By Charles M. Katz , Anthony Harriott, and E.C. Hedberg

The article examines a gang-related peace initiative instituted in Greater August Town, Jamaica. Our objective was to understand the negotiation processes and determine whether the gang truce resulted in the desired outcome: a reduction in homicide. Bivariate analyses showed a significant decline in homicides immediately following the truce. Upon closer examination, however, comparing change in the target area to the balance areas in Jamaica and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect was the possibility that homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time.

International Criminal Justice Review 35(2): 2022.

y Adam Baird , Matthew Louis Bishop , Dylan Kerrigan

The Southern Caribbean became a key hemispheric drug transhipment point in the late 1990s, to which the alarmingly high level of homicidal violence in Trinidad is often attributed. Existing research, concentrated in criminology and mainstream international relations, as well as the anti-drug policy establishment, tends to accept this correlation, framing the challenge as a typical post-Westphalian security threat. However, conventional accounts struggle to explain why murders have continued to rise even as the relative salience of narcotrafficking has actually declined. By consciously disentangling the main variables, we advance a more nuanced empirical account of how ‘the local’ is both inserted into and mediates the impact of ‘the global’. Relatively little violence can be ascribed to the drug trade directly: cocaine frequently transits through Trinidad peacefully, whereas firearms stubbornly remain within a distinctive geostrategic context we term a ‘weapons sink’. The ensuing murders are driven by the ways in which these ‘residues’ of the trade reconstitute the domestic gangscape. As guns filter inexorably into the community, they reshape the norms and practices underpinning acceptable and anticipated gang behaviour, generating specifically ‘residual’ forms of violence that are not new in genesis, but rather draw on long historical antecedents to exacerbate the homicide panorama. Our analysis emphasises the importance of taking firearms more seriously in understanding the diversity of historically constituted violences in places that appear to resemble—but differ to—the predominant Latin American cases from which the conventional wisdom about supposed ‘drug violence’ is generally distilled.

Political Geography. Volume 106, October 2023, 102966

By Adam Baird, Matthew Louis Bishop & Dylan Kerrigan

The murder rate in Port of Spain, Trinidad, rose dramatically around the turn of the millennium, driven overwhelmingly by young men in gangs in the city’s poor neighborhoods. The literature frequently suggests a causal relationship between gang violence and rising transnational drug flows through Trinidad during this period. However, this is only part of a complex picture and misses the crucial mediating effect of evolving male identities in contexts of pronounced exclusion. Using original data, this article argues that historically marginalized “social terrains” are particularly vulnerable to violence epidemics when exposed to the influence of transnational drug and gun trafficking. When combined with easily available weapons, contextually constructed male hegemonic orders that resonate with the past act as catalysts for contemporary gang violence within those milieus. The study contributes a new empirical body of work on urban violence in Trinidad and the first masculinities-specific analysis of this phenomenon. We argue that contemporary gang culture is a historically rooted, contextually legitimated, male hegemonic street project in the urban margins of Port of Spain.

International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2021.

2021 Durham Community Gang Assessment

By Michelle Young

Beginning in 2021, the Durham Gang Reduction Strategy Steering Committee (GRSSC) commissioned an updated community gang assessment for Durham. The GRSSC community gang assessment used the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model Guide to Assessing Your Community’s Youth Gang Problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009). This report presents five key findings and related recommendations arising from that exercise. Key finding 1: What is the most acute problem related to gangs/violence in Durham and where is it most acute? At least 12 census tracts/neighborhoods in Durham are currently affected by extremely high rates of violent person incidents (aggravated assault and homicide) that are up to 7.5 times higher than Durham’s overall rate per capita of these crimes. Eight of these census tracts have experienced high rates of violence since the last community gang assessment was conducted in Durham. Violence exposure in these areas is exacerbated by extreme poverty and exposure to other social vulnerabilities that have remained mostly unchanged since 2014. Key finding 2: Why are youth in Durham joining gangs? What risk factors locally must be addressed to keep youth out of gangs? Young people in Durham experience an elevated level of exposure to risk factors for gang involvement, including substance use, delinquency, the presence of gangs in their neighborhood and at school, family gang involvement, victimization, and exposure to violence. This level of risk exposure is higher for youth who enter the juvenile justice system and highest for gang involved individuals. Key finding 3: What is keeping young people in gangs? What must be addressed to help gang-involved individuals exit gangs? Research indicates that young people who join gangs become disconnected from mainstream pursuits. Gang involved individuals in Durham have difficulty exiting gangs because of high rates of school dropout, unemployment/underemployment, substance use, gang activity in the neighborhood, and a need to replace the social and emotional needs currently met by their gang. Key finding 4: How is this issue affecting the wider community? What should motivate policymakers to address the problem? People who live and work in Durham experience the gang issue very differently depending on their role and location. In some neighborhoods, gangs are deeply imbedded in the neighborhood’s culture which plays a key role in the decision to join a gang in Durham. Other neighborhoods experience gang issues indirectly. However, surveys across constituency groups indicates that the widespread nature of gang activity and community violence in Durham reduces quality of life for residents across the community. Key finding 5: How well is the current response to gangs working? What should be done differently in the future? All constituency groups that participated in this study described low levels of satisfaction with the current response to gangs and identified specific deficits that have caused this dissatisfaction. These issues include a failure to address the underlying conditions that give rise to gangs, a lack of awareness about the current responses to gangs across constituency groups, lack of information about the results of current strategies, and concerns about criminal justice policies. Recommendations Recommendation 1: Implement intensive, place-based strategies to address underlying social conditions that increase the vulnerability of children and youth in the most violence affected census tracts to gang involvement Recommendation 2: Implement comprehensive, intensive, and neighborhood-based service delivery specifically for gang-involved individuals in the highest violence neighborhoods. Recommendation 3: Because of the elevated level of gang exposure/involvement and youth risk exposure locally, Durham policymakers should expand available gang prevention and intervention programming, localize these services in the most violence/gang affected census tracts, and prioritize these services for children and youth who are at the highest level of risk of involvement in violence and gangs Recommendation 4: More regularly collect and report data that reflects the progress of the community’s gang violence reduction efforts. Recommendation 5: Institute standardized performance measures to track reductions in violence and improve existing criminogenic social conditions at the census tract level and more regularly report the outcomes attained by gang prevention, intervention and desistance strategies to policymakers and the community at the census tract level.

Wake Forest, NC: Michelle Young Consulting, 2022. 257p.

By Ross Deuchar

This article explores the links between gangs, masculinity, religion, spirituality and desistance from an international perspective. It presents insights from life history interviews conducted with a small sample of 17 male reforming gang members in Denmark who had become immersed in a holistic spiritual intervention programme that foregrounded meditation, yoga and dynamic breathing techniques. Engagement with the programme enabled the men to begin to perform broader versions of masculinity, experience improved mental health and well-being and develop a greater commitment to criminal desistance. Links with religious and spiritual engagement are discussed, and policy implications for the UK gang context included.

Youth JusticeVolume 20, Issue 1-2, April-August 2020, Pages 113-127

By Sarah Frisby-Osman and Jane L. Wood

Mental health difficulties, conduct problems, and emotional maladjustment predict a range of negative outcomes, and this may include gang involvement. However, few studies have examined how behavioral, mental health, socio-cognitive, and emotional factors all relate to adolescent gang involvement. This study examined 91 adolescents to compare non-gang with gang-involved youth on their conduct problems, emotional distress, guilt-proneness, anxiety and depression, and use of moral disengagement and rumination. Analyses revealed that gang-involved youth had higher levels of anxiety, depression, moral disengagement, and rumination. Gang-involved youth also had higher levels of conduct disorder and exposure to violence, but they did not differ from non-gang youth on levels of emotional distress and guiltproneness. Discriminant function analysis further showed that conduct problems, moral disengagement, and rumination were the most important predictors of gang involvement. Discussion focuses on how intervention and prevention efforts to tackle gang involvement need to consider the mental health and behavioral needs of gang-involved youth. Further research is also needed to build an evidence base that identifies the cause/effect relationship between mental health and gang involvement to inform the best practice when tackling gang membership

Youth Justice 2020, Vol. 20(1-2) 93–112

By William J. Aceves

On the eve of the 1992 Los Angeles uprising, a small group of gang leaders and community activists drafted an agreement to curtail violence in south Los Angeles. Several gangs in Watts accepted the truce and established a cease-fire agreement. By most accounts, the 1992 Watts Gang Treaty succeeded in reducing gang violence in Los Angeles. Local activists attributed the reduction in shootings to the Treaty. Even law enforcement officials grudgingly recognized the Treaty’s contribution to reducing gang violence and a corresponding decrease in homicides. The origins of the Watts Gang Treaty can be traced to gang leaders recognizing that the devastating struggle between rival gangs was analogous to a military conflict—complete with “no-man’s land,” assault weapons, targeted killings, and civilian casualties—and, therefore, it required a diplomatic solution. Seeking inspiration from international conflict resolution efforts, gang members looked to the 1949 Armistice Agreement adopted by Egypt and Israel to end the Arab-Israeli War. The drafters of the Watts Gang Treaty mirrored the key provisions of the Armistice Agreement, including a cease-fire agreement and other confidence-building measures. The drafters then built a social movement to support the Treaty. This Article examines the origins, impact, and legacy of the Watts Gang Treaty. It also pursues a prescriptive agenda. It supports the study of hidden history that runs counter to the common narrative of power and privilege in the United States. Moreover, this Article argues that social movements can achieve meaningful change even in the face of poverty, violence, and structural racism.

Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review (CR-CL), Vol. 57, 2022. 63p.

By Europol and US Drug Enforcement Administration

The EU drug landscape is populated by a diverse range of criminal actors involved in the production, trafficking and distribution of a variety of illicit substances. These actors benefit from a number of criminal enablers and facilitators in their operations. In recent years, seizures of methamphetamine and cocaine linked to Mexican criminal actors have emerged as a prominent feature of the EU drug landscape. Mexican criminal actors and EU-based criminal networks have been working together to traffic both of these illicit drug types from Latin America to the EU.

This report delves into the activities of these criminals and their methods. Drug trafficking operations benefit from a number of different actors, such as brokers, cooks, envoys, intermediaries and money laundering service providers. Examples of the methods used by the criminals include the corruption of officials in the public and private sectors and the exploitation of legal business structures. The report also provides an outlook on potential threats that may develop in the future.

In the first initiative of this kind, Europol and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have issued this joint strategic product with the aim of expanding the intelligence picture on the involvement of Mexican criminal actors in the EU drug market.

The Hague: Europol and the DEA, 2022. 8p.

By Nancy Lombard and katy Proctor

Scotland’s record of accomplishment in tackling issues such as stalking and coercive control has been identified as an exemplar. Most recently, the Domestic Abuse Scotland Act (2018) was implemented which for the first time recognised a coercively controlling course of conduct as the crime of Domestic Abuse, possibly indicating a more empathetic and understanding criminal justice system. However, it is important to recognise that despite victim-centred policies and legislation, institutional criminal justice processes can diminish their impact. As such, victims can feel disempowered and controlled simultaneously by the bureaucracy in which they find themselves and by the continued abuse of the perpetrator. Therefore, this research explored whether the Scottish Criminal Justice System facilitates the empowerment of the victims who access its support or exacerbate their disempowerment.

The aim of this study was to explore the lived experiences of victims of coercive control and/or stalking as they navigated the criminal justice system.

Glasgow: SCCJR - The Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, 2023. 72p.

By Niombo Lomba, Cecilia Navarra and Meenakshi Fernandes

With the rise of new technology and social media, gender-based cyber violence is a constantly growing threat with impacts at individual, social and economic levels, on women and girls and on society generally. There is currently no common definition or effective policy approach to combating gender-based cyber violence at EU or national level. Action taken so far has been inadequate, and the cross-border nature of gender-based cyber violence has yet to be properly addressed either. This European added value assessment (EAVA) supports the European Parliament in its right to request legislative action by the Commission, and complements its own-initiative legislative report 'Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence' (2020/2035(INL)). Examining the definition and prevalence of gender-based cyber violence, the legal situation and individual, social and economic impacts, the EAVA draws conclusions on the EU action that could be taken, and identifies eight policy options. The costs to individuals and society are substantial and shown to be in the order of €49.0 to €89.3billion. The assessment also finds that a combination of legal and non-legal policy options would generate the greatest European added value, promote the fundamental rights of victims, address individual, social and economic impacts, and support law enforcement and people working with victims. The potential European added value of the policy options considered is a reduction in the cost of gender-based cyber violence ranging from 1 to 24%

Brussels, European Union, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2021. 242p.

By Danielle Keats Citron

For too long, cyber abuse has been misunderstood and ignored. The prevailing view is that cyber abuse is not “really real,” though in rare cases authorities take it seriously. Justices of the U.S. The Supreme Court, for instance, demanded and received extra protection for themselves after facing online threats, but, in oral argument, dismissed a woman as “overly sensitive” for reporting hundreds of threatening texts to law enforcement. In other words, protection for me (the powerful) but not for thee. For everyday women and minorities, cyber abuse is unseen and unredressed, due to invidious stereotypes and gender norms. Empirical proof now exists that makes non-recognition difficult to justify. Studies show that cyber abuse is widespread, the injuries profound, and disproportionately borne by women, who often have intersecting disadvantaged identities. (Hence, the moniker cyber gender abuse). After years of advocacy and scholarship, it pains me to acknowledge the continued invisibility of cyber gender abuse, but progress is possible if we recognize our failings and commit to structural reform. Internet exceptionalism must end for the businesses best situated to prevent destructive cyber gender abuse. Congress should condition the immunity afforded content platforms on a duty of care to address cyber gender abuse and eliminate the legal shield for platforms whose business is abuse. Companies must commit to safety by design as a core principle.

Yale Law Journal Forum, Forthcoming. Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2023-57

By UN Women

The current survey arises as a joint initiative of the Observatory for Women's Equity (OEM) and the International Center for Private Enterprise (CIPE). The objective of this research is to characterize gender-based violence online, with a particular emphasis on businesswomen and/or female workers from companies registered in the chambers of commerce of Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. The goal is to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and manifestations of gender-based violence in the digital environment, in order to propose policies that promote safe and equitable environments for all women in the business and labor sphere. The OEM is an initiative that emerged from the alliance between the WWB Colombia Foundation and the Universidad Icesi, with a mission to build, consolidate, and make visible projects that contribute to women's equity and inclusion. As a body for measurement, dissemination, institutional advocacy, and public policy, the Observatory focuses on analyzing factors that affect women's autonomy and equity in the Valle del Cauca region. Through systematic and timely measurement and analysis, it seeks to generate high-quality, accurate, and reliable information that contributes to regional and national debates on women's living conditions across various dimensions, promoting interventions in public policy and institutional programs that foster gender equity.

On the other hand, CIPE is one of the four core institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Since 1983, CIPE has worked with business leaders, politicians, and journalists to build civic institutions that are vital for a democratic society. CIPE addresses fundamental issues for democracy and economic development, including women's participation in the business and labor sphere. Its commitment to promoting gender equity, framed within the work carried out by its Center for Women's Economic Empowerment (CWEE), makes it a strategic ally to conduct this survey on gender-based violence in the digital environment, with the purpose of shedding light on and combating the violence that affects women in the business and labor context. Both organizations, aware of the importance of addressing gender issues comprehensively and cross-cutting, have joined forces to carry out this survey to achieve a greater understanding of gender-based violence online. The alliance seeks to generate accurate and reliable data that reflect the experiences and perceptions of businesswomen and female workers in the digital environment, in order to propose strategies and policies that promote equal opportunities and the eradication of gender violence. The collaboration between OEM and CIPE represents a joint effort to promote workplaces and business environments free from violence and discrimination, where women can fully thrive, exercise their rights, and contribute to the economic and social development of their communities.

New York: UN Women, 2023. 48p.

By Jonathan Klick and John MacDonald

Objectives This study examines the impact of alcohol consumption in a Major League Baseball (MLB) stadium on area level counts of crime. The modal practice at MLB stadiums is to stop selling alcoholic beverages after the seventh inning. Baseball is not a timed game, so the duration between the last call for alcohol at the end of the seventh inning and the end of the game varies considerably, providing a unique natural experiment to estimate the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime near a stadium on game days. Methods Crime data were obtained from Philadelphia for the period 2006–2015 and geocoded to the area around the MLB stadium as well as popular sports bars. We rely on difference-in-differences regression models to estimate the change in crime on home game days around the stadium as the game time extends into extra innings to other areas of the city and around sports bars in Philadelphia relative to days when the baseball team plays away from home. Results When there are extra innings and more game-time after the seventh inning alcohol sales stoppage crime declines signifcantly around the stadium. The crime reduction beneft of the last call alcohol policy is undone when a complex of sports bars opens in the stadium parking lot in 2012. The results suggest that alcohol consumption during baseball games is a contributor to crime. Conclusions The fndings provide further support for environmental theories of crime that note the congregation of people in places with excessive alcohol consumption is a generator of violent crime in cities. The consumption of alcohol in MLB stadiums appears to increase crime.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2021) 37:813–834

Aaron Chalfin, Benjamin Hansen and Rachel Ryley

For nearly every crime there is a victim. However, the vast majority of studies in the economics of crime have focused the causal determinants of criminality. We present novel evidence on the causal determinants of victimization, focusing on legal access to alcohol. The social costs of alcohol use and abuse are sizable and well-documented. We find criminal victimization — for both violent and property crimes — increases noticeably at age 21. Effects are not present at other birthdays and do not appear to be driven by a “birthday celebration effect.” The effects are particularly large for sexual assaults, especially those that occur in non-residential locations. Our results suggest prior research which has focused on criminality has understated the true social costs associated with increased access to alcohol.

Journal of Human Resources. Vol. 58, Issue 6. 1 Nov 2023

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol

EU Drug Market: Amphetamine describes the European amphetamine market from production and trafficking, to distribution and use. It details the processes, materials and actors involved at different stages and levels of the market. Taking a threat assessment approach, the module identifies key issues and makes recommendations for action at EU and Member State level.

Amphetamine is the most common synthetic stimulant drug available on the European drug market and it competes with cocaine and a range of new psychoactive substances for a share of the profitable European Union (EU) stimulant drug market. The prevalence of amphetamine use is higher than methamphetamine in most EU Member States, with notable exceptions, such as Czechia and Slovakia. Illicit amphetamine products mostly consist of powders or pastes, usually mixed with other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets containing amphetamine are also available. The estimated annual value of the retail market for amphetamine in the EU is at least EUR 1.1 billion, with a range of EUR 0.9 billion to EUR 1.4 billion.

The demand for amphetamine in the EU is met by European production concentrated largely in the Netherlands and Belgium, where production is complex, large-scale and based on the drug precursor BMK. BMK has some limited use in industry and can be diverted from legitimate sources or smuggled into the EU, but more frequently it is made from chemicals known as designer precursors imported from China. Some of the amphetamine produced in the EU is used to produce captagon tablets, which are mainly trafficked to consumer markets in the Middle East

Lisbon, Portugal: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, 2023. 8p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

From July 2021 to June 2023, the Mekong Australia Partnership on Transnational Crime and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) organized an expert briefing series to enhance debate and collaboration on issues related to organized crime in the Mekong.

The outcome of the two-year briefing series was the creation of opportunities for discussion, collaboration and learning. It brought together a committed set of stakeholders working at the local, regional and international levels to reduce the harms of organized crime and helped build new partnerships while strengthening existing ones. The series enhanced the knowledge base on organized crime in the Mekong and helped bridge the gap between research and policy.

With the support of a dynamic set of stakeholders, the series explored some of the region’s most pertinent and pressing issues and their intersections globally.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 69p.

By Tihomir Bezlov | Atanas Rusev | Dardan Koçani

The war in Ukraine has spurred the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. According to EU border and coastguard agency Frontex, by the end of 2022, 15 million Ukrainian citizens had fled to Europe since the beginning of the war, with roughly 3 million choosing to stay.

While the unforeseen scale of the refugee crisis meant that much of the border authorities’ efforts and resources were occupied, people smuggling networks took advantage of the situation, and the number of irregular migrants from the Middle East travelling along the Western Balkan route soared. There are many contributing factors to this trend, but migrant smuggling has indeed resurfaced as the fastest-growing market for organized crime in the Balkan region. At the start of September 2022, Frontex reported that they had documented the highest number of irregular entries since 2016, with a 75% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. Thus, in 2022, the Western Balkan route became the most active European migration route, surpassing the Central and Western Mediterranean routes.

This paper assesses the factors that contributed to the emergence of the Western Balkan route as the most critical for irregular migration to the EU during 2022, focusing in particular on the impact of the war in Ukraine on refugee flows from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and its implications for the future. It analyzes how, if anything, refugee flows from Ukraine have affected pre-existing movements of migrants from MENA countries on the Western Balkan route indirectly, exacerbating dynamics and network operations. It also estimates the overall number of irregular migrants smuggled along the Western Balkan route since 2016, describes the evolution of smuggling networks in 2022 and assesses the implications for South Eastern Europe.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 3p.

By Gabriel Feltran, Isabela Vianna Pinho and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo

Cocaine trafficking through West Africa, following the well-established route from Latin America to the European consumer market, appears to be in a phase of sharp growth. Since 2016, the majority of consignments transiting West Africa begin their journey in Brazil. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – the largest criminal organization in Brazil – is pivotal to understanding Brazil’s newfound importance for cocaine in West Africa.

Cocaine trafficking between Brazil and West Africa stretches back at least to the 1980s, but as cultivation in Latin America continues to increase and consumption in Europe has grown, more and more cocaine is being moved along this path. In 2018, only one West African country – Senegal – was in the top 10 destinations for cocaine seized in Brazilian ports; by 2019, after a bumper year of seizures in Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone had also pushed their way onto the list. Cultivation in Latin America reached record levels in 2021, and in the following year an unprece-dented 24 tonnes were seized across West Africa.

In this report, we focus on the flow of cocaine between Brazil and West Africa, which largely supplies the lucrative European consumer market, and in particular on the role of the PCC, which straddles various illicit supply chains.

The research for this report has drawn on various data collection techniques but rests primarily on field observations of the retail trade and transit of illegal goods in South America, West Africa and Europe between 2015 and 2022. These observations, described in detail in the authors’ field notebooks, were supplemented by formal and informal interviews with those involved in the cocaine trade, from the South American borders to the retail trade spaces of Europe, allowing us to trace the journey of cocaine through the different nodes of the value chain.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023 28p.

By Saša Đorđević

Fuel smuggling is the illegal transport, sale or purchase of petroleum products such as crude oil, petrol, diesel and other refined petroleum products. It has been a persistent illicit trade in the Balkans for over three decades.

In 2022, police and customs of the seven Balkan countries seized more than 3 000 tonnes of illegal fuel, with a retail value of €4.3 million – almost four times more than the value of fuel seized in all of 2021. Fuels are goods subject to high excise and customs duties that smugglers try to avoid paying. Alternatively, smugglers seek to profit by evading embargoes on oil imports and exports. From this perspective, the Balkan countries’ public funds lost at least €1.2 million in 2022 as a result of fuel smuggling.

However, relying solely on seizure data to evaluate the illicit fuel market may lead to misleading conclusions because of law enforcement’s inherent challenge in substantiating the unlawful provenance of fuel. This discrepancy becomes more apparent when considering the estimated scale of the issue. In Bulgaria alone, for example, the projected value of illegal fuel in 2019 reached approximately €0.5 billion, resulting in significant budget losses of €250 million.

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Libyan electoral crisis, both of which involved major oil-producing countries, the UN extended measures to combat illicit petroleum exports from Libya in July 2022. The EU also imposed bans on Russian oil in December 2022 and again in February 2023, as part of its response to the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the Balkans became the focus for licit and illicit fuel manoeuvres.This report analyzes the mechanisms of fuel smuggling during times of crisis and instability in the Balkans, considering both internal and external factors that contribute to the overall landscape. It identifies lessons learned from fuel smuggling in the early 1990s and then moves to explain the evolution of this activity with reference to trafficking methods, actors and routes through to 2022. The report also identifies countries in the Balkans at particular risk from fuel smuggling, as well as hotspots that allow illicit trade, particularly on rivers and seas. The report, furthermore, assesses the typical profile of criminal actors active in fuel smuggling. The research is limited to cross-border fuel smuggling operations rather than illegal distribution within a specific country.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 34p.

BY Stephanie Beckwith, Lauren Lowe, Liz Wall, Emily Stevens, Rachel Carson, Rae Kaspiew, Jasmine B. MacDonald, Jade McEwen and Melissa Willoughby

This report presents a literature review on coercive control in the context of domestic and family violence, with a particular focus on the understanding of, and responses to coercive control in the Australian context.

Commissioned by the Australian Attorney-General’s Department, this review focuses on identifying, summarising, analysing and synthesising the existing Australian academic research and evaluations on coercive control. The review highlights the complexities of defining, recognising and responding to coercive control and identifies relevant gaps in the evidence base.

Drawing from a range of quantitative and qualitative studies across scholarly and grey literature, including non-government reports, government and parliamentary reports, peak body reports, and position papers, this review captures the growing recognition of coercively controlling behaviour in the context of family and domestic violence.

Southbank VIC: Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2023. 54p.