By Jacob Phelps, Steven Broad, Jennifer Mailley 

  KEY TAKEAWAYS 1. Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) persists in contravention of laws specifically aimed to address negative impacts of over‐exploitation of nature, one of the most critical threats to the world’s biodiversity. 2. By reducing and otherwise negatively impacting populations of wildlife species, IWT undermines the functioning of ecosystems, with significant potential to harm related natural processes – including those affecting climate.    3. The causal chains that demonstrate and explain these links are diverse, complex, and little researched and they are important to long‐term climate stability and mitigation of climate change impacts.    4. Some key pathways linking IWT, ecosystems and climate:

IWT is both a reflection of weak environmental governance, and an exacerbating factor to it. It is often associated with ineffective regulation, 6. Given the importance of climate stability and the long‐term persistence of carbon stocks, adopting broader time horizons and a more holistic view that considers biodiversity is important to climate mitigation and stability. Adopting this type of longer, broader view that recognizes the centrality of biodiversity to many ecosystem processes highlights the clear need for improved governance of wildlife resources and recognizes the need for strong justice system responses to environmental crimes.   7. It is critical to keep in mind that this relationship works in both directions. As climate change impacts take shape, natural resource conflicts will worsen as people and wild species adapt to evolving living conditions. It is very likely that this will lead to new incentives for and patterns of illegal wildlife trade, and in turn new interventions to contain the resulting environmental harm. 8. The links between IWT, biodiversity and climate are still under researched and not well understood. This Research Brief is the first effort to frame these linkages, which are important to understand how policies aimed at addressing IWT, biodiversity and climate can be better integrated.   

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Drime. 2022. 20p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Crimes that affect the environment are among the most profitable and fastest growing types of international criminal activity. In resolution 10/6, adopted in 2020, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime expressed its alarm at research indicating that crimes that affect the environment had become some of the most lucrative transnational criminal activities and were often closely interlinked with different forms of crime and corruption, and that money-laundering and the illicit financial flows derived from them may contribute to the financing of other transnational organized crimes and terrorism. It affirmed that the Organized Crime Convention constitutes an effective tool and an essential part of the legal framework for preventing and combating transnational organized crimes that affect the environment and for strengthening international cooperation in this regard and requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, subject to the availability of extrabudgetary resources, and within its mandate, to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to State parties, upon request, for the purposes of supporting their efforts to effectively implement the Convention in preventing and combating transnational organized crimes that affect the environment. In 2019, the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, in its resolution 8/12, noted with concern the role that corruption can play in crimes that have an impact on the environment and expressed concern that money-laundering may be used to disguise and/or conceal the sources of illegally generated proceeds, as well as to facilitate crimes that have an impact on the environment. In 2021, the Fourteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice adopted the Kyoto Declaration on Advancing Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law: Towards the Achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in which it reiterated the United Nations commitment to adopt effective measures to prevent and combat crimes that affect the environment, including, among other crimes, illicit trafficking in hazardous and other wastes, by making the best possible use of relevant international instruments and by strengthening legislation, international cooperation, capacity building, criminal justice responses and law enforcement efforts aimed at, inter alia, dealing with transnational organized crime, corruption and money-laundering linked to such crimes, and illicit financial flows derived from such crimes, while acknowledging the need to deprive criminals of proceeds of crime.2 In the same year, the General Assembly, in its resolution 76/185, urged Member States to take these same measures. 

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 133p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

  This report presents the results of the twenty-second Myanmar opium survey, covering the 2023/2024 opium growing and harvesting season. The last three surveys in Myanmar covering the 2020/2021, 2021/2022, and the 2022/2023 seasons showed an increase at the national level in both areas under opium poppy cultivation and opium production. The 2023 survey reported an 18% increase in the area under cultivation to an estimated 47,100 hectares. For the first time in three years the 2024 survey shows a modest decline in the area under cultivation by 4% to 45,200 hectares, indicating a possible stabilization at recent high levels. Three consecutive years of expanding cultivation followed by a year of limited decline could indicate some degree of saturation in regional heroin markets supplied by Myanmar. Declining prices of fresh opium in Myanmar and declining purity adjusted prices of heroin in regional markets could have dissuaded a further increase of production in Myanmar in 2024. However, information from the field suggests that the stagnation in productivity could also be related to the ongoing internal conflict. While instability and conflict, and their impact on the rule of law have traditionally been seen as a driver of illicit crop cultivation, the expansion of the conflict and shifts in the territorial control of armed actors, especially in the growing areas of Shan and Kachin, have limited the mobility of rural population, and likely prevented farmers from accessing cultivation areas further away from their villages. The dynamics of internal conflict might also explain the uneven development across Myanmar’s states in regions, with some areas showing declines in cultivation and others continued growth. In October 2024, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were some 3 million people internally displaced across the country, with Shan and Kachin in particular seeing escalating tensions and clashes in late 2023 and early 2024. The 2024 survey shows decreases in illicit opium cultivation in half of the geographic areas observed, including South Shan which traditionally experienced the most extensive opium cultivation. Eastern Shan, Chin, and Kayah had modest increases between survey years. Overall, cultivation in Shan State, which continues to be the centre of opium production in Myanmar at 88% of total cultivation area, decreased by 4% to 39,700 ha, with decreases in South and North Shan (-9% and -4% respectively) while East Shan increased by 10%. Cultivation in Kachin saw a moderate decrease of 10%, a change from past trends when above-average increases were observed. Estimates for Chin and Kayah, where the overall area remained small in comparison to other areas, showed an 18% and 8% increase, respectively. Overall potential opium production decreased at greater rates than cultivation due to a decline in opium yield. In 2024, average yield declined by 4% from 22.9 kg per hectare to 22kg per hectare, resulting in an estimated opium production of 995 (700-1,580) metric tons, or 8% less than in 2023. Nevertheless, both yield and production remain at high levels across the last decade. The decrease in cultivation and production coincided with a decrease in farmgate prices of both fresh and dry opium in USD terms, by 4% and 8%, respectively. In 2024, fresh opium traded at just over US$300 per kilogram, down from US$317 the year before, although it remained high compared to the last low point in 2021 when it stood at US$131 per kilogram. In combination with lower production, nationally farmers earned slightly less income than the previous year, between US$230 – US$518 million in 2024 (US$271 - US$613 million in 2023). The farmgate value only represents a small share of the overall opiate economy, with heroin manufacture and export making up a larger share. Wholesale prices of heroin in the region declined even more, contributing to a much larger decrease in the value of the total national opiate economy of about 40%, now ranging between US$589 million and US$1.57 billion, representing between 0.9 – 2.4% of Myanmar’s 2023 GDP  

Thailand: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific 2024. 88p.

By The Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

Now entering its second year of enforcement, the ban continues to hold. In 2024, the area under cultivation was estimated at 12,800 ha, or 19% more than in 2023 (10,800 ha) . Despite the increase, opium poppy cultivation is still far below the priorban levels. In 2022 an estimated 232,000 ha were cultivated. The increase in cultivation came with a geographical shift. The South-western provinces of the country were long the center of cultivation up to and including 2023. In 2024, this changed and now 59% of all cultivation took place in the North-east, particularly in Badakhshan. The rapid and currently sustained decline in poppy cultivation and opium production has important and wide-ranging implications for the country and opiate markets long supplied by product from Afghanistan. Questions remain as to how the country will cope with the continued reduction in opiate income and how opiate markets downstream will react. Farmers that lack sustainable alternatives face a more precarious financial and economic situation and need alternative economic opportunities to become resilient against picking up poppy cultivation in the future. Distributors and dealers closer to destination markets, as well as consumers, are likely to experience supply constraints in the coming years, should the ban remain in place. Following a major hike in 2022 and 2023, dry opium prices stabilized slightly in the first half of 2024 to around US$730. These prices are several times higher than the long-running pre-ban average of US$100 per kilogram. Extremely high farmgate prices and questions about dwindling opium stocks may encourage a resumption in poppy cultivation, especially in places outside of traditional cultivation centers, including neighboring countries. 

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 20p.

By The United Office on Drugs and Crime

  In the Sahel countries and their neighbours, the high prevalence of infectious diseases, including malaria, coupled with challenges in terms of the availability and affordability of and access to healthcare, creates an environment in which the demand for medical products and services is not fully met through formal channels. The disparity between the demand for and supply of regulated pharmaceutical products leaves room for trafficking, provides an incentive for the involvement of organized criminal groups and fuels the ongoing threat to public safety and public health in the Sahel countries. Between January 2017 and December 2021, at least 605 tons of different medical products were seized in West Africa during international operations.  While there are no reliable estimates of the overall quantities of medical products that are trafficked in different ways and forms in the Sahel countries, studies point to a percentage of substandard and falsified medicines in the medical market of between 19 and 50 per cent. Some 40 per cent of the substandard and falsified medical products reported in the Sahel countries between 2013 and 2021 was discovered in the regulated supply chain. Just as regulated medical products can be diverted, illicitly manufactured medical products can find their way into authorized pharmaceutical outlets, which shows how much the regulated (legal) and unregulated (illicit) supply chains are interconnected. The Sahel countries rely heavily on imports of medical products because their pharmaceutical industries are still in the early stages of development. Of total pharmaceutical expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, imports represented as much as 70 to 90 per cent (roughly 14 billion United States dollars ($)). Medical products diverted from the legal supply chain often originate in the main exporting countries of medical products to the Sahel countries, in particular Belgium and France, and to a lesser extent China and India. Others are manufactured in neighbouring countries, including in North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The seaports in the Gulf of Guinea, Conakry (Guinea), Tema (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Apapa (Nigeria) can be identified as major entry points for medical products destined for the Sahel countries. Trafficking by air, using postal shipments or carried out by commercial air passengers, is employed for smuggling smaller quantities of medical products. Once in West Africa, trafficked medical products reach the Sahel countries through smugglers who follow traditional trafficking routes using buses, trucks and private cars. Investigations have revealed the involvement of a wide range of opportunistic actors in trafficking in medical products in the Sahel countries, from employees of pharmaceutical companies, public officials, law enforcement officers and health agency workers to street vendors, all motivated by potential financial gain. Despite terrorist groups and non-state armed groups being commonly associated with trafficking in medical products in the Sahel, most reported cases in the region show that the involvement of such groups is limited and mainly revolves around consuming medical products or levying "taxes" on them in the areas under their control. In sub-Saharan Africa, as many as 267,000 deaths per year are linked to falsified and substandard antimalarial medicines. In addition, up to 169,271 are linked to falsified and substandard antibiotics used to treat severe pneumonia in children.     

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 28p.

By Jennifer McDonald

Across the country, law enforcement agencies routinely seize currency from individuals using civil forfeiture—a legal process that allows agencies to take and keep property without ever charging owners with a crime, let alone securing a conviction. Studies examining civil forfeiture have found it to be a multibillion-dollar industry that punishes people without proving they have done anything wrong. This study is the first to examine how U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard—use civil forfeiture to take and keep currency from often unsuspecting travelers at airports across the country. DHS agencies are just a few of the many government agencies that conduct airport seizures, but newly available data give fresh insight into their activity. This study, covering 2000 through 2016, quantifies just how often DHS agencies have seized currency at airports—and just how much currency has flowed into the federal government’s coffers as a result.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2020. 32p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The ratio of registered vehicles to people in the Sahel countries is low and per capita daily gasoline consumption is estimated to be among the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, an average at-pump price of $1 per litre would result in a combined annual total market value of at least 5 billion United States dollars ($) for both legal and illegal fuel in the region. Despite some of them producing oil, the Sahel countries rely on fuel imports from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, where fuel is heavily subsidized. It appears that the low fuel prices in Algeria, Libya and Nigeria are among the most significant drivers of fuel trafficking in the Sahel. In addition to fuel trafficking, cheap gasoline and diesel also fuel the activities of illegal non-state armed groups, including groups deemed “terrorist” by the international community. Moreover, there are some indications that there may be deeper linkages to other forms of smuggling, such as trafficking in medical products, drugs and firearms. There are four major fuel trafficking flows into the Sahel countries: from Nigeria via Benin to Burkina Faso and Mali; from Nigeria via the Niger to Mali; from Algeria to Mali; and from Libya to the Niger and Chad. A large portion of the market for trafficked fuel in the Sahel countries appears to be informally organized. However, recent investigations have revealed the involvement of structured groups with links to prominent individuals with interests in retail fuel companies, financial institutions and corrupt law enforcement officials. This highlights the importance of the formal trade in laundering smuggled fuel. Companies associated with individuals under United Nations Security Council sanctions are also reported to be involved in fuel smuggling from the Niger to Mali. The introduction of fuel subsidies and licensing policies has led to the emergence of powerful business elites in the Sahel countries with sufficient political influence to protect fuel smuggling activities. Opportunities to earn illegal revenue indirectly from fuel trafficking through bribery and other forms of corruption compromise the level of repression that the Sahel countries can exercise on the illicit fuel trade. Issues with, and gaps in, the rule of law in some areas, owing to a combination of a high level of insecurity and vast, porous borders, constitute a key enabling

factor for fuel trafficking in the Sahel. The lack of state presence in remote areas gives room for the proliferation of criminal activities.

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 24p.

By Natascha Eichinger, Ekaterina Spassova, Murat Yildiz, et al.

The continued global demand for opiates, and the conditions that sustain opiate production in Afghanistan, pose a threat to public health, governance, and security at regional and global

level. This is likely to continue following the change of regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. Afghan opiates are trafficked to almost every continent worldwide. In 2021, the income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some USD 1.8–2.7 billion: however, much larger sums are accrued by international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) along illicit drug supply chains outside Afghanistan. While most opiates trafficked from Afghanistan are trafficked by land methods, a proportion of the opiates produced in South-West Asia are also trafficked by maritime methods to global destinations.

� Some of the opiates produced in Afghanistan and South-West Asia are trafficked via the southern route by maritime means. Seizures of opiates – and methamphetamine – have been increasing in the Indian Ocean, the result of sustained interdictions by national authorities and international maritime coalitions including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the EU Naval Force – Somalia (EUNAVFOR). � Drug packages seized in the Indian Ocean are marked with a wide range of stamps including hand pressed and hand-written markings. These stamps are made up of several elements consisting of sequential and non-sequential numbers, names, locations, and different objects. The stamps can provide some detail on the manufacturers and traffickers involved in the production and transport of drugs to international markets. � Stamps can often be used for branding purposes in a similar way to brand logos used with legitimate goods or can be used to identify or alternatively conceal the producers of a batch of heroin. The number of different stamps marked on a package of heroin can be an indicator of how many producers or traffickers were involved with that package. � Stamps are chosen by individual Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). They appear to be well known amongst DTOs and usually can not be copied by other traffickers. However, in some cases a “franchising” process is possible, with smaller traffickers purchasing the right to use stamps associated with larger DTOs. � Dates printed on heroin packages generally indicate the production year. However, there is less clarity when two dates are stamped on a package. In some cases, the second year may indicate when heroin manufacture continued by the same lab, or alternatively can be the expiry date of the heroin or the date when the package was distributed to international markets. Printed dates can also be updated by hand-written markings. � Sequential and non-sequential numbers stamped on heroin packages are generally seen as being coded communications between heroin manufacturers and traffickers, although the specific messages are not known. Sequential numbers (for example 555 or 777) have been found in both the Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2021, and in Central Asia and the Russian Federation in 2012. By comparison, nonsequential numbers (for example 355 or 787) seized in the Indian Ocean are not seen in Central Asia and are only infrequently seized in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that sequential numbers may be associated with relative purity of the heroin contained in the packages stamped with these numbers. � Words stamped on heroin packages appear to be an indicator of where the heroin was produced. Heroin produced in southern Afghanistan is reportedly stamped with Pashto words, while heroin produced in northern Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more likely to be stamped with Farsi words. Heroin produced in eastern and western Afghanistan often has words in English, Farsi and Pashto, while heroin produced in Pakistan is labelled with words in English and Urdu. � Heroin and methamphetamine manufactured and trafficked by the same DTO may be stamped with the same or very similar stamps. In some cases, heroin packages are stamped with images of

animals which may be an indicator of relative purity of the heroin or an indicator of the location of the manufacturer. � Although some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of heroin stamps seized in the Indian Ocean, there is still a lack of clarity on the meaning and purpose of some stamps – even among the drug traffickers interviewed in Afghanistan. Further analysis is required, including the analysis of drug stamps seized in locations outside of the Indian Ocean. It would be advantageous to develop a database of the different markings of heroin stamps to aid such analysis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Key findings • Hawala is a Money or Value Transfer Service (MVTS) that has been used for centuries, originating in the Middle East and South Asia. It is overwhelmingly used for legitimate purposes, including personal and business financial transactions and for the sending of remittances by migrants and refugees to family members. Cultural preferences, convenience, low-threshold accessibility, low processing fees, reliability, and faster value transfer services are some of the reasons for using hawala, and customers using the service come from all walks of life. • Despite being widely used for legitimate purposes, some attributes of the hawala system also make it vulnerable to use by organised crime for the purposes of transferring illicit funds and values. This includes financial transfers by drug traffickers, migrant smugglers and other criminal actors and organisations, as well as safekeeping of funds obtained from illegal activity. The 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study do not commonly ask about the source of money or the reason for sending and receiving money. Additionally, when they did have doubts about the source of the funds, over half of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they had never refused a hawala transaction. • There is no single global regulatory framework for the hawala system. However, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has produced international standards and recommendations for countries to take measures to regulate the hawala system and ensure regular monitoring and compliance. Specific regulations and monitoring regimes vary by country, but FATF recommends countries take a risk-based approach to regulating the hawala system. Of the 18 countries covered by this study, the hawala system was regulated in most of them. However, in four countries it was not regulated, and in Afghanistan – following the events of August 2021 – the current regulatory status of the hawala system is unclear as of the time of writing. • Of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this report, 43 per cent of hawaladars declared they had a license to operate. In jurisdictions where it is a requirement, 25 per cent operated without a license and 31 per cent preferred not to respond. 36 per cent of the interviewed hawaladars stated that they provided reports to the Central Bank or other relevant financial authorities about their hawala activities, while 64 per cent either had never reported or preferred not to answer the question. Licensed hawaladars collected more personal information from their customers and require identification documents, while for unlicensed hawaladars a name and contact number is sufficient to process a transaction. • Of the hawaladars interviewed in this

study, over one-third reported that they ran multiple branches within the same country and more than half of them reported having offices in other countries. Regular hawala customers are likely to receive a discount on commission charges by hawaladars. • People engaging in regular and irregular migration constitute one customer base of the hawaladars interviewed in this study. Over half of reported that they had migrants as customers. The findings of this study suggest that hawaladars – knowingly and unknowingly - facilitate irregular migration and migrant smuggling by providing multiple financial services including, but not limited to, money or value transfer, safekeeping of funds and introducing migrants and refugees to migrant smugglers. • There are multiple reasons why migrants and refugees would use hawala before, during and after traveling, and these are broadly linked to the features of the system, and, for some, lack of access to any other financial system, such as banks or mobile money services. Migrants and refugees may be directed to a hawaladar by a friend or relative, smuggler, fellow traveller, shopkeeper or accommodation provider. • The interviewed hawaladars identified the following services they provided to migrants and refugees during their journeys: guiding migrants on their journey; helping with finding work upon arrival; referring migrants to support organizations; providing temporary accommodation or referring migrants to an individual who provides temporary accommodation; and finding local medical aid, as undocumented migrants may not be able to or may be reluctant to access hospitals. • Some hawaladars also assist migrants and refugees by finding, recommending or introducing them to a smuggler; and finding or directly renting out boats and trucks for transportation. • The majority of customers using the services of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study sent funds to countries located in the Near and Middle East/ South-West Asia sub region, followed by Western and Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe subregions. Customers in the Near and Middle Eastern sub-regions frequently sent funds to hawaladars in most of the eighteen countries where interviews were conducted. Customers of the interviewed hawaladars in the countries of the North American sub-region only sent funds to hawaladars interviewed in Afghanistan, Denmark, Nigeria, Somalia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. • Hawala is widely associated with transferring money or value - this was the most common type of service provided by the sample group in this study. However, sending and receiving money is just one among several financial services hawaladars provide. Cash savings, currency exchange, short-term lending, safekeeping of funds, and trade guarantees were other services the interviewed hawaladars provided to their customers to varying degrees. Some of them safekeep customers’ funds. The amount of funds kept for safekeeping with the interviewed hawaladars ranged from US$ 20,000 to US$ 500,000. • Hawaladars often operate additional businesses alongside their hawala business. Some of the side businesses mentioned by interviewed hawaladars were grocery store, travel agency, selling mobile top-up cards, construction company and electronics shops. • A hawala transaction does not always proceed directly from country A to country B. Depending on the source and destination, sometimes a transaction is carried out through one or more intermediary hawaladars located in at least one other country. Hawaladars interviewed for this study reported that there are multiple hawala hubs located in several regions of the world where such intermediary hawaladars operate. • Hawaladars interviewed in this study reported processing both domestic and international transactions, however, nearly three out of four processed mostly international transactions. The amount of a single hawala transaction varies substantially. Transactions handled by the interviewed hawaladars ranged from as low as US$50 and as high

as US$200,000. To keep a record of these transactions, most hawaladars interviewed in this research reported that they keep a paper (ledger book) as well as an electronic (digital) record of hawala transactions and other services provided. • Hawaladars use a variety of methods to settle their accounts including through cash, reverse transaction, bank transfer or trading in goods and services. Reverse transaction was the most often used method of account settlement among the hawaladars interviewed in this study, followed by settlement through bank transfer. Misuse of the hawala service • In addition to its widespread legitimate use, hawala is vulnerable to misuse by organized crime groups and other criminal actors. More than one-third of the interviewed hawaladars judged the hawala system to be more vulnerable to illegal transactions compared to the formal banking system, while some perceived an equal vulnerability in both systems. A lack of proper oversight by national authorities, a lack of reporting by hawaladars, a lack of regulation, policy, or guidelines for hawaladars to follow, the operation of unlicensed hawaladars, and the closed nature of the hawala system are all potential reasons for vulnerability. • There are no exact estimates as to the extent to which hawaladars, knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the misuse of their financial services for criminal purposes. Some hawaladars interviewed for this research reported the direct involvement of other hawaladars in transferring funds associated with illegal activities. Additionally, some criminal groups have hawaladars, who may be relatives, working specifically for them for the purposes of transferring funds linked to organised crime. • Several of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they do not ask the purpose of transactions from their customers. As a result, it is possible that hawaladars involved in handling transactions of illicit proceeds are not aware of the nature and source of the money they are transferring or safekeeping. This is particularly the case with hawaladars who are dealing with smaller transactions which usually do not arouse suspicions. However, some hawaladars reported that they could not refuse a transaction from customers connected with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) due to the risk of negative consequences for themselves and their businesses. • It remains a challenge to precisely document the degree to which hawaladars are transferring illicit funds; it is also difficult to trace illicit financial flows, to separate them from licit flows, and to establish concrete financial links to criminal activities. Law enforcement agencies face challenges in investigating crimes linked to hawala systems, because of the closed nature of the business and, in some cases, the kinship ties of the actors.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 91p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Sahel countries are some of the largest gold producers in Africa. While gold production data can be unreliable, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are estimated to have produced 228 tons of gold in 2021, worth over 12.6 billion United States dollars ($). The gold sector is a major economic driver in the Sahel countries. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) production is estimated at 108 tons per year in Sahel countries, although official ASGM production data is largely unreliable due to the informal nature of the sector. ASGM provides a livelihood to over 1.8 million people in areas where income-generating activities are limited. The sector is characterized by high levels of informality because it often takes place on unlicensed and undeclared mining sites. Gold mining without licenses is illegal in all Sahel countries, although Member States have taken measures to formalize ASGM. Barriers to accessing mining licences often push communities involved in ASGM into a vicious cycle of illegality. Without protection of the law, they depend on a local economy often controlled by transnational organized crime (TOC) groups to fund their operations and to sell their gold production, with limited opportunities for structural investments. These communities are potentially susceptible to

recruitment by armed groups, including violent extremist groups. Porous borders enable gold to be easily moved within the Sahel countries and smuggled out of the region, including to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 36p.

By Asier Moneva, Stijn Ruiter, Daniël Meinsma

Criminal expertise plays a crucial role in the choices offenders make when committing a crime, including their modus operandi. However, our knowledge about criminal decision making online remains limited. Drawing on insights from cyber security, we conceptualize the cybercrime commission process as the sequence of phases of the cyber kill chain that offenders go through. We assume that offenders who follow the sequence consecutively use the most efficient hacking method. Building upon the expertise paradigm, we hypothesize that participants with greater hacking experience and IT skills undertake more efficient hacks. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed data from 69 computer security and software engineering students who were invited to hack a vulnerable website in a computer lab equipped with monitoring software, which allowed to collect objective behavioral measures. Additionally, we collected individual measures regarding hacking expertise through an online questionnaire. After quantitatively measuring efficiency using sequence analysis, a regression model showed that the expertise paradigm may also apply to hackers. We discuss the implications of our novel research for the study of offender decision-making processes more broadly.

Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 155, June 2024, 108180

By Marleen Weulen Kranenbarg*, Stijn Ruiter, Jean Louis Van Gelder

The distinct setting in which cyber-dependent crime takes place may reduce the similarity in the deviance of social network members. We test this assumption by analysing the deviance of the most important social contacts of cyber-dependent offenders and traditional offenders in the Netherlands (N = 344 offenders; N = 1131 social contacts). As expected, similarity in deviance is weaker for cyber-dependent crime. Because this is a strong predictor of traditional offending, this has important implications for criminological research and practice. Additionally, for both crime types the offending behaviour of a person is more strongly linked to the deviance of social ties if those ties are of the same gender and age, and if the offender has daily contact with them. Implications and future criminological research suggestions are discussed.

European Journal of Criminology Volume 18, Issue 3, May 2021, Pages 386-406

By Sabine E. M. van Sleeuwen, Wouter Steenbeek, Stijn Ruiter

Objectives: Building on Hägerstrand’s time geography, we expect temporal consistency in individual offending behavior. We hypothesize that repeat offenders commit offenses at similar times of day and week. In addition, we expect stronger temporal consistency for crimes of the same type and for crimes committed within a shorter time span. Method: We use police-recorded crime data on 28,274 repeat offenders who committed 152,180 offenses between 1996 and 2009 in the greater The Hague area in the Netherlands. We use a Monte Carlo permutation procedure to compare the overall level of temporal consistency observed in the data to the temporal consistency that is to be expected given the overall temporal distribution of crime. Results: Repeat offenders show strong temporal consistency: they commit their crimes at more similar hours of day and week than expected. Moreover, the observed temporal consistency patterns are indeed stronger for offenses of the same type of crime and when less time has elapsed between the offenses, especially for offenses committed within a month after the prior offense. Discussion: The results are consistent with offenders having recurring rhythms that shape their temporal crime pattern. These findings might prove valuable for improving predictive policing methods and crime linkage analysis as well as interventions to reduce recidivism.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2021) 37:863–889

Shocking videos surfaced in late August of gun-wielding Venezuelan migrants storming an apartment building in the suburban city of Aurora, Colorado. One of the migrants, a 20-year-old, confessed that he is part of a Venezuelan gang called Tren de Aragua (TdA, or “Train from Aragua”). The Aurora police department is now beefing up its budget to confront the increased crime spilling over from the sanctuary city next door in Denver.Aurora was just the beginning. In the past 11 months, there have been increasing reports of TdA activity in no fewer than 30 major cities across America. At least 100 federal investigations involving the TdA are underway, catching most of the U.S. law enforcement community by surprise. Shooting two New York City

police officers, building sex trafficking rings in Louisiana, and murdering the Georgia nursing student Laken Riley and 12-year-old Jocelyn Nungaray in Houston are just some of the high- profile violent crimes carried out by the TdA. Moreover, given that the Venezuelan government does not cooperate or provide any data on suspected criminals coming from their country into the United States, some law enforcement officers have dubbed the TdA as “ghost criminals” with little to identify them other than confessions and/ or tattoos. The Tren de Aragua has been around for more than a decade, first as a Venezuelan prison gang, then as a transnational criminal organization (TCO) spreading throughout Latin America, and now as a major street gang terrorizing cities in at least 20 states throughout America—and growing. Many comparisons have been drawn between the TdA and the transnational Salvadoran gang, La Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). The TdA, however, is expanding much more quickly, likely due to its unique origin and state sponsorship in Venezuela. Unlike MS-13, which was born in Los Angeles in the 1980s, the TdA is foreign-born and was virtually nonexistent in America until 2021, distinct from other major TCOs such as MS-13 or the Mexican cartels. The TdA’s rapid expansion in the United States is a direct consequence of the Biden–Harris Administration’s failed immigration policies and lack of border enforcement.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The TdA’s goal is to establish territorial control and impose a criminal economy that connects illicit networks to penitentiaries in or near those neighborhoods. The new Trump Administration should work with Latin American partners to dismantle the TdA throughout the Western Hemisphere.

BACKGROUNDER No. 3876 | December 5, 2024

Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, the Douglas ans Sarah Alison Center for National Security, 2024. 18p.

By Tadesse Simie Metekia and Matt Herbert

Summary Due to their difficult political paths – Ethiopia’s stalled transition and Tunisia’s reversal – these two nations demonstrate the effects of failing transitions and democratic backsliding on rising transnational organised crime. Reversing the current trend of organised crime depends heavily on restoring stability and rule-of-law-based democracies, which could be achieved through a revived political process that embraces dialogue and transitional justice to mitigate the challenges and enable governance structures to tackle the complexities of organised crime. Key points The surge in transnational organised crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia can be seen as a consequence of their unrealised political transitions due to: • ensuing economic upheaval that has been the major driver of transnational organised crimes in both countries • porous borders and ungoverned spaces that allow criminal networks to grow • attention to pressing security challenges, such as conflicts and terrorism, that create space for criminal networks to strengthen and operate with impunity

ENACT Africa, 2024. 48p.

By The Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921

A mob destroyed 35-square-blocks of the African Amer i can Community during the eve - ning of May 31, through the afternoon of June 1, 1921. It was a tragic, infamous moment in Oklahoma and the nation’s history. The worst civil disturbance since the Civil War. In the aftermath of the death and destruction the people of our state suffered from a fatigue of faith — some still search for a statute of limitation on morality, attempting to forget the longevity of the residue of injustice that at best can leave little room for the healing of the heart. Perhaps this report, and subsequent humanitarian recovery events by the governments and the good people of the state will extract us from the guilt and confirm the commandment of a good and just God — leaving the deadly deeds of 1921 buried in the call for redemption, historical correctness, and re pair. Then we can proudly sing together: “We know we belong to this land. “And the land we belong to is grand, and when we say, ay yippy yi ki yea, “We’re only saying, you’re doing fine Oklahoma.” “Oklahoma, you’re O-K-L-A-H-O-M-A, Oklahoma OK.”

Oklahoma Historical Society, [Oklahoma City], 2001, 200p.

By Jake M. Drew and Tyler Moore

To be successful, cybercriminals must figure out how to scale their scams. They duplicate content on new websites, often staying one step ahead of defenders that shut down past schemes. For some scams, such as phishing and counterfeit goods shops, the duplicated content remains nearly identical. In others, such as advanced-fee fraud and online Ponzi schemes, the criminal must alter content so that it appears different in order to evade detection by victims and law enforcement. Nevertheless, similarities often remain, in terms of the website structure or content, since making truly unique copies does not scale well. In this paper, we present a novel optimized combined clustering method that links together replicated scam websites, even when the criminal has taken steps to hide connections. We present automated methods to extract key website features, including rendered text, HTML structure, file structure, and screenshots. We describe a process to automatically identify the best combination of such attributes to most accurately cluster similar websites together. To demonstrate the method’s applicability to cybercrime, we evaluate its performance against two collected datasets of scam websites: fake escrow services and high-yield investment programs (HYIPs). We show that our method more accurately groups similar websites together than those existing general-purpose consensus clustering methods.

• Smugglers were the top source of information for those who obtained information prior to starting their journey (50%), even more so for women (60%).This high percentage likely stems from the unique sampling criteria, in which all respondents used a smuggler. • However, 28% of migrants overall considered smugglers to be the most reliable source of information, and less so among women (21%).

London: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 12p.

By Kristin Franke Björkman and Lina Fjelkegård

Since 2021, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) has been commissioned by the Government with evaluating the initiative for 10,000 more police employees. The initiative aims to increase the number of police employees by 10,000 over the period 2016-2024 (Ju2021/02238). This is the third interim report under the assignment and focuses specifically on the investigative activities. The overarching purpose of the report is to analyse staff development and investigative results in the police's work with serious crime, especially serious crimes related to organised crime, and crime against particularly vulnerable victims during the period 2018-2023. In the study, Brå uses the Police Authority's personnel statistics and case data, interviews with heads of units and investigators, as well as a survey on the current staffing situation in the police districts’ investigative sections. In the analyses of case data, we also use the Police Authority's complexity measure, which was developed with the purpose of weighting cases according to how resource-intensive (complex) they are. The higher the value of the complexity measure (Kvalue) a case has, the more resources it requires. Delimitations In terms of staff development, the study is limited to focus specifically on Serious Crimes Investigative Units (SCUs), which are on the police district and regional organisational level, and on Domestic Violence Investigative Units (DVIUs), which are on the police district level. Investigative activities at local police district level are covered to a limited extent, and activities at national level are not included in the study at all. Trends in the inflow of cases and investigation outcomes focus on three overarching categories of offences. The first two categories, serious crimes and serious crimes related to organised crime (a subset of serious crimes), were identified empirically based on the types of crime that, according to the list of offences, shall be investigated at the police district level and are usually investigated by the SCUs. These categories include for example homicide (with or without the use of firearms), extortion, violence against a public official (police officer), arson, destruction causing public endangerment by explosion (hereafter referred to as explosions) and serious weapons offence. The fact that we selected the types of crime that the SCUs normally investigate is a delimitation that Brå has had to make in order for the study to be manageable in its scope. By including explosions and homicides with firearms, which are two of the most resource-intensive types of crime in terms of investigation, we believe that the study captures a key part of the police's investigative activities in relation to serious crime and serious organised crime. The third category, crimes against particularly vulnerable victims (SUB crimes), is the collective name for the offence code groups crimes against children, crimes in close relationships and rape against adults. This study includes those SUB crimes that, according to the list of offences, shall be investigated at police district level and are usually investigated by

the DVIUs. In addition, the study covers, to a limited extent, the investigative activities at the level of local police districts and their investigation of volume crimes, which are less complex and common types of crime such as theft, assault, and minor drug offences. The main outcome used to measure investigative performance is the proportion of cases reported to prosecutors out of all closed cases involving a preliminary investigation, which we refer to as clearance rate. Some analyses also present the number of cases reported to prosecutors. More employees in the investigative activities Within the investigative activities as a whole, the number of employees has increased by 2,900 (36%) over the period 2018-2023. However, staff growth is not evenly distributed across organisational levels, but is significantly higher at police district and regional level than at local police district level. Increased inflow of cases and high number of staff on temporary loan in Serious Crimes Over the period 2018-2023, the total inflow of serious crimes has increased by almost 30 per cent, both in terms of the number of cases and their complexity (K-value). However, the number of serious crime cases handled by the specialised Serious Crimes Investigative Units (SCUs) has remained relatively unchanged over time, while the K-value has increased. This development indicates that less complex cases have been removed from the SCUs, while a larger part of their inflow consists of the most complex serious crimes. The clear discrepancy between the increase in total inflow of cases (30%) and the unchanged inflow to the SCUs also suggests that a large and increasing number of serious crimes are handled in other parts of the organisation. This is also reflected in the increasing number of serious crime cases handled by local police districts. The number of serious crimes investigated by local police districts has increased by more than 80 per cent since 2018. Police Region Stockholm is the main driver of this development. There, the number of serious crimes investigated by local police districts has increased by almost 300 per cent. The number of employees in the SCUs has increased by 250 people, just over 30 per cent, between 2018 and 2023. The increase in staff took place mainly at the beginning and end of the period studied. Police Region Stockholm stands out with a significantly lower staff growth than the other regions (7%). Police Region Mitt has also experienced relatively low growth (17%). Growth is highest in Police Region Bergslagen (75%). Despite large regional variations, the overall picture is that despite the increase in staff, the specialised SCUs have not been able to cope with the increased influx of serious crimes. The staffing survey of the investigative sections also shows that the teams have difficulty managing the influx of cases themselves. According to the survey, almost a quarter of the SCU's staffing consists of temporarily borrowed staff.

English summary of Brå report 2024:9

Stockholm: Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention, 2024. 14p.

By Johanna Skinnari, Karolina Hurve and Andrea Monti

In this report, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) presents a government assignment regarding facilitators in the legal sector who provide assistance to criminal networks. For the purposes of this report, a facilitator is defined as someone misusing his or her position or mandate in local government or the public or private sectors in order to benefit criminal networks. Our research is based on analyses of interviews, cases and encrypted chat messages from members of criminal networks. Our study broadly confirms previous findings from Swedish and international research, particularly with regard to the tasks performed by facilitators. This report also presents a broader and more comprehensive picture of the conditions in Sweden. Unique data also provides us insight into areas not previously described.

What tasks do facilitators perform? Our study suggests that many members of criminal networks appear to have a substantial interest in using facilitators. Access to such facilitators is limited, but they can be found in all studied sectors. These mainly include the criminal justice system, numerous local government administrations, banking and finance, real estate, incorporation, bookkeeping and accounting services, legal services, security and surveillance, and transport. Overall, the identified cases occur in most regions of Sweden. This is therefore not solely a metropolitan phenomenon. The degree of activity among the identified facilitators ranges from sporadic, brief assistance to long-term and frequent assistance provided to numerous members of different criminal networks. The material as a whole shows that, in some areas, facilitators are more likely to assist criminal networks. Such professionals have frequent contacts with criminal actors, are exposed to threats or other pressure to a significant degree or receive remuneration that is tied to their number of clients. Facilitators mainly provide information to members of criminal networks, which is in line with previous studies. This information can be of very different kinds, including sensitive personal data, information about what public authorities or municipalities know about a criminal network, or more strategic information regarding potential criminal activity. Such information may also consist of warnings or instructions relayed to the criminal network from detained or imprisoned members. Such information allows them to coordinate their testimony and complicate investigations. One important observation is that information sought from facilitators need not be secret to be valuable. Rather, accumulated information and insider knowledge makes such information sensitive and useful to members of criminal networks. Professionals also facilitate logistics by smuggling, transporting or storing illegal goods. Facilitators may also create legitimate covers by generating credible documentation or certificates, or by providing companies which are used to commit crimes, as well as by identifying criminal schemes which appear as legitimate business activity. In some cases, facilitators are also needed to handle criminal proceeds, which public anti-money laundering measures have made more difficult for criminal networks. Finally, some facilitators even issue favourable decisions - they deviate from procurement procedures or other important decisions, fail to report crimes, or facilitate improper payments from welfare systems or the private sector. Our survey shows the facilitators are asked to perform a broad array of tasks of varying complexity. These range from logistical tasks, which the criminal network might have performed on its own or learned, to complex assignments which only a facilitator could perform, especially influencing the outcome of certain decisions and accessing sensitive information. Report 2024:2

Stockholm: Swedish Council on Crime Prevention 2025. 12p.

By Karolina Kamra Kregert

The main purpose of the Swedish Crime Survey (SCS) is to study trends in self-reported exposure to crime, fear of crime, confidence in the criminal justice system and crime victims' contact with the criminal justice system in the Swedish population (16-84 years). The survey also aims to describe differences among population groups, such as differences between men and women or among different age groups. This chapter presents a selection of the indicators included in the report, to summarise the results and provide an overall picture of trends and patterns. Note that, in the context of the SCS, exposure to crime refers to events that occurred during the previous calendar year, meaning that SCS 2024 refers to exposure to crime in 2023. Fear of crime refer to perceptions over the past year, while unsafety and confidence in the criminal justice system refer to perceptions at the time the questionnaire was answered. Trends Exposure to sexual offences, threats and bicycle theft have decreased, while fraud has increased There is a decreasing trend in the proportion of the population who state that they have been exposed to sexual offences, threats and bicycle theft. Exposure to sexual offences has significantly decreased in this year's survey (3.8 % in 2023, compared to 4.7 % in 2022), and after a sharp increase in the period 2012-2017, has begun decreasing instead. The proportion of respondents having been exposed to threats has also decreased (7.4% in 2023, compared to 7.7% in 2022), with an evident decreasing trend since 2020. Before that, there was an increase between 2014 and 2019. Furthermore, the proportion of households exposed to bicycle theft has decreased for the fourth consecutive year. Both sales fraud and card and credit fraud have increased in this year's survey. For sales fraud, an increasing trend has been observed since the first measuring point (2016), with a significant increase in this year's survey (from 6.1%, in 2022, to 6.9%, in 2023). Card and credit fraud have increased in the last two years, having previously decreased in 2020 and 2021. In terms of exposure to robbery, there was a decreasing trend as of 2020, but in this year's survey the proportion is the same as the previous year. For assault, pickpocketing, online harassment, harassment, burglary and car theft, the proportion has remained stable over the last three to four years.

English summary of Brå report 2024:8

Stockholm: Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention, 2024. 30p.