By Tzipporah P. Dang , Bradley D. Mattan , Denise M. Barth , Grace Handley, Jasmin Cloutier, Jennifer T. Kubota

From social media to courts of law, recordings of interracial police officer-civilian interactions are now widespread and publicly available. People may be motivated to preferentially understand the dynamics of these interactions when they perceive injustice towards those whose communities experience disproportionate policing relative to others (e.g., non-White racial/ethnic groups). To explore these questions, two studies were conducted (study 1 neuroimaging n = 69 and study 2 behavioral n = 58). The fMRI study examined White participants’ neural activity when viewing real-world videos with varying degrees of aggression or conflict of White officers arresting a Black or White civilian. Activity in brain regions supporting social cognition was greater when viewing Black (vs. White) civilians involved in more aggressive police encounters. Additionally, although an independent sample of perceivers rated videos featuring Black and White civilians as similar in overall levels of aggression when civilian race was obscured, participants in the fMRI study (where race was not obscured) rated officers as more aggressive and their use of force as less legitimate when the civilian was Black. In study 2, participants who had not viewed the videos also reported that they believe police are generally more unjustly aggressive towards Black compared with White civilians. These findings inform our understanding of how perceptions of conflict with the potential for injustice shape social cognitive engagement when viewing arrests of Black and White individuals by White police officers.

NeuroImage, Volume 255, 15 July 2022, 119153

By National Police Chiefs’ Council (UK)

This Review was established to ‘identify ways in which forces across England and Wales can be more productive, improving outcomes’1 . In the three fnancial years to March 2023, Government funded the recruitment of an additional 20,000 police ofcers. This – together with additional resources provided by precept - is a considerable investment into policing. As new recruits build up experience and capabilities, we would expect to see its impact in terms of public safety. Compared to 2007, ofcer numbers have increased seven per cent whilst the population has increased by about 12 per cent (and with it, demand). However, like-for-like comparisons are not necessarily helpful: technology for example should have made police forces more productive since then. But to a large extent we have found that if the uplift has helped fll the most urgent capacity gaps (and improve performance), it has not taken away the need to prioritise and task resources effectively. A productivity drive is as necessary now as it was in the years of officer reduction. An environment of budget pressures suggests difficult choices ahead for public sector investment. Public agencies will need to evidence, more than ever, that they are providing value for money and becoming more productive. Pouring additional resources into a service might create more outputs but it does not per se increase productivity if these resources are not used wisely. Neither do officer numbers guarantee reduced crime2. Effective resource allocation is essential to deliver the greatest gains. Coordinated planning and multi-agency collaboration are vital to maximise the chances of better public outcomes. In this context, as a prerequisite to further investment demands and to strengthening public legitimacy, it is imperative that the policing sector is able to demonstrate how it is making best use of its resources and what direct benefits its activity delivers to the public. THE OPERATING LANDSCAPE OF POLICING IS SHIFTING Policing demand has changed. Since the mid-1990s, there have been long-term falls in overall crime levels but since 2014, offences have risen again (while still 20 per cent below their 2002/03 level). New technologies have created new criminal opportunities: the Office for National Statistics (ONS) reports 3.8 million fraud offences and cyber-enabled, or cyber-dependent crimes, and even across “traditional” crimes, the Metropolitan Police Service assesses that two ffths of robberies and 70 percent of theft are for mobile phones. Technological advances can also give rise to investigative opportunities, and policing productivity (and its perceived effectiveness in using technology) can act as a deterrent to criminality. Some patterns of crime are less easy to read. Violent offences recorded by police increased, but the Crime Survey for England and Wales suggests a decrease. Recorded sexual offences have markedly increased . More victims are fnding the courage to come forward and report crimes such as rape, domestic abuse and the sexual exploitation of children. The recognition of vulnerability in victimisation has become a powerful element shaping policing since the death of Fiona Pilkington and her daughter in 2007. Because of these changes, policing today requires a very different skillset. In 2003, armed with a knowledge of three crime types (burglary, theft and criminal damage), a constable knew how to approach 80 per cent of the demand coming their way. In 2023, in order to manage the same proportion of their work, this constable has to be competent across six disparate and wider categories of crime: theft, fraud (including online), violence with injury, stalking and harassment, public order and violence without injury. Non crime demand on officers equally broadened in scope during that time.

London: Home Office, 2023., 85p.

The Police Foundations report contains 56 recommendations regarding how the structure, skill sets, and training of the police service in England and Wales should change to meet today’s challenges.

Under the direction of The Independent Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, the report lays out a long-term strategic direction for the police service so that it will be capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. Announcing the final report at an event in London, Sir Michael Barber, Chair of the Review, said, “Policing in this country is at a crossroads, and it cannot stand still whilst the world changes so quickly around it. Now is the moment to move forward quickly on the path of reform.”

The report calls for:

• Increasing trust between the police and the public

• Equipping to take on new forms of crime through a complete overhaul of training systems

• Changing the police service’s existing organization, adding special agencies dedicated to cybercrime, cross-border crime, and police modernization

London: Strategic Review of Policing in england and Wales, Police Foundation, 2022. 196p.

By Susan Olzak

An underlying premise of democratic politics is that protest can be an effective form of civic engagement that shapes policy changes desired by marginalized groups. But it is not certain that this premise holds up under scrutiny. This paper presents a three-part argument that protest (a) signals the salience of a movements’ focal issue and expands awareness that an issue is a social problem requiring a solution, (b) empowers residents in disadvantaged communities and raises a sense of community cohesion, which together (c) raise costs and exert pressure on elites to make concessions. The empirical analysis examines the likelihood that a city will establish a Civilian Review Board (CRB). It then compares the effects of protest and CRB presence on counts of officer-involved fatalities by race and ethnicity. Two main conjectures about the effect of protest are supported: Cities with more protest against police brutality are significantly more likely to establish a CRB, and protest against police brutality reduces officer-involved fatalities for African Americans and Latinos (but not for Whites). But the establishment of CRBs does not reduce fatalities, as some have hoped. Nonetheless, mobilizing against police brutality matters, even in the absence of civilian review boards.

American Sociological Review. 86(6): 2021.

By Jesse Jannetta, Sino Esthappan, Jocelyn Fontaine, Mathew Lynch , and Nancy G. LaVigne

Many communities throughout the United States that face high levels of crime and concentrated disadvantage—particularly communities of color—also struggle with high levels of mistrust in the police and strained police-community relations. Recognizing that a lack of legitimacy and community trust in policing was a serious and persistent problem with deep historical roots, and that addressing that problem required a wellresourced, multidimensional approach combining proven practices with new tools and approaches, the US Department of Justice launched the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice. Led by John Jay College of Criminal Justice’s National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC), and in partnership with the Center for Policing Equity (CPE), Yale Law School (YLS), and the Urban Institute, the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice (National Initiative) brought together practitioners and researchers to deliver a suite of interventions focused on law enforcement and community members in six cities: Birmingham, Alabama; Fort Worth, Texas; Gary, Indiana; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Stockton, California. Core National Initiative interventions included (1) training and technical assistance for police officers on engaging with residents in a procedurally just manner, (2) trainings that encouraged officers to understand and mitigate implicit biases, (3) developing model police department policies and identifying key changes to extant policies, and (4) reconciliation discussions, during which police officers and community members had authentic conversations to acknowledge historic tensions, harms, and misconceptions and to repair relationships. The Urban Institute evaluated the National Initiative’s implementation and impact to inform potential replications and/or modifications of the initiative’s components, and to guide future research on police efforts to build community trust. The evaluation focuses on National Initiative activities occurring from January 2015 through December 2018. Researchers collected the following qualitative and quantitative data to support the evaluation: ◼ monthly teleconferences among members of the National Initiative implementation team that included partners from CPE, NNSC, and YLS ◼ publicly available information and media coverage of the National Initiative and issues pertaining to police-community relations in the pilot sites ◼ fieldwork that included observations of National Initiative activities and interactions between National Initiative partners and site stakeholders ◼ routine teleconferences with site coordinators, police chiefs, and other stakeholders ◼ documents provided by the sites and National Initiative partners ◼ semistructured interviews with police and community stakeholders in each site ◼ learning assessment surveys of officers receiving National Initiative trainings in each site ◼ surveys of residents in areas with high levels of concentrated crime and poverty/disadvantage in each site The implementation evaluation focused specifically on the successes and challenges of the collaboration among the National Initiative partners, participating police departments, and communities.

Washington, Urban Institute, 2019. 112p.

By Andy Higgins and Ruth Halkon

Public support and approval sit at the heart of the British policing model and are critical dependencies for effective policing. Although citizen attitudes have slipped out of formal policy focus over the last decade, a complex combination of factors – most obviously the recent set of misconduct scandals and cultural failings exposed within the Metropolitan Police in particular – have pulled questions of trust, confidence, and police legitimacy back into the spotlight. The first data to emerge from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) following its hiatus during Covid, confirms a consistent deterioration in public sentiment towards the police, which has begun to spread into more ‘relational’ dimensions (of fairness and respectfulness), not just appraisals of service quality. The downturn in London is particularly stark. These conditions and their causes require action from police leaders and policy makers, and a range of ‘issue based’ reform efforts, reviews and change programmes are underway. Additionally, however, the strategic-level questions these shifts pose, about the future working relationship between police and public, demand that concerted attention should also be given to contact – the way that citizens experience ‘everyday’ interactions with the police, across a variety of contexts, and the attitudinal traces these episodes leave behind. Personal contact is what citizens consistently say affects their trust and confidence in police, and its impact can ripple beyond those directly involved, through ‘vicarious’ transmission (e.g., reports from family and friends) and media (and social media) coverage. It also seems to be an aspect of service delivery amenable to policy and practice change, drawing on a well-established evidence-base about what is likely to be effective. But contact is also an area of considerable flux and disruption. Right across society, technology is precipitating radical shifts in the way citizens communicate with each other and interact with businesses, organisations, and government services. Online commerce and service provision, social media, videoconferencing, artificial intelligence (AI) powered chatbots, and advanced analytics are all contributing to a much more complex and plural contact environment. These developments are shifting public expectations and promise real benefits in terms of the speed, efficiency, convenience, and choice available to citizens in their everyday lives. The pace of change, however, is such that the wider social implications are difficult to comprehend. Policing, of course, is not immune to these shifts and technologically enabled developments such as in online crime reporting, self-service portals, social media engagement, Body-Worn Video, live chat and video-link responses are increasingly coming to augment and meditate the public experience of dealing with the police. At a strategic level, the service seems optimistic about the potential for these and future innovations to generate mission critical efficiencies, optimise effectiveness, enable the sector to keep pace with public expectations, and promote public trust and confidence – although the mechanisms through which the latter might occur remain largely under-theorised. This report begins to address the interconnections between those two trajectories: the deterioration in police/public relations (and associated imperatives on policing to halt and reverse this), and the technological transformation of police/public contact. More specifically, it asks: what are the implications, opportunities, and risks for public confidence (and related attitudes) arising from the introduction of new technology into police/public contact experiences? Our investigation proceeds in three parts: • First (in Section 2) we revisit and summarise what is already known about the way police/public contact impacts on public confidence (and related attitudes) from research conducted in more ‘analogue’ times and contexts. • Second (in Section 3) we ask: what evidence is emerging, what is promising and what can be hypothesised, about how various forms of technology might impact on public experiences of contact, and the lasting impressions these leave behind? We present six promising mechanisms and one pressing risk. • Third (in Section 4) we conclude by considering the strategic implications for policing and present eight recommendations. Our analysis is informed by a literature review, analysis of survey data collected by the London Mayor’s Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC), a survey of police contact management and community engagement leads, a roundtable discussion, and interviews and discussions with relevant experts and stakeholders.

London: Police Foundation, 2023. 57p.

By Dermot S. Barr

This thesis explores the intergroup dynamics during the development of rioting at two sites in Greater Manchester in 2011, Pendleton, in Salford, and Manchester city centre. The primary theoretical contribution of this thesis is to the Elaborated Social Identity Model of the development of conflict (ESIM, Drury & Reicher 2000). Through detailed analysis of how the intergroup dynamics informed the development of the two riots, and participants’ subjective experiences, the thesis confirms and extends the ESIM understandings of the social psychological processes involved in escalating intergroup conflict.

Manchester, UK: University of Manchester, 2018. 420p

By Fernando G. Cafferata. and Carlos Scartascini

Crime is a major problem in Latin America and the Caribbean. With 9 percent of the world's population, the region accounts for 33 percent of global homicides. Using new, extensive survey data, we endeavor to identify what anti-crime policies citizens in the region demand from their governments. We also analyze who is demanding what and why. We find that harsher penalties appear to be the preferred weapon in the anti-crime arsenal but people are willing to spend public moneys not only for punishment, but also for anti-poverty and detection policies. Citizens recognize that allocating resources to the police is better than subsidizing private security for citizens. Nevertheless, most oppose raising taxes to fund the police, a reluctance that might stem from mistrust in governments' ability to manage these resources. Mistrust, misinformation, and impatience combine to create flawed anti-crime policy. Educating citizens both about crime and about the fiscal consequences of their policy preferences may help move the region's public opinion toward a better policy equilibrium. Governments should also invest in their capability to design and deliver evidence-based solutions for fighting crime, and work to increase trust levels among citizens.

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2021. 68p.