By Hanna Hernandez, M.A. & Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry

This report analyzes COVID-19 impacts on criminal justice data. Specifically, it focuses on reported National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) offenses and Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) arrests and bookings. This type of analysis supports state and federal policymakers to determine the actions needed to address the pandemic’s impact on the criminal justice system. This will also help future researchers define the anomalies that occurred in the criminal justice datasets, specifically the longitudinal studies that include the years impacted by COVID-19. Researchers can provide a more accurate assessment of the impact that the pandemic may have on the criminal justice system and its associated datasets. The Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2021 State Justice Statistics Grant from Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Among other projects, the SAC sought the grant to conduct this report to evaluate the impact of COVID-19 on criminal justice data. Main conclusions: 1. There was a decrease in 2018 to 2019 (3.0%) and 2019 to 2020 (9.3%) in NIBRS incidents reported. 2. There was a decrease in 2018 to 2019 (0.5%) and 2019 to 2020 (19.1%) in WASPC arrests. 3. There was a decrease in 2018 to 2019 (24.7%) and 2019 to 2020 (12.4%) in WASPC bookings.

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2022. 23p.

By The United Office on Drugs and Crime

  In the Sahel countries and their neighbours, the high prevalence of infectious diseases, including malaria, coupled with challenges in terms of the availability and affordability of and access to healthcare, creates an environment in which the demand for medical products and services is not fully met through formal channels. The disparity between the demand for and supply of regulated pharmaceutical products leaves room for trafficking, provides an incentive for the involvement of organized criminal groups and fuels the ongoing threat to public safety and public health in the Sahel countries. Between January 2017 and December 2021, at least 605 tons of different medical products were seized in West Africa during international operations.  While there are no reliable estimates of the overall quantities of medical products that are trafficked in different ways and forms in the Sahel countries, studies point to a percentage of substandard and falsified medicines in the medical market of between 19 and 50 per cent. Some 40 per cent of the substandard and falsified medical products reported in the Sahel countries between 2013 and 2021 was discovered in the regulated supply chain. Just as regulated medical products can be diverted, illicitly manufactured medical products can find their way into authorized pharmaceutical outlets, which shows how much the regulated (legal) and unregulated (illicit) supply chains are interconnected. The Sahel countries rely heavily on imports of medical products because their pharmaceutical industries are still in the early stages of development. Of total pharmaceutical expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, imports represented as much as 70 to 90 per cent (roughly 14 billion United States dollars ($)). Medical products diverted from the legal supply chain often originate in the main exporting countries of medical products to the Sahel countries, in particular Belgium and France, and to a lesser extent China and India. Others are manufactured in neighbouring countries, including in North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The seaports in the Gulf of Guinea, Conakry (Guinea), Tema (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Apapa (Nigeria) can be identified as major entry points for medical products destined for the Sahel countries. Trafficking by air, using postal shipments or carried out by commercial air passengers, is employed for smuggling smaller quantities of medical products. Once in West Africa, trafficked medical products reach the Sahel countries through smugglers who follow traditional trafficking routes using buses, trucks and private cars. Investigations have revealed the involvement of a wide range of opportunistic actors in trafficking in medical products in the Sahel countries, from employees of pharmaceutical companies, public officials, law enforcement officers and health agency workers to street vendors, all motivated by potential financial gain. Despite terrorist groups and non-state armed groups being commonly associated with trafficking in medical products in the Sahel, most reported cases in the region show that the involvement of such groups is limited and mainly revolves around consuming medical products or levying "taxes" on them in the areas under their control. In sub-Saharan Africa, as many as 267,000 deaths per year are linked to falsified and substandard antimalarial medicines. In addition, up to 169,271 are linked to falsified and substandard antibiotics used to treat severe pneumonia in children.     

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 28p.

By Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry. & Hanna Hernandez

The global 2020 coronavirus pandemic has had an unprecedented impact on the operations and actions of local, state, and national governments across all areas of criminal justice. The unique characteristics of this pandemic trend toward short- and long-term consequences as significant changes to criminal justice and legal outcomes. To respond to these impacts, the Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2022 State Justice Statistics (SJS) grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). The SAC sought the grant to increase access to statistical data and create new metrics and indicators to enhance the integrated criminal justice database — the Justice Data Warehouse (JDW) — in efforts to strategically and analytically evaluate the pandemic’s impacts in criminal justice. Through this grant, the Washington SAC leveraged and built upon the JDW to expand the data variables by creating COVID-19 metrics and indicators to help assess and account for COVID-19 impacts in the criminal justice and legal system.

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center. 2024. 49p.

By Kaitlyn Rines

This report summarizes law enforcement reports of sexual assault offenses for the State of Ohio during the years 2016-2023. We also summarize characteristics of crime incidents, victims and suspects. We provide sexual assault rates throughout this report, and it is important to understand how we calculated them and what they mean. First, we calculate offense totals by counting the number of sexual assault victimizations documented within each law enforcement incident report. Sexual assault victim totals do not necessarily represent unique victims. For example, law enforcement could report that a suspect sexually assaulted an individual more than once during a single incident. Further, a suspect could assault the same individual during a different incident. Therefore, it is almost certain that the sexual assault offense total is larger than the number of individuals who were victims of sexual assaults. Next, we calculate the rate of sexual assault by dividing the sexual assault total by the population total and then multiplying the resulting number (the quotient) by 100,000. This yields a sexual assault crime rate per 100,000 persons. We provide Ohio’s overall sexual assault crime rates over time, and we also compare rates of sexual assault for Ohio’s standard demographic groups (e.g., age, sex, race). Rates can vary significantly depending on how many victimizations a group experienced as well as the size of one group versus another. For example, the sexual assault crime rate is much higher for female Ohioans than males, largely because the number of female sexual assaults is much larger than male. Further, most sexual assault victims are White females because most of Ohio is White. However, Black females have the highest victimization rate because their sexual assault total is large while their overall population size is small.

Columbus:; Ohio Department of Public Safety, Office of Criminal Justice Services. 2024. 62p.

By Jennifer McDonald

Across the country, law enforcement agencies routinely seize currency from individuals using civil forfeiture—a legal process that allows agencies to take and keep property without ever charging owners with a crime, let alone securing a conviction. Studies examining civil forfeiture have found it to be a multibillion-dollar industry that punishes people without proving they have done anything wrong. This study is the first to examine how U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard—use civil forfeiture to take and keep currency from often unsuspecting travelers at airports across the country. DHS agencies are just a few of the many government agencies that conduct airport seizures, but newly available data give fresh insight into their activity. This study, covering 2000 through 2016, quantifies just how often DHS agencies have seized currency at airports—and just how much currency has flowed into the federal government’s coffers as a result.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2020. 32p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The ratio of registered vehicles to people in the Sahel countries is low and per capita daily gasoline consumption is estimated to be among the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, an average at-pump price of $1 per litre would result in a combined annual total market value of at least 5 billion United States dollars ($) for both legal and illegal fuel in the region. Despite some of them producing oil, the Sahel countries rely on fuel imports from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, where fuel is heavily subsidized. It appears that the low fuel prices in Algeria, Libya and Nigeria are among the most significant drivers of fuel trafficking in the Sahel. In addition to fuel trafficking, cheap gasoline and diesel also fuel the activities of illegal non-state armed groups, including groups deemed “terrorist” by the international community. Moreover, there are some indications that there may be deeper linkages to other forms of smuggling, such as trafficking in medical products, drugs and firearms. There are four major fuel trafficking flows into the Sahel countries: from Nigeria via Benin to Burkina Faso and Mali; from Nigeria via the Niger to Mali; from Algeria to Mali; and from Libya to the Niger and Chad. A large portion of the market for trafficked fuel in the Sahel countries appears to be informally organized. However, recent investigations have revealed the involvement of structured groups with links to prominent individuals with interests in retail fuel companies, financial institutions and corrupt law enforcement officials. This highlights the importance of the formal trade in laundering smuggled fuel. Companies associated with individuals under United Nations Security Council sanctions are also reported to be involved in fuel smuggling from the Niger to Mali. The introduction of fuel subsidies and licensing policies has led to the emergence of powerful business elites in the Sahel countries with sufficient political influence to protect fuel smuggling activities. Opportunities to earn illegal revenue indirectly from fuel trafficking through bribery and other forms of corruption compromise the level of repression that the Sahel countries can exercise on the illicit fuel trade. Issues with, and gaps in, the rule of law in some areas, owing to a combination of a high level of insecurity and vast, porous borders, constitute a key enabling

factor for fuel trafficking in the Sahel. The lack of state presence in remote areas gives room for the proliferation of criminal activities.

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 24p.

By Natascha Eichinger, Ekaterina Spassova, Murat Yildiz, et al.

The continued global demand for opiates, and the conditions that sustain opiate production in Afghanistan, pose a threat to public health, governance, and security at regional and global

level. This is likely to continue following the change of regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. Afghan opiates are trafficked to almost every continent worldwide. In 2021, the income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some USD 1.8–2.7 billion: however, much larger sums are accrued by international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) along illicit drug supply chains outside Afghanistan. While most opiates trafficked from Afghanistan are trafficked by land methods, a proportion of the opiates produced in South-West Asia are also trafficked by maritime methods to global destinations.

� Some of the opiates produced in Afghanistan and South-West Asia are trafficked via the southern route by maritime means. Seizures of opiates – and methamphetamine – have been increasing in the Indian Ocean, the result of sustained interdictions by national authorities and international maritime coalitions including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the EU Naval Force – Somalia (EUNAVFOR). � Drug packages seized in the Indian Ocean are marked with a wide range of stamps including hand pressed and hand-written markings. These stamps are made up of several elements consisting of sequential and non-sequential numbers, names, locations, and different objects. The stamps can provide some detail on the manufacturers and traffickers involved in the production and transport of drugs to international markets. � Stamps can often be used for branding purposes in a similar way to brand logos used with legitimate goods or can be used to identify or alternatively conceal the producers of a batch of heroin. The number of different stamps marked on a package of heroin can be an indicator of how many producers or traffickers were involved with that package. � Stamps are chosen by individual Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). They appear to be well known amongst DTOs and usually can not be copied by other traffickers. However, in some cases a “franchising” process is possible, with smaller traffickers purchasing the right to use stamps associated with larger DTOs. � Dates printed on heroin packages generally indicate the production year. However, there is less clarity when two dates are stamped on a package. In some cases, the second year may indicate when heroin manufacture continued by the same lab, or alternatively can be the expiry date of the heroin or the date when the package was distributed to international markets. Printed dates can also be updated by hand-written markings. � Sequential and non-sequential numbers stamped on heroin packages are generally seen as being coded communications between heroin manufacturers and traffickers, although the specific messages are not known. Sequential numbers (for example 555 or 777) have been found in both the Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2021, and in Central Asia and the Russian Federation in 2012. By comparison, nonsequential numbers (for example 355 or 787) seized in the Indian Ocean are not seen in Central Asia and are only infrequently seized in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that sequential numbers may be associated with relative purity of the heroin contained in the packages stamped with these numbers. � Words stamped on heroin packages appear to be an indicator of where the heroin was produced. Heroin produced in southern Afghanistan is reportedly stamped with Pashto words, while heroin produced in northern Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more likely to be stamped with Farsi words. Heroin produced in eastern and western Afghanistan often has words in English, Farsi and Pashto, while heroin produced in Pakistan is labelled with words in English and Urdu. � Heroin and methamphetamine manufactured and trafficked by the same DTO may be stamped with the same or very similar stamps. In some cases, heroin packages are stamped with images of

animals which may be an indicator of relative purity of the heroin or an indicator of the location of the manufacturer. � Although some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of heroin stamps seized in the Indian Ocean, there is still a lack of clarity on the meaning and purpose of some stamps – even among the drug traffickers interviewed in Afghanistan. Further analysis is required, including the analysis of drug stamps seized in locations outside of the Indian Ocean. It would be advantageous to develop a database of the different markings of heroin stamps to aid such analysis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Key findings • Hawala is a Money or Value Transfer Service (MVTS) that has been used for centuries, originating in the Middle East and South Asia. It is overwhelmingly used for legitimate purposes, including personal and business financial transactions and for the sending of remittances by migrants and refugees to family members. Cultural preferences, convenience, low-threshold accessibility, low processing fees, reliability, and faster value transfer services are some of the reasons for using hawala, and customers using the service come from all walks of life. • Despite being widely used for legitimate purposes, some attributes of the hawala system also make it vulnerable to use by organised crime for the purposes of transferring illicit funds and values. This includes financial transfers by drug traffickers, migrant smugglers and other criminal actors and organisations, as well as safekeeping of funds obtained from illegal activity. The 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study do not commonly ask about the source of money or the reason for sending and receiving money. Additionally, when they did have doubts about the source of the funds, over half of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they had never refused a hawala transaction. • There is no single global regulatory framework for the hawala system. However, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has produced international standards and recommendations for countries to take measures to regulate the hawala system and ensure regular monitoring and compliance. Specific regulations and monitoring regimes vary by country, but FATF recommends countries take a risk-based approach to regulating the hawala system. Of the 18 countries covered by this study, the hawala system was regulated in most of them. However, in four countries it was not regulated, and in Afghanistan – following the events of August 2021 – the current regulatory status of the hawala system is unclear as of the time of writing. • Of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this report, 43 per cent of hawaladars declared they had a license to operate. In jurisdictions where it is a requirement, 25 per cent operated without a license and 31 per cent preferred not to respond. 36 per cent of the interviewed hawaladars stated that they provided reports to the Central Bank or other relevant financial authorities about their hawala activities, while 64 per cent either had never reported or preferred not to answer the question. Licensed hawaladars collected more personal information from their customers and require identification documents, while for unlicensed hawaladars a name and contact number is sufficient to process a transaction. • Of the hawaladars interviewed in this

study, over one-third reported that they ran multiple branches within the same country and more than half of them reported having offices in other countries. Regular hawala customers are likely to receive a discount on commission charges by hawaladars. • People engaging in regular and irregular migration constitute one customer base of the hawaladars interviewed in this study. Over half of reported that they had migrants as customers. The findings of this study suggest that hawaladars – knowingly and unknowingly - facilitate irregular migration and migrant smuggling by providing multiple financial services including, but not limited to, money or value transfer, safekeeping of funds and introducing migrants and refugees to migrant smugglers. • There are multiple reasons why migrants and refugees would use hawala before, during and after traveling, and these are broadly linked to the features of the system, and, for some, lack of access to any other financial system, such as banks or mobile money services. Migrants and refugees may be directed to a hawaladar by a friend or relative, smuggler, fellow traveller, shopkeeper or accommodation provider. • The interviewed hawaladars identified the following services they provided to migrants and refugees during their journeys: guiding migrants on their journey; helping with finding work upon arrival; referring migrants to support organizations; providing temporary accommodation or referring migrants to an individual who provides temporary accommodation; and finding local medical aid, as undocumented migrants may not be able to or may be reluctant to access hospitals. • Some hawaladars also assist migrants and refugees by finding, recommending or introducing them to a smuggler; and finding or directly renting out boats and trucks for transportation. • The majority of customers using the services of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study sent funds to countries located in the Near and Middle East/ South-West Asia sub region, followed by Western and Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe subregions. Customers in the Near and Middle Eastern sub-regions frequently sent funds to hawaladars in most of the eighteen countries where interviews were conducted. Customers of the interviewed hawaladars in the countries of the North American sub-region only sent funds to hawaladars interviewed in Afghanistan, Denmark, Nigeria, Somalia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. • Hawala is widely associated with transferring money or value - this was the most common type of service provided by the sample group in this study. However, sending and receiving money is just one among several financial services hawaladars provide. Cash savings, currency exchange, short-term lending, safekeeping of funds, and trade guarantees were other services the interviewed hawaladars provided to their customers to varying degrees. Some of them safekeep customers’ funds. The amount of funds kept for safekeeping with the interviewed hawaladars ranged from US$ 20,000 to US$ 500,000. • Hawaladars often operate additional businesses alongside their hawala business. Some of the side businesses mentioned by interviewed hawaladars were grocery store, travel agency, selling mobile top-up cards, construction company and electronics shops. • A hawala transaction does not always proceed directly from country A to country B. Depending on the source and destination, sometimes a transaction is carried out through one or more intermediary hawaladars located in at least one other country. Hawaladars interviewed for this study reported that there are multiple hawala hubs located in several regions of the world where such intermediary hawaladars operate. • Hawaladars interviewed in this study reported processing both domestic and international transactions, however, nearly three out of four processed mostly international transactions. The amount of a single hawala transaction varies substantially. Transactions handled by the interviewed hawaladars ranged from as low as US$50 and as high

as US$200,000. To keep a record of these transactions, most hawaladars interviewed in this research reported that they keep a paper (ledger book) as well as an electronic (digital) record of hawala transactions and other services provided. • Hawaladars use a variety of methods to settle their accounts including through cash, reverse transaction, bank transfer or trading in goods and services. Reverse transaction was the most often used method of account settlement among the hawaladars interviewed in this study, followed by settlement through bank transfer. Misuse of the hawala service • In addition to its widespread legitimate use, hawala is vulnerable to misuse by organized crime groups and other criminal actors. More than one-third of the interviewed hawaladars judged the hawala system to be more vulnerable to illegal transactions compared to the formal banking system, while some perceived an equal vulnerability in both systems. A lack of proper oversight by national authorities, a lack of reporting by hawaladars, a lack of regulation, policy, or guidelines for hawaladars to follow, the operation of unlicensed hawaladars, and the closed nature of the hawala system are all potential reasons for vulnerability. • There are no exact estimates as to the extent to which hawaladars, knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the misuse of their financial services for criminal purposes. Some hawaladars interviewed for this research reported the direct involvement of other hawaladars in transferring funds associated with illegal activities. Additionally, some criminal groups have hawaladars, who may be relatives, working specifically for them for the purposes of transferring funds linked to organised crime. • Several of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they do not ask the purpose of transactions from their customers. As a result, it is possible that hawaladars involved in handling transactions of illicit proceeds are not aware of the nature and source of the money they are transferring or safekeeping. This is particularly the case with hawaladars who are dealing with smaller transactions which usually do not arouse suspicions. However, some hawaladars reported that they could not refuse a transaction from customers connected with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) due to the risk of negative consequences for themselves and their businesses. • It remains a challenge to precisely document the degree to which hawaladars are transferring illicit funds; it is also difficult to trace illicit financial flows, to separate them from licit flows, and to establish concrete financial links to criminal activities. Law enforcement agencies face challenges in investigating crimes linked to hawala systems, because of the closed nature of the business and, in some cases, the kinship ties of the actors.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 91p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Sahel countries are some of the largest gold producers in Africa. While gold production data can be unreliable, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are estimated to have produced 228 tons of gold in 2021, worth over 12.6 billion United States dollars ($). The gold sector is a major economic driver in the Sahel countries. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) production is estimated at 108 tons per year in Sahel countries, although official ASGM production data is largely unreliable due to the informal nature of the sector. ASGM provides a livelihood to over 1.8 million people in areas where income-generating activities are limited. The sector is characterized by high levels of informality because it often takes place on unlicensed and undeclared mining sites. Gold mining without licenses is illegal in all Sahel countries, although Member States have taken measures to formalize ASGM. Barriers to accessing mining licences often push communities involved in ASGM into a vicious cycle of illegality. Without protection of the law, they depend on a local economy often controlled by transnational organized crime (TOC) groups to fund their operations and to sell their gold production, with limited opportunities for structural investments. These communities are potentially susceptible to

recruitment by armed groups, including violent extremist groups. Porous borders enable gold to be easily moved within the Sahel countries and smuggled out of the region, including to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 36p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Women

In this publication, the term “femicide” is used to refer to all types of gender-related killings of women and girls as described in the “Statistical framework for measuring the gender-related killing of women and girls (also referred to as “femicide/feminicide”)”.

Globally, approximately 51,100 women and girls were killed by their intimate partners or other family members during 2023. Higher than the 2022 estimate of 48,800 victims, this change is not indicative of an actual increase as it is largely due to differences in data availability at the country level. The 2023 figure means that 60 per cent of the almost 85,000 women and girls killed intentionally during the year were murdered by their intimate partners or other family members. In other words, an average of 140 women and girls worldwide lost their lives every day at the hands of their partner or a close relative...

P.18 When considering possible risk factors, it should be noted that fewer victims (11 per cent) and perpetrators (20 per cent) of femicides are under the influence of alcohol than in the case of male homicides (25 and 30 per cent respectively). Some studies point to the drug intoxication of victims as a homicidal risk factor,13 but in the case of femicides in France, this does not seem to be the case, with 3 per cent of victims and 5 per cent of perpetrators of femicide being under the influence of drugs at the time of the crime.

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 36p.

By Ayumi Takano, Kunihiko Takahashi, Tatsuhiko Anzai, Takashi Usami, Shiori Tsutsumi, Yuka Kanazawa, Yousuke Kumakura, Toshihiko Matsumoto

Background: Methamphetamine use is related to severe health, social, and criminal challenges. However, there is limited evidence regarding the factors associated with the recurrence of drug use among individuals who have used methamphetamine, particularly within populations involved in the criminal justice system. This study aimed to identify predictors of illicit drug use at a one-year follow-up among males in Japan who have used methamphetamine and are involved in the criminal justice system. Methods: The study participants were adult males on probation due to methamphetamine use or possession and were involved in a community-based program. The participants were recruited early in their probation period and participated in telephone-based surveys conducted by mental health center staff. We analyzed one-year follow-up data to investigate the recurrence rate of illicit drug use and associated risk factors using multiple logistic regression. Results: Out of 234 participants, 27 (11.5%) used illicit drugs during the one-year follow-up period. After adjusting for demographic characteristics, severity of drug use, type of probation, and use of treatment for substance use disorders, the use of social welfare services (OR = 2.78) and a lack of trustworthy relationships (OR = 3.17) were significantly associated with recurrence of illicit drug use. Conclusions: This study suggested that individuals facing challenges in maintaining stable living conditions and building trustworthy relationships were more likely to return to drug use early in their probation period. Comprehensive and tailored support focused on social stabilization and relationship-building is required to prompt recovery in males who have experienced methamphetamine use.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, (2024)

By Ulla D. Berg, and Sebastian K. León

Each year the United States government detains and deports hundreds of thousands of people who prior to their removal are held in confinement for an average of 55 days. The short and long-term effects of the coronavirus pandemic on migrant detention and deportation continue to be evaluated in real time, including how we can best study it. This paper provides a timely analysis on the relationship between immigration enforcement and confinement, public health emergencies, and ethnographic methods. It makes two contributions. The first is methodological and focuses on the challenges and opportunities of ethnographic methods in carceral settings when pandemic-related protocols have raised additional challenges to conventional in-person prison ethnography. The second contribution is empirical and documents how we adapted ethnographic methods to an interdisciplinary research design and to the exigencies of the pandemic to study the spread of the coronavirus in four immigrant detention facilities in New Jersey, USA.

EthnographyVolume 25, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 314-334

By Rivke Jaffe

Rivke Jaffe explains how despite Jamaica’s “dons” are associated with crime and violence, they have become figures of political authority and seen as legitimate leaders.

Throughout Kingston, Jamaica, figures known as “dons” exercise political authority and are seen as legitimate leaders despite their associations with crime and violence. In the absence of strong government support, they provide impoverished residents with access to security, conflict resolution, and various forms of welfare through their own resources and connections to Jamaica’s political parties. In The Rule of Dons, Rivke Jaffe shows how dons’ power relies on a widespread belief in their right to rule, explaining how criminal power is legitimized through a set of aesthetic, affective, and spatial mechanisms. She argues that dons must credibly embody an outlaw persona that stands outside of the political establishment while also connecting strategically to state institutions and mobilizing democratic ideals such as freedom and equality. As such, dons represent a form of authority that involves balancing an autocratic form of rule

with an established democratic order. While donmanship represents a historically and culturally specific type of political authority, Jaffe’s analysis of this phenomenon offers insights into the entanglement of violent autocratic rule and democratic institutions far beyond Jamaica.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2024. 217p.

By Elena Marushiakova, and Vesselin Popov

In their centuries-old history, the Roma (formerly known as Gypsies) experienced many difficult moments and cruel trials from their arrival in Europe until now. The history of the Roma in the USSR is no exception in this respect. Along with affirmative state policy towards them (at least until the end of the 1930s), they also fell victim to the massive political repressions of that time. In this book, the Roma victims of these repressions are made visible and the scale of the repressions against them is discussed. The authors describe the political repression of Roma not as an isolated historical phenomenon explicitly aimed at the Roma as a separate ethnic community but understand the events as a component of the mass terror and brutal against all Soviet citizens. In this way, the history of the Roma is inscribed in the general history of the USSR.

Leiden; Boston: Brill: 2024.

By Alexander Huezo

Focusing on the lived experiences of Afro-Colombians processing and resisting violence against their ecological communities, Visions of Global Environmental Justice employs accounts of the supernatural narratively and analytically to frame a contemporary struggle for environmental justice. The book applies Achille Mbembe’s theorization of necropolitics to the environmental racism of the US War on Drugs in Colombia, specifically the aerial eradication of coca in the comunidades negras of the Pacific Coast. Through critical examination and deconstruction of transnational mythmaking and local oral tradition, Visions of Global Environmental Justice illustrates that non/humans rendered expendable by US-driven drug (necro)politics are indispensable to both the conceptualization and the realization of environmental justice globally. Far from being a study singularly focused on the symptoms of environmental issues, this book creatively guides us toward a broader understanding of environmental racism and justice across geographic scales and non/human agencies.

Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2025.

Edited by Nutmeg Hallett, Richard Whittington, Dirk Richter, Emachi Eneje

This book aims to provide a state-of-the-art overview of the contexts, causes and treatments that relate to the reduction of coercion and the prevention of violence in mental health settings. The objective of this new edition in Open Access is to integrate theoretical explanations, empirical findings and practical solutions on the topic from many countries and diverse professional contexts.

A large proportion of the text is concerned with practical and applied guidance for practitioners and others based on a clear understanding of conceptual and theoretical issues. Significantly enriched by the contributions of lived experience editors and co-authors, this edition brings authentic, new perspectives that deepen its relevance and impact.

There is extensive use of case studies drawn from practice and the media to enliven the discussion. The scope of the book is intended to go beyond a reductionist medical/biological orientation on coercion and violence in mental health by integrating this within broader psychological and social frameworks. It includes new relevant contributions from nursing, psychology, psychiatry and sociology. The language of the book is clear and understandable to a broad audience whilst offering new knowledge for researchers and other specialists.

Cham Springer Nature, 436p.

By William Downs

The Labour government has committed to halving knife crime in a decade.

This briefing provides an overview of legislation concerning knives and offensive weapons, and the approaches taken by the police and other agencies to prevent serious violence in England and Wales.

What are knife crime offences? It is a criminal offence to possess any knife or other bladed article in a public place, under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It is also a criminal offence to have an “offensive weapon” in any public place, under section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Both offences carry maximum penalties of up to four years’ imprisonment. It is a defence for someone to prove they have possessed a knife, bladed article or offensive weapon with “good reason or lawful authority”, though the legislation does not provide examples of what this means in practice. A court determines whether the explanation provided by a defendant amounts to lawful authority or reasonable excuse based on the specific circumstances of a case. It is also a criminal offence to possess any prohibited weapon under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the Offensive Weapons Act 2019). Prohibited weapons cannot be possessed anywhere, even in private, and are also illegal to hire, lend or manufacture. Like other possession offences, the maximum penalty is four years’ imprisonment. There are currently 20 prohibited weapons listed in secondary legislation under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, including a range of knives, bladed articles and other weapons. Under section 141(2) of the 1988 act, the government can introduce secondary legislation to add further weapons to this list. In 2024, the government added a new definition of “zombie-style” knives and machetes to the list, and launched a consultation on adding “ninja swords” to the list. Sentencing statistics from the Ministry of Justice shows that in the year ending March 2023, there were almost 18,500 cautions and convictions made for possession of a knife or offensive weapon. Juveniles (aged 10-17) were the offenders in around 17.3% of cases. Further data for England and Wales related to knife-related offences can be found in the Library briefing: Knife Crime Statistics: England and Wales.

London: House of Commons Library, 2025. 41p.

By Ernesto Lopez, Bobby Boxerman

Key Takeaways This study updates and supplements previous U.S. crime trends reports by the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) with data through December 2024. It examines yearly and monthly rates of reported crime for 13 violent, property, and drug offenses in 40 American cities that have consistently reported monthly data over the past six years. The 40 cities are not necessarily representative of all jurisdictions in the United States. Not all cities published data for each offense (see the Appendix for which cities reported which offenses); trends in offenses with fewer reporting cities should be viewed with caution. Not all crimes are reported to law enforcement. In addition, the data collected for this report are subject to revision by local jurisdictions. Reported levels of 12 of the 13 offenses covered in this report were lower in 2024 than in 2023; shoplifting was the only offense higher in 2024 compared to 2023. Looking at changes in violent offenses from 2023 to 2024, the number of homicides in the 29 study cities providing data for that crime was 16% lower, representing 631 fewer homicides. There were 4% fewer reported aggravated assaults, 15% fewer gun assaults, 6% fewer sexual assaults, and 4% fewer domestic violence incidents last year than in 2023. Robbery fell by 10% while carjackings (a type of robbery) decreased by 32%. Motor vehicle theft had been on the rise from the summer of 2020 through 2023, but that trend reversed last year; there were 24% fewer motor vehicle thefts in 2024 than in 2023. Reports of residential burglaries (-13%), nonresidential burglaries (-6%), larcenies (-5%), and drug offenses (-3%) all decreased in 2024 compared to 2023. But rates of reported shoplifting, a crime that has received extensive attention from the media and policymakers, increased by 14% over the same period. Examining trends over a longer timeframe, most violent crimes are at or below levels seen in 2019, the year prior to the onset of the COVID pandemic and racial justice protests of 2020. There were 6% fewer homicides in the study cities in 2024 than in 2019. Similarly, sexual assault (-26%), domestic violence (-11%), and robbery (-19%) were lower in 2024 than in 2019. In contrast, aggravated assaults (+4%), gun assaults (+5%), and carjackings (+25%) were higher in 2024 than in 2019. Homicide rates in some high-homicide cities, including Baltimore, Detroit, and St. Louis, have dropped even further, returning to the levels of 2014, when national homicide rates were at historic lows. Rates in other cities have largely returned to pre-pandemic levels. Property crime trends have been mixed over the last five years. There were fewer residential burglaries (-38%) and larcenies (-12%) in 2024 than in 2019, but more nonresidential burglaries (+12%) and shoplifting (+1%). Motor vehicle thefts were higher by half (+53%) during the timeframe. Drug offenses in 2024 were 28% below 2019 levels. While these crime reductions are promising, the United States still experiences high levels of homicide compared to other industrialized nations, and progress should not slow local, state, federal, and community efforts to adopt comprehensive, evidencebased strategies to reduce violence. Furthermore, researchers should redouble their efforts to identify how broad behavioral shifts and other societal dynamics may affect trends.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2025. 39p.

By Danielle Stibbe, Stijn Ruiter, Wouter Steenbeek, Asier Moneva

Objectives: This study investigates the effect of advertised rewards in credential leaks on the likelihood and speed of account hijacking. Methods: In an online field experiment, we created 176 honey Gmail accounts and randomly assigned them to eight different posts containing account credential leaks. We used a 2 × 2 experimental design, manipulating two key variables within the post titles: the number of accounts (5 K or 1.5 M) and the promise of access to additional platforms (absent or present). We then monitored the accounts for any subsequent activity. Results: Our findings indicate that the promise of access to additional platforms increased the likelihood and speed of an attempted access. Only 12 accounts were fully accessed, however, because most hijackers did not complete the second-factor authentication (2FA) process required for gaining full access. It seems that the 2FA acted as a deterrent to complete Gmail account hijacking. Conclusions: The study aligns with the rational choice perspective of crime, showing that the prospect of greater rewards leads to more attempted account accesses

Computers in Human Behavior Reports, Volume 14, May 2024, 100410

By Asier Moneva, Stijn Ruiter, Daniël Meinsma

Criminal expertise plays a crucial role in the choices offenders make when committing a crime, including their modus operandi. However, our knowledge about criminal decision making online remains limited. Drawing on insights from cyber security, we conceptualize the cybercrime commission process as the sequence of phases of the cyber kill chain that offenders go through. We assume that offenders who follow the sequence consecutively use the most efficient hacking method. Building upon the expertise paradigm, we hypothesize that participants with greater hacking experience and IT skills undertake more efficient hacks. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed data from 69 computer security and software engineering students who were invited to hack a vulnerable website in a computer lab equipped with monitoring software, which allowed to collect objective behavioral measures. Additionally, we collected individual measures regarding hacking expertise through an online questionnaire. After quantitatively measuring efficiency using sequence analysis, a regression model showed that the expertise paradigm may also apply to hackers. We discuss the implications of our novel research for the study of offender decision-making processes more broadly.

Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 155, June 2024, 108180