By Masayuki Sakamoto

Africaʼ s elephants continue to be poached for their ivory tusks. To combat the poaching crisis, and to support the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)ʼ s 1990 ban on international commercial ivory trade, nations and jurisdictions around the world have taken steps to close their domestic markets for ivory. By closing the market for ivory, governments send a strong signal that the trade in ivory and killing of elephants is unacceptable, streamline enforcement efforts by eliminating legal cover for illegal ivory, and support ivory demand reduction efforts. Nevertheless, one major consumer market remains open ‒ Japan. With an ivory stockpile of 244 tonnes, Japanʼ s domestic market is the worldʼ s largest and most significant legalized ivory market. Evidence indicates its ivory trade controls are porous, enabling the trade in illegal ivory and illegal ivory exports. At least 76 seizures of ivory from Japan were made between 2018 and 2020, mostly in China by Chinese authorities. To further examine illegal ivory export from Japan to China, the Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund (JTEF) turned to court cases in China, which could include more details than seizure data. JTEF identified court cases on illegal export of ivory from Japan into China, and analyzed them in order to contribute to evidence-based decision-making, constructive dialogue, and decisive outcomes from the Parties at the 19th Conference of the Parties (CoP19) to CITES,. In all, 49 public court decisions on 45 different cases between 2010 and 2019, published by the Government of China, were…..

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  identified and analyzed. Fifteen out of 45 cases occurred in 2018 and 2019, after Chinaʼ s domestic ivory market closure went into effect. In addition to summarizing basic information about each case, any information pertaining to the role of Japanʼ s legal market in illegal ivory export and information regarding the defining characteristics of transnational organized crime was assessed.  

Tokyo: Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund (JTEF) 2022. 88p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

West and Central Africa continues to raise concerns among Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) as a significant hub for global wildlife trafficking. This briefing highlights the parallel responsibilities and shortcomings of both West and Central Africa and South-East Asia in implementing their commitments under CITES and outlines what needs to happen to tackle transnational wildlife crime more effectively. At SC74, EIA raised these concerns in our briefing document Joint Responsibilities: The Nigeria- Vietnam wildlife trafficking corridor and compliance with CITES, which similarly highlighted the need for urgent action.

London; Washington, DC: EIA, 2022. 12p.

By Environmental Investigation Agency

In 2017, rhino poaching started to increase in Botswana as poachers began killing rhinos in the vast Okavango Delta region in the northwest of the country. EIA’s situational analysis highlights some of the key issues facing Botswana’s conservation sector and contains EIA’s recommendations for actions to be taken by Botswana and CITES CoP19.

London; Washington, DC: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), 2022. 11p.

By Forest Trends

On February 1st, 2021, the military launched a coup d'état against the newly re-elected government of Myanmar. Over the past year, the military junta has been accused of massive human rights violations, arresting more than 12,000 people, killing more than 1,500, and instigating a growing humanitarian crisis that has seen more than 400,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) (AAPP Burma 2022, UN News 2022). Compounding the impact of COVID-19, the military’s violence has destroyed Myanmar’s economy. Furthermore, the majority of society has engaged in a predominately non-violent Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), including a boycott of companies with military links. Deprived of revenue, the junta has increasingly relied on revenue from natural resources to support their operations and their ongoing campaign to retain power, which has included escalation of armed conflict and attacks on civilians. While much international focus has been given to the revenues generated by the oil, gas, and mining sectors, the forest sector has in the past been an important source of revenue for Myanmar’s governments and entities associated with the military. This report reviews the timber sector’s role in the revenue now being generated for the current military regime.  

Washington, DC: Forest Trends, 2022. 42p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA).

In February 2021, Myanmar’s democratically elected ruling party, the National League for Democracy, was overthrown by the Myanmar military in a coup d’état. In the months since the coup, the people of Myanmar (formerly Burma) have been subjected to a continued escalation of conflict and brutal human rights atrocities. To maintain its illegal regime and crush dissent, the military is dependent on a continual flow of hard currency. As for the previous regimes, natural resources provide a source of profit for the military, whereby the forests of Myanmar are defined by their monetary value and have been part of the military and economic elites’ profits and, in some cases, survival for decades.

London; Washington, DC: EIA, 2022. 16p.

By Charles Victor Barber, Karen Winfield, and Rachael Petersen 

Nature crime1 occurs when individuals or criminal networks illegally exploit natural ecosystems to extract natural resources. Nature crimes include illegal logging, illegal mining, illegal fishing, illegal wildlife trade,2 and the illegal conversion of forests and wetlands for agriculture or other uses. These crimes are often associated with financial crime of various types, as well as labor and human violations and official corruption. The prevalence of nature crime and associated corruption and criminal behavior constitutes a serious barrier to progress in tackling climate change, slowing biodiversity loss, reducing the risk of future zoonotic pandemics, and achieving sustainable, peaceful, and equitable human development. The scale of the nature crime economy is immense. It is variably estimated to be the third- or fourth-largest illicit economy in the world (after drug trafficking and trade in counterfeit goods) with an annual value of as much as $281 billion, but this figure underestimates its indirect impacts: governments are deprived annually of some $7-12 billion in timber and fisheries revenues, while the indirect costs of undermining ecosystem services may be as high as $1-2 trillion per year (World Bank 2019a).  

San Francisco: Climate and Forests 2030, 2021. 30p.

By Emerson Y. Sy

The illegal wildlife trade is one of the most lucrative transnational crimes in the world. Numerous wildlife are threatened with extinction due to overexploitation for food, medicine, and as pets. Although it is difficult to quantify the illegal wildlife trade due to its mostly clandestine nature, analyzing seizure data can indicate its magnitude. Wildlife seizure records from the DENR, PCSDS, and other sources for the period 2010–2019 were collated and analyzed to identify species threatened by the illegal wildlife trade, hotspots, and trafficking routes. The 10-year seizure dataset involved 511 incidents, 283 taxa, and 44,647 wildlife individuals. Reptiles (n = 16,237 individuals) and birds (n = 6,042) were the top seized live wildlife, while pangolin scales (>2,100 kg) had the most quantity and seizure frequency among derivatives. Intervention policies on the key source, transit, and destination locations were proposed to address illegal wildlife trade in the country.

Manila: USAID Philippines, 2021. 56p.

By Alastair MacBeath, Simone Haysom, Emerson Sy

In recent years, several studies have raised alarm at the illicit trade pressure on the Philippines’ endemic pangolin species – the Palawan pangolin. Between 2018 and 2019, seizures of Palawan pangolins increased more than ninefold compared with the previous 18 years.1 Around 20 live pangolins have been ‘retrieved’ in and around Metro Manila, a several hundred kilometres boat ride away from their natural habitat, the province of Palawan – also known as the Philippines’ ‘last ecological frontier’. Recent studies have estimated that as many as 26 784 pangolins may be illegally hunted on the islands of Palawan per year,2 with much of the meat and most of the scales making their way to buyers based either in Manila or abroad, making this a national problem driven by international demand. In light of these indications of burgeoning illegal trade, this report was undertaken with three aims in mind: 1) to understand the broader context of drivers and factors that shape pangolin trafficking dynamics; 2) to shed light on the nature of networks driving the trade; and 3) to identify challenges and gaps in the state response. It is intended to complement work undertaken under the rubric of a broader project by the Zoological Society of London and six other organizations, namely 'Combating Palawan pangolin trafficking: Empowering community-based protection and proactive enforcement', funded by the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The primary components of this project focus on community-based responses to illegal hunting, but also seek to improve…..

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  the government response at various levels of the trade chain. The report sets out how trafficking of the Palawan pangolin has grown over the last two decades, with what appears to be a sharp acceleration from around 2016. This rise has been linked both to shifts in the broader illicit economy in the Philippines, burgeoning links between pangolin consumer populations and the country, and global shifts in the patterns of illicit trade. We also describe the challenges facing the Filipino government agencies charged with responding to wildlife trafficking, which have created gaps in the state response that trafficking networks have profited from.  

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 46p.

By Masayuki Sakamoto

Africa’s elephants continue to be in crisis due to poaching for trading their ivory, and domestic markets for ivory have been closing worldwide to combat this crisis. The 18th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP18) to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) adopted a decision, aimed at promoting the implementation of the recommendation on the closure of domestic ivory markets included in Resolution Conf.10.10 amended at CoP17, which states “the Parties that have not closed their domestic markets for commercial trade in raw and worked ivory are requested to report to the Secretariat for consideration by the Standing Committee to CITES at its 73rd and 74th meetings on what measures they are taking to ensure that their domestic ivory markets are not contributing to poaching or illegal trade.” The Government of Japan (GoJ) submitted reports under the CITES Decision and insisted that “Japan has been implementing stringent measures to ensure that its domestic ivory market is not contributing to poaching or illegal trade”. Most importantly, Japan demonstrates a new business registration requiring ivory dealers to fulfill all requirements for registration and renew their registration every five years; a 100%-registration-mandate on whole tusks when they renew or initially receive their business registrations; maintenance of inventory data including transaction records and traceability information records for cut pieces; and, increased scrutiny of the registration of whole tusks by requiring the result of radiocarbon dating…..

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  However, GoJ’s claims of stringent market controls are flawed and unjustified. Firstly, according to the GoJ’s report, raw and worked ivory dealers must be registered. In this case, they must fulfill all requirements for registration, which requires renewal every five years. But, our analysis of the GoJ’s examination of eligibility of the business registration renewal indicates that businesses are being registered via a token examination with a lack of scrutiny by the competent authorities. Specifically, the reality of the examination of applications for business registration is that the competent authority has left it solely to the authorized private organization, even for the applications by kingpin dealers with track records of illegal trade engagement. Thus, it is obvious that the examination of business registration and renewal is in name only, and it has not exerted any effect on excluding problematic dealers. Secondly, GoJ insists ivory dealers must register all (whole) tusks in their possession when they renew or initially receive their business registrations. This approach is a countermeasure to the problem of unregulated unregistered whole tusks owned by the businesses; the Japanese domestic law requires whole tusks to be registered prior to transactions, however, exempts them from being registered as far as the owner does not intend to transfer them (even the case of tusks stocked by dealers for being consumed as raw material). Thus, it should be questioned whether the 100%-registration-mandate on whole tusks realized the goal of regulating the stockpile of registered dealers through the whole tusk registration or not. Our analysis indicates that registered dealers successfully evaded this requirement by cutting their whole tusks into pieces and then processing them into hanko beforehand. 

Japan: Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund, 2022. 24p.

By Len Engel, Erin Farley, and John Tilley

The drug overdose epidemic that swept through the United States over the past decade commanded the attention of public health providers, researchers, criminal justice practitioners, and policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels. Because of its severity and associated mortality rates, the epidemic became a priority among leaders across multiple sectors. As collaboration across these sectors matured, researchers and practitioners began to develop evidence-informed strategies to slow the spread of the epidemic. But the progress that was underway appears to have abruptly stopped when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged and fundamentally altered many aspects of American life.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2020. 11p.

By Emily Leslie and Riley Wilson

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic has pushed people to spend more time at home, amidst increased uncertainty and soaring unemployment rates. The best available evidence tells us that these conditions have the potential to increase domestic violence (Lindo et al., 2018; Card and Dahl, 2011). News outlets around the world reported increased reports of domestic violence as the pandemic spread globally during Spring 2020. We use data on calls for service to the police from 14 large American cities to compare domestic violence calls before and after the pandemic began in the United States, relative to trends during the same period in 2019. The pandemic led to a 7.5% increase in calls for service during March, April, and May. The biggest increase came during the first five weeks after widespread social distancing began, when domestic violence calls were up 9.7%. State-mandated stay-at-home orders and school closures came later, suggesting the increase was not only a response to shelter-in-place policies. The increase came across a broad range of demographic and socioeconomic groups, and includes households without a recent history of domestic violence calls.'  

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2020. 8p.

By Alex R. Piquero and Wesley G. Jennings, et al

In March and April of 2020, government leaders began to impose stay-at-home orders to help contain the spread of the coronavirus. This report, by a team of researchers led by sociologist Alex R. Piquero of the University of Miami, was based on a systematic review of multiple studies that compared changes in the number of domestic violence incidents before and after jurisdictions put lockdown restrictions in place.

Findings:

• Based on a review of 12 U.S. studies, most of which included data from multiple cities, shows that domestic violence incidents increased 8.1% after jurisdictions imposed pandemic-related lockdown orders.

• Unlike some early reports on domestic violence trends that relied exclusively on police calls for service, the studies covered by this review also drew on data from crime reports, emergency hotline registries, hospital and other health records, and additional administrative documents.

• While the precise dynamics driving the increase are unclear, lockdowns and pandemic-related economic impacts likely exacerbated factors typically associated with domestic violence, such as increased male unemployment, stress associated with childcare and homeschooling, and increased financial insecurity. Poor coping strategies, including the increased use of alcohol and other substances, may have elevated the risk of abuse.

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  The authors also conclude that COVID-19 left parents and children confined to their homes, cut off from friends, neighbors, colleagues, and others who might have reported signs of abuse and violence and intervened to help potential victims escape violent situations.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2021. 21p.

By Richard Rosenfeld and Ernesto Lopez:   National Commission on COVID-19 and Criminal Justice

This study is the fifth in a series of reports exploring pandemic-related crime changes for the National Commission on COVID-19 and Criminal Justice. Updating that earlier work, this analysis reveals both increases and decreases in crime rates in a sample of United States cities during the first quarter of 2021 compared with the first quarter of 2020. Homicides, aggravated and gun assaults, and motor vehicle thefts increased, while residential burglaries, nonresidential burglaries, larcenies, and drug offenses fell. The timing of the declines in burglaries, larcenies, and drug crimes coincided with the stay-at-home mandates and business closings that occurred in response to the pandemic. Quarantines reduced residential burglary. When businesses are closed, there is no shoplifting. Selling drugs on the street is more difficult when there are fewer people on the street, and drug arrests fall when police reduce drug enforcement because they have prioritized other activities. Our findings show that there was a 26% increase in motor vehicle thefts in the first quarter of 2021 compared to the same period in the previous year, even as other property crimes declined. Motor vehicle thefts may have risen during the pandemic as more people left their vehicles unattended at home rather than in secure parking facilities at work.  

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2021. 

By Christopher Blattman, et al.  

Since the COVID-19 outbreak, scholars and journalists have spread anecdotes of gangs and criminal organizations coming to the aid of citizens, governing in place of the state. They report gang activities that range from enforcing lockdowns to providing goods and services to the poor and hungry. This is especially true in Latin America where thousands of gangs exert authority over civilians in large swaths of territory. Some argue that organized crime is stepping in where states have failed, seizing the chance to consolidate its position. But just how widespread is the kind of gang involvement that captures headlines? Are these anecdotes typical of how gangs are responding to COVID-19? Only systematic data can answer these questions and help assess whether the pandemic will ultimately strengthen organized crime’s grip on Latin American cities. We have spent four years studying criminal groups in Medellín, Colombia, a city with one of the highest concentrations of organized criminals in the world. If gangs respond to COVID-19 anywhere, it should be Medellín. Almost every low- and middle-income neighborhood in the city has a local gang that resolves disputes, polices the community, and often taxes businesses. As soon as the pandemic broke out, anecdotes about gang responses surfaced in Medellin. We set out to collect systematic data on gang and state governance before and during the pandemic. Despite the headlines, gang involvement in pandemic response is exceptional and mostly idiosyncratic. Surveying every low- and middle-income neighborhood in…..

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  Medellin, we find: ● Most welfare support to civilians came from state authorities rather than the gangs. ● Overall, state authorities played by far the largest role in enforcing quarantine rules. ● A small number of gangs, however, were highly involved in providing welfare and enforcing quarantine rules in their territories. ● These rare gang pandemic responses were relatively idiosyncratic. Whereas normal pre-pandemic gang rule is associated with a range of neighborhood characteristics, pandemic gang rule is not. Moreover, gang enforcement of pandemic lockdown or provision of services is almost uncorrelated with pre-pandemic levels of gang rule. We speculate that personal choices of the gangs and their leaders may have dominated in the first weeks of  COVID-19.

Chicago: Innovations for Poverty Action – The University of Chicago – Universidad EAFIT, 2020. 19p.

By The International Crisis Group

Criminal groups in Mexico and the Northern Triangle of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) have been quick to absorb the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and seize new opportunities provided by lockdowns, distracted states and immiserated citizens. At first, trade disruptions and movement restrictions forced some criminal outfits to slow illicit activities. But the lull has not lasted. Exchange of illicit goods already appears to be swinging back to normal, while extortion rackets are resurging. As the region’s recent history shows, quick fixes to rein in organised crime and official corruption are very likely to be counterproductive. Instead, governments should concentrate their limited resources to aid the most violent regions and vulnerable people, ideally through regional programs to curb impunity and create alternatives to criminal conduct. After months of lockdowns of varying severity, with disease transmission still uncontrolled and poised to spike again, the threat of rising crime across the region is manifest. Mexico has been afflicted for years by transnational criminal organisations that feed off a lack of economic opportunity and corruption in the state and security forces. The new force in the underworld, the Jalisco Cartel New Generation, has bared its teeth during the pandemic in fights for control of illicit markets such as drug trafficking and “taxing” legal commodities. It has also displayed its paramilitary might in the media. Myriad criminal groups have claimed to be lifelines for local people, largely in bids to widen their support base. Across the north of Central…..

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  America, street gangs that have lorded it over their economically struggling strongholds for years have also found ways to take advantage of the pandemic. After the outbreak, they advertised themselves as champions of communities under lockdown, handing out food baskets and forgiving protection payments. Due to COVID-19 movement restrictions, violence fell briefly in Honduras and Guatemala. But it is now back to or above pre-pandemic levels, while extortion rackets in both countries appear set to intensify. El Salvador is an outlier in that murder rates have stayed close to historical lows for reasons that remain disputed. The government says its security plan has kept violent gangs at bay, while Crisis Group has suggested that gang and government leaders may have struck an informal agreement to scale back violence. But, if such a pact exists, neither side has acknowledged it in public, and sudden spates of killings underline that gangs’ commitment to peace is far from robust. Behind concerns about deteriorating security in Mexico and northern Central America is the realisation that the pandemic (and counter-measures) will worsen the economic and institutional ills underlying the crime wave. The incidence of COVID-19 varies from country to country, but it is hard to imagine that any will avoid a negative impact on livelihoods, public services and the popular mood. Mexico ranks fourth worldwide with its officially reported death toll of over 90,000 – which the government admits is an undercount – while rates of infection in northern Central America stand around the Latin American average. Nonetheless, all four countries are now facing one of the most severe economic contractions in decades, made worse in Central America by the recent devastation left by Hurricane ETA. Expected falls in 2020 GDP, reaching close to 10 per cent in Mexico and El Salvador and causing unemployment to soar across the region, are set to reverse advances in reducing inequality and poverty, weaken public services in poor areas, intensify criminal rivalries and sharpen officials’ motives for consorting with illicit business. 

Brussels:  International Crisis Group, 2020. 37p.

By Larrea-Schiavon, Silvana, Lina López-Lalinde, Isabel Vieitez Martínez, Ricardo Regules, Juan Pablo Gutiérrez, René Nevárez, Cristina Mac Gregor, Pablo López, Nicole Haberland, and Thoai Ngô

This report presents findings from the baseline survey of the Violence Outcomes in COVID-19 Era Study (VOCES-19). The study, conducted by Population Council Mexico in collaboration with the National Institute of Youth and the National Center for Gender Equity and Reproductive Health aims to understand the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying mitigation measures on the experience and perception of violence among 15–24-year-olds living in Mexico, as well as its effects on other social, economic, and health, related outcomes. The primary objectives for this first survey round were to gather baseline information on several outcomes of interest, assess differential effects by gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, and establish a cohort of adolescents and young adults to measure the impact of the pandemic on young people in Mexico over time.

Mexico: Population Council, 2021. 153p.

By John Kleinig, Peter Mameli, Seumas Miller, Douglas Salane and Adina Schwartz

This study is principally concerned with the ethical dimensions of identity management technology – electronic surveillance, the mining of personal data, and profiling – in the context of transnational crime and global terrorism. The ethical challenge at the heart of this study is to establish an acceptable and sustainable equilibrium between two central moral values in contemporary liberal democracies, namely, security and privacy. Both values are essential to individual liberty, but they come into conflict in times when civil order is threatened, as has been the case from late in the twentieth century, with the advent of global terrorism and trans-national crime. We seek to articulate legally sustainable, politically possible, and technologically feasible, global ethical standards for identity management technology and policies in liberal democracies in the contemporary global security context. Although the standards in question are to be understood as global ethical standards potentially to be adopted not only by the United States, but also by the European Union, India, Australasia, and other contemporary liberal democratic states, we take as our primary focus the tensions that have arisen between the United States and the European Union.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2011. 304p.

By Elisa-Sofía García-Marcano

In recent years, two apparently different and unconnected problems have received repeated attention from global news outlets, namely the opioid crisis and the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. The opioid crisis, which is especially catastrophic in the United States, involves the over-prescription and abuse of synthetic opioid painkillers such as oxycontin and fentanyl (Felter, 2020). The pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong involves legions of protesters, many of them university students, taking to the streets against what they see as the erosion of their civil liberties at the hands of the mainland Chinese government (Perper, 2019). How can these two issues possibly be connected? This paper tells the story of how the world's first great opioid crisis occurred in nineteenth-century China, and how the drug trafficking British thwarted the Chinese government's attempts to stop drug imports, fighting two wars in the process. Upon conclusion of the first of these wars, China was forced to cede the territory of Hong Kong. This British colonial outpost became the principal entrepôt for British opium entering the Chinese market. Over the next century and a half, Hong Kong grew into one of the world's most dynamic commercial cities, and its citizens enjoyed liberties under British rule that were not available to the mainland Chinese population. Thus, the legacy of the opium wars and the British opium trade to China is still very much with us today.

 Online Journal Mundo Asia Pacifico, 10(19), 98–109. 

By Liz McCulloch and Scarlett Furlong

In this report, Volteface aims to bridge the gap in understanding of how social media is being used as a marketplace for illicit drugs and the impact this is having on young people – social media’s primary user group. This report examines how prevalent this phenomenon is, which platforms are most likely to host this activity, what drugs are being advertised, how the platforms are being used, and what impact this is having on young people’s wellbeing, as well as the challenges facing social media regulators and law enforcement.   

London: Volteface, 2019. 87p.

By Mark Shaw

Drug seizures are widely referred to in the media and academic reporting on drug trafficking and organised crime. Everyone knows their limitations. But what if seizures represent the exact opposite of what we generally think them to be? That is, not a reflection of state efficiency, but rather cracks in systems of political protection. If that is the case, they may appear more regularly at some times rather than others. A detailed study of West African cocaine seizures in the context of periods of political instability over a twenty-year period suggest this association is worth exploring.

ENACT (Africa), 2021. 23p.