By Aaron Chalfin, Greg Ridgeway, John MacDonald, Rachel Ryley

The Philadelphia Police Department began distributing 435 mobile smartphones to officers in police districts 22, 24, and 25 in February 2021. At the same time PPD established Crime Information Centers (CICs) to facilitate analysis and information sharing. We compared changes in police-related outcomes in districts 22, 24, and 25 with six districts (12, 14, 15, 19, 35, 39) that received no phones and had similar levels of serious crime. The smartphones provided officers with improved access to information and a convenient technology to receive requests for intelligence crucial to investigations, report street-level intelligence, and communicate directly with members of the community. Mobile phones/CICs have public safety benefits • An increase in the violent crime clearance rate from 24% to 30% • An increase in the likelihood that a stop resulted in an arrest — from 10% to 28% — suggesting more surgical policing, without increasing the number of stops conducted Mobile phones substantially ease regular PPD officers’ tasks • Greatly increased the amount and variety of evidence collected – Weekly uploads increased 40% after at least one SIG detective received a phone • Facilitated 311 reports to address physical disorder in districts • Made officers more willing and able to create intelligence reports • Enhanced basic communication between police and community members through calls and text messages, including direct contact about the location of illegal firearms • Can improve the completeness and timeliness of NCIC/PCIC checks, patrol logs, and court notices PPD has more to gain from mobile IT and CICs • More incentives are needed to promote smartphone use among officers. A few officers in each of the pilot districts were more active users of the smartphones – 5/7 squads use the phones a lot, others were infrequent users  – 3 officers submitted half of the 311 requests – 86% of officers submitted no intelligence reports at all – Usage has essentially ended in District 22 • Regular use of phones among officers could support mission-directed patrol – Monitoring the time spent in mission areas – Documenting mission-related business checks and home visits – Promote intelligence reports in mission areas • PPD could encourage additional phone usage – Encourage officers to share information and give feedback on how their intel reports and 311 reports are solving community problems – Emphasize phone usage in CompStat by tracking key metrics ∗ Time spent in strategic areas ∗ Number of leads connected to shootings or priority incidents ∗ Volume of direct calls/messages from community leading to crime clearances – Establish a clear policy on expected phone use, monitor use, and provide feedback to command staff and officers on the successful uses of technology  

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Crime and Justice Policy Lab, 2022. 43p.

By Dulani Woods, John S. Hollywood, Jeremy D. Barnum, Danielle Fenimore, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Brian A. Jackson

The advent of blockchain-based technologies has opened a new frontier for individuals wishing to conduct financial and other transactions remotely, anonymously, and without the need for a third party like a bank. Blockchain technology has various uses but is perhaps best known as the foundation for a certain type of digital currency called cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is increasingly an accepted form of payment in many legitimate business transactions, but it is also used to facilitate many illegal activities, in large part because of its capacity to facilitate mostly anonymous transactions remotely. As a result, law enforcement investigators need to develop new skills, competencies, and tools for ensuring justice. In support of the National Institute of Justice, researchers from RAND and the Police ExecutiveResearch Forum conducted a workshop with law enforcement practitioners, academics, and other experts. Workshop participants identified and priorit ized 24 research and development needs that, if invested in, would improve law enforcement's ability to adapt to these societal changes. These needs pertain to policies for digital key management, resources for law enforcement training on blockchain and cryptocurrency, and tools for investigations involving cryptocurrency.

In this report, the researchers detail the proceedings of the workshop, discuss the ten highest-priority needs identified by the participants, and provide additional context based on the participants' discussions. The participants prioritized needs associated with raising the level of knowledge for officers and investigators, training or hiring experts who can assist with investigations, and adapting existing policies and procedures to ensure that cryptocurrencies are handled responsibly.

Key Findings

• There are not enough law enforcement–specific blockchain and cryptocurrency training and experts to meet the demand for educating justice practitioners.

• Cryptocurrency can be transferred by anyone in possession of an easy-to-copy digital key. Individuals with copies of the keys may move assets before an agency can take possession.

• This digital key is merely a unique set of letters and/or numbers (i.e., text). This text allows the bearer to control digital assets of high value and should not be treated like other text-based information within a case file.

• Seized cryptocurrency assets can be transferred by anyone in possession of a digital key to a digital wallet of unknown ownership. This presents opportunities for officer misconduct.

• Blockchain and cryptocurrency are fast-moving, rapidly evolving technologies. Justice practitioners are having difficulty keeping up with the changes.

• There is a lack of expertise in all aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrency technologies across the justice system.

• Commercial cryptocurrency-tracking tools can be more expensive than an agency can afford. Open-source tools can require significant computing power.

• Once a problematic cryptocurrency wallet is identified by law enforcement (via subpoena or another method), there is no good way to notify other interested investigators in other jurisdictions.

Recommendations

• Identify best-practice policies and procedures for rapidly securing cryptocurrency assets during investigations.

• Develop best-practice policies and procedures (e.g., two-person systems) to minimize opportunities for mishandling cryptocurrency.

• Identify best-practice policies and procedures for handling, storing, transferring, and redacting digital cryptocurrency keys within record-management systems.

• Catalog and publicize the training resources that are already available, including training that is not tailored for justice practitioners.

• Develop regional or national sharing systems that facilitate sharing of training materials and actionable intelligence for ongoing cases (e.g., digital or cyber fusion centers).

• Develop model materials that can be easily adapted for training recruits, investigators, forensics experts, prosecutors, judges, and others.

• Conduct research to examine the balance of skills and expertise that law enforcement agencies look for when hiring and assess whether those are likely to meet current and future needs.

• Convene a standing group of practitioners and experts who can examine the “state of the possible” and generate requirements for research and development organizations.

• Work with federal, state, local, and private entities (e.g., the Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory, Lawyers Without Borders) to make available appropriate cryptocurrency-tracking resources so that costs can be more easily shared.

• Assess the costs and benefits of developing a private-sector clearinghouse that will allow the public sector and vetted private-sector entities to coordinate (similar to how the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children screens potentially abusive materials.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023. 28p.

By Andy Higgins and Ruth Halkon

Public support and approval sit at the heart of the British policing model and are critical dependencies for effective policing. Although citizen attitudes have slipped out of formal policy focus over the last decade, a complex combination of factors – most obviously the recent set of misconduct scandals and cultural failings exposed within the Metropolitan Police in particular – have pulled questions of trust, confidence, and police legitimacy back into the spotlight. The first data to emerge from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) following its hiatus during Covid, confirms a consistent deterioration in public sentiment towards the police, which has begun to spread into more ‘relational’ dimensions (of fairness and respectfulness), not just appraisals of service quality. The downturn in London is particularly stark. These conditions and their causes require action from police leaders and policy makers, and a range of ‘issue based’ reform efforts, reviews and change programmes are underway. Additionally, however, the strategic-level questions these shifts pose, about the future working relationship between police and public, demand that concerted attention should also be given to contact – the way that citizens experience ‘everyday’ interactions with the police, across a variety of contexts, and the attitudinal traces these episodes leave behind. Personal contact is what citizens consistently say affects their trust and confidence in police, and its impact can ripple beyond those directly involved, through ‘vicarious’ transmission (e.g., reports from family and friends) and media (and social media) coverage. It also seems to be an aspect of service delivery amenable to policy and practice change, drawing on a well-established evidence-base about what is likely to be effective. But contact is also an area of considerable flux and disruption. Right across society, technology is precipitating radical shifts in the way citizens communicate with each other and interact with businesses, organisations, and government services. Online commerce and service provision, social media, videoconferencing, artificial intelligence (AI) powered chatbots, and advanced analytics are all contributing to a much more complex and plural contact environment. These developments are shifting public expectations and promise real benefits in terms of the speed, efficiency, convenience, and choice available to citizens in their everyday lives. The pace of change, however, is such that the wider social implications are difficult to comprehend. Policing, of course, is not immune to these shifts and technologically enabled developments such as in online crime reporting, self-service portals, social media engagement, Body-Worn Video, live chat and video-link responses are increasingly coming to augment and meditate the public experience of dealing with the police. At a strategic level, the service seems optimistic about the potential for these and future innovations to generate mission critical efficiencies, optimise effectiveness, enable the sector to keep pace with public expectations, and promote public trust and confidence – although the mechanisms through which the latter might occur remain largely under-theorised. This report begins to address the interconnections between those two trajectories: the deterioration in police/public relations (and associated imperatives on policing to halt and reverse this), and the technological transformation of police/public contact. More specifically, it asks: what are the implications, opportunities, and risks for public confidence (and related attitudes) arising from the introduction of new technology into police/public contact experiences? Our investigation proceeds in three parts: • First (in Section 2) we revisit and summarise what is already known about the way police/public contact impacts on public confidence (and related attitudes) from research conducted in more ‘analogue’ times and contexts. • Second (in Section 3) we ask: what evidence is emerging, what is promising and what can be hypothesised, about how various forms of technology might impact on public experiences of contact, and the lasting impressions these leave behind? We present six promising mechanisms and one pressing risk. • Third (in Section 4) we conclude by considering the strategic implications for policing and present eight recommendations. Our analysis is informed by a literature review, analysis of survey data collected by the London Mayor’s Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC), a survey of police contact management and community engagement leads, a roundtable discussion, and interviews and discussions with relevant experts and stakeholders.

London: Police Foundation, 2023. 57p.

By Irena Leisbet Ceridwen Connon, Mo Egan, Niall Hamilton-Smith, Niamh MacKay, Diana Miranda, C. William R. Webster

This report has been compiled for the Scottish Government’s “Emerging Technologies in Policing” project, and was commissioned by the Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR) acting on behalf of the Scottish Government. It is based on a review of emerging technologies in policing undertaken between January and July 2022. The review was completed by a research team based at the University of Stirling.

The review considered: 1) the social and ethical implications of particular types of emerging technologies in policing practice, 2) the legal considerations associated with the adoption of emerging technologies in policing, 3) recommendations from the existing research examining the trial and adoption of new emerging technologies in policing, as well as for ethical and scientific standards frameworks and guidelines, for informing best practice and wider dissemination of these technologies in police practice, 4) recommendations for the use of emerging technologies in policing based on experiences from other sectors (Health, Children and Family), and 5) the lessons learnt and recommendations that can be made from the analysis of existing case law concerning emerging technology. The report provides a descriptive overview of the relevant literature and case law available, as well as a series of recommendations for best practice in the implementation and dissemination of the different forms of technology in police practice

Edinburgh, Scottish Government, 2023. 486p.

By The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

This document was developed through efforts by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC or Council) Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group, to develop guidelines for local and state agencies in relation to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence (i.e., the fusion process). Those efforts laid the foundation for the expansion of the Fusion Center Guidelines to integrate the public safety and private sector entities. The guidelines are intended to ensure that fusion centers are established and operated consistently, with enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened partnerships, and improved crime-fighting and antiterrorism capabilities. Key elements include: sector-specific information and sharing plans; identification of goals for the fusion center; creation of a representative governance structure and collaborative environment for intelligence sharing among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies, public safety agencies, and the private sector; utilization of memoranda of understanding (MOUs), non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), and other agency agreements, as appropriate; leveraging of databases, systems, and networks to maximize information sharing; creating environments that promote communication among entities; development and publication of privacy and civil liberties policies; ensuring appropriate security measures for the facility, data, and personnel; integration of technology, systems, and people; achievement of a diversified representation of personnel based on the needs and functions of the center; ensuring adequate personnel training; provision of multitiered educational program for intelligence-led policing and information sharing; offering a variety of intelligence services and products to customers; developing and adhering to a policies and procedures manual; defining expectations and performance measurement for determining effectiveness; establishing and maintaining the center based on funding availability and sustainability; and the development and implementation of a communications plan among personnel, officers, and the general public. The eighteen guidelines provided reflect those key concepts; the document includes eight appendices.

Washington, DC: DHS, 2023. 104p..

By Peter Manning

With the rise of surveillance technology in the last decade, police departments now have an array of sophisticated tools for tracking, monitoring, even predicting crime patterns. In particular crime mapping, a technique used by the police to monitor crime by the neighborhoods in their geographic regions, has become a regular and relied-upon feature of policing. Many claim that these technological developments played a role in the crime drop of the 1990s, and yet no study of these techniques and their relationship to everyday police work has been made available. Noted scholar Peter K. Manning spent six years observing three American police departments and two British constabularies in order to determine what effects these kinds of analytic tools have had on modern police management and practices. While modern technology allows the police to combat crime in sophisticated, detail-oriented ways, Manning discovers that police strategies and tactics have not been altogether transformed as perhaps would be expected. In The Technology of Policing, Manning untangles the varying kinds of complex crime-control rhetoric that underlie much of today's police department discussion and management, and provides valuable insight into which are the most effective—and which may be harmful--in successfully tracking criminal behavior.

New York: New York University Press, 2011. 338p.