignant at the government’s crackdown, will once again resort to extreme violence.  

  Crisis Group Latin America Report N°81, 8 July 2020  

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 46p.

By The International Crisis Group

Born of Port-au-Prince’s most powerful gangs, Viv Ansanm has raised the criminal threat overhanging Haiti’s state and civilians to alarming heights. The gang coalition announced itself to the world by besieging the Haitian capital in early 2024, triggering former Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation. After consolidating its hold on much of the city, Viv Ansanm has expanded into neighbouring departments, tightened its grip on the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country and mounted attacks on the airport, essentially cutting Haiti off. Gangs’ violent offensives have killed over 16,000 people since 2022. But a rising death toll and diversifying criminal portfolio, now including extortion, piracy and drug trafficking, have not stopped gangs from claiming to represent the country’s downtrodden, especially on social media. UN approval of a new foreign force to combat the gangs could shift the balance of power. But it is vital that plans are in place not just to overpower the gangs but also to persuade them to demobilise. Haitian business and political elites have relied on paramilitary forces to protect their interests since the 1950s dictatorship of Francois Duvalier, or “Papa Doc”. But in the wake of the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gangs have mutated, evolving from tools in the hands of the most powerful to overlords of Haiti. Two main gang groupings – the G-9, whose most public figure was Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and the Gpèp, under Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as “Ti Gabriel” – fought for supremacy after Moïse’s murder. Even as the two faced off, gang leaders discussed whether to strike agreements to scale down the death toll among their members and spare resources. Mediators managed to craft several pacts among local groups to divvy up coveted turf. Late in 2023, reports emerged that the country’s two main gang coalitions had merged into one platform; their first joint offensive began months later replace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. Alongside its violent expansion, Viv Ansanm has sought to transform its public profile from that of a predatory criminal force into that of an ideological crusader. Crime bosses say their mission is to protect the poorest Haitians from rapacious elites and colonial powers that historically have oppressed this black Caribbean nation. Chérizier and other gang leaders have even announced the creation of a new political party, albeit without taking the steps needed to register it formally. While continuing to enrich themselves at the expense of Haitians rich and poor, their message has nevertheless become more overtly political: they appear intent on guaranteeing that their allies are part of the next administration, which should be formed by 7 February 2026 toreplace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. A well-resourced, properly informed and expertly commanded Gang Suppression Force could help change the balance of force on the ground and push the gangs onto the back foot. Port-au-Prince and its foreign counterparts, however, must take care to mitigate the dangers of civilian casualties and violations of human rights, ensuring that robust accountability systems are in place. Once the force is up and running, the Haitian government should also overcome the coordination failures that have plagued previous security campaigns. In particular, the government should appoint members to the National Security Council and ask them to design a strategy that lays out each institution’s role in fighting the gangs. Even so, it remains unlikely that force aone will entirely extricate gangs from the communities they control or sever the nexus with politics that has bedevilled Haiti for over half a century. Though informal negotiations with gangs take place on a regular basis – to gain access to people in need of humanitarian aid or to keep businesses open – many Haitians oppose the idea of formal dialogue with the perpetrators of crimes they consider unforgivable. Government officials have correctly said the Haitian state cannot engage in talks from a position of weakness. But if the new multinational force and revamped Haitian security forces allow the authorities to gain the upper hand and broadcast their armed superiority, state officials should look to use dialogue as a means of convincing the gangs to cut their losses, reduce violence against civilians and, eventually, demobilise

While that happens, the administration, with the support of donors, should expand the program that is now providing exit ramps for minors in the gangs’ ranks. In cooperation with international experts, it should also start to design a transitional justice system that provides benefits and a measure of judicial reprieve to those who disarm and cooperate with the authorities, while also guaranteeing that there will be no general impunity. It is hard to understate the damage gangs have wrought in Haiti, killing and raping thousands, creating the hemisphere’s worst humanitarian crisis and destroying the lives of millions. Understandably, many Haitians refuse to contemplate responding to the horrors they have endured with anything less than crushing retaliation. But even if the Gang Suppression Force lives up to its promise, it is hard to compute the possible cost in lives and resources of a campaign to destroy the gangs. At some stage, negotiations from a position of strength aimed at protecting civilians and disarming the gangs would serve Haiti far better as a first step on the long path to stability.

Port-au-Prince/New York/London/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 49p.

By Mary Holper

Prolonged mandatory immigration detention has become the norm, not the exception. We have arrived at this moment because immigration detention is supposedly exceptional, subject to different constitutional norms than other civil detention. When the Supreme Court first examined a facial due process challenge to mandatory immigration detention in its 2003 decision in Demore v. Kim, immigration detention exceptionalism caused the Court to uphold mandatory detention. Absent from the Court's analysis was an entire body of due process jurisprudence, most of which developed in the 1970s, which questioned the government's purposes behind civil detention and required significant procedural protections in order for the government to deprive a person of liberty. In the wake of Demore, courts considering as-applied challenges to prolonged mandatory detention formulated multi-factor tests as a method of interpreting the statute to avoid unconstitutional detention. These tests provided an important counterweight to immigration detention exceptionalism and predictability for litigants, but most of the factors are irrelevant to a federal district court in deciding whether prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates a detainee's due process rights. Courts have been taking out the scales to engage in due process balancing, but putting the wrong weights on the scales.

Courts are beginning to discard these multi-factor tests and instead applying the Supreme Court's 1976 Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process test to decide whether prolonged mandatory immigration detention is unconstitutional. The Mathews balancing test, which considers the private interests at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's interests, has been welcomed in immigration law because it encourages courts to first focus on an individual noncitizen's liberty interest. Mathews thus counteracts immigration detention exceptionalism, which focuses exclusively on the government's interest and finds that removable detainees have no liberty interest whatsoever. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is the first circuit court to shift its test, transitioning to Mathews balancing in 2024 to decide whether mandatory detention was unreasonably prolonged. As a cautionary note, an attempt at transitioning the balancing test led the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 2024, to reject all forms of balancing, embrace immigration detention exceptionalism, and hold that any length of mandatory detention is acceptable during removal proceedings. This Article argues that courts can make prolonged mandatory immigration detention exceptional by continuing the work of the Second Circuit in applying the Mathews procedural due process balancing test instead of the existing multi-factor tests.

 Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 662

By Rasmus Munksgaard, Kim Moeller & Theresa Dyrvig Henriksen

Sex workers in Europe are increasingly of nonnational origin. The Schengen cooperation allows internal migration within the European Union, but many migrant sex workers originate from outside the EU. While sex workers are already in precarious positions, nonnationals risk deportation, dependent on their citizenship status, and may have debts to smugglers. Consequently, they may be more likely to work longer hours to increase short-term profits. Using a dataset of sex work advertisements from one Danish website (n = 2,594), we estimate the association between inferred citizenship status and a) advertised hours on shift using ordinary least squares regression, and b) the probability of advertising 24/7 availability using a linear probability model. Compared to Danish sex workers, we find migrants advertise almost twice as many hours on shift and are more likely to advertise 24/7 availability. These results shed light on the inequalities that persist between national and nonnational sex workers.

Global Crime, Volume 26, 2025 - Issue 1

By the U.K.Ministry of Justice, and the Office of Health Improvement and Disparities

Executive Summary This report presents follow-up analysis building on Pathways between probation and addiction treatment in England: report - GOV.UK focusing on people sentenced to community orders (COs) and suspended sentence orders (SSOs) with an Alcohol Treatment Requirement (ATR) or Drug Rehabilitation Requirement (DRR). It examines engagement with alcohol and drug treatment, how engagement relates to reconvictions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395926000332 outcomes, and their characteristics. The analysis covers all ATRs and DRRs issued between August 2018 and March 2023. The study linked probation case management records with the National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS) using probabilistic data linkage. This was supplemented by Natural Language Processing (NLP) analysis of probation contact notes. This approach aimed to assess whether the absence of ATRs and DRRs in structured treatment data reflected a true lack of treatment or gaps in data linkage. A total of 45,943 ATR and DRR requirements were issued during the period. Of these, 22,636 were linked to structured treatment through data linkage. The NLP approach derived an engagement rate from the unlinked sample. This was then applied to all unlinked records, resulting in an estimated 18,712 requirements with evidence of treatment engagement. Key Findings 1. Up to 90%1 of ATRs and DRRs were estimated to involve some form of treatment engagement. This is based on 49% linked to structured treatment through probabilistic data linking and an additional 41% of unlinked records showing treatment engagement in probation contact notes. Engagement was estimated to be higher for ATRs (93%) than for DRRs (88%). 2. Reconviction was less common following ATRs and DRRs linked to structured treatment. Within 12 months of sentencing, 36% of those linked to structured treatment were reconvicted, compared with 44% of those not linked to structured treatment. 

3. Characteristics associated with being more likely to be linked to structured treatment included being: • aged over 50 • female • in settled accommodation, (least likely when associated with rough sleeping) • engaged by treatment services within: 

▪ 3 weeks of an ATR, ▪ 3–6 weeks of a DRR 4. Reconviction outcomes varied by treatment outcome: • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs were lowest when they remained in structured treatment at the end of the observation period (13% for ATR; 26% for DRR). • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs were highest when they dropped out of structured treatment (41% for ATR; 60% for DRR). • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs that were not identified in structured treatment were higher than completed or remained in structured treatment but lower than those that dropped out of structured treatment (37% for ATR; 51% for DRR). Conclusion The analysis shows clear associations between treatment engagement and both individual characteristics and justice system factors. Individuals with ATRs and DRRs who completed or remained in structured treatment had better reconviction outcomes than those who dropped out of or had no identified structured treatment. This highlights the value of sustained engagement. The report also demonstrates the value of AI based NLP methods to strengthen insight by identifying treatment activity not captured through data linkage alone.

London: U.K. Ministry of Justice and the Office of Health Improvement and Disparities, 2026. 47p.

By Steven Dudley, et al.

Although traditional synthetic opioid strongholds like the United States and Canada appear to be experiencing a stabilization of their illicit fentanyl market—evidenced by a historic reduction in overdose deaths 1—synthetic opioids continue to expand across the globe, creating widespread health and security concerns. Existing explanations for the rise and stabilization of these markets focus on economic incentives, supply-chain disruption, precursor controls, consumption patterns, and public-health interventions. But the role of organized crime in structuring retail distribution has been largely overlooked. The experience of Mexico’s northern border illustrates that local criminal governance can be a decisive factor in determining where and how new drug markets take root. Fentanyl, for example, has quietly reshaped drug markets in Mexico and upended some widely held assumptions of how larger criminal groups interact with these markets. As local criminal organizations became major producers and exporters of the synthetic opioid to the United States, domestic consumption also emerged in key trafficking corridors. In Tijuana and Mexicali in Baja California, Hermosillo and Nogales in Sonora, and Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua, the transnational fentanyl economy has taken root locally, generating unprecedented public health and security pressures. This expansion, however, has been uneven, and the criminal actors who control local drug economies are far from monolithic. Across northern Mexico, fragmented local factions—sometimes linked to larger organizations, sometimes operating with considerable autonomy—determine what reaches consumers and under what conditions. Retail fentanyl markets have therefore expanded not simply in response to demand or price signals, but according to thestrategic decisions of local criminal groups. In Baja California, these groups actively promoted fentanyl sales, enabling the market to consolidate. In Sonoran cities and Ciudad Juárez, they restricted distribution, confining consumption to specific user niches.Overall, the impact on the ground has been substantial. The introduction of fentanyl triggered waves of overdose deaths and serious health effects among users. Although there are signs that the crisis may have stabilized in some areas, the risks persist, and the problem remains underestimated in official statistics, limiting the effectiveness of institutional responses that are already ill-equipped to address it. This report aims to provide a deeper understanding of this issue. It examines fentanyl consumption dynamics in the cities mentioned, traces the evolution of the market, and outlines the distribution networks that sustain it. Additionally, it analyzes the models of criminal control over local drug markets and assesses the state’s response to date. A central question running through the analysis is why fentanyl did not spread uniformly across these cities and what role local criminal structures played in that divergence.

Washington DC: Insight Crime, 2026. 66p.

By ECLAC

The purpose of the Femicidal Violence in Figures Bulletin is to disseminate data on femicide/feminicide or gender-related killings of women in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to report on the methodological advances made by national institutions in generating statistics on this form of violence. Responsible entities:  Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the UNiTE to End Violence against Women campaign.

By Dan Anderberg. Line Hjorth Andersen,  N.Meltem Daysal, Mette Ejrnæs

We examine the impact of a 2002 Danish parental leave reform on intimate partner violence (IPV) using administrative data on assault-related hospital contacts. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that extending fully paid leave increased mothers’ leave-taking and substantially reduced IPV, with effects concentrated among less-educated women. The reform also lengthened birth spacing, while separations remained unchanged and earnings effects were modest. The timing and heterogeneity of impacts point to fertility adjustments—rather than exit options or financial relief—as the key mechanism. Parental leave policy thus emerges as an underexplored lever for reducing IPV.

By Sarah Picard, Leah Nelson, Rae Walker, Kasey Eickmeyer, and Ellie Wilson

Every year, courts across the United States impose millions of dollars in fines, fees, and restitution on people convicted of traffic violations, misdemeanors, and felonies. Collectively, monetary sanctions and other criminal justice fees are referred to as legal financial obligations or simply court debt. Ostensibly, court debt is intended to sanction offenders, recover the costs of running a court system, raise revenue, and compensate victims of crime. In most jurisdictions, however, court debt is assessed without considering an individual’s ability to pay, and much of what is owed goes uncollected. Estimates suggest that there are approximately $27.6 billion in outstanding obligations. In addition to being an unreliable source of revenue, court debt can have severe and long-standing consequences for those who owe, exposing them to increasing debt, future incarceration related to unpaid debt, and the suspension of voting rights, among other collateral consequences. In jurisdictions across the country, court debt also has a disproportionate effect on the economically disadvantaged, as well as Black and Latino individuals and communities. Many of the equity and collateral consequences described above hold true for court debt assessment and collection in Jefferson County and across Alabama, as documented in a 2018 survey with over 800 Alabama residents who owed court debt. This research attracted the attention of judges in the Tenth Circuit Court in Jefferson County (home to Birmingham) who worked with Leah Nelson, lead researcher on the 2018 survey, and MDRC to develop the Jefferson County Equitable Fines and Fees (JEFF) Project, a multidisciplinary study of the scope and consequences of court debt in the county. With funding from Arnold Ventures, the JEFF Project began in 2022. The findings in this report reflect multiple lines of inquiry, including descriptive and inferential analyses of five years of case-level court data, in-depth interviews with court practitioners, and focus group discussions with individuals who have direct experience with court debt in Jefferson County. Taken together, these analyses point to a system that is neither effective in generating revenue for the court, nor fair, given its outsized impact on Black and indigent people living in poor communities. Over the five years of the study, just under half of the individuals who owed court debt paid in full, with many seeing their debt burden grow over time. The research team also isolated some of the major factors that contribute to debt growth, which include race and economic disadvantage, in addition to factors related to how debt is collected, most notably the practice of assessing a 30 percent late fee on those who do not submit a payment within 90 days. Both court practitioners and individuals who are directly affected viewed the current system as broken, with the latter describing serious financial, emotional, and collateral consequences. Findings from the JEFF Project have already prompted the reconsideration of current practices in Jefferson County, including a pilot project to reduce debt burdens and encourage payments, and the creation of a statewide task force that will examine fines and fees across Alabama. Finally, given that Jefferson County is home to a midsized  city situated in a fiscally and socially conservative state, its social and geographic characteristics make it a useful reference for many cities and counties looking to make changes in their fines and fees systems.

By Tobias Auer and Tom Kirchmaier

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.