Genevieve Kotarska and Lauren Young

This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.

Critical minerals are broadly defined as minerals that are of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security and are also subject to serious risks relating to the security of their supply. This paper uses the term ‘critical minerals’ broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that this is not a fixed list, and that a country’s specific assessment will affect whether a mineral is considered critical.

A dramatically increased supply of these minerals will be vital for the net zero transition – both in the UK and internationally – and to meet the target to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, set at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Conference in 2015.

Yet the extraction of critical minerals poses various environmental and human security risks, many of which pose a threat to the net zero transition, in the UK and globally. This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks. It identifies key environmental risks as including the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, pollution, soil degradation, water scarcity and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks identified include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses, labour exploitation, crime, conflict and corruption. Where mining takes place on or near Indigenous lands, both environmental and human security risks are found to disproportionately affect already-disenfranchised communities.

While a number of these risks are well established, there is a potential for burgeoning demand for critical minerals to accelerate potential harms. Such harms can occur in situations where rising demand pushes governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; where new extractive operations open up in countries without mining histories, which lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; where harmful boom–bust cycles of extractive activity occur due to ongoing technological advances; and where a race to secure supplies of critical minerals exacerbates competition and geopolitical tensions.

If the mining sector fails to address these risks as demand booms, public opinion across source and supply countries might turn against the net zero transition as the harms are perceived to outweigh the benefits. It is crucial that the UK leverages its unique position as an international trade, financial and mining hub to help the international community mitigate the risks posed in this regard.

Based on the findings of this research, the authors suggest the following ways forward for consideration by the UK government, many of which are also applicable to other governments in the Global North:

• Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures, Science-Based Targets for Nature, Global Reporting Initiative and other similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.

• Develop an updated industrial strategy on critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.

• Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the ‘levelling up’ agenda.

• Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.

• Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.

• Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks. This could involve providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation. Such regulation should improve the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries, in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.

• Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises the pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth, and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies -RUSI, 2023. 49p.

By The Venezuela Investigative Unit

The blood streamed down Eduardo Labrador’s face and splattered across his shirt. “Film me! Film me!” he shouted at the journalist who had come to check on him. As he addressed the camera, he was defiant, angry even. Today, he said, they had come out to defend democracy in Venezuela. And this was the result.

One year later, he grasped for an analogy for what it felt like to be beaten. “I don’t know if you’ve ever experienced an explosion, you feel it there, so close to your ears — Boom! For hours I heard that boom in my ears,” he told InSight Crime.

The image of Labrador, blood-streaked and indignant, shattered the façade of an orderly and peaceful election that the Venezuelan government had been desperate to present to the world.

Labrador had been attacked by armed men as he tried to carry out his duties as the campaign director for the political opposition during local and regional elections in November 2021. The assault, he says, was part of a premeditated campaign of voter intimidation in the municipality of San Francisco in the northwestern state of Zulia. And behind that campaign, he alleged, was Zulia’s then-governor Omar Prieto.

Labrador had witnessed Prieto’s rise firsthand as a political ally within the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela – PSUV) and member of his cabinet. He was often seen as Prieto’s right-hand man.

But over time, Labrador watched the socialist project he had once believed in descend into what another former high-level PSUV insider described to InSight Crime as “a project of crime in power.”

That project saw Prieto and his cronies carry out extortion, embezzlement, theft, and smuggling rackets from within the state, while deploying a criminalized police force as a private militia to protect their interests.

It was a project very much of that moment in Venezuela’s history.

When Prieto became governor in 2017, Venezuela was on the brink of economic collapse, and President Nicolás Maduro was under political siege. Desperate to maintain the loyalty of a fractured PSUV, underpaid security forces, and military and political elites unhappy with their dwindling corruption profits, Maduro granted territories to the different poles of power within the Chavista political movement. And then he gave them permission to squeeze whatever criminal profits they could from those territories.

Prieto was granted power in Zulia as a scion of the most important political faction within Chavismo outside of Maduro’s own network. And for the duration of his term, he pushed that permissiveness to its limits.

But by the time he was standing for reelection in 2021, that moment was beginning to pass. Venezuela had a measure of stability. Maduro’s presidency had survived, and his objectives were shifting. He wanted to reenter the international community both politically and economically. He wanted to consolidate his personal power and neuter his rivals within the PSUV. And he wanted to bring order to the mafia state that had grown up during the crisis.

Which is why Maduro invited international observers to monitor the 2021 elections, in the hopes that they would tell the world the elections were free and fair. And why even when it became clear the PSUV was going to lose Zulia, he made no intervention to help Prieto, who had overstepped the conventional limits on criminality and corruption.

Venezuela’s 2021 elections were problematic but largely peaceful. The violence in Zulia, which left one dead and three — including Labrador — injured, was a shocking exception. But it was entirely predictable. Prieto, the gangster governor, was never likely to go quietly.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 39p.

by Julia Stanyard

The development of transport infrastructure boosts trade and stimulates economic growth. However, this infrastructure can also benefit criminal networks, which use air transport to traffic illicit goods such as drugs, wildlife and gold. Their activities are disguised from regulatory bodies, and many act in collusion with corrupt officials. However, this can be countered by implementing effective oversight measures. This is crucial considering the substantial expansion of African air traffic in recent years, forecasts that Africa will continue to be one of the fastest-growing regions in the world for aviation, and the challenges that the aviation sector globally is facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 18p.

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

Across the globe, the proliferation of new armed groups (including rebels, militias, criminal groups and gangs) has made conflict prevention and resolution even more complex . Armed groups are diversifying their revenues, which are increasingly based on organized crime activities . Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) often benefit from the turmoil of armed conflicts and violence. They can engage in violence to protect their illicit business, undermining national economic development and security. Furthermore, OCGs can team up with armed groups to access and control natural resources, competing with the state to provide public goods or even protection to their community. Different situations of violent conflict affect countries in the Eastern African region. Crime dynamics that emerge from instability in one country of the region can spill over into a neighbouring country, posing a threat to regional peace and security. The emergence of hybrid criminal groups engaged in transnational organized crime and in armed conflict most likely represents a relevant dimension of contemporary conflict in Eastern Africa. Yet, the knowledge on the multiple ways in which OCGs prey, or even amplify, local conflicts for their own benefit remains limited. In many instances, the scale of criminal activities in Eastern Africa contributes to an increase in the risk of conflict or in its prolongation. Organized crime thrives in conflict and other situations of violence in the region when goods and supplies are scarce, filling the demand often in association with armed groups. In some cases, revenue from criminal activities enables armed groups to finance their activities. The illicit circulation of weapons in the region from and into conflict-affected settings fuels violence and criminal activities. Information suggests that in some occasions, armed groups and OCGs collude to smuggle goods, migrants and drugs through the region and beyond. Moreover, the illicit extraction, control and taxation of natural resources in the region is often a source of revenue for armed groups and often links them with criminal actors. Information shows that livestock theft, or cattle rustling, poses a serious threat to many countries in the region and fuels the increase in the demand for small arms and light weapons in two aspects: for fighters to steal cattle and for ranchers to protect their livestock against such attacks. Higher levels of violence have been reported in cattle rustling cases affecting local economies and security. Organized violence for profit continues to affect Eastern Africa. Kidnapping for ransom, looting, threats and sexual gender-based violence are among the most reported incidents in the region. The driving factors for those crimes are sometimes difficult to discern and involve a combination of reasons such as economic gain, firearms sourcing (notably for cases of looting security forces), intention to control a community or territory. Illicit financial flows, and particularly, illicit taxation, allow OCGs and armed groups to generate revenue through commodity taxes, by imposing taxes on the community to move through certain areas or to run their business

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

In the last two decades the percentage of imprisoned women offenders is growing globally, at a faster rate than imprisoned male offenders. 1 Such global increase raises the question as to whether the same can be observed on the African continent . Information suggests that transnational organized crime (TOC) affects African women and girls differently than African men and boys. It is crucial to learn how and if men and women behave differently in TOC in Africa in order to uncover the main drivers of these differences and adapt policing methodology accordingly. While gendered data continues to be insufficiently reported upon by law enforcement authorities in Africa, the assessment suggests that African law enforcement authorities are possibly under -investigating and under -estimating the involvement of African women in TOC. African law enforcement authorities likely continue to perceive them as victims or accomplices only. They are possibly rarely seen as the criminals themselves and less so as being the organizers, leaders, traffickers or recruiters. This gap in police investigations is indeed known to be exploited to the benefit of organized crime as women are more likely to go under the radar . The assessment draws attention to the common features of African female offenders based on available data to share insights and encourage police forces to reconsider their approach.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The monitor draws on information provided by field researchers working in gang-affected communities of the Western Cape. This includes interviews with current and former gang members, civil society and members of the criminal justice system.

Over the past three months, our team has monitored and recorded almost a thousand instances of gang-related violence, which are unpacked here to provide a picture of some emerging trends in gang behaviour. The key findings analyzed here have been selected, as they would appear to be emblematic of broader trends in gang social dynamics, and because they have been under-reported elsewhere, or may have repercussions for how we understand developments in Western Cape gang violence.

In this first issue of the Gang Monitor, we also include a summary of key dynamics to watch, which draws on a longer-term view of how the gang landscape has changed in recent years. The analysis is based on the GI-TOC’s research over several years identifying how Western Cape gang dynamics have developed and to help us understand how they may continue to in future.

This quarter has been characterized by increased infighting between splinter groups within gangs. Conflict between Americans groups in Hanover Park provides a key example. The Fancy Boys are on an aggressive campaign to expand territorial control, including in Mitchells Plain and Manenberg. Pagad G-Force has become more vocal and visible in anti-gang campaigning. A shooting in Hanover Park may indicate that the group is taking a more militant stance. There has been an increase in young child gang recruits forming breakaway groups, as exemplified by KEY FINDINGS

ISSUE No. 1 | QUARTERLY OCTOBER 2023. Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 8p.

By Shehryar Fazli

This project addresses the complex issue of drug production in Afghanistan, which continues to fuel regional and global narcotics trade. Despite the Taliban's 2022 ban on poppy cultivation and narcotics trade, trafficking remains a major concern. The subsequent crackdown in 2023 resulted in reduced cultivation in specific provinces, but the ban's sustainability is uncertain due to poppy's significance in Afghanistan's rural economy and the fragile economic situation.

The project extends its focus to the Golden Crescent region, where Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran intersect, serving as a prominent drug smuggling hub. Pakistan and Iran, pivotal to the southern drug trafficking route, have consistently accounted for over 90% of global opium seizures since 2002. Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan, presents counter-narcotics challenges in the northern drug route to Russia and Europe.

Challenging the notion that state capacity alone can address the drug trade, the project advocates for a multifaceted approach, emphasising international cooperation beyond law enforcement. The punitive regimes in Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan, coupled with corruption, inadvertently protect high-level traffickers. In Afghanistan, the project raises the question of whether neighboring or Western governments are willing to end Kabul's isolation, providing economic assistance to reduce dependence on poppy cultivation. However, prospects are limited due to regressive Taliban policies.

The proposed counter-narcotics strategy expands beyond law enforcement, including building domestic public pressure for an accountable regime. This involves partnerships with local organisations, rehabilitation centers, health and education NGOs, and human rights groups. The goal is to foster domestic political ownership and public demand for humane and accountable national counter-narcotics policies. The project argues against relying solely on coercive state organs, offering a more comprehensive and sustainable solution to the core challenges posed by drug trafficking.

SOC ACE Research Paper 25. University of Birmingham. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 30p.

By Diana Kim andYuhki Tajima

This article analyzes the efficacy of border enforcement against smuggling. We argue that walls, fences, patrols, and other efforts to secure porous borders can reduce smuggling, but only in the absence of collusion between smugglers and state agents at official border crossings. When such corruption occurs, border enforcement merely diverts smuggling flows without reducing their overall volume. We also identify the conditions under which corruption occurs and characterize border enforcement as a sorting mechanism that allows high-skilled smugglers to forge alternative border-crossing routes while deterring low-skilled smugglers or driving them to bribe local border agents. Combining a formal model and an archival case study of opium smuggling in Southeast Asia, we demonstrate that border enforcement has conditional effects on the routes and volumes of smuggling, depending on the nature of interactions between smugglers and border agents. By drawing attention to the technological and organizational aspects of smuggling, this article brings scholarship on criminal governance into the study of international relations, and contributes to debates on the effects of border enforcement and border politics more generally.

International Organization , Volume 76 , Issue 4 , Fall 2022 , pp. 830 - 867

By The Congressional Budget Office

The United States has been experiencing an opioid crisis since the mid-1990s, and opioids have had a significant effect on public health and on the nation’s economic and social outcomes. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office examines the consequences and timeline of the crisis, the contributing factors and federal responses to it, and the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on the crisis.

Deaths. More than 500,000 opioid-involved deaths have occurred since 2000, and the United States has the world’s highest number of opioid-involved deaths per capita. Although federal funding to address the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, opioid overdose mortality has increased as well. Deaths from opioid-involved overdoses were among the leading causes of death in 2020.

Health and Other Effects. The use and misuse of opioids can result in serious health effects: People with certain harmful behaviors that result from opioid misuse—such as an increase in the amount and frequency of opioid use or failure to fulfill major responsibilities at work, home, or school—have opioid use disorder (OUD), which can affect people’s participation in the labor force and their ability to care for their children. Treatment for OUD is used far less than behavioral health professionals recommend.

Changes Over Time. The opioid crisis has occurred in waves distinguished by the different types of opioids involved in overdose deaths and the use of opioids in combination with other drugs.

Contributing Factors. A rise in opioid prescribing, changes in illegal opioid markets, and greater demand for opioids due to worsening economic and social conditions for certain populations are key contributors to the crisis.

Federal Laws. Between 2016 and 2018, three laws enacted in response to the crisis aimed to lower the demand for and supply of opioids and to reduce their harm. The funding in those laws complemented annual appropriations to agencies tasked with responding to substance use disorder, including opioid use disorder.

The Crisis After the Enactment of the Laws and During the Pandemic. Opioid-involved deaths continued to increase after the laws were enacted—initially more slowly than in preceding years but then more rapidly during the pandemic. Opioid misuse increased during the pandemic as people experienced worsened mental health, more social isolation, greater job losses, and reduced access to treatment. In addition, the use of more potent synthetic opioids led to a sharp increase in overdose deaths. The pandemic and other factors have made it difficult to isolate the effect of the laws on the opioid crisis.

Washington, DC: CBO, 2022. 38p.

By Maximilian Meyer, Jean N. Westenberg , Kerry L. Jang , Fiona Choi , Stefanie Schreiter , Nickie Mathew , Conor King, Undine. Lang , Marc Vogel and R. Michael Krausz

Understanding drug market dynamics and their underlying driving factors is paramount to developing effective responses to the overdose crisis in North America. This paper summarises the distinct drug market trends observed locally and internationally over the past decade to extrapolate future drug market trajectories. The emergence of fentanyl on North American street markets from 2014 onwards led to a shift of street drug use patterns. Previously perceived as contaminants, novel synthetic opioids became the drugs of choice and a trend towards higher potency was observed across various substance classes. The diversification of distribution strategies as well as the regionalisation and industrialisation of production followed basic economic principles that were heavily influenced by prosecution and policy makers. Particularly, the trend towards higher potency is likely most indicative of what to expect from future illicit drug market developments. Nitazenes and fentanyl-analogues, several times more potent than fentanyl itself, are increasingly detected in toxicological testing and have the potential of becoming the drugs of choice in the future. The dynamic of drug import and local production is less clear and influenced by a multitude of factors like precursor availability, know-how, infrastructure, and the success of local drug enforcement strategies. Drug market dynamics and the current trajectory towards ultrapotent opioids need to be recognised by legislation, enforcement, and the health care system to prepare effective responses. Without significant improvements in treatment access, the implementation of preventative approaches and early warning systems, the mortality rate will continue to increase. Furthermore, there is no mechanism in place preventing the currently North American focused overdose crisis to spread to other parts of the globe, particularly Europe. A system of oversight, research, and treatment is needed to address mortality rates of historic proportions and prevent further harm.

International Journal of Mental Health Systems (2023) 17:36

By Jonathan P. Caulkins and Keith Humphreys

If, in 2015, someone had told you that the number of overdose deaths caused solely by the two most historically lethal drugs—heroin and cocaine—would drop by more than half by 2021, you would likely have assumed that the overdose crisis in the U.S. was finally coming to an end. Instead, drug overdose deaths soared to more than 100,000 per year due to the rise of synthetic drugs, a truly disruptive innovation with which U.S. drug policy is only beginning to grapple.

To clarify the key term: synthetic drugs are substances that can be produced in a lab and are not from plant-derived components. In Canadian and U.S. illegal opioid markets, synthetic fentanyl and its analogues are outcompeting heroin, which is made from the poppy plant. These synthetics claimed the lives of more than 70,000 Americans in 2021 (out of 106,699 total drug-involved overdose deaths, or 66%), either by themselves or in combination with other drugs.[1] Methamphetamine, another synthetic, has attained a larger share of the stimulant market than cocaine, which is made from coca leaves.[2] The rapid expansion of synthetic tranquilizers—such as xylazine and benzodiazepines—has spread addiction and death, particularly when these drugs are used in combination with opioids. The U.S. is also facing a bevy of so-called new psychoactive substances (NPS), such as MDMA and mephedrone, that collectively attract more users than do older, “minor” drugs such as LSD, GHB, and PCP.

Drug policy analysts, including the authors of this brief, are swamped with requests from desperate policymakers, clinicians, parents, and activists to find solutions to the problem of synthetic drugs. This brief comprises our answer. Unfortunately, it is not particularly upbeat. All four traditional pillars of drug policy—enforcement, treatment, harm reduction, and prevention—have limits, and there is no simple solution for the synthetic drug market. Nonetheless, the nation can do some things better and should stop doing other things that are harmful. Policymakers must:

• Maintain prohibition of the production and sale of synthetic drugs

• Expect law enforcement to shrink market-related harms, such as violence, but not necessarily to shrink the supply of the drugs themselves

• Keep expanding medication-assisted treatment and access to naloxone

• Embrace the shunning of illegal drugs as a cultural norm

• Be generous toward those who are struggling, including those suffering from drug addiction

Unfortunately, the widespread availability of potentially lethal temptations in the U.S. may be the new normal, and overdose deaths will continue to remain higher than historical norms. Such realism is depressing but honest, and honesty is the best foundation for policy.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2023. 13p.

By Kingsley Madueke | Lawan Danjuma Adamu Katja Lindskov Jacobsen | Lucia Bird

Political violence is a major obstacle to democratic processes worldwide. Violence perpetrated in pursuit of electoral victory has widespread consequences: the destruction of lives and property, the displacement of people, undermining the credibility of the electoral process, and the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions.1 In countries throughout Africa, including Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, gangs play a pivotal role in political violence. When they are not perpetrating political violence, the same gangs often engage in a range of illicit markets.2 Yet, so far, analyses have not adequately scrutinized the link between gangs, political violence and illicit markets, predominantly understanding them as separate phenomena.3 The intersection between them has been understated, with important implications for response strategies. Background Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, criminal gangs have played an increasingly pivotal role in driving political violence in the country. These criminal actors engage in a broad spectrum of activities, including intimidation of voters and political opponents, assassinations and disruption of political rallies on behalf of political actors. Gangs are remunerated in cash, material gifts and other favours from political actors, including state appointments and protection. Despite the deployment of security forces, election periods in Nigeria have long been characterized by high levels of violence – the 2023 elections were no exception.4 Although data collated regarding political violence in Nigeria broadly demonstrates a decrease in lives lost compared to previous electoral cycles, the number of violent incidents recorded has grown. Furthermore, the research presented in this report underscores that number of incidents of political violence fails to capture the full impact of political violence in determining Nigeria’s most recent political outcomes. Disenfranchisement was a clear consequence of covert forms of threat and intimidation: the 2023 elections saw the lowest voter turnout in Nigeria’s history, with President Bola Tinubu’s mandate effectively granted by less than 10% of Nigeria’s electorate. Though electoral violence is a countrywide concern in Nigeria, Kano in the north and Rivers in the south are repeatedly among the states hit hardest by political violence. In 2023 both became flashpoints for election violence.5 Both states are highly politically competitive and have a strong presence of criminal gangs with links to politicians, which play a leading role in electoral violence. The long history of election violence, coupled with the incidents of attacks and clashes leading up to and during the 2023 elections, had a major impact on voter turnout, the voting process and, consequently, the outcome of the elections in these areas Criminal gangs are not the only actors that have been associated with violence in Nigeria. For example, different groups, including violent extremist organizations such as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), armed bandits in the north, as well as secessionists such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the south-east have allegedly been involved in violence in different parts of the country. However, this report focuses on criminal gangs because they have featured more prominently in election-related violence and they have comparatively deeper roots in the country’s social and political landscape in the states under study. As case studies, the situations in Kano and Rivers demonstrate that political violence in Nigeria cannot be dismissed as a phenomenon limited to a particular geography or political party. The states are positioned in different regions, beset by different criminal and conflict dynamics, and have contrasting histories of political affiliation. Yet the centrality of political violence – and the pivotal interlinkages between crime and politics it reveals – is a common thread corroding democratic processes across both states, and Nigeria as a whole. In Kano and Rivers, the current dynamics of political violence emerged when political parties contracted elements of pre-existing groups (hunters’ associations and cult groups, respectively) to attack opponents, voters and election officials. The contracted groups benefited from this political alignment, and over time there emerged a mutually beneficial ecosystem between gangs and politicians. This ecosystem – the exact contours of which are shaped by complex local factors – is highly damaging for the Nigeria’s democracy. The two case studies presented in this report attempt to untangle this complex ecosystem and explore key questions: did gangs or political violence emerge first? What happens to gangs on the losing side of the political contest? Furthermore, elections are cyclical, and political gangs seem poised to service the demands of their political contractors at each four-year interlude. But what do these gangs do in the interim? This question – what do political thugs do when they are not doing political violence?6 – underpinned this research. Criminal markets provided the answer. This report argues that outside of election cycles, criminal gangs involved in political violence are engaged in a range of illicit markets for their sustainability and resilience. The link between political violence and illicit markets is a significant concern as it provides criminal actors with political cover and access to the means to perpetrate further acts of violence and criminality. Exploring the implications of such intersections for politics and governance, and identifying potential ways to disrupt such links, is therefore urgently required.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 47p.

By Francesca Soliman

In this paper I examine authorities’ management of migrant boats on the island of Lampedusa, Italy, as an example of environmental border harm. A danger to trawlers, sunken wrecks are also hazardous to the environment, with pollutants such as oil and fuel seeping into the sea. Migrant boats that reach the island, whether independently or towed by rescuers, are left to accumulate in the harbour and eventually break up, scattering debris in bad weather. When boats are uplifted onto land, they are amassed in large dumps, leaking pollutants into the soil. Periodically, the resulting environmental crises trigger emergency tendering processes for the disposal of the boats, which allow for the environmental protections normally required in public bidding to be suspended for the sake of expediency. The disposal of migrant boats thus relies on a pattern of manufactured environmental emergencies, consistent with the intrinsically crisis-based management of the border itself.\

Critical Criminology 31(12):1-17, 2023.

By Malvina Bondy, Sefi Roth, and Lutz Sager

Many empirical studies have examined the various determinants of crime.However, the link between crime and air pollution has been largely overlooked. In this paper we study whether exposure to ambient air pollution affects crime using daily administrative data for London in 2004–5. For identification, we estimate models withward fixed effects and implement two instrumental variable strategies, using atmo-spheric inversions and wind direction as exogenous shocks to local pollution. We Find That air pollution has a positive and statistically significant impact on overall crime andon several major crime categories, including those with economic motives. Impor-tantly, the effect also occurs at pollution levels that are well below current regulatory standards and appears to be unevenly distributed across income groups. Our results suggest that reducing air pollution in urban areas may be an effective measure to reduce crime and that air pollution forecasts can be used to improve predictive policing

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. Volume 7, Number 3. May 2020

By Melina Risso, et al.

Environmental crime became the world’s third most lucrative illicit economy after drug trafficking and smuggling, with estimates of $110 to $281 billion in annual profits. Between 2006 and 2016, environmental crimes grew at a rate of 5% to 7% per year, a pace two or three times faster than that of global GDP growth. Money laundering is part of the criminal machinery that plunders the Amazon Rainforest.

The study “Follow the Money: connecting anti-money laundering systems to disrupt environmental crime in the amazon” reveals the need for systems, agencies, and institutions responsible for preventing money laundering to turn their attention to the connections between this illicit practice and environmental crimes.

The Igarapé study shows that the money laundering cycle follows three stages before the laundered funds can enter the financial system: placement, layering, and integration. However, not all proceeds from criminal activity are directly laundered into the formal financial system. Thus, informal diversification constitutes the process of moving illegal flows into the informal economy. It is estimated that 30% of the money to be laundered is used to pay the operating expenses of illicit economies. Cash transactions, divided into small amounts and deposited by “money mules,” are used to finance the hiring of precarious labor, accommodations, food, security, transportation, health services, leisure, and machinery, for example. The remaining 70% of illicit proceeds are formally inserted into the financial system.

Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brasil ; Igarape Institute, 2023. 33p.

By Melina Risso, et al.

Environmental crime in the Amazon has become one of the largest illicit economies in the world, generating annual profits estimated at between $110 billion and $281 billion. However, only 6.3% of money laundering cases reported between 2017 and 2020 to the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (Gafilat), the main body responsible for combating illicit financial flows in the region, were related to environmental crimes.

To assess the level of attention and priority given to environmental crimes at each stage of the anti-money laundering system, we are launching the second publication in the “Follow the Money” series. Focusing on the three key countries of the Amazon basin – Brazil, Colombia, and Peru – the study proposes an analytical approach to the legal and institutional capacities to combat money laundering in five dimensions: 1) strategic planning and preventive measures; 2) monitoring and detection – financial intelligence units; 3) mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions; 4) criminal investigation; and 5) Prosecution and sanctions.

Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brasil , Igarape Institute, 2023. 43p.

By Faith Ngum | Radha Barooah

What constitutes an environmental crime has long been subject to debate. However, human-induced environmental degradation and biodiversity loss are both pertinent. Local communities, largely indigenous groups, living around biodiverse areas comprising forests, mountains and marine ecosystems stand to be among the first affected. The presence of illegal extractive activities, whether mining or logging, attracts men from outside these areas and effectively ‘masculinizes’ these territories. This disrupts regular life and threatens the safety of women, who often have to venture into forests to carry out domestic activities. The impact varies from community to community and is linked to gender roles and patriarchy, and sometimes includes physical violence. This policy brief presents case studies from four forest ecosystems: the Arajuno forests of the Ecuadorian Amazon, the Sierra Tarahumara forests in Mexico, the Yabassi forests in Cameroon and the rainforests of North Sumatra in Indonesia. The findings show that while local indigenous communities rally to defend their territories against extractive operations and perceived environmental crimes, gender norms and patriarchy limit women’s voices and participation. However, women’s participation in resistance movements has gradually increased, especially against large-scale state concessions, and many have become leading environmental defenders in their communities. Their motivation to voice their perspectives and challenge dominant narratives against indigenous communities through various acts of solidarity is firmly rooted in their desire to protect their livelihoods. Their resilience strategies are similar but context-specific and nuanced across the communities in the four forest ecosystems analyzed in this brief.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 34p.

By Lucy Vigne and Esmond Martin

Executive summary ■ From 2013 to 2016, Laos’s retail ivory market has expanded more rapidly than in any other country surveyed recently. ■ Laos has not been conforming with CITES regulations that prohibit the import and export of ivory. Since joining CITES in 2004, only one ivory seizure into Laos has been reported to the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS). ■ Almost no arrests, let alone prosecutions and punishments, have been made of smugglers with ivory coming in or out of the country. ■ Most worked ivory for sale in Laos originates from elephants poached in Africa. ■ Ivory has also been entering Laos illegally from Thailand, as Thai traders have been offloading their ivory following the imposition of much stricter regulations there. ■ In late 2013 the average wholesale price of raw ivory sold by Lao traders peaked at about USD 2,000/kg. ■ By late 2016, the average wholesale price of raw ivory in Laos had declined to USD 714/kg, in line with prices elsewhere in the region. This price was much higher than in African countries, such as Sudan (Omdurman/Khartoum), where the average wholesale price of ivory was USD 279/kg in early 2017. This price differential is due to the extra expenses incurred in transport and bribes to government officials on the long journey to Asia. ■ In Laos, the decline in the wholesale price of raw ivory between 2013 and 2016, as elsewhere in the region, was mainly due to the slowdown in China’s economy, that resulted in an oversupply of illegal ivory, relative to demand. ■ Ivory items seen for sale in Laos are carved or machine-processed in Vietnam by Vietnamese and smuggled into Laos for sale, or are processed by Chinese traders in Laos on new computerdriven machines. Ivory carving by Lao people is insignificant. ■ In Laos, the survey found 81 retail outlets with ivory on view for retail sale, 40 of which were in the capital, Vientiane, 21 in Luang Prabang, 8 in Kings Romans, 5 in Oudom Xay, 3 in Pakse, 2 in Dansavanh Nam Ngum Resort and 2 in Luang Nam Tha. ■ The survey counted 13,248 ivory items on display for sale, nearly all recently made to suit Chinese tastes. Vientiane had 7,014 items for sale, Luang Prabang 4,807, Kings Romans 1,014, Dansavanh Nam Ngum Resort 291, Oudom Xay 93, Luang Nam Tha 16, and Pakse 13. ■ Most outlets, displaying the majority of worked ivory, also sold souvenirs, Chinese herbal teas or jewellery, or were hotel gift shops. ■ Outlets were usually owned by traders from mainland China. The number of Chinese-owned shops had risen in Laos from none recorded in the early 2000s to several in 2013, including one main shop in Vientiane’s Chinese market and two on the main tourist street of Luang Prabang. By 2016, there were 22 and 15 outlets, respectively, in these two areas, both of which are popular with Chinese visitors. By 2016, Chinese outlets with ivory had also sprung up in other locations, mainly those visited by the increasing number of Chinese. ■ In 2016, the most common ivory items for sale were pendants, followed by necklaces, bangles, beaded bracelets and other jewellery, similar to items for sale in 2013, but in far larger quantities. ■ The least expensive item was a thin ring for USD 3 and the most expensive was a pair of polished tusks for USD 25,000. ■ Retail prices for ivory items of similar type were higher than elsewhere in Kings Romans, which is visited primarily by wealthier Chinese visitors with money to spend. ■ Mainland Chinese buy over 80% of the ivory items in Laos today. There are sometimes buyers from South Korea and other Asian countries, according to vendors. ■ Laotians today generally buy amulets that are made of bone or synthetic material, rather than ivory items.

Nairobi, Kenya: Save the Elephants, 2027. 92p.

By The Joint Analytical Cell (JAC)

In early October, the Joint Analytical Cell (JAC) released the results of a collaborative analysis into a fleet of Chinese-linked distant-water squid fishing vessels. These vessels are known as the “150 Series,” named as such because each vessel’s reported Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSI) numbers all start with the numbers one-five-zero. This group of vessels identified in the report appear to have engaged in behavior consistent with attempts to conceal their identity by MMSI spoofing — changing and sharing names over Automatic Identification System (AIS), as well as using multiple MMSIs, making it extremely challenging to monitor and enforce their activities. Following the identification of this behavior, which has been linked with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities, the JAC engaged with China to better understand the nature and motivation of the behavior identified.

Long Beach CaliforniaL Global Fishing Watch, 2023. 46p.

By The Wildlife Justice Commission

The report builds on our first crime convergence report, published in 2021, which analysed a set of 12 case studies, and illustrated the varied ways that wildlife crime can overlap or intersect with other serious and organised crimes.

It presents additional analysis and insights from three in-depth case studies, based on open-source research and intelligence collected during Wildlife Justice Commission investigations. These three case studies add to the knowledge base on this issue, which will continue to develop globally as more cases are detected and analysed.

Wildlife crime is a cross-cutting criminal activity which cannot be tackled in isolation from other crimes. Crime convergence should be further studied and integrated as part of the approach to tackle wildlife crime and organised crime more broadly. An improved understanding of this intersection can help to identify more strategic policy and law enforcement responses to address it.

The Hague: Wildlife Justice Commission, 2023.39p.