By Grant Duwe

Key Points

• Programming dosage should be calibrated to risk, with higher-risk prisoners receiving longer, more intensive interventions.

• As program participation increases, recidivism generally decreases. Recidivism outcomes are significantly better when prisoners participate in multiple interventions or spend much of their imprisonment in programming.

• Back-loading programming closer to release from prison has been associated with better recidivism outcomes.

• Program sequencing may be effective for those who participate in multiple interventions.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 6p.

By Marke Geisy da Silva Dantas, Luciano Menezes Bezerra Sampaio, Thadeu Gasparetto

Background: The violent behavior of football fans is constantly associated with their drinking habits. Aiming to reduce its impact, policy makers often ban the sales and consumption of alcohol beverages during matches. Nonetheless, there are few papers that empirically analyzed such relationship, and our paper aims to shed light on this question. Methods: Out dataset comprises 4,560 matches from the first and second tiers of the Brazilian League, where 245 exhibited at least one antisocial behavior from fans. Ordered logistic regressions are used as method. Results: Our empirical findings evidence that the sales of alcoholic drinks do increase the likelihood of severe antisocial behavior. We also observed a higher likelihood of violent cases when the home club loses its match as well as during crowded matches. Conclusions: We conclude that the change in the alcohol police in Brazil did show a significant association with the likelihood of antisocial behavior among football fans. However, since the magnitude of such effect is small, further research is needed to examine the potential benefits of this policy changes

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 123, January 2024, 10427

By Robert Doar

“Given New York Today, Could Anyone Lead It?” So bemoaned a 1991 New York Times headline after decades of failure and futility.1 Crime was endemic, schools were failing, poverty was pervasive, and the economy had stagnated. From John Lindsay to David Dinkins, mayor after mayor had tried to tackle these problems. They had all failed. After three decades of policy futility, New Yorkers were giving up. In 1991, surveys indicated that more than half of New Yorkers wanted to leave.2 Political leadership had come to regard the city’s ills as intractable pathologies. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then New York senator, said at one public hearing on juvenile violence in 1993, “There is nothing you’ll do of any consequence, except start the process of change. Don’t expect it to take less than thirty years.”

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2023. 10p.

By W. Bradford Wilcox | Rafael A. Mangual | Seth Cannon | Joseph E. Price

The debate about how best to respond to urban crime—a debate that has become more important in light of recent increases in violent crime and homicide in many cities across America—has tended to focus on two perspectives. The first prioritizes tackling the “social structural factors” (unemployment, economic inequality, poverty, etc.) that are thought to be the “root causes” of crime, and violent crime, in particular. A second perspective rejects this structural approach in favor of a strategy that relies on traditional law-enforcement institutions (namely, police, prosecutors, and jails/prisons), often citing the sharp violent crime declines of the 1990s and 2000s that occurred in the wake of new policing and prosecutorial approaches—even in the face of structural realities said to be at the root of the urban crime problem.

But a third perspective seeks to understand how the fragile state of core social institutions—schools, churches, youth sports leagues, and, above all, families—in too many of our cities may also have a hand in urban crime. Princeton sociologist Patrick Sharkey, for instance, has argued that nonprofits “focused on reducing violence and building stronger communities” are linked to lower rates of violent crime in cities across the country. In a new Institute for Family Studies report, we turn our attention to the core institution of family. Drawing on the work of scholars like Harvard sociologist Robert Sampson—who found that “(f)amily structure is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, predictors of … urban violence across cities in the United States”—we explore the relationship between family structure and urban crime in the 21st century. Specifically, we address this question: How is family structure associated with crime, violent crime, and homicide rates in American cities—and with these outcomes in Chicago neighborhoods?

We find that cities are safer when two-parent families are dominant and more crime-ridden when family instability is common. The same story applies to the neighborhoods of Chicago. More specifically, we find the total crime rate is about 48% higher in cities that have above the median share of single-parent families, compared to cities that have fewer single-parent families. That difference is even larger with respect to violent crime and homicide, specifically, with cities above the median level of single parenthood experiencing 118% higher rates of violent crime and 255% higher rates of homicide. In the Windy City, relying on an analysis of census tract level data, our research indicates that neighborhoods above the median fraction of single-parent-headed households experienced 137% higher total crime rates, 226% higher violent crime rates, and 436% higher homicide rates.

When controlling for additional factors such as racial composition, poverty rates, and educational attainment levels, we find that the association between family structure and total crime rates, as well as violent crime rates, in cities across the United States remains statistically significant. However, the association between family structure and homicide in cities does not. In Chicago, the links between family structure and both violent crime and homicide rates at the neighborhood level were significant, net of controls, but not the total crime rate. In addition to the question of whether there exists a statistical relationship between family structure and crime—a question we generally answer in the affirmative—this study also offers possible answers to the question of what might explain the relationships between family instability and crime.

Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of social science research, we theorize that this relationship is likely a byproduct of some mix of the heightened risk of family instability in the socialization of young children and the role that father absence plays in providing less guidance and oversight for adolescent and young adult males.

Particularly in light of the pre-existing literature on the role of family structure in various life outcomes, these findings may have important implications for policymakers. They suggest the need to encourage more young Americans—particularly those living in vulnerable neighborhoods with both high rates of violence and out-of-wedlock childbearing—toward forming strong and stable families in marriage.

Washington, DC: Institute for Family Studies, 2023. 21p.

By: Atheendar S. Venkataramani, MD, PhD; Elizabeth F. Bair, MS; Jacob Bor, Sc; et al

Importance: Racial disparities in sleep health may mediate the broader health outcomes of structural racism.

Objective: To assess changes in sleep duration in the Black population after officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, a cardinal manifestation of structural racism.

Design, Setting, and Participants: Two distinct difference-in-differences analyses examined the changes in sleep duration for the US non-Hispanic Black (hereafter, Black) population before vs after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black people, using data from adult respondents in the US Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS; 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2018) and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS; 2013-2019) with data on officer-involved killings from the Mapping Police Violence database. Data analyses were conducted between September 24, 2021, and September 12, 2023.

Exposures: Occurrence of any police killing of an unarmed Black person in the state, county, or commuting zone of the survey respondent’s residence in each of the four 90-day periods prior to interview, or occurence of a highly public, nationally prominent police killing of an unarmed Black person anywhere in the US during the 90 days prior to interview.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Self-reported total sleep duration (hours), short sleep (<7 hours), and very short sleep (<6 hours).

Results: Data from 181 865 Black and 1 799 757 White respondents in the BRFSS and 9858 Black and 46 532 White respondents in the ATUS were analyzed. In the larger BRFSS, the majority of Black respondents were between the ages of 35 and 64 (99 014 [weighted 51.4%]), women (115 731 [weighted 54.1%]), and college educated (100 434 [weighted 52.3%]). Black respondents in the BRFSS reported short sleep duration at a rate of 45.9%, while White respondents reported it at a rate of 32.6%; for very short sleep, the corresponding values were 18.4% vs 10.4%, respectively. Statistically significant increases in the probability of short sleep and very short sleep were found among Black respondents when officers killed an unarmed Black person in their state of residence during the first two 90-day periods prior to interview. Magnitudes were larger in models using exposure to a nationally prominent police killing occurring anywhere in the US. Estimates were equivalent to 7% to 16% of the sample disparity between Black and White individuals in short sleep and 13% to 30% of the disparity in very short sleep.

Conclusions and Relevance: Sleep health among Black adults worsened after exposure to officer-involved killings of unarmed Black individuals. These empirical findings underscore the role of structural racism in shaping racial disparities in sleep health outcomes

JAMA Internat Medicine, online Feb. 2024.

By Matt Weidinger | Amy Simon

Key Points

• The nation’s unemployment benefits system, which was significantly expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic, suffered unprecedented losses to fraud and improper payments.

• Official—and still partial—estimates of improper payments approach $200 billion, while unofficial estimates suggest $400 billion or more may have been lost.

• There are multiple causes of these record improper payments, including historically large benefits, poor program design including eligibility self-certification in new programs, and degraded administrative systems without adequate defenses against various fraudulent schemes.

• State and federal policymakers should review the causes and consequences of these unprecedented losses and take specific steps, such as those outlined in this report, to both prevent a recurrence of the record taxpayer losses experienced during the pandemic and better establish a proactive anti-fraud posture for the unemployment insurance system.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 45p.

By Alex Brill | Scott Ganz

Recent data show a small decline in opioid-related mortality following a decade during which opioid-related mortality more than doubled to nearly 53,000 in 2018. However, the aggregate statistics mask important spatial and temporal trends in the data. This report estimates nationwide, regional, and county-level economic costs associated with the opioid crisis. The data show that, despite recent nationwide per capita opioid-related cost declines, the impact of the crisis continues to be felt across large swaths of the Northeast, Midwest, and South. We also find that opioid-related mortality tends to diffuse among nearby counties, with the local diffusion rate from illegal opioids—which are the primary cause in the current wave of the crisis—exceeding the rate from prescription opioids, which were the primary cause in earlier waves. The combination of lower aggregate mortality and faster diffusion among nearby counties points to a changed spatial distribution of economic costs as the opioid crisis evolves.

Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020.

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

• Under US federal law, weed, also known as “marijuana” or “cannabis,” remains a Schedule I illegal narcotic, in the same category as cocaine and heroin. Production and sale of weed are federal felonies punishable by severe prison terms.

• Individual US states, in conflict with federal law, began legalizing medical weed in 1996. However, in the past decade, the US Department of Justice has agreed not to enforce federal criminal weed laws against anyone who is following state laws.

• As of 2022, 33 percent of all Americans live in states with legal recreational sales of weed, 41 percent live in states with medical legalization but no legal recreational sale, and 26 percent live in states with total weed prohibitions.

• In its early years, legally produced and sold weed has struggled to capture market share. In most places where the sale and use of weed are now legal, illegal weed—unlicensed, unregulated, and untaxed—still has a dominant market share and shows no signs of fading away.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 7p.

By Daniel A. Sumner | Robin S. Goldstein

Key Points

• Cannabis containing more than 0.3 percent tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which the US government still calls “marijuana” but here we call “weed,” has been legalized by many state governments but is still illegal at the federal level.

• If a major goal of federal legalization is to help legal weed replace illegal weed, the best step forward for federal policy is simply to step out of the way. This would involve removing weed from the schedule of illegal narcotics, permitting states to implement cannabis policy as they see fit, and allowing cannabis to move among jurisdictions where it is legal.

• Forms of federal legalization that include more regulations and taxes on cannabis—including House and Senate bills that have been recently publicized—would almost surely do more harm than good, given the state and local policies already in place.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. 5p.

By Howard Husock

• The legalization of cannabis, rather than sidelining the black market, has fueled it, providing cover to illicit cannabis enterprises that often undercut the legal market on price and accessibility.

• State policies, such as high or complex cannabis taxes, scant issuance of licenses for legal operation, and widespread local “opt-outs,” play a key role in keeping the legal market from outcompeting illegal alternatives.

• The treatment of alcohol and cigarettes may be better models: States should allow legal retail to proliferate to minimize the advantages illicit operators now enjoy.

• At the same time, as with tobacco, public health authorities should mount education campaigns to minimize marijuana use, in light of its demonstrated dangers.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 1113p.

By Micere Keels

There is increasing pressure for the juvenile criminal legal system to address trauma; this is in response to advances in the science of trauma and adversity, evidence from interventions showing promising outcomes for juveniles coping with trauma, and development of systemic frameworks for providing trauma-informed care. This review details how exposure to potentially traumatic events can create primary, secondary, and tertiary effects that are relevant to how the criminal legal system engages with juveniles coping with trauma. Associations that could be dismissed on methodological challenges can no longer be ignored as an increasingly sophisticated body of prospective studies replicate previous cross-sectional and retrospective studies, which found a higher prevalence of trauma among system-involved juveniles and show that exposure to potentially traumatic events and trauma symptoms play causal roles in engaging in behaviors that can be classified as criminal offending. Additionally, several examples are used to illustrate how racialized exposure to systemic trauma across generations underlies racialized disparities in persistent criminal offending—over exposure to potentially traumatic events and underexposure to coping resources. A broad range of developmental and criminological research is drawn upon to provide frameworks for implementing trauma-informed care as a systemic intervention aimed at minimizing retraumatization and using every interaction that juveniles have with the criminal legal system to contribute to recovery and prevent recidivism.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 329 - 355

By Rachel E. Barkow and Mark Osler

The federal government and most American states provide for some form of clemency that allows the president or the governor to reduce a sentence or pardon a conviction. Although most US presidents and some governors have made great use of this power in the past, it has long been in decline. Diagnosing the reasons for this decline proves easier than providing solutions to reinvigorate this practice. A great deal of scholarship explores the causes and offers solutions, and this review catalogs the main lines of argument. It also explains why clemency's renewal remains urgent, even in regimes dedicated to the rule of law, to serve the best purposes of punishment and check the excesses of criminal law and punishment that are inevitable given the political process and enforcement practices.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 311 - 327

By United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

The exponential growth of the sports business market, extensive media coverage and the global growth of real-time online betting have created an environment in which many individuals and organizations have a direct or indirect financial interest in the course or the outcome of sports competitions. Such an environment can incentives those seeking to exploit sport for illicit gain. The nature of competition manipulation involves criminal acts that are not unique to sport, including fraud and money-laundering as well as the involvement of organized crime. It is viewed as an attractive area to infiltrate because of the opportunity to make large profits with limited risk of detection and sanction as a result of a lack or non-uniformity of laws and regulations around the world.

The implication is that sports organizations cannot deal with this issue on their own and cooperation with law enforcement agencies and criminal justice authorities can only strengthen the fight against competition manipulation. Sport organizations only have the power to take disciplinary measures, while criminal justice authorities and law enforcement agencies have a wider range of measures at their disposal. Because of the complex and transnational nature of competition manipulation, the investigation of offenses can be challenging for a wide range of stakeholders and jurisdictions. Effective and timely investigations play a crucial role in prevention strategies. At the same time, the failure to investigate or ineffective investigations can embolden would-be offenders.

At the national, regional and international levels, there is growing recognition that more needs to be done to tackle these threats effectively, including the allocation of more resources. This has been highlighted at the international level, including by the Conference of the States Parties (the main policymaking body of the United Nations Convention against Corruption), the General Assembly and the Group of 20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, and by the entry into force on 1 September 2019 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, the only legally binding international instrument solely dealing with the issue of competition manipulation.

Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 71p.

By Piotr Bakowski

Corruption is a major challenge for the European Union (EU), with all its Member States affected by the problem to some extent. Its scale, however, is difficult to measure both in Europe and elsewhere. Surveys on the perception of corruption among citizens and experts – such as the Global Corruption Barometer and Eurobarometer surveys – are the principal measurement tool. Since the 1990s, countries around the world have joined efforts to address corruption collectively. This has led to the emergence of widely recognised international laws and standards, adopted in particular by the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations. Mechanisms, such as the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), have been developed to monitor implementation of these rules. The EU has gradually adopted laws addressing a range of corruption-related issues. These include a Directive on the Fight against Fraud to the Union's Financial Interests, as well as directives on public procurement, whistleblowers and money-laundering. However, the legal framework thus created remains patchy, the lack of minimum rules on the definition of criminal offense and sanctions in the area of corruption being one important missing element. The EU has also developed its own tool for monitoring anti-corruption efforts – the EU anti-corruption report – only to abandon it after having issued its first edition. Recently, corruption-related issues have been addressed almost exclusively within the EU rule of law framework, a development criticised by various stakeholders, including the European Parliament. The latter has adopted numerous resolutions on corruption addressing, among other things, the impact of COVID 19, as well as systemic challenges to rule of law and deficiencies in the EU's fight against corruption. This briefing updates an earlier one published in 2022, which built on a study by 00 and Sofija Voronova, published in 2017.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2023. 11p.

By Bradley Sauve, Jessica Woodley, Natalie J. Jones, & Seena Akhtari

This literature review provides a comprehensive summary of methods commonly used to prevent corruption in both the private and public sectors and where possible, provides insight on which preventative methods have empirical value and demonstrated effectiveness.

Several key findings were identified, including:

·  Four main approaches to preventing corruption are highlighted. Namely, these include: 1) value-based approaches; 2) compliance-based approaches; 3) risk management approaches; and, 4) awareness and participation-based approaches. Within these four approaches, 18 specific corruption prevention methods are examined and assessed;

·     Findings demonstrate wide variability in the empirical effectiveness of existing prevention methods;

·     Findings demonstrate: 1) the tone at the top principle 2) ethics training programs; 3) top-down auditing; 4) merit-based recruitment; 5) E-government; and, 6) freedom of the press all show signs of empirical effectiveness;

·     The literature demonstrates mixed results regarding: 1) intrinsic motivations; 2) extrinsic motivations; 3) bottom-up monitoring; 4) public awareness campaigns; and, 5) freedom of information laws;

·     The four-eyes principle was the only method found to be effective, with the remaining methods lacking sufficient evidence to support their use; and

·     Analysis of the finding points towards the conclusion that organizations should seek to develop compliance programs and anti-corruption strategies that: 1) involve multiple evidence-based methods; 2) tailor prevention methods to meet the specific needs and context of the organization.

 Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2023. 63p.

By Luca Maiotti and Rashad Abelson

This booklet provides practical answers to frequently asked questions relating to how companies can identify, prevent, mitigate and report on risks of contributing to bribery and corruption through their mineral sourcing. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“the Minerals Guidance”) provides due diligence recommendations on how all companies along mineral supply chains, from the miner to the final product manufacturer, should combat bribery and corruption linked to minerals production and trade (OECD, 2016a). The following FAQs do not represent new or additional guidance but aim to explain in simple terms the recommendations already set out in the Minerals Guidance and other OECD standards and best practice. Note, this booklet does not aspire to be an exhaustive stocktaking of all corruption issues and possible mitigation responses. This booklet provides practical answers to frequently asked questions relating to how companies can identify, prevent, mitigate and report on risks of contributing to bribery and corruption through their mineral sourcing. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“the Minerals Guidance”) provides due diligence recommendations on how all companies along mineral supply chains, from the miner to the final product manufacturer, should combat bribery and corruption linked to minerals production and trade (OECD, 2016a). The following FAQs do not represent new or additional guidance but aim to explain in simple terms the recommendations already set out in the Minerals Guidance and other OECD standards and best practice. Note, this booklet does not aspire to be an exhaustive stocktaking of all corruption issues and possible mitigation responses. 

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , OECD,  2021. 32p

By Ylenia Rocchini and Bernardo Monzani, together with Kelly–Ange Irakoze

The “Tubiri Tuvurana Ubupfu” project’s main aim was to strengthen trust and positive relationships between youth and police to prevent violence before, during and after the 2020 electoral cycle. To this effect, the project set out to transform the relationship between the two groups by encouraging constructive and humanizing interactions, and also with other members of the community. The project intended, in particular, to harness the potential of mixed security committees. AP’s staff Ylenia Rocchini and Bernardo Monzani, together with Kelly–Ange Irakoze, conducted the final evaluation of the project. The evaluation confirms the effectiveness of the project, and identifies positive elements relating to its impact and sustainability. This said, there are two challenges worth highlighting. The first relates to the participation of police officers, which was different than that of young people, for reasons outside of Search’s control, but nonetheless significant for impact and sustainability. The second challenge relates to the participation of women. The project was not able to reach gender parity across several activities, primarily because the institutions it targeted, the mixed security committees and the police force, are male–dominated. Yet, more research should done to understand why women participate less on this front, to build a more gender–sensitive approach capable, if anything, at least to build the basis for greater inclusivity in future endeavours.

Bologna, Italy: Agency for Peacebuilding, 2022. 30p.  

By Simon A. Cole and Juan R. Sandoval

Police misconduct represents a profound societal issue with far-reaching consequences. Its detrimental effects encompass the discriminatory application of laws, harassment, physical violence and murder, corruption, wrongful arrests and wrongful convictions.1 These concerns are particularly pressing for underserved communities of color, where heightened levels of police contact and incarceration have effectively eroded the legitimacy of law enforcement.2 While police misconduct has been a long-standing concern, it has garnered heightened attention in recent years, primarily fueled by extensive media coverage of egregious acts of police violence, such as the killings of Michael Brown, George Floyd, and Tyre Nichols. An important recent concern about police violence has been the problem of “repeat offenders”— instances of police misconduct are not isolated events but rather involve particular officers who engage in misconduct repeatedly, with impunity. Discussion of this issue has focused on two key aspects: first, the existence of officers with extensive histories of misconduct that are often concealed from criminal defendants, judges, reporters, and the public; and second, the phenomenon of the “wandering officer” who commits misconduct in a particular department, is fired or leaves that police force, and then is hired by another police department in a different jurisdiction, where stakeholders are unaware of that officer’s history.3 The first issue came to light when it was revealed that in certain jurisdictions, including Los Angeles County and Baltimore, prosecutors maintained undisclosed “do not call” lists of police officers who should not be presented as witnesses in criminal trials due to their known histories of misconduct, perjury, or both. 4 The second problem came to light through the exposure of several infamous cases in which police officers effectively erased records of serious misconduct, secured  more widely accessible to stakeholders. This type of information has historically enjoyed legal protection, making it challenging for the public to access in numerous states.6 Notable disclosure efforts include the Invisible Institute’s publication of Chicago police misconduct data on a dedicated website, 7 and the New York Legal Aid Society's creation of a mobile device “app” designed for recording and accessing public information about individual police officers, which subsequently gained national traction through the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.8 Finally, there have been persistent lobbying efforts aimed at persuading legislators to increase the transparency of information related to police misconduct for the general public. In California, these lobbying efforts have succeeded. In 2019, the legislature enacted new laws transforming the state from one that “without question, had the worst laws governing the disclosure of adjudicated findings of police misconduct” to one with “some of the strongest transparency laws” in the U.S.9 A consortium of stakeholders, including academic institutions, civil rights organizations, journalists, public defenders, and innocence organizations (including the National Registry of Exonerations), has formed the California Law Enforcement Accountability Network (CLEAN) to coordinate efforts of gathering, archiving, analyzing, and making public this newly accessible data.10 This report seeks to support these initiatives by exploring possible uses of information from the National Registry of Exonerations. This online publicly accessible archive contains data and narratives about all known exoneration cases in United States history. Police misconduct is important to the Registry because it is widely recognized as one of the key contributors to wrongful convictions in the United States. Police misconduct contributed to 43% of the wrongful convictions that resulted in exonerations since 1989.11 In addition, the Registry tracks clusters of exonerations through its Groups Registry. This includes exonerations centered around notorious rogue officers, such as former sheriff's deputy Tom Coleman in Tulia, Texas, former Sergeant Ronald Watts in Chicago, and Rafael Perez, the former Los Angeles Police detective at the heart of the Rampart scandal.   

 Ann Arbor: National Registry of Exonerations, 2023. 13p.

By The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller

The Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) is authorized to conduct audits, investigations, and reviews of Executive branch entities, including state and local police departments, to identify and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the expenditure of public funds. OSC initiated this investigation into Street Cop Training (Street Cop or the Company) after receiving information that public funds were spent to send New Jersey police officers to a six-day conference in October 2021 in Atlantic City that trained officers on questionable policing tactics and contained offensive and discriminatory content (the Conference). Street Cop is a New Jersey-based company. Around 990 law enforcement officers nationwide attended the Conference, with about 240 from New Jersey. The 240 New Jersey officers came from agencies across the state, working at all levels of government—interstate, state, county, and municipal. The majority of these officers had their attendance paid for by their public employers. OSC’s investigation confirmed that at least $75,000 in public funds were directly spent by New Jersey entities on attendance at the Conference. This number does not include paid time off and/or paid training days relating to officers’ attendance. To conduct this investigation, OSC’s Police Accountability Project reviewed documents, videos, and other materials received from the Company, training centers, and various law enforcement agencies and departments with officers in attendance at the Conference, among other sources. OSC also consulted directives, regulations, policies, and case law, and conducted interviews of relevant witnesses. OSC also conducted a sworn interview with Street Cop’s founder and Chief Executive Officer, Dennis Benigno. OSC’s investigation uncovered alarming deficiencies in the police training provided at the Conference and a dangerous and potentially costly gap in the oversight of private post-academy police training. Currently, private post-academy police training in New Jersey is not regulated by the Attorney General, Police Training Commission (PTC), or any other designated entity. Among other things, OSC found: • Instructors at the Conference promoted the use of unconstitutional policing tactics for motor vehicle stops; • Some instructors glorified violence and an excessively militaristic or “warrior” approach to policing. Other presenters spoke disparagingly of the internal affairs process; promoted an “us vs. them” approach; and espoused views and tactics that would undermine almost a decade of police reform efforts in New Jersey, including those aimed at de-escalating civilian-police encounters, building trust with vulnerable populations, and increasing officers’ ability to understand, appreciate, and interact with New Jersey’s diverse population; and • The Conference included over 100 discriminatory and harassing remarks by speakers and instructors, with repeated references to speakers’ genitalia, lewd gestures, and demeaning quips about women and minorities. This kind of training comes at too high a price for New Jersey residents. The costs of attendance for training like this is small in comparison to the potential liability for lawsuits involving excessive force, unlawful searches and seizures, and harassment and discrimination. It is well-documented  that state and local entities in New Jersey spend millions of dollars litigating these types of allegations. Between 2012 and 2018, over 100 excessive force lawsuits were brought against officers and departments in New Jersey. 1 And in 2022, just one excessive force lawsuit cost a New Jersey county $10 million. 2 The costs of lawsuits alleging discrimination or harassment can be just as expensive. By one estimate, from 2019 to 2023, New Jersey police departments agreed to pay at least $87.8 million to resolve claims of misconduct by officers, and many of those claims involved harassing and discriminatory behaviors. 3 Of course, these quantifiable high dollar amounts do not include the immeasurable and hidden cost to the victims, their families, and their communities. Quality police training can play a crucial role in ensuring law enforcement is equipped with the knowledge, expertise, and experience to navigate complex and difficult situations safely. But training that encourages officers to employ techniques that violate civil liberties, disparage legitimate public safety initiatives, undermine police reform efforts, and promote a toxic culture in which women and racial and ethnic minorities are made to feel unwelcome — this is not training that should be paid for with New Jersey’s public money. In light of these findings, and because Street Cop and other private police training companies who receive public funds operate without oversight or regulation by the Attorney General, PTC, or any other designated organization, OSC makes nine recommendations. OSC is also making a number of referrals to appropriate agencies, including to the Attorney General, the Division on Civil Rights, and internal affairs departments for further investigation into OSC’s publicly reported findings, and into additional concerning conduct identified in OSC’s review of the Conference presentations. 

Trenton: New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, 2023. 43p.

By Tim Head

Serious Violence Reduction Orders (SVROs) are a new police stop and search power, being piloted by forces in England and Wales. Introduced under the controversial Police Crime Sentencing and Courts Act (2022), SVROs are part of a broader expansion of police powers and the rolling back of safeguards and avenues for police accountability. The Home Office itself has admitted that many of the potential harmful consequences of SVROs will likely fall on people of colour, on Black people in particular. In “Against SVROs”, we review the evidence around high-discretion police powers similar to SVROs, which overwhelmingly shows that they do not work to reduce serious violence. Contrary to the government's claim that SVROs will "break the cycle of offending”, we found that high-discretion police powers and behavioural orders push people, disproportionately people of colour, into the criminal justice system. These policing interventions are clearly evidenced to harm the mental and physical health of those targeted, while reproducing deep-seated racial discrimination in the use and abuse of police powers. 

London: Runnymede Trust, 2023. 43p.