By Anniina Jokinen, Anna-Greta Pekkarinen, Jessiina Rantanen

Forced marriage is a multifaceted phenomenon encompassing sev - eral intersecting factors that relate to situations in which individu - als are compelled to marry or stay married against their will. Forced marriage is widely recognized as a violation of human rights and in particular as a form of gender-based violence and honour-based vio - lence. The harms and negative consequences of forced marriages are multifold and challenge many service providers as well as the crimi - nal justice system. This report outlines the concrete challenges, factors and con - cepts that must be addressed when developing effective responses to tackle forced marriages and providing support to victims and persons affected. It is targeted towards various professionals and practitioners who may encounter victims of forced marriage or persons, families or communities affected by the phenomenon in their line of work. The content is based on a desk review of academic and other relevant liter - ature, as well information collected by the EASY project partners: the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI), University of Lleida (Spain), Associació Valentes I Acompanyades (Spain), SOLWODI (Germany), and the Im - migrant Council of Ireland, to identify approaches that have relevance in the development of effective and victim-centred interventions for victims of forced marriages. The best practices were collected mainly via semi-structured (individual or group) interviews with experts and/or survivors, that were based on a shared interview framework. The interviews were conducted in the summer and autumn of 2023.1 The experts interviewed included, e.g., NGO representatives and counsellors working with topics related to forced marriage, migrant women’s rights, honor-based violence and human trafficking, shelter/residential counsellors, government officials and policymakers, and law enforcement authorities from Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Catalonia (Spain). The survivors interviewed included, e.g., victim-survivors who work as mentors and/or had been supported by the interviewing organisation. Throughout the report there are quotes from the interviews to demonstrate the challenges, experiences and solutions identified. Table 1. Number of persons interviewed to collect best practices by each country and in total. The best practices collected were also shared and discussed with partners in a best practice workshop hosted by SOLWODI in Bonn, Germany on 20–21 November 2023. Each partner identified 4–8 best practices with a focus on themes such as proactive methods to identify victims, engaging with persons from impacted communities and reducing the risk of forced marriage; ways to support and assist victims; training and awareness-raising activities targeting professionals; multi-agency collaboration at local, national and international levels; and municipal, regional or national strategies to tackle or address honor-related violence and/or forced marriages. Ten of the collected best practices were selected and summarised for this publication. Moreover, in early 2024, the EASY project partners launched a legislative overview which presents the results of comparative desk research on the legal approach to forced marriage in Germany, Finland, Ireland and Spain (Villacampa and Salat 2023). Therefore, this report does not cover legislative frameworks and procedures in place in the four countries to address forced marriages and to protect the victims as they are covered in detail in the legislative overview. The two reports are complimentary. The ultimate aim of the EASY project is to enhance support for victims/survivors of forced marriage and strengthen the work against forced marriage in the four partner countries.

Helsinki: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI) HEUNI, 2024. 58p.

By Aisha M Abubakar, Rowland G Seymour, Alison Gardner, Imogen Lambert, Rachel Fyson, Nicola Wright

Background

Exploitation poses a significant public health concern. This paper highlights ‘jigsaw pieces’ of statistical evidence, indicating cognitive impairment as a pre- or co-existing factor in exploitation.

Methods

We reviewed English Safeguarding Adults Collection (SAC) data and Safeguarding Adults Reviews (SARs) from 2017 to 22. Data relevant to exploitation and cognitive impairment were analysed using summary statistics and ‘analysis of variance’.

Results

Despite estimates suggesting cognitive impairments may be prevalent among people experiencing exploitation in England, national datasets miss opportunities to illuminate this issue. Although SAC data include statistics on support needs and various forms of abuse and exploitation, they lack intersectional data. Significant regional variations in recorded safeguarding investigations and potential conflation between abuse and exploitation also suggest data inconsistencies. Increased safeguarding investigations for people who were not previously in contact with services indicate that adults may be ‘slipping through the net’. SARs, although representing serious cases, provide stronger evidence linking cognitive impairment with risks of exploitation.

Conclusions

This study identifies opportunities to collect detailed information on cognitive impairment and exploitation. The extremely limited quantitative evidence-base could be enhanced using existing data channels to build a more robust picture, as well as improve prevention, identification and response efforts for ‘at-risk’ adults.

Journal of Public Health, Volume 46, Issue 4, December 2024, Pages 498–505,

By Aisha Abubakar, Rowland Seymour, Alison Gardner, Nicola Wright, Rachel Fyson, Imogen Lambert, and Rachael Clawsona

People with an illness, disability or other health conditions are more likely to experience various forms of exploitation in comparison to other groups, particularly if their health condition necessitates assistance with daily functioning such as personal care, financial management, or socialising. For the purpose of this study, we consider a wide range of cognitive impairments and differences that affect processing, understanding, and memory, and therefore may cause additional challenges in everyday life. People with ‘hidden’ disabilities such as mental health conditions, cognitive decline, intellectual disabilities, autism, and ADHD are more vulnerable to exploitation than people with other types of disability. For example, they may be vulnerable due to trauma from adverse experiences leading to dissociation, or addiction means they can be exploited to fulfil their needs. They may struggle to recognise when they are being exploited and may be unable to effectively communicate or report abuse. Adults with cognitive impairment living alone may be vulnerable, while those having difficulty understanding financial matters may be more vulnerable to financial exploitation. The aforementioned factors not only increase vulnerability to exploitation but also amplify the severity of harm when exploitation occurs, making the relationship between cognitive impairment and exploitation a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Hence, implementing strategies that pay attention to these factors is imperative in preventing exploitation and mitigating the severity of harm. Yet, there is a lack of public and official statistics to quantify the intersections between exploitation and disability/cognitive impairment to inform appropriate strategies for mitigation. Adults with cognitive impairments may be classed as a vulnerable group of individuals at increased risk of being exploited because of their reduced capacity to identify and report abuse or exploitation. Hence the prevalence of exploitation in this population is

not well understood, it is thought to be under-reported due to the challenges faced by these individuals in communicating their experiences . Section 42 (S42) of the Care Act 2014 requires local authorities in England to conduct investigations when they have reasonable grounds to suspect that an adult with care and support needs is experiencing, or is at risk of experiencing, abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Social workers, health professionals, the police, and other relevant stakeholders are all involved in S42 investigations, with the aim of ensuring the safety and well-being of adults with care and support needs, as well as preventing and responding to incidences of maltreatment. Hence, these enquiries are intended to garner information about the adult and their circumstances, assess the risks to their safety, and determine the best way to protect them. Estimates from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) show that between 2014 and 2020, people with cognitive impairment aged between 16 and 59 were more likely to be victims of different forms of domestic abuse and sexual assaults than people with other forms of impairment, particularly women. However, it is not possible to extrapolate what incidents reported by individuals with lived experience constitute exploitation in the CSEW. Hence this paper is an exploratory study aimed at quantitatively understanding the intersections between cognitive impairment and exploitation. Given that there is currently very little intersecting data, quantitative statements about how people with cognitive impairment are at risk of, or are being exploited, need to be extrapolated. To extrapolate the relationship between cognitive impairment and exploitation, this

study provides a descriptive account of disability prevalence, exploitation prevalence and S42 enquiries in English LAs using data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS), the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), and the Safeguarding Adults Collection (SAC), with the aim of addressing the following important questions: • Are there trends in disability prevalence and exploitation by types of impairment, and if so, what types of cognitive impairment and exploitation are more prominent? • Are there trends in S42 enquiries, and if so, what are they? • What proportion of S42 enquiries involved people with cognitive impairment? • How frequently did exploitation appear as a factor of S42 enquiries? The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains what data is currently available to quantify the relationship between cognitive impairment and exploitation. The results and discussion in Section 3 then provides a contextual and descriptive account of the prevalence of disability and exploitation in England, including findings from the analysis of S42 enquiries. The final section offers concluding remarks, limitations, and emerging recommendations.

Working Paper 2023 50p.

By Alison Gardner, Aisha Abubakar, Imogen Lambert, David Charnock, Rachael Clawson, Rachel Fyson, Nicola Wright , Rowland Seymour

In recent years there has been increasing attention to ‘modern slavery’, human trafficking and wider forms of exploitation both in the UK and internationally. There has also been growing awareness that people can be placed at risk of exploitation by a wide range of personal, social and economic circumstances, including physical and mental health issues. News stories have highlighted examples of people with different forms of cognitive impairment experiencing control and exploitation by those seeking to profit from their labour or property, sometimes over long periods of time. However, statistics on this issue remain elusive. This project aimed to provide the first robust description of the intersection between cognitive impairment and the exploitation of adults in England. We were interested mainly in cognitive impairment as a risk factor prior-to exploitation, rather than impairment caused by experiences of exploitation. Whilst we recognise that there is a wide spread of IQ and cognitive ability across populations, we define cognitive impairment broadly to include both developmental and acquired impairments including intellectual disability, dementia, brain injury, autistic spectrum disorders, ADHD, functional mental health disorders and substance misuse. We also examined a diverse spectrum of exploitation looking at a range of situations where one person, either opportunistically or premeditatedly, unfairly manipulates another person for profit or personal gain. Research methods Our multi—method study included the following methods of data collection and analysis. ■ A wide-ranging scoping review of existing literature. ■ Analysis of statistical information, including data on exploitation and support needs within the Safeguarding Adults Collection (SAC) from NHS England Digital between 2017 and 2022, as well as wider contextual data. ■ Quantitative and qualitative analysis of evidence extracted from Safeguarding Adults Reviews (SARs) featuring exploitation during the same period (2017-2022). SARs (formerly known as serious case reviews) are initiated in cases where an adult with care and support needs has suffered serious harm or death, and abuse or exploitation is suspected. From our initial search of a national library of SARs we identified and analysed 58 narrative SARs featuring exploitation involving 71 people. ■ An open online survey of practitioners who were working in roles relevant to safeguarding people with cognitive impairment, which gained 95 responses. ■ Semi-structured interviews with 24 practitioners and 26 people who had lived experience of cognitive impairments and exploitation. ■ Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to inform our understanding of how factors combine to increase risks for exploitation.

Key findings 1 Previous studies suggest that cognitive impairments can increase vulnerability to exploitation Academic literature looking at cognitive impairment and exploitation is sparse, but our scoping review found 20 studies published in English that related to the topic. These covered three types of exploitation (sexual, financial and criminal) with intellectual disability and mental health the most frequently discussed types of impairments. The literature indicated that cognitive impairment was a factor increasing vulnerability to exploitation, but the limited number of studies meant that it was difficult to disentangle complexities in the relationship between cognitive impairment and exploitation without further research. 2 Existing datasets and surveys miss important opportunities to publish intersecting data on cognitive impairment and exploitation. Building on the literature review, we went on to examine the data that was available in England relating to cognitive impairment and exploitation. A review of statistical information found that existing English surveys and datasets currently describe the prevalence of disability and exploitation separately. With minor adjustments these could collate and publish intersecting data on cognitive impairment and exploitation, but at present these opportunities are being missed. Safeguarding Adults Collection (SAC) Data from NHS England includes statistics on support needs (including cognitive impairments) and various forms of abuse and exploitation, but has some limitations. In particular, it does not yet publish data showing the intersections between different types of support needs and forms of abuse. There were also significant regional variations in recorded safeguarding investigations, as well as potential for conflation between abuse and exploitation, which could create data inconsistencies. The SAC data did show increased safeguarding investigations for people who were not previously in contact with services, indicating that more adults with support needs may not be known to services until a crisis occurs. There were also a small but increasing number of reports of modern slavery. 3 Cognitive impairments are present within 96% of individuals in Safeguarding Adults Reviews that include exploitation Analysis of Safeguarding Adult Reviews (SARs) on exploitation showed clearer connection between cognitive impairment and exploitation. Approximately 96% of individuals in reviews that included exploitation between 2017 and 2022 focussed on adults who had some form of cognitive impairment. 4 People are often exploited in multiple ways, and alongside other abuses The relationship between cognitive impairment and exploitation is complex, with multiple forms of exploitation and abuse often co-existing and overlapping, alongside diverse risk factors. Both data from SARs and our survey suggests that financial exploitation and ‘mate crime’ (being exploited by someone posing as a friend) were the most commonly-experienced forms of exploitation. However, these more frequently observed forms often co-occur alongside others, such as sexual, labour or criminal exploitation. People with experience of living with cognitive impairment also identified ‘everyday exploitation’ as part of their regular experience, including issues like being targeted for phone and online scams. 5 Risks for exploitation arise not just from cognitive conditions, but their social impacts. The presence of a coercive and controlling relationship is a key factor. Factors identified as contributing to vulnerability included substance misuse, intellectual disabilities, mental health and dementia or cognitive decline, though in many cases there were multiple diagnoses. Complex and developmental trauma in earlier life was frequently evident. A lack of diagnosis was also a frequent challenge for practitioners seeking to support individuals at risk of exploitation. Beyond clinical factors, a range of social drivers impacted on vulnerability to exploitation, including limited or absent family support, harmful social networks, trauma and isolation. People with lived experience also described the impact of discrimination and hate-crime, and social precarity, sometimes driven through factors such as irregular immigration status or unemployment. Factors such as a history of abuse and/ or other adverse experiences such as bullying could also be present. Coercive and controlling relationships were also a significant factor predicting exploitation alongside the existence of social networks used to target a potential victim.

Nottingham, UK: University of Nottingham, Rights Lab, 2024. 58p.

By Federico Varese  & Fanqi Zeng

Studies of organized crime in cities have traditionally concentrated on the global south or ethnic enclaves and traditional mafa territories within the global north. Here this study turns its attention to governance-type organized crime in the English city of Nottingham, where the main protagonists are white and British born. It investigates whether such a gang can govern communities by reducing ordinary crimes. We conduct in-depth interviews with local ofcials and analyze a novel dataset of the public’s phone calls to the Nottingham police from 2012 to 2019, encompassing spatio-temporal information and police-labeled crime types. We identify Nottingham’s ward of Bestwood as the site of an entrenched, governance-type organized crime group, whereas its most similar ward, Bulwell, is not. Further comparative analyses indicate that certain ordinary crime rates are significantly lower in Bestwood than in Bulwell. We conclude that governance-type organized crime can emerge in a country with a high capacity to police and in a nonimmigrant, less affluent community. Our findings suggest that traditional explanations of the emergence of criminal governance in cities need to be revisited.

Nature Cities | Volume 1 | December 2024 | 821–829

By Ella Cockbain, Patricio Estévez-Soto, and Felia Allum

Organised crime – and the people, processes and structures involved – do not exist in a geographical vacuum. They have an inherent spatiality: shaped by and shaping the places they occupy in physical, virtual and hybrid spaces. Although the ‘social embeddedness’ of organised crime is relatively well-recognised, its spatiality – or ‘spatial embeddedness’ – has been neglected. This article contextualises and introduces our special issue on the new geographies of organised crime. We put forward a central argument that geographical lenses can advance and enrich understanding of organised crime, briefly review relevant literature and explain some of the foundational concepts in geographical thinking. We discuss the rationale for this special issue and highlight its papers’ main contributions. Since the geographies of the illicit are full of complexities, heterogeneities and subjectivities, we do not propose any singular approach, but rather see a plurality of possibilities for better incorporating geography into organised crime scholarship. Accordingly, the papers are theoretically and methodologically diverse, as well as covering varied topics and locations

Criminology & Criminal Justice, 25(1). 2025, 3-20 pages

By Aisha M Abubakar, Rowland G Seymour, Alison Gardner, Imogen Lambert, Rachel Fyson, Nicola Wright

Background

Exploitation poses a significant public health concern. This paper highlights ‘jigsaw pieces’ of statistical evidence, indicating cognitive impairment as a pre- or co-existing factor in exploitation.

Methods

We reviewed English Safeguarding Adults Collection (SAC) data and Safeguarding Adults Reviews (SARs) from 2017 to 22. Data relevant to exploitation and cognitive impairment were analysed using summary statistics and ‘analysis of variance’.

Results

Despite estimates suggesting cognitive impairments may be prevalent among people experiencing exploitation in England, national datasets miss opportunities to illuminate this issue. Although SAC data include statistics on support needs and various forms of abuse and exploitation, they lack intersectional data. Significant regional variations in recorded safeguarding investigations and potential conflation between abuse and exploitation also suggest data inconsistencies. Increased safeguarding investigations for people who were not previously in contact with services indicate that adults may be ‘slipping through the net’. SARs, although representing serious cases, provide stronger evidence linking cognitive impairment with risks of exploitation.

Conclusions

This study identifies opportunities to collect detailed information on cognitive impairment and exploitation. The extremely limited quantitative evidence-base could be enhanced using existing data channels to build a more robust picture, as well as improve prevention, identification and response efforts for ‘at-risk’ adults.

Journal of Public Health, Volume 46, Issue 4, December 2024, Pages 498–505,

By Elin Lindqvist, Jacob Hollenberg, Mattias Ringh, Per Nordberg, Henrik Druid, Leif Svensson, Sune Forsberg

Background

Approximately 1% of Sweden's 90 000 annual deaths were reported caused by poisoning. In this study, we aim to describe this poisoning population's characteristics, autopsy frequency and results of toxicology testing.

Method

A national cohort study based on Swedish national registers. All deceased subjects older than 18 years with poisoning as the cause of death registered between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2021 were included. Causes of death according to primary ICD-10 code were analysed along with the substances found in forensic chemistry testing.

Results

There were 27 057 poisonous deaths during the study periods 2 018 495 adult deaths. Subjects deceased due to poisoning had a median age of 53 years, and 18 838 (70%) were men. A private home was the most reported location of death (52%). In total, 23 260 (87%) did undergo some sort post-mortem examination. Drugs (synthetic narcotics, opioids, heroin) caused 12 448 (46%) deaths, and alcohols explained 9056 cases (33%). Positive toxicological tests were found in 22 550 (83%) of the subjects. The most common separate substances were ethanol, zopiclone and nordazepam.

Conclusion

Poisoning caused 1.3% of Swedish deaths. Men in their 50s were the most common victims, and their deaths were often cause by synthetic narcotics, other opioids or alcohol. The autopsy frequency was lower than expected for poisonous deaths.

Basic & Clinical Pharmacology & Toxicology, early view, 2024;1–8.

By Nicholas Chan and Alana Cook

It is well recognised that both domestic and non-domestic violence vary over the course of the year often rising in summer and spiking during holiday periods and with other key events. This paper shows the daily number of domestic violence (DV) and non-DV assaults recorded by the NSW Police Force on each date of the year to observe the extent to which violence increases on public holidays and other significant dates1 . Figure 1 shows the median daily number of criminal incidents of assault recorded by police from the years 2010 to 2023. To minimise the impact of abnormal crime patterns during the COVID pandemic, the chart excludes the years 2020 and 2021. The chart shows that across the year, there are clear peaks on several dates. The largest spike for both DV assault and non-DV assault occurs on New Year’s Day (1 January). Obvious spikes in assault also occur on Australia Day (January 26), ANZAC Day (April 25), New Year’s Eve (31 December), Christmas Day (December 25) and Boxing Day (December 26).

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 2024. 4p.

By Charles C. Lanfear, David S. Kirk , Robert J. Sampson

Most homicides in the United States are committed using a handgun, but little research examines gun carrying over critical stages of the life course and changing contexts of violence. Notably, although most of the handgun homicides are committed by adults, most research on concealed gun carrying focuses on adolescents in single cohort studies. Using more than 25 years of longitudinal multi-cohort data from Chicago, 1994–2021, we show that pathways of concealed gun carrying are distinct between adolescence and adulthood. Adolescent carrying is often age-limited and responsive to direct exposure to gun violence (witnessing and victimization), while adult carrying is a persistent behavior that is less tied to direct exposure. The onset of concealed carry is also a strong predictor of later gun use (shooting or brandishing), and we find distinct patterns of gun use between individuals who first carry in adolescence versus adulthood. We discuss the implications of these dual pathways for research and policies on firearm use.

Sci. Adv. 10, 2024, 12p.

By Rohit Acharya and Rhett Morris

In 2020, the average U.S. city experienced a surge in its homicide rate of almost 30%—the fastest spike ever recorded in the country. Across the nation, more than 24,000 people were killed compared to around 19,000 the year before.

Homicides remained high in 2021 and 2022, but in 2023 they began to fall rapidly. Projections suggest the national homicide rate in 2024 is on track to return to levels close to those recorded in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet that spike in murders continues to deliver major costs in terms of the lives lost, the people incarcerated, and the perception of decreased safety across the country.

Some commentators have suggested the increase in homicides during 2020 was a response to the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer in May of that year. Others hypothesized that it was caused by a police “pull back,” in which officers chose to do less work in reaction to the protests that followed Floyd’s death.

As more information has become available, these theories appear to be less supported by evidence than some initially thought.1 The evidence indicates that the national homicide rate was already on track to reach a peak far above the previous year even before Floyd was killed.As Figure 1 demonstrates, murders began to rise rapidly in mid-April of 2020. Cell phone data show this is when residents started leaving home more often as lockdown policies eased and the weather grew warmer. During the 6-week period from April 12 to May 23 (weeks 16 to 21 in Figure 1), homicides went up by an average of 17 murders each week.

After Floyd was killed on May 25, the national homicide rate continued to follow this trend, with additional increases during the 2 weeks around Memorial Day and the 2-week period around July 4. But even the highest point of these additional increases was less than 40 murders above the pre-existing trend. While it’s true that homicides did temporarily rise more than they were already on track to following Floyd’s death, these additional increases are unlikely to explain the 5,000 additional murders seen during the year.

This leaves us with a question: What happened that could have caused homicides to spike in 2020, remain high for 2 years, and then start to decline rapidly in 2023?

New data offers a potential explanation. In this report, we analyze thousands of police records and compare them to changes that occurred in U.S. cities just before homicides started to surge. This showed that the spike in murders during 2020 was directly connected to local unemployment and school closures in low-income areas. Cities with larger numbers of young men forced out of work and teen boys pushed out of school in low-income neighborhoods during March and early April, had greater increases in homicide from May to December that year, on average. The persistence of these changes can also explain why murders remained high in 2021 and 2022 and then fell in late 2023 and 2024.

These analyses point to new answers and offer focused solutions that civic leaders can use to prevent future spikes in murder and reduce current levels of violence. We present these findings in detail below in three main sections:

First, we review evidence from existing research that reveals a formula for how violence develops in cities.

Second, we analyze detailed administrative data from a single city with multiple spikes in murder prior to the COVID-19 pandemic to illustrate how this formula applies to local communities.

Finally, we use lessons from this analysis to offer a new explanation for the national spike in homicides in 2020 and make recommendations on how to avoid future increases in murder.

Brookings, 2024. 20p.

By Mark Galeotti

In May 2022, Lithuanian police raided two underground factories where counterfeit cigarettes worth some €73 million were being produced.2 This happens all the time, and even the involvement of a Russian-linked organized crime group was hardly unusual. However, as the investigation extended to Belgium (where the goods would be transhipped to Britain), it became clear that behind the gangsters lay Russian intelligence officers, who were using the business – or at least part of its profits – to raise operational funds for their activities in Europe. With Putin regarding himself as ‘at war’ with the West, at a time when Europol chief Catherine de Bolle is warning that organized crime is on the rise across Europe,3 and Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s counter-intelligence agency, is assessing ‘the risk of [Russian] state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased’,4 it is perhaps unsurprising that gangsters and spies would find themselves brought together in his campaign. It has, after all, become commonplace since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to characterize the relationship between Russia and the West as some shade of war: economic, political, but typically more than just cold. Indeed, even as he insists that his invasion is not a war, just a ‘special military operation’ (SVO) – actually calling it a ‘war’ can conceivably get Russians a 15-year prison sentence5 – Putin freely uses the term when describing his country’s engagement with the West. However, it is less clearly understood just how significant and long held this view of his may be. In this context, it does seem in hindsight that Putin has considered himself as de facto at war with the West – or, more precisely, that the West has been warring against him – since at least around 2012. After stepping back from the presidency to the position of prime minister in order to observe the letter, if not the spirit, of term limits, all the while clearly still running the country, when Putin announced he would be returning to the Kremlin, this was for many the last straw. Demonstrations that became known as the Bolotnaya Protests were mastered and dispersed, but Putin seems to have been unable or unwilling to accept that they were a genuine, organic expression of dismay. Instead, he chose to see them as spurred by the US Department of State, after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘gave the signal’ to opposition leaders.6 There had been a growing school of thought within Russian security circles that the West was using ‘political technologies’ to topple hostile governments, and support for civil society, democratization and the rule of law were seen as part of this campaign. As a former Kremlin insider put it, Putin was scared, then angry. As far as he was concerned, this was it, this was a sign that the West – the Americans – were coming for him. So he was determined to fight back, and that didn’t just mean defending himself, the repressions and arrests, it meant going on the attack. He was clear, he made it clear to us all: if the West was coming to mess with him, we would mess them up worse, by whatever means necessary.

Russia’s transition from a “conscription state” to a full “mobilization state”, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations.

The report also highlights Russia’s weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally.

“Gangsters at War” reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia’s geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 62p.

By The U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Indiana is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (both fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico-grown marijuana in the state. The opioid threat remains dire and is of grave concern.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 7p.

By New York City Office of the Mayor

On December 16, 2022, New York City Mayor Eric Adams convened more than 70 stakeholders to collaborate on policy and find creative solutions to address the prevalent increase in retail theft. The summit brought together law enforcement officials, government stakeholders, small business representatives, large retail groups, union leaders, Business Improvement Districts, Chambers of Commerce, and diversion providers with diverse perspectives to discuss a variety of topics, including physical security measures, new diversion programs, leveraging technology to protect businesses and improve citywide responses, and enhancing existing partnerships among private, government, and non-profit sectors. In developing this report, an evidence-based and stakeholder-informed methodology was followed. The Administration analyzed the information shared by the attendees at the summit, conducted independent research and data analysis, and consulted with law enforcement and retail business management. The Administration also conferred closely with New York State Attorney General Letitia James and with the Loss Prevention Research Council to receive additional input and advice on these matters. A draft of this report was then distributed to stakeholders to solicit feedback and, based on the input received, the report was further refined, and the recommendations developed as described herein. The plan outlined in this report identifies recurring problems that plague New York City businesses, which the subsequent list of solutions seeks to address in order to ensure public safety and promote economic growth.

New York: New York City Office of the Mayor, 2023. 33p.

By Michael Ahn Paarlberg

Policy responses to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) within migrant receiving countries often conflate all organizations which conduct illegal activity in multiple countries based on the mafia or cartel model. This model imagines the TCO to be the most evolved form of organized crime: deeply institutionalized, well resourced, hierarchically structured, highly profitable, and diversified in their criminal activities. Such a model informs law enforcement and immigration policies which are often draconian and counterproductive to citizen security. In reality, transnational crime is highly varied in organization, activities, scope, and membership. A major TCO type that defies the mafia archetype is the transnational gang. This study seeks to nuance our understanding of TCOs, illustrated by case studies of two transnational gangs, MS-13 and Satudarah, by advancing the concept of criminal remittances to locate agency in transnationalization. As the case studies demonstrate, for transnational gangs, the remittance of criminal activity is not at the organization level but at the individual and state level. Thus the transnationalization of crime can itself be the product of state foreign and migration policies.

Comparative Migration Studies volume 10, Article number: 24, 2022, 20p.

By Moamen Gouda and Anouk S. Rigterink

This study investigates the long-term relationship between slavery and violent crime in the USA. Although qualitative evidence suggests that slavery perpetuated violence, there has been no largeN study supporting this claim. Using county-level data, we find that the percentage of slaves in the population in 1860 is linked with violent crime in 2000. This result is specific to violent crime, robust to instrumenting for slavery and varying the approach to missing crime data, and not driven by biased crime reporting. Investigating the theoretical mechanisms driving these results, we find that historical slavery affects inequality (like Bertocchi and Dimico, 2014), white Americans’ political attitudes towards race (like Acharya et al., 2016b) and black American’s political attitudes – in opposite directions. Results suggest that inequality and black American’s political attitudes mediate the observed effect on violence.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11515, Dec 2024, 50 pages

By Ionel Zamfir and Colin Murphy

The rise of digital technologies represents a double-edged sword for women's rights. On the one hand, the digital environment has enabled women to build networks and spread awareness about the abuse they suffer, such as through the #Metoo movement. On the other, it has provided abusers and misogynists with new tools with which they can spread their harmful content on an unprecedented scale. With the development of artificial intelligence, these trends, both positive and negative, are expected to continue. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that digital violence is as harmful as offline violence and needs to be tackled with the full force of the law, as well as through other non-legislative measures. Moreover, the digital content causing the harm – images, messages, etc. – needs to be erased. This is particularly important, as the impact on victims is profound and long-lasting. The European Union has adopted several pieces of legislation that aim to make a difference in this respect. The directive on combating violence against women, to be implemented at the latest by June 2027, sets minimum EU standards for criminalising several serious forms of cyberviolence and enhances the protection of and access to justice for victims. EU legislation on the protection of privacy is also having an impact on cyberviolence. For example, the new Digital Services Act imposes an obligation on big digital platforms in the EU to remove harmful content from their websites. This is instrumental in removing intimate or manipulated images that are disseminated on the internet without the person's consent; almost all such images portray women, according to existing data. Member States use a multiplicity of legal approaches to tackle this issue, combining criminalisation of specific cyber offences with the use of general criminal law. In some Member States, an explicit gender dimension is also included.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 11p

By Megan Steele-Baser; Alyssa L. Brown; Denise V. D’Angelo; Kathleen C. Basile, Rosalyn D. Lee, ; Antoinette T. Nguyen, & Cynthia H. Cassell

Intimate partner violence (IPV) can include emotional, physical, or sexual violence. IPV during pregnancy is a preventable cause of injury and death with negative short- and long-term impacts for pregnant women, infants, and families. Using data from the 2016–2022 Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System in nine U.S. jurisdictions, CDC examined associations between IPV during pregnancy among women with a recent live birth and the following outcomes: prenatal care initiation, health conditions during pregnancy (gestational diabetes, pregnancy-related hypertension, and depression), substance use during pregnancy, and infant birth outcomes. Overall, 5.4% of women reported IPV during pregnancy. Emotional IPV was most prevalent (5.2%), followed by physical (1.5%) and sexual (1.0%) IPV. All types were associated with delayed or no prenatal care; depression during pregnancy; cigarette smoking, alcohol use, marijuana or illicit substance use during pregnancy; and having an infant with low birth weight. Physical, sexual, and any IPV were associated with having a preterm birth. Physical IPV was associated with pregnancyrelated hypertension. Evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies that address multiple types of IPV are important for supporting healthy parents and families because they might reduce pregnancy complications, depression and substance use during pregnancy, and adverse infant outcomes

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024, 6p.

By Claire Provost,

U.S. leads global drug war

The role of the United States in exporting the destructive war on drugs to other countries is unparalleled. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent more than a trillion dollars on the war on drugs, prioritising law enforcement responses and fuelling mass incarceration within its borders. It has also played a leading role in pushing and funding punitive responses to drugs internationally. This has continued despite clear evidence that such approaches don’t work to achieve their stated aims (ending drug use and sales) while having devastating effects on rights and health, including mass criminalisation, disease transmission, repression and displacement.

This report demonstrates how U.S. assistance has supported and expanded destructive and deadly anti-drug responses in low- and middle-income countries around the world. It also presents new follow-the-money data analysis on U.S. international drug control spending by various government departments and budgets. This includes official development assistance (ODA) intended to support poverty reduction and other global development goals; and three case studies – Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines – to reveal the damage done by this spending.

Vast and complex global network

The 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the U.S. State Department described a “whole of government approach” to drug control and a strategy of deep collaboration and “capacity building” with counterparts in other countries. A vast and complex global network of U.S. government agencies, programs, and activities has been developed in the ongoing “war on drugs.”

U.S. support for drug enforcement internationally includes financial, material and technical assistance. The U.S. drug war bureaucracy is expansive, involving numerous agencies of the government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as the infamous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), under the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2023, the DEA had 93 foreign offices in 69 countries.

Follow the money

Over the decade between 2015-2024, a total of almost $13 billion of U.S. taxpayer money was allocated to “counternarcotics” activities internationally.

For fiscal year 2025, the President requested $1 billion for international “counternarcotics” activities. Almost half of this request was to be received and spent by the DEA ($480 million); the second largest planned intermediary for this spending was to be the State Department’s INL bureau (about $350 million).

Separate budget documents from the involved departments contain further detail on where and how international drug control funding is to be spent. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) showed that Latin America was budgeted to receive more than half ($225 million) of the total $375 million for “counternarcotics” requested by the department and its agencies (including INL and USAID). Colombia was to be the largest single country recipient ($115 million).

Aid donors (led by the U.S.) spent almost $1 billion of their ODA on “narcotics control” projects in dozens of low- and middle-income countries over the decade 2013-2022. No donor contributed more to these “narcotics control” budgets than the U.S.

Controversially, the U.S. has been increasingly classifying drug control spending as ODA: in 2020, it counted just over $30 million like this; in 2021 that figure was $309 million (and while it dropped to $106 million in 2022, this was still higher than earlier years).

Profit-making companies are also benefiting from this ODA spending on “narcotics control.” The top “channel” for this spending has been private companies (“private sector institutions,” receiving $244 million over the decade) followed by the governments of countries funded ($202 million), and then multilateral organisations such as UNODC ($77 million).

Harm Reduction International | Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 47p.

By Indra de Soysa

Democracy and the level of economic development correlate tightly. While some argue that egalitarian conditions inherent in democracies reduce homicide, others suggest that it is economic development that matters. This study evaluates competing theory and tests the democracy—homicide link using homicide data defined as death due to interpersonal violence and novel data on a variety of democracies. The results show that democracies associate positively with homicide, and egalitarian democracy shows the strongest effect. The level of economic development is negative on homicide and substantively large. The basic results are robust to alternative data, estimating method, and to omitted variables bias.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2024, 22 p.