By David Spencer

1. The Government should legislate to abolish, in its entirety, the recording of Non-Crime Hate Incidents by the police. Should the Government choose to retain the NCHI regime, they should issue an updated Code of Practice which leads to a substantial reduction in the number of NCHIs record – increasing ‘freedom of expression’ protections and reducing the distraction of police officers from their core mission of fighting crime. This should include no longer record any NCHIs which do not contain personal data.

2. The definitions used to meet the threshold for recording of NCHIs should be raised to genuinely meet the standard of ‘Hate’, rather than the current low standard which includes “unfriendliness” and “dislike”. The current standard for “hostility” grossly distorts the perception of the prevalence of genuine ‘Hate’ incidents.

3. The Home Office should collate and publish on an annual basis the number of NCHIs recorded per force (splitting out the number of NCHIs containing personal data and the number which do not contain personal data). This data should be published for the previous decade and in future years.

4. Should the Government choose not to abolish the NCHI regime, they should pass legislation to mandate police forces to follow the provisions of the NCHI Code of Practice.

5. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services should include compliance with the provisions of the NCHI Code of into NCHIs within their annual PEEL force inspection regime.

6. All police forces should be required to publish their full policies and procedures in relation to the recording of NCHIs – including making clear on their websites (and other public information systems) the difference between hate crimes and NCHIs.

7. The National Audit Office should examine the costs in their totality of the NCHI regime to provide a clear understanding of its impact on policing, national government and local government resources.

8. The Government should conduct and publish a rapid, standalone, review identifying how often the recording of NCHIs is: (a) genuinely leading to the prevention of crime and harm, given that this is the principal justification for the recording of NCHIs and (b) the level of distraction from the core mission of policing to prevent and detect crime.

9. The Government should review the current Policing Protocol relating to ‘Operational Independence’. The current expansive understanding adopted by many chief constables leads to police forces failing to properly take account of the views of both Police and Crime Commissioners and the Home Secretary – who are accountable to the public and Parliament for crime and policing. It must be made clear that the limits of ‘Operational Independence’ concern directly operational matters.

Policy Exchange, 2024. 38p.

By Tom Gash and Rick Muir

This discussion document aims to promote debate about the best ways to organise our national policing institutions, resources, and processes to support effective policing, reduce crime and promote safer communities. We hope to contribute to the development of options prior to the government publishing a white paper on police reform in the coming months. We believe that a big reform to the landscape could unlock major benefits in terms of police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.

The ideas and analysis in this document are based on the work of each of the authors at the interface of national and local policing over the past 15 or more years, the Police Foundation’s Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, and informal conversations with leaders across policing and home affairs policy. The work has not been commissioned by anybody. We have written it because we think reform could deliver significant improvements in the service the police provide to the public.

An earlier version of this paper was shared privately with those leading national policing institutions and considering police reform in December 2023. We are sincerely grateful for the insightful comments and feedback received from these leaders and from those we have shared drafts of this paper (please see acknowledgements).

We now welcome further feedback from readers and hope that the paper will stimulate debate and discussion as the government moves forward with its police reform agenda.

The case for change

There is a clear case for greater (and more coherent) national policing action

Much of policing today is as local a profession as it ever was. Robberies and violence in public spaces, hidden harms taking place in homes across the country, theft affecting local retailers, public reassurance and victim care all require a local policing response. These harms can all, to some extent, be controlled through local activity by the police and their public sector and community partners. Community confidence in policing is still mainly shaped by local experiences and direct contact. And it remains the case that trust in local institutions and services in the UK is often higher than in national ones.

There is no doubt, however, that effective policing also requires extensive national coordination and action. This need for national action is increasing due to:

• The growing role of digital technology, which has increased ‘remote’ and borderless criminality – for example in relation to fraud, online criminal exploitation, and computer misuse. Local forces alone are simply not able to tackle increasingly large volumes of internet enabled crime.

• The long-present but much underestimated role of national and increasingly multi-national companies in creating (or restricting) criminal opportunities - for example, vehicle manufacturers’ work on car security, or social media company identity management and reporting policies. To prevent crime in the 21st century the UK requires national relationships with global corporations.

• More extensive citizen exposure to national and global information on crime and policing, with public views of policing increasingly shaped by non-local events, social media comment and video footage.

• Changing public expectations for services, including expectations of consistency, partly drive by customer experiences elsewhere.

These factors are in addition to other long-standing reasons for national action, including:

• Efficiency: when police forces face common problems or opportunities, it will often be more efficient to design solutions once at a national level, rather than many times locally – though attention needs to be paid to ensuring national action will ‘work’ in local environments. As a positive example, Single Online Home is clearly assisting public contact – albeit with different levels and speed of uptake. However, in most cases, digital, data and technology investment is still determined entirely locally, resulting in multiple procurement processes and creating myriad local systems that struggle to share essential data.

• Effectiveness: There are clear effectiveness gains, for example, from national analysis and sharing of data: on crime patterns, and offenders, on ‘what works’ in tackling crime, and on how to organise policing resources to best effect (as the recent Home Office-sponsored Productivity Review demonstrated) - even though local contextual qualifiers will always need to be taken into account. In areas of specialist police work, there are benefits to be gained from concentrating expertise in ‘centres of excellence’ as opposed to dispersing it throughout the country. Indeed, the benefits of effectiveness in tackling serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism across a larger geographical scale are already reflected in the existence the National Crime Agency (NCA), the Counter Terrorism Command, and the network of regional organised crime units (ROCUs).

• Legitimacy: when the public expect (or need) a consistent response, it can be helpful to ensure this through national standards or action. Given that confidence in policing is clearly shaped by national (and even international) media and events, policing would often benefit from a single policing voice on key issues

Current approaches to national action are often ad hoc, undermining efficiency and effectiveness

In recognition of the need for national action, there have been several examples of recent national initiatives that have aimed to overcome the limitations or inefficiency of local-only solutions, including:

• Operation Talla, which drove a more coordinated and consistent Covid-19 policing response.

• The Police Uplift Programme, which supported the delivery of the 20,000 officer number increase and developed new pan-policing data sets that allow for more informed workforce planning.

• The National Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) strategy and Operation Soteria Bluestone, which is aiming to drive an improved policing response to rape and serious sexual offences.

• The Policing Productivity Review identified model processes that ought to be adopted by all forces where they can show there are more effective and efficient ways of doing things.

• New light-touch support from the College of Policing for forces in (or at risk of entering) HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) ‘Engaged’ status (policing’s equivalent of ‘special measures’).

• A very wide range of activities – ranging from research to guidance to ‘on-the-ground’ projects – led by Chairs of National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) Coordinating Committees (e.g. for Performance Management, or Prevention), often undertaken with minimal dedicated funding or resource ‘borrowed’ from the force of the Chair or Committee members.

Each initiative has been helpful to some extent. Yet it is striking that each such initiative is much like a business ‘start-up’. Funding streams are often ad hoc and insecure. There is no consistency of governance. Teams supporting initiatives are ‘stood up’ and ‘stood down’, meaning there is little scope for learning and continuously improving the model for driving local improvement through national work. In short, there is no standard operating model for national improvement or the running of many ongoing critical national policing capabilities – and each initiative has therefore not been able to operate with optimal efficiency and effectiveness. Matters are not helped by the wider recent trend towards one-year funding settlements.

Nowhere is this gap better demonstrated – or known – than in relation to police technology. The Home Office has set a clear direction of travel for policing: that the NPCC should eventually take over from the Home Office the commissioning and assurance of national technology programmes. However, models of funding, the approach to effective commissioning, the governance of the ever-expanding Police Digital Service (the envisaged main delivery body), and many other issues are still being worked through. Approaches are, again, being developed in isolation – creating a risk that the model created will again add complexity, and not interact neatly with linked areas such as digital forensics, procurement or service improvement initiatives.

In the arena of serious and organised crime, we are also currently building core national capabilities in different places. Fraud data is held separately from money laundering and cybercrime data. The serious and organised crime picture is being assembled in a different place to the counter-terrorism picture. There is a clear need to move over time to joint capabilities, so the system adds up to more than (not less than) the sum of its parts and scarce resource is used to the greatest effect across the system.

London: Police Foundation, 2024. 20p.

By: Gary Cordner and Elizabeth Biebel

Problem-oriented policing was first introduced in an article by Herman Goldstein in 1979. It was formally field-tested in the 1980s in Baltimore County (Cordner, 1986) and Newport News (Eck and Spelman, 1987), given a wider audience through an Atlantic Monthly magazine article in 1989 (Wilson and Kelling), and systematically described and explained in Goldstein's 1990 book. Today, it is widely regarded as the most analytical and intellectually challenging strategy in the police arsenal.

Questions linger, however, about the implementation and practicality of problem-oriented policing (POP). The SARA process (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) for carrying out POP is analytically and creatively demanding, as well as time-consuming. Some observers question whether police have the knowledge and skill to implement the SARA process properly. Police officers often question whether they have the time to do so.

The research reported here carefully examined problem-oriented policing in practice by ordinary police officers in one agency - the San Diego, California Police Department. The objective was to discover and describe the reality of everyday, street-level POP as practiced by generalist patrol officers. San Diego was chosen because of its reputation as a national leader in problem-oriented policing.

200518, 06/19/2003, 98-IJ-CX-0080

By Barry Friedman et al.

Recent events have brought to the fore longstanding concerns about the nature of policing in the United States and how it undermines racial equity. As an institution, policing needs significant reconsideration. It is time to rethink the structure and governance of policing. It is also time to engage in a deeper conversation about the meaning of public safety. In the meantime, however, the following is a list of urgently-needed reforms, compiled by a small group of law school faculty, each of whom runs or is associated with an academic center devoted to policing and the criminal justice system. The reforms are not intended as an entire agenda for what ought to happen around policing, or what American policing should look like. Rather, they offer immediate, concrete steps federal, state, and local governments can take to address enduring problems in policing. The authors are scholars who are also deeply involved in the daily practice of policing, and included among them are the Reporters for the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law: Policing, which works with advisers from across the ideological spectrum in drafting high-level principles to govern policing, though the recommendations here go beyond the scope of the ALI project.

New York: NYU School of Law Policing Project (June, 2020).18p.

By The Little Hoover Commission

The state should prioritize data collection and collaboration with research institutions as it seeks to understand and combat retail theft in the long term, the Little Hoover Commission concluded in a new report, Retail Theft: A Data Driven Response for California.

The report was prompted by a request from 66 members of the legislature to study issues surrounding retail theft. The report notes that since the Legislature and the voters are now considering changes to the penal code sections addressing retail theft, the Commission’s recommendations focus on long-term improvements in the way the state reports and assesses retail theft and law enforcement’s response.

In recent years, alarming videos showing brazen thefts of commercial property have circulated on social media, increasing public concern. Some businesses have cited theft as a reason for closing stores. These crimes also burden the criminal justice system, using limited resources that could be redirected toward more severe crimes.

Looking at available data, the Commission found that, despite a recent uptick, reported retail theft remains at roughly the same level as during the 2010s and lower than it was in earlier decades. Like many crimes, retail theft is undoubtedly underreported, but the report notes that by its nature, the level of underreporting is difficult to measure.

The Commission concluded that more detailed crime data is needed for policymakers to craft an evidence-based response. The Commission commended the Department of Justice for its existing data initiatives, and recommend they be expanded in consultation with experts. At a minimum, data should include information on crime statistics, demographics, law enforcement response times, prosecution and adjudication data, and rehabilitation, reentry, and recidivism data. In addition to data collection, the Commission recommended that the state partner with California universities and other nonpartisan research institutions to study preventative measures, rates of underreporting, economic impact, and drivers of public perception.

“Never was the aphorism, ‘You can’t manage what you don’t measure,’ more true than when discussing retail theft. We can’t fully comprehend the effects of retail theft, or address its causes, without detailed data. As it now stands, necessary data is missing,” said Commission Chair Pedro Nava. “There are many potential partners who can collaborate to remedy the information gap. Working with stakeholders, California can fund coordinated studies and data collection efforts to better understand the complexities of these crimes.”

“California has the opportunity to join efforts with some of the best researchers in the nation as it navigates the issue of retail theft,” said Vice Chair Anthony Cannella. “With a more complete picture of how retail theft is impacting the state, the Governor and Legislature can make evidence-based decisions on how to respond effectively.”

Sacramento: Little Hoover Commission, 2023/ 35p.

By: Kyle Hucke

The street-level violence prevention field includes a range of professionals fulfilling specific roles in various programs. This literature review focuses on violence interrupters as a specific type of outreach worker and the programs that utilize them. Violence interrupters embed themselves within specific areas of communities experiencing elevated levels of violence and mediate emerging conflicts between groups and/or individuals to interrupt the cycle of violence. This review describes the theoretical frameworks guiding the design of these programs, the role of violence interrupters, and program implementations. It also summarizes results from the research literature that evaluates these programs. The literature suggests that violence interrupters are successful at reaching the target population. The research on the effects of these programs on community violence shows that most experience initial success followed by challenges maintaining that success. Program instability from funding and employee turnover likely reduce the effectiveness of VI programs. The dangerous and stressful nature of the work and the relatively poor level of monetary compensation drives the high turnover of VIs. The high social and economic cost of violence suggests that VI programs “pay for themselves” by preventing violence. Overall, evidence suggests violence interrupters are a valuable part of the violence prevention field, but researchers, practitioners, and policymakers need to be aware of violence interrupters’ strengths, limitations, and the supports needed for them to work effectively.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority 2024. 42p.

By Illinois Crime Reduction Task Force

Background

To develop and propose policies and procedures aimed at reducing crime in Illinois, the Crime Reduction Task Force Act established the Crime Reduction Task Force (20 ILCS 3926/1-5). Task Force membership was statutorily mandated in the Crime Reduction Task Force Act. The Task Force was active from October 2022 through June 2024. Meetings were held virtually and were open to the public. Meeting content included:

• Testimony from subject matter experts.

• Input from community service providers.

• Reports and other documents submitted by Task Force members and other interested parties.

• Votes taken on submitted recommendations.

Recommendations

The approved recommendations are listed below.

• There should be a new legislation that mandates judges to order an abusive partner to complete a Partner Abuse Intervention Program (PAIP) when granting an Order of Protection for domestic violence in civil courts. This can help prevent domestic violence, and crime in general, because domestic violence offenders can pose a threat to a family as well as to the community. A PAIP focuses on power, control, and relationship dynamics. It helps people reflect on their relationship and take responsibility for one’s behavior.

• If the person fails to complete the PAIP, there should be a consequence, such as restrictions in child custody or supervised visitation of family members. Because taking a PAIP costs money and it lasts 26 weeks, there should be a financial support to complete a PAIP for low-income earners.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.. 2024. 52p.

By SHEYLA A. DELGADO, GINA MORENO, FIDEL OSORIO, RICHARD ESPINOBARROS, JEFFREY A. BUTTS JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER

Researchers at the John Jay College Research and Evaluation Center (JohnJayREC) investigated transit fare evasion in subway stations and station complexes throughout New York City between 2018 and 2023. The study was conducted as part of the New York City Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative Plan, overseen by the New York City Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ). The research team analyzed associations between fare evasion and arrests reported by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and considered the social and economic characteristics of the neighborhoods surrounding each transit station. The study found no statistically significant associations between fare evasion enforcements and total arrests for felonies and misdemeanors. Fare evasion enforcement, however, was most prevalent in stations whose neighborhoods were characterized by high socioeconomic disadvantage. The statistical interaction of crime rates, fare evasion enforcement, and socioeconomic disadvantage underscores the role of social factors in public safety.

New York: JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER, 2024. 15p.

By  Kate Bowers , Lisa Tompson and Shane D. Johnson

In many disciplines, there is a wealth of primary evaluation research on what works, and systematic reviews that synthesize that evidence. This is, of course, extremely positive. However, the sheer scale of the information and the way in which it is indexed and presented can mean that it is difficult for practitioners to locate the best available evidence. For this reason, in health, education, and other disciplines, using techniques from information science, researchers have systematically assembled databases such as those hosted on healthevidence.org and educationendowmentfoundation.org which bring together the most reliable evidence. Hitherto, no such database has existed for crime and criminal justice interventions. This article sets out some of the challenges and early findings of one exercise which aims to produce such a database, being completed as part of the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction initiative in collaboration with the College of Policing. 

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Volume 17, 2023

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Facial recognition technology is increasingly used for identity verification and identification, from aiding law enforcement investigations to identifying potential security threats at large venues. However, advances in this technology have outpaced laws and regulations, raising significant concerns related to equity, privacy, and civil liberties. This report explores the current capabilities, future possibilities, and necessary governance for facial recognition technology. Facial Recognition Technology discusses legal, societal, and ethical implications of the technology, and recommends ways that federal agencies and others developing and deploying the technology can mitigate potential harms and enact more comprehensive safeguards.

Washington, DC: Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 120p.

By Luca Maiotti and Rashad Abelson

This booklet provides practical answers to frequently asked questions relating to how companies can identify, prevent, mitigate and report on risks of contributing to bribery and corruption through their mineral sourcing. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“the Minerals Guidance”) provides due diligence recommendations on how all companies along mineral supply chains, from the miner to the final product manufacturer, should combat bribery and corruption linked to minerals production and trade (OECD, 2016a). The following FAQs do not represent new or additional guidance but aim to explain in simple terms the recommendations already set out in the Minerals Guidance and other OECD standards and best practice. Note, this booklet does not aspire to be an exhaustive stocktaking of all corruption issues and possible mitigation responses. This booklet provides practical answers to frequently asked questions relating to how companies can identify, prevent, mitigate and report on risks of contributing to bribery and corruption through their mineral sourcing. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“the Minerals Guidance”) provides due diligence recommendations on how all companies along mineral supply chains, from the miner to the final product manufacturer, should combat bribery and corruption linked to minerals production and trade (OECD, 2016a). The following FAQs do not represent new or additional guidance but aim to explain in simple terms the recommendations already set out in the Minerals Guidance and other OECD standards and best practice. Note, this booklet does not aspire to be an exhaustive stocktaking of all corruption issues and possible mitigation responses. 

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , OECD,  2021. 32p

By Max Schanzenbach

Police misconduct is at the top of the public policy agenda, but there is surprisingly little understanding of how police personnel management policies affect police misconduct. Police-civilian interactions in large jurisdictions are, in principle at least, highly regulated. But these regulations are at least partially counteracted by union contracts and civil service regulations that constrain discipline and other personnel decisions, thereby limiting a city’s ability to manage its police force. This Essay analyzes police personnel management by bringing forth evidence from a variety of data sources on police personnel practices as well as integrating an existing, but relatively siloed, literature on police misconduct. The empirical findings that emerge are as follows: (1) policing is a surprisingly secure, well-paid job with little turnover prior to retirement age; (2) inexperienced police officers are, all else equal, more likely to commit misconduct and, at the same time, more likely to receive high risk assignments; and (3) bad cops are a serious problem, are identifiable, and are rarely removed or disciplined. Taken together, these facts suggest that attempts to regulate police conduct directly or through civil rights litigation are impeded by the inability of those who supervise police to control individual officers through assignments, discipline, and removal. The nexus of compensation, seniority, promotion, discipline, and pension policies that characterize much police personnel management cannot be rationalized under traditional labor and employment contract analysis. Existing compensation  and pension policies could be rationalized, however, if supervisors were empowered to manage police through assignments, penalties, and promotion.

Chicago: Vanderbilt Law Review, 2022, 49p.