By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

Current estimates indicate there are at least 8,900 tigers being held in more than 300 facilities in East and South-East Asia. More than 6,000 of these tigers are located in China, with the remaining animals found almost exclusively in Thailand (approx.1,635), Laos (451) and Vietnam (395).

These numbers are estimates based on the best available information and, particularly in South-East Asia, can rapidly shift. The rate at which tigers are bred, traded from one facility to another and slaughtered for illegal trade is not known but is believed to be high, accounting for the rapid shifts in captive tiger estimates.

Additionally, there are significant concerns around captive tiger facilities and their role in the tiger trade in Myanmar, South Africa and some EU Member States, as well as the large captive tiger population in the United States.

London: by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK) 2024. 16p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK)

The long-standing illegal trade in substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

As Parties to the Montreal Protocol meet in Bangkok for the 45th Open Ended Working Group, they will also attend a workshop on strengthening the effective implementation and enforcement of the Montreal Protocol.

EIA has produced this briefing describing the long history of the illegal trade of controlled substances under the Montreal Protocol, including CFCs, HCFCs and HFCs.

It examines efforts by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to combat such trade, with consideration of potential next steps to meet the continued and growing challenge of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and HFC climate crime. EIA has been investigating and documenting the illegal trade in ODS since the mid-1990s, providing unprecedented insights into the dynamics of this multi-million dollar environmental crime, including the shifting smuggling routes and methods used to evade detection.

London: The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA UK) , 2023. 16p.

By The International Council of Shopping Centers

Organized retail crime (ORC) not only harms communities and retail centers but also threatens the safety of consumers and retail workers alike. ORC involves a criminal enterprise employing a group of individuals (2 or more) who steal substantial quantities of merchandise from a retailer. Stores lost $121.6 billion to retail theft in 2023; projections indicate shoplifting could cost retailers over $150 billion in 2026.

Reducing ORC was a major priority for state lawmakers and law enforcement in 2024. Lawmakers in nine states (Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, Vermont and West Virginia) plus D.C., enacted 23 pieces of legislation that targeted different aspects of organized retail crime (ORC). Most of the measures considered by lawmakers addressed one of the following objectives: 1) provide more flexibility for prosecutors to charge offenders with the total value of stolen goods across multiple jurisdictions, 2) increase funding for law enforcement to investigate ORC cases, and 3) enforce tougher punishment for repeat offenders. To date, 17 states have created ORC Task Forces to coordinate activity among law enforcement, prosecutors, and businesses in stopping multi-jurisdictional retail crime rings.

New York: ICSC, 2023, 44p.

By New York City Office of the Mayor

On December 16, 2022, New York City Mayor Eric Adams convened more than 70 stakeholders to collaborate on policy and find creative solutions to address the prevalent increase in retail theft. The summit brought together law enforcement officials, government stakeholders, small business representatives, large retail groups, union leaders, Business Improvement Districts, Chambers of Commerce, and diversion providers with diverse perspectives to discuss a variety of topics, including physical security measures, new diversion programs, leveraging technology to protect businesses and improve citywide responses, and enhancing existing partnerships among private, government, and non-profit sectors. In developing this report, an evidence-based and stakeholder-informed methodology was followed. The Administration analyzed the information shared by the attendees at the summit, conducted independent research and data analysis, and consulted with law enforcement and retail business management. The Administration also conferred closely with New York State Attorney General Letitia James and with the Loss Prevention Research Council to receive additional input and advice on these matters. A draft of this report was then distributed to stakeholders to solicit feedback and, based on the input received, the report was further refined, and the recommendations developed as described herein. The plan outlined in this report identifies recurring problems that plague New York City businesses, which the subsequent list of solutions seeks to address in order to ensure public safety and promote economic growth.

New York: New York City Office of the Mayor, 2023. 33p.

By Michael Ahn Paarlberg

Policy responses to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) within migrant receiving countries often conflate all organizations which conduct illegal activity in multiple countries based on the mafia or cartel model. This model imagines the TCO to be the most evolved form of organized crime: deeply institutionalized, well resourced, hierarchically structured, highly profitable, and diversified in their criminal activities. Such a model informs law enforcement and immigration policies which are often draconian and counterproductive to citizen security. In reality, transnational crime is highly varied in organization, activities, scope, and membership. A major TCO type that defies the mafia archetype is the transnational gang. This study seeks to nuance our understanding of TCOs, illustrated by case studies of two transnational gangs, MS-13 and Satudarah, by advancing the concept of criminal remittances to locate agency in transnationalization. As the case studies demonstrate, for transnational gangs, the remittance of criminal activity is not at the organization level but at the individual and state level. Thus the transnationalization of crime can itself be the product of state foreign and migration policies.

Comparative Migration Studies volume 10, Article number: 24, 2022, 20p.

By Moamen Gouda and Anouk S. Rigterink

This study investigates the long-term relationship between slavery and violent crime in the USA. Although qualitative evidence suggests that slavery perpetuated violence, there has been no largeN study supporting this claim. Using county-level data, we find that the percentage of slaves in the population in 1860 is linked with violent crime in 2000. This result is specific to violent crime, robust to instrumenting for slavery and varying the approach to missing crime data, and not driven by biased crime reporting. Investigating the theoretical mechanisms driving these results, we find that historical slavery affects inequality (like Bertocchi and Dimico, 2014), white Americans’ political attitudes towards race (like Acharya et al., 2016b) and black American’s political attitudes – in opposite directions. Results suggest that inequality and black American’s political attitudes mediate the observed effect on violence.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11515, Dec 2024, 50 pages

By Amnesty International

Enforced disappearance is both a crime under international law and a serious human rights violation. When a person is deprived of their liberty and their fate or whereabouts concealed, the lives of their families, loved ones and communities are put on hold while they wait to learn of what has happened to them and where they are. In Colombia, as in other countries in the Americas, many of the people left waiting or searching for their loved ones after an enforced disappearance have turned uncertainty into a force for change. Firstly, to find the victims of enforced disappearance. Second, to demand truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. Third, to continue the struggle to ascertain the fate and whereabouts of other people’s loved ones and to defend human rights. Women play a leading role in this story. They are the ones who have overwhelmingly taken on the task of searching for the victims of enforced disappearance in Colombia. In doing so, not only have they raised their voices against the injustice of the enforced disappearance imposed on them, but they have also acted as searchers and human rights defenders. In Colombia, taking on these roles means exposing themselves to unacceptable risks, threats and attacks. Whether they are searching for a loved one, helping someone else to search for a loved one, or defending the rights of victims of enforced disappearance and their families, women who search face arbitrariness, impunity and violence, sometimes from the state and sometimes from non-state actors, especially state security forces and armed opposition groups. In most cases, this violence is gendered. The nature of the risks, threats and attacks that women searchers face often intersect with their gender. Among other forms of violence against women, threats relate to their bodies or to their assigned or assumed gender roles, and perpetrators disproportionately use sexual violence against women. However, women searchers not only continue their work, but also put forward proposals for action to ensure that the state respects, guarantees and protects their rights. The most recent manifestation of this driving force is the approval of Law 2364 of 2024, a proposal that emerged from a group of organizations and communities of women searchers who spoke of their own life experiences, analysed them and used them to draft a bill designed to urge the state to take appropriate measures to end this scourge. With this report, Amnesty International begins a process of documenting the situation of risks, threats and attacks faced by women searchers in Colombia and, based on this, a process of monitoring the implementation of Law 2364 of 2024, which will continue over the next few years. This first part documents the story of Yanette Bautista, Andrea Torres and the Nydia Erika Bautista Foundation (FNEB), an organization of women searchers and victims of enforced disappearance that accompanies other organizations and communities in their own cases.

London: Amnesty International, 2024. 64p.

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager., et al.

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this report, we look at teenage children’s views and experiences of the police. Here’s what we found. Opinions of the police differ according to children’s experiences. Teenagers’ views of the police shift as they get older and gain more exposure to policing. Over half (54%) of 13-17-year-olds believe the police do a good job in their local areas. Similar proportions feel the police use force appropriately (50%) and are available when needed (47%). Only 45% think the police treat everyone fairly, regardless of race or religion.

Age plays a significant role in shaping perceptions. Thirteen-year-olds consistently express the most positive views, while 16-17-year-olds are more critical of police conduct. Interestingly, Black teenagers (63%) are the most likely to agree that the police do a good job locally, compared to 54% of White children, 52% of Asian children and 50% of mixed ethnicity children. However, Black (39%) and mixed ethnicity (36%) children are far less likely to believe the police treat everyone fairly than White children (47%). When it comes to the use of force, Asian (47%), Black (42%) and mixed ethnicity (39%) children are also less likely to agree that police use force only when necessary when compared to White children (52%).

Children with direct experiences of violence tend to have more positive views of the police. For instance, 62% of children who’ve been victims of serious violence think their local police do a good job, compared to 54% of children who haven’t been a victim. Direct experiences with the police also affect perceptions, but the effect differs depending on racial background. White teenagers who’ve had contact with the police are more likely to say the police do a good job than those with no direct experience. But this is not the case for teenagers from Black, Asian and mixed ethnic backgrounds.

Children are mostly supportive of stop and search but don’t all agree it’s used fairly. Most teenagers are supportive of the police’s power to stop and search, though not all believe it’s applied fairly. Overall, 68% of 13-17-year-olds support stop and search, and 72% believe it helps prevent knife crime. However, only 56% think that stop and search is used fairly. Younger teenagers (aged 13-15) are generally more supportive of stop and search than older teenagers (aged 16-17). Racial differences also emerge, with White children more likely to view stop and search as both effective and fair than their Black, Asian and mixed ethnicity peers.

London: Youth Endowment Fund, Children, violence and vulnerability 2024 Report 4. 33p.

By Ionel Zamfir and Colin Murphy

The rise of digital technologies represents a double-edged sword for women's rights. On the one hand, the digital environment has enabled women to build networks and spread awareness about the abuse they suffer, such as through the #Metoo movement. On the other, it has provided abusers and misogynists with new tools with which they can spread their harmful content on an unprecedented scale. With the development of artificial intelligence, these trends, both positive and negative, are expected to continue. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that digital violence is as harmful as offline violence and needs to be tackled with the full force of the law, as well as through other non-legislative measures. Moreover, the digital content causing the harm – images, messages, etc. – needs to be erased. This is particularly important, as the impact on victims is profound and long-lasting. The European Union has adopted several pieces of legislation that aim to make a difference in this respect. The directive on combating violence against women, to be implemented at the latest by June 2027, sets minimum EU standards for criminalising several serious forms of cyberviolence and enhances the protection of and access to justice for victims. EU legislation on the protection of privacy is also having an impact on cyberviolence. For example, the new Digital Services Act imposes an obligation on big digital platforms in the EU to remove harmful content from their websites. This is instrumental in removing intimate or manipulated images that are disseminated on the internet without the person's consent; almost all such images portray women, according to existing data. Member States use a multiplicity of legal approaches to tackle this issue, combining criminalisation of specific cyber offences with the use of general criminal law. In some Member States, an explicit gender dimension is also included.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 11p

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager.. et al

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this report, we explore children’s access to positive activities, youth clubs and trusted adult figures. Here’s what we found. Most children do positive activities. Activities such as sports programmes, arts and volunteering can provide children with safe spaces, support, educational opportunities and a sense of community. They can also provide ‘hooks’ to engage them in other services and support. The majority of teenage children (95%) have access to these sorts of activities locally, with 84% participating in at least one activity once a month or more. Team and individual sports are the most common, with 72% of 13-17-year-olds having access to team sports and 42% regularly participating. Similarly, 62% have access to individual sports, with 35% participating. Gender differences are notable: 88% of boys engage in positive activities compared to 80% of girls. Boys are far more involved in team sports (54% of boys vs 30% of girls), while girls participate more in arts (27% of girls vs 13% of boys) and part-time work (15% of girls vs 11% of boys). Among 17-year-olds, 34% of girls take up part-time work, compared to 25% of boys. Interestingly, children directly affected by violence as victims (88%) and perpetrators (90%) are more likely to take part in positive activities than children who haven’t been victims of or perpetrated violence (83%). They are less likely to do activities such as team sports, but are more likely to do volunteering, wilderness activities and combat sports. Vulnerable children are the most likely to attend youth clubs. Youth clubs are places that provide children and young people access to activities, support and community. They also provide opportunities or ‘hooks’ to engage children with other services and forms of support. While 70% of 13-17-year-olds report having access to a youth club in their area, 40% attend one at least once a month. School-based youth clubs are the most commonly attended (35% have access and 17% attend), followed by those in youth or community centres (37% have access and 12% attend). A third (33%) of teenage children who don’t currently attend a youth club would like to. It seems that youth clubs manage to reach those who most need them. Children who’ve been directly affected by violence are twice as likely to regularly go to a youth club – 60% of victims and 65% of those who’ve perpetrated violence, compared to 31% who haven’t been victims or perpetrators of violence. Youth clubs, especially those based in schools, are generally viewed as safe spaces. For children who’ve been victims of violence, online youth clubs1 are considered safer, with 14% attending them compared to 7% of their peers. Most children, including those most affected by violence, have a trusted adult outside the home. When a child or young person is vulnerable and in need of support, having an adult in their life who they can turn to can make a big difference. For some, this might be a family member, but others might feel more comfortable seeking help from someone outside their family or friends – for example, a youth worker, sports coach or more formal mentor. While 82% of teenage children have a trusted adult outside their family, 18% do not. School staff are the most trusted adults (58%), but children who’ve been suspended, excluded or face greater risks of violence —such as drug use, exploitation or involvement with the police – are more likely than others to turn to adults outside of school settings, such as sports coaches, mentors, doctors or youth workers. Boys, in particular, are more likely to trust a sports coach (24% of boys vs 12% of girls), while girls tend to rely more on school staff (60% of girls vs 56% of boys). These findings highlight the importance of supporting and facilitating these trusted relationships to help vulnerable children navigate their challenges.

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024 Report No. 5, 2024. 37p.

By Sofia Amaral, Aixa Garcia-Ramos, Selim Gulesci, Sarita Oré, Alejandra Ramos, & Maria Micaela Sviatschi

Gender-based violence (GBV) at schools is a pervasive problem that affects millions of adolescent girls worldwide. In partnership with the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, we developed an intervention to increase the capacity of key school personnel to address GBV and to improve students’ awareness as well as proactive behaviors. To understand the role of GBV on girls’ education, we randomized not only exposure to the intervention but also whether the student component was targeted to girls only, boys only, or both. Our findings indicate a reduction in sexual violence by teachers and school staff against girls, regardless of the targeted gender group, providing evidence of the role of improving the capacity of key school personnel to deter perpetrators. Using administrative records, we also find that in schools where the intervention encouraged proactive behavior by girls, there was an increase in their school enrollment, largely due to an increased propensity for GBV reporting by victims. Our findings suggest that effectively mitigating violence to improve girls’ schooling requires a dual approach: deterring potential perpetrators and fostering a proactive stance among victims, such as increased reporting.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11506, Nov 2024, 64p.

By Megan Steele-Baser; Alyssa L. Brown; Denise V. D’Angelo; Kathleen C. Basile, Rosalyn D. Lee, ; Antoinette T. Nguyen, & Cynthia H. Cassell

Intimate partner violence (IPV) can include emotional, physical, or sexual violence. IPV during pregnancy is a preventable cause of injury and death with negative short- and long-term impacts for pregnant women, infants, and families. Using data from the 2016–2022 Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System in nine U.S. jurisdictions, CDC examined associations between IPV during pregnancy among women with a recent live birth and the following outcomes: prenatal care initiation, health conditions during pregnancy (gestational diabetes, pregnancy-related hypertension, and depression), substance use during pregnancy, and infant birth outcomes. Overall, 5.4% of women reported IPV during pregnancy. Emotional IPV was most prevalent (5.2%), followed by physical (1.5%) and sexual (1.0%) IPV. All types were associated with delayed or no prenatal care; depression during pregnancy; cigarette smoking, alcohol use, marijuana or illicit substance use during pregnancy; and having an infant with low birth weight. Physical, sexual, and any IPV were associated with having a preterm birth. Physical IPV was associated with pregnancyrelated hypertension. Evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies that address multiple types of IPV are important for supporting healthy parents and families because they might reduce pregnancy complications, depression and substance use during pregnancy, and adverse infant outcomes

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024, 6p.

By Timothy Cubitt, Anthony Morgan and Rick Brown

Drawing on a survey of 13,302 online Australians, this study examines the characteristics and behaviours of respondents who viewed child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and fringe or radical content online, or both. In the past 12 months, 40.6 percent of respondents had viewed fringe or radical content and 4.5 percent had viewed CSAM. Among respondents who viewed CSAM, 64.7 percent had also viewed fringe or radical content, while 7.1 percent of those who viewed radical content had also viewed CSAM. Respondents who viewed only CSAM or only fringe or radical content were similar to one another. Respondents who viewed both were more likely to be younger and male and had higher rates of criminal justice system contact and diagnosed mental illness. Their online activity, including the platforms used, also differed.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 708. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 16p.

By Australia Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services

This report examining financial abuse in Australia provides a comprehensive analysis of the issue, identifies key challenges within legislation, regulation, and financial institutions, and puts forward 61 recommendations to prevent and mitigate financial abuse.

The report highlights that financial abuse is a widespread issue with a direct cost to victims estimated at $5.7 billion—a figure higher than Australia's total scam losses in 2023.

It calls for legislative amendments, enhanced support services for victims, improved identification and response mechanisms within financial institutions, and greater collaboration between government agencies and stakeholders.

Key findings

Financial abuse is a prevalent issue in Australia, often occurring alongside other forms of domestic and family violence.

The financial toll on victims of financial abuse is estimated at $5.7 billion.

Current legislative and regulatory frameworks have significant gaps.

Financial institutions have made some progress in implementing measures to address financial abuse but require further action to provide comprehensive support for victims.

The rise of online financial platforms presents both opportunities and challenges in tackling financial abuse.

Vulnerable groups, including older Australians, people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and those in regional and remote areas, face unique challenges and barriers in accessing support and protection from financial abuse.

Key recommendations

Establish a mechanism for co-design with victim-survivors of financial abuse in developing reforms to mitigate the prevalence and impact of financial abuse.

Amend the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 to recognise the unique threats posed by financial abuse and strengthen protections for victims.

Review the intersection between financial abuse and the superannuation system.

Implement a mandatory requirement for providers of financial services, products, and government agencies to include a "quick exit" button on webpages.

Co-design standard operating guidelines for the referral of reasonably suspected financial abuse to financial institutions.

Amend the Social Security Act 1991 to remove the requirement for victims to have left their home to qualify for crisis support payments, lengthen the application time frame for crisis payments, and ensure access to "special circumstances" waivers for victims subjected to perpetrator manipulation.

e Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, Canberra, 2024, 230p.

By Elodie Rolls, Yasmin Youle and Charlotte Hartwright

Domestic abuse (DA) is a widespread crime. According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales, about 4.4% of people aged 16 and over experienced DA in a single 12-month period. This means approximately 2.1 million people were victims of DA in just one year (Office for National Statistics, 2023). The Government’s plan to tackle DA, announced in 2022, included the establishment of interventions for perpetrators, such as electronic monitoring (EM) for high-risk individuals. The Domestic Abuse Perpetrators on Licence (DAPOL) scheme was launched in August 2023 in two probation regions, the East Midlands and the West Midlands. DAPOL requires adult offenders at risk of committing DA to wear an electronic tag upon leaving prison, if deemed necessary and proportionate as part of the formal licence planning process. The scheme aims to strengthen offender management, help victims feel safe following the release of the abuser, and help prevent further offending. An evaluation of DAPOL was commissioned by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). It will involve three types of evaluation: process, impact, and economic. This report presents findings from a process evaluation conducted during the first few months of delivery. The findings can be used to inform expansion of the scheme, prior to assessing impacts. 1.1 Evaluation Objectives The research was undertaken during the first six months of delivering the DAPOL scheme. The evaluation aimed to address four objectives: • To gather evidence that describes the context in which DAPOL was delivered (see Sections 4 and 8). • To collect evidence on how DAPOL was used by practitioners (see Section 5). • To provide a descriptive analysis of compliance and any early perceived impacts (see Sections 6 and 7). • To identify facilitators and barriers to the implementation of DAPOL (see Section 8). These objectives centred on understanding early implementation of the DAPOL pilot. This ensured that lessons learned could be embedded prior to any expansion and assessment of impact. The research comprised three strands: primary data collection through interviews and surveys with people on probation and staff working with EM or DA, an analysis of management information (quantitative) data, and qualitative analysis of probation case management records. By triangulating findings across these data sources, the research team aimed to capture the complexity surrounding the implementation of DAPOL. 1.2 Key Findings There were 442 DAPOL orders during the six-month evaluation period. Key findings are summarised below: • The scheme was used to manage high risk individuals with complex criminogenic needs. Probation practitioners typically used DAPOL with prison leavers who had a history of violent offending, stalking and harassment, and those with an elevated risk of perpetrating DA. People supervised under the scheme often had attitudinal and psychosocial risks relating to relationships, thinking and behaviour, and pro-criminality. EM was used alongside other licence conditions such as alcohol monitoring, freedom of movement, non-contact, supervised contact, disclosure of information and (notification of) relationships. The profile of people on the scheme was consistent with established predictors of DA perpetration (e.g., Costa et al., 2015), suggesting that DAPOL was applied with reasoned professional judgement around DA risk. • To gather evidence that describes the context in which DAPOL was delivered (see Sections 4 and 8). • To collect evidence on how DAPOL was used by practitioners (see Section 5). • To provide a descriptive analysis of compliance and any early perceived impacts (see Sections 6 and 7). • To identify facilitators and barriers to the implementation of DAPOL (see Section 8). These objectives centred on understanding early implementation of the DAPOL pilot. This ensured that lessons learned could be embedded prior to any expansion and assessment of impact. The research comprised three strands: primary data collection through interviews and surveys with people on probation and staff working with EM or DA, an analysis of management information (quantitative) data, and qualitative analysis of probation case management records. By triangulating findings across these data sources, the research team aimed to capture the complexity surrounding the implementation of DAPOL. 1.2 Key Findings There were 442 DAPOL orders during the six-month evaluation period. Key findings are summarised below: • The scheme was used to manage high risk individuals with complex criminogenic needs. Probation practitioners typically used DAPOL with prison leavers who had a history of violent offending, stalking and harassment, and those with an elevated risk of perpetrating DA. People supervised under the scheme often had attitudinal and psychosocial risks relating to relationships, thinking and behaviour, and pro-criminality. EM was used alongside other licence conditions such as alcohol monitoring, freedom of movement, non-contact, supervised contact, disclosure of information and (notification of) relationships. The profile of people on the scheme was consistent with established predictors of DA perpetration (e.g., Costa et al., 2015), suggesting that DAPOL was applied with reasoned professional judgement around DA risk. the early stages of this scheme, it is likely that demand will increase with further expansion of DAPOL. This may result in more demand for GPS tagging equipment. This report also found qualitative evidence that location monitoring was more time consuming to manage. Therefore, the potential for a greater time cost to supervise DAPOL cases should also be considered.

Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, London: UK Ministry of Justice, 2024. 77p.

By Ching-Min Tang, Chen-Fang Lou, Shao-Hsuan Hsia, Kuang-Tsung Liang, Wen Chang, Jainn-Jim Lin, Oi-Wa Chan, Kuang-Lin Lin & En-Pei Lee

Background: Child abuse in Taiwan is a major societal concern that severely affects the well-being of children. Despite the complexity in detecting abuse, reports of child abuse are increasing, evidenced by a rise in cases and heightened awareness. This study utilizes judicial judgments as a lens to understand the varied interpretations of child abuse by clinical and forensic experts and explores the broader epidemiological trends of such abuse within the declining youth population of Taiwan.

Methods: We conducted a retrospective study by analyzing official court judgments on child abuse allegations judged from 2008 to 2022 from the online database of Judicial Yuan. Furthermore, the study analyzed demographic factors, injury patterns, and opinions from various experts.

Results: The results reveal that severe criminal cases of child abuse predominantly involve biological fathers as the primary offenders and physical abuse as the most common form of maltreatment. Victims are typically aged less than 5 years, which frequently leads to an unfavorable prognosis. Analysis also highlights the TEN-4-FACESp acronym as a highly predictive indicator of child abuse and underscores the prevalence of abusive head trauma (AHT). Moreover, the findings emphasize ongoing disparities in opinions between forensic medical examiners and clinical physicians, especially in AHT cases, which potentially influences judicial decisions.

Conclusion: In summary, the study reveals ongoing disagreements between forensic medical examiners and clinical physicians, especially in cases of AHT, which may impact judicial decisions. Promoting consensus through interdisciplinary collaboration and improved communication can aid in revealing the truth in child abuse cases.

Archives of Public Health volume 82, Article number: 191, 2024, 8p.

By Leila Pereira, Rafael Pucci, Rodrigo R. Soares

We study a Force-down/Shoot-down intervention in Brazil that led cocaine traffickers to shift from air to river routes. Using data on cocaine production, homicides, and the network of rivers in the Amazon, we provide evidence that violence increased in municipalities along river routes originating from Andean producing countries after the policy. We also show that, during the same period, violence in these municipalities became more responsive to cocaine production in origin countries. We document an instance of crime displacement over the three-dimensional space, involving sophisticated adaptations from criminals regarding transportation technologies, with dramatic side-effects for local populations.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 55p.

By European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA).

This report explores the intricate relationship between economic recessions and illicit drug use through an in-depth scoping review of the literature. Unravelling complexities among demographics and drug types, this analysis sheds light on potential impacts of economic downturns, suggesting that young and already socioeconomically vulnerable population groups appear to be most affected during economic downturns. Among young adults, several studies indicate that the use of cannabis may increase during economic downturns. In addition, there are indications that transitioning to more problematic patterns of drug use, such as from smoking or snorting to injecting, may also increase during times of economic turmoil.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union., 2024. 60p.

By Claire Provost,

U.S. leads global drug war

The role of the United States in exporting the destructive war on drugs to other countries is unparalleled. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent more than a trillion dollars on the war on drugs, prioritising law enforcement responses and fuelling mass incarceration within its borders. It has also played a leading role in pushing and funding punitive responses to drugs internationally. This has continued despite clear evidence that such approaches don’t work to achieve their stated aims (ending drug use and sales) while having devastating effects on rights and health, including mass criminalisation, disease transmission, repression and displacement.

This report demonstrates how U.S. assistance has supported and expanded destructive and deadly anti-drug responses in low- and middle-income countries around the world. It also presents new follow-the-money data analysis on U.S. international drug control spending by various government departments and budgets. This includes official development assistance (ODA) intended to support poverty reduction and other global development goals; and three case studies – Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines – to reveal the damage done by this spending.

Vast and complex global network

The 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the U.S. State Department described a “whole of government approach” to drug control and a strategy of deep collaboration and “capacity building” with counterparts in other countries. A vast and complex global network of U.S. government agencies, programs, and activities has been developed in the ongoing “war on drugs.”

U.S. support for drug enforcement internationally includes financial, material and technical assistance. The U.S. drug war bureaucracy is expansive, involving numerous agencies of the government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as the infamous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), under the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2023, the DEA had 93 foreign offices in 69 countries.

Follow the money

Over the decade between 2015-2024, a total of almost $13 billion of U.S. taxpayer money was allocated to “counternarcotics” activities internationally.

For fiscal year 2025, the President requested $1 billion for international “counternarcotics” activities. Almost half of this request was to be received and spent by the DEA ($480 million); the second largest planned intermediary for this spending was to be the State Department’s INL bureau (about $350 million).

Separate budget documents from the involved departments contain further detail on where and how international drug control funding is to be spent. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) showed that Latin America was budgeted to receive more than half ($225 million) of the total $375 million for “counternarcotics” requested by the department and its agencies (including INL and USAID). Colombia was to be the largest single country recipient ($115 million).

Aid donors (led by the U.S.) spent almost $1 billion of their ODA on “narcotics control” projects in dozens of low- and middle-income countries over the decade 2013-2022. No donor contributed more to these “narcotics control” budgets than the U.S.

Controversially, the U.S. has been increasingly classifying drug control spending as ODA: in 2020, it counted just over $30 million like this; in 2021 that figure was $309 million (and while it dropped to $106 million in 2022, this was still higher than earlier years).

Profit-making companies are also benefiting from this ODA spending on “narcotics control.” The top “channel” for this spending has been private companies (“private sector institutions,” receiving $244 million over the decade) followed by the governments of countries funded ($202 million), and then multilateral organisations such as UNODC ($77 million).

Harm Reduction International | Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 47p.

By Raquel Rosenbloom

Agricultural workers in the United States not only support the US economy, but are also responsible for keeping people across the country and the globe fed. The agricultural sector contributed $1.055 trillion to the US GDP in 2020, with $134.7 billion coming just from farms. US agricultural exports were worth $139.6 billion in 2018.

The agricultural sector in the United States relies on foreign workers; 86 percent of agricultural workers in the United States are foreign-born and 45 percent of all US agricultural workers are undocumented. Seasonal and agricultural labor demands are also growing in the United States. Requests for the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program, which brings immigrants from abroad for periods of up to eight months to meet agricultural workforce needs, have more than doubled from 2010 to 2019. The program increased from 79,000 H-2A workers in 2010 to 258,000 in 2019.

CMS estimates characteristics of populations who would be eligible for general and population-specific legalization programs and for special legal status programs. Due to the cyclical nature of agricultural work, it can be difficult to estimate exact numbers and characteristics of workers with an annual survey.

According to CMS estimates, there are approximately 283,000 undocumented immigrants who work in the United States as agricultural workers. These individuals make up approximately 4 percent of the total undocumented workforce in the United States. Immigrants coming from Mexico comprise the majority of undocumented agricultural workers at 88 percent. Following Mexico, undocumented agricultural workers come from Guatemala (7 percent), El Salvador (3 percent), Honduras (2 percent), and Nicaragua (1 percent) (Figure 1). Approximately 63 percent of undocumented agricultural workers are male and 37 percent are female (Figure 2)

New York: Center for Migration Studies, 2022. 9p