By Jeannine Bell and Stephen Rushin

This Article considers how policymakers can more effectively constrain police authority during traffic stops to reduce racial disparities and prevent unnecessary violence.

We begin by chronicling the power granted to police officers during traffic enforcement and the harms generated by this discretionary power. Under existing criminal procedure, police officers have considerable authority to stop motorists for any technical violation of the traffic code, even if the stated justification is a pretext for investigating an unrelated hunch or suspicion. After stopping a motorist, existing doctrine gives police the ability to question motorists, search vehicles under numerous circumstances, arrest drivers for minor violations of the law, and otherwise use traffic stops as a justification for criminal fishing expeditions. This makes police traffic stops an entryway into officer misconduct and violence.

Moreover, the harms of police traffic enforcement are felt disproportionately by communities of color. Empirical evidence generally suggests that Black and Hispanic drivers are more likely than their white counterparts to experience traffic stops. Black and Hispanic drivers are more likely to be stopped during daylight hours relative to nighttime hours when their race is apparent to police through visual observation. And searches of Black and Hispanic motorists are less likely to produce contraband than searches of white drivers, suggesting that police may employ a less rigorous standard of probable cause when justifying vehicle searches of drivers of color.

Given the growing body of literature on the harms caused by police traffic enforcement, some have called for the abolition of police traffic enforcement. Short of abolition, though, this Article shows how jurisdictions across the country have already moved to limit the authority of police during traffic encounters. This approach does not seek to eliminate entirely the police from the enforcement of traffic laws. Rather, it involves state and local policymakers enacting restrictions on police power during traffic enforcement that go beyond those mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court under existing doctrine. Indeed, in recent years, states and municipalities have enacted limitations on the use of pretextual traffic stops, consent searches, and unrelated questioning of motorists after stops. Others have restricted or banned the use of quotas as a police management tool. Some prosecutors’ offices have announced declination policies designed to disincentivize police from using traffic stops as a tool for the investigation of other unrelated crimes. Still other jurisdictions have explored additional reporting requirements and even technological replacements for the use of police officers in the enforcement of the traffic code.

Combined, we argue that this sort of criminal justice minimalism can reduce the harmful and racially disparate effects of police traffic enforcement without compromising public safety

57 Arizona State Law Journal, 2025, 52p.

By Mylan Denerstein

This is the Monitor’s 23rd report and second report focused on the compliance of the New York City Police Department’s (the “Department” or “NYPD”) Neighborhood Safety Teams (“NST”) and Public Safety Teams (“PST”) with constitutional requirements in executing stops, frisks, and searches. In March 2021, the NYPD initiated NST units in certain precincts to combat gun violence in high-crime areas. Officers in NST units engage in proactive stop, frisks, and searches, and generally they are not expected to respond to 911 calls-for-service. NST officers drive unmarked cars and wear uniforms distinct from those worn by NYPD patrol officers. In June 2023, the Monitor filed the Nineteenth Report of the Independent Monitor (the “19th Report”) with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which contained results of the Monitor team’s 2022 audit of the NSTs. That report concluded that NST officers performed substantially below constitutional standards and had a rate of unlawful Terry stops nine percentage points higher than their counterparts in regular patrol positions. In addition, the report concluded that supervisors in the Department failed to identify and remediate unlawful reported stops. To determine Fourth Amendment compliance with the stops, frisks, and searches conducted by NSTs since the filing of the 19th Report, the Monitor began a second, more comprehensive audit of NSTs and PSTs, another specialized proactive enforcement unit, to assess their compliance with court-ordered reforms. This follow-up report audits NST, PST, and regular patrol officers based on stops, frisks, and searches conducted in 2023. It compares NST officers with their counterparts on regular patrol and in PSTs and measures compliance rates of all supervisors and officers regardless of unit assignment. Based on the 2023 audit, the Report concludes that NST and PST officers are not performing stops, frisks, and searches at constitutional levels, and that supervisors of NST, PST, and patrol officers are not appropriately overseeing their officers. Some of the key findings are below: • This 2023 audit shows that NST officers’ constitutional compliance with respect to stops, frisks, and searches did not improve since the Monitor’s 2022 audit. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers had reasonable suspicion (and thus a lawful basis) for 75% of the reported Terry stops, slightly below the NST percentage of 76% compliance in the 2022 audit. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers made lawful stops at a rate of 75%, 17 percentage points lower than their patrol counterparts’ rate of 92%. • In the 2023 audit, PST officers also made lawful stops at a rate lower than patrol officers, with only 64% of their reported stops being assessed as lawful, which is 28 percentage points lower than their patrol counterparts’ rate of 92%. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers and PST officers overwhelmingly conducted self-initiated stops (70% and 77%, respectively, were self-initiated), while officers on routine patrol primarily conducted stops based on radio runs (68% were radio runs). • In the 2023 audit, regardless of the officer’s unit assignment (NST, PST, Patrol, or other), Terry stops based on a complainant/witness (100% lawful) or a radio run (94% lawful) were nearly all constitutional, while only 65% of self-initiated stops were assessed as lawful. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers had reasonable suspicion for only 58% of the frisks assessed and had a legal basis for only 54% of the searches assessed. • In the 2023 audit, despite significant numbers of unlawful stops, frisks, and searches, command-level supervisors of NST, PST, and Patrol officers only determined that 1% of stops were unlawful and 1% of frisks and searches were unlawful. • In 95% of the stop reports in this audit in which race was identified (N=385) and 93% of the BWC videos assessed (N=697), the person stopped was identified as Black or Hispanic. Of the 397 stop reports in which gender was indicated, 97% were male. Overall, in this audit, 89% of the individuals encountered were Black or Hispanic males. The NYPD must focus on supervisors ensuring implementation of constitutionally compliant stops, frisks, and searches. The Department must improve Fourth Amendment compliance levels and NST and PST units must be better supervised. The ball is in the Department’s hands, and the NYPD can do this. The law requires no less.

New York: New York Police Department Monitor, 2025. 51p.