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Posts tagged risk assessment
Mitigation and Risk in Restorative Justice

By Joanna Shapland, Jamie Buchan, Steve Kirkwood and Estelle Zinsstag

This report summarises key findings from our project which was funded by the Scottish Government, in support of the Scottish Government’s Restorative Justice Action Plan (Scottish Government 2019). In particular, we seek to support the expansion of restorative justice in Scotland to include its use in response to more serious offending and more difficult cases.

Our objectives were to develop a sense of what factors were perceived by facilitators as risky in any restorative justice process, how they assessed risks, and what measures have been used to prevent and mitigate these risks, with a view to informing the development of practice and policy in Scotland. By ‘risk’ we mean not (just) risks to safety but any factors that might jeopardise the success of the process, i.e. the participants being able to communicate safely. To this end, we interviewed 30 restorative justice facilitators in 11 European jurisdictions. The extent to which restorative justice was ‘established’, and how it was organised, varied considerably between these. Our questions roughly followed the timeline of a restorative justice process: we began by talking about the referral process and how facilitators decide to move forward (or not), before considering facilitators’ definitions of ‘risk’, approaches to assessment, and measures they used to mitigate specific risks in restorative justice. Finally, we asked them about their training and measures for capacity building, including co-facilitation, mentoring and reflective practice.

Key Findings

  • The restorative justice risks described by our interviewees attach to individual people and cases. Some cases are risky, but this is because of individual factors, not because of the type of case or person. This is essentially different to the actuarial/statistical mode of risk assessment found in many criminal justice settings.

  • It is impossible to predict the risks of a case before engaging with the individuals involved, because different people experience ‘risk’ factors in very different ways. Furthermore, the seriousness of the harm in a given case may not tally with the legal categories imposed on it by the criminal justice system.

  • Aside from unwillingness to engage or attempts to coerce others on the part of either party, only two types of risk were seen as ruling out restorative justice entirely: where the person responsible is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the harm (which does not necessarily entail admitting criminal guilt), and where either party is unable to comprehend the proceedings, usually because of substance use or severe mental disorder. Even these may be amenable to change over time. 

  • Most facilitators agreed that certain difficult cases, particularly those involving sexual offending and domestic/intimate partner abuse, presented particular challenges related to trauma and power imbalance. There was no sense however of them being qualitatively different to other cases in terms of how they were approached from a practice perspective - they just require additional care and preparation.

  • Capacity to facilitate more challenging cases comes with experience. In Scotland, many facilitators are less experienced with these types of case, so are more concerned about risk and their capacity to facilitate these; facilitators in other jurisdictions with experience around facilitating in cases involving more severe harm are much more confident taking on more difficult cases. 

  • Facilitators rarely used formal risk assessment processes, and none appeared to use, or have, validated risk assessment tools in relation to restorative justice, although some may use informal ‘checklists’ of factors. Professional judgment and a case-by-case approach, sometimes with advice and support from other professionals, was the key element in assessing and mitigating risks. Given this, and the individual nature of ‘risk’, it was usual to consider risks and mitigating measures simultaneously, not sequentially. In assessing risk, they focus on risks related to the restorative justice process itself, rather than more general risks, such as risk of re-offending. They would also adopt a restorative approach to assessing risk, such as through raising and discussing potential risks and their mitigation with participants. 

  • Facilitators valued the advice of other professionals, such as prison officers, social workers and psychiatrists, and (in some cases) these professionals’ work supporting parties in restorative justice meetings. However, in making decisions about restorative justice, facilitators’ own judgment and the views and needs of the parties (principally the person harmed) were seen as more important. 

  • Facilitators use a range of measures to mitigate potential risks. The single most important measure is simply preparation with the people involved, through a series of ‘pre-meetings’. All facilitators used these meetings to prepare each party for the restorative justice process, and identify and mitigate particular risks; more difficult cases were generally seen as requiring more pre-meetings. 

  • Communication difficulties which could affect the process included language barriers as well as those related to mental illness or the youth of the parties. Facilitators used a range of methods to overcome these, including interpreters and supporters as well as non-verbal communication techniques. 

  • While some types of case, such as those involving young people, communication difficulties or large groups, might require extra preparation, these cases (like more difficult cases) were not seen as fundamentally different to any others. 

  • Many participants want supporters present at face-to-face meetings, and so facilitators invited these people into the restorative justice process as ‘supporters’. These could be friends and family of the participants or sometimes professionals (e.g. therapists or social workers). While this was seen as useful, care was needed in order to avoid power imbalances or inappropriate interventions from supporters. 

  • There was varied evidence on the practice of using follow-up measures after the meeting, though this was seen as very desirable. While some facilitators iv check in with the participants afterwards, others are content simply to provide contact information and solicit feedback. 

  • It was common for facilitators to work in pairs on a given case, particularly where the case is risky, complex or involves many people. This ‘co facilitation’ is particularly valuable for gaining complementary perspectives as well as for training newer or less experienced facilitators, who can ‘shadow’ a senior colleague. 

  • The physical space in which a meeting occurs is very important. Preferably this would be an accessible and neutral space with no links to criminal justice or to either of the parties, and conducive to an atmosphere of safety and calm. It should have at least one ‘breakout room’ for parties to prepare and take breaks. 

  • Facilitators generally felt that their training had prepared them adequately for facilitating restorative justice, but this training had not always been well evaluated. 

  • Restorative justice is not suitable for all people or all cases. However, it is worth remembering that for some people harmed by offences, the risks of not engaging in restorative justice may outweigh the risks of doing so.

Suggestions 

  • We do not advise the adoption of formal risk assessment processes in restorative justice. This would risk compromising the individual-focused ethos of restorative justice, and could have harmful consequences by imposing risk categories ‘top down’ on cases. Tools should particularly not be imported from other criminal justice processes, where the aims and purposes are likely to be different. There must be an acknowledgement that every case is different - the most serious offences may be relatively straightforward in restorative justice terms, while apparently minor crimes may hide unexpected risks. However, checklists, tailored to the specific restorative justice services, may function as a useful aide memoire for practitioners in considering the types of issues and factors that should be considered when assessing and mitigating risks. 

  • ‘Pre-meetings’ are the key measure for identifying and mitigating risks. Without introducing undue delay, adequate time must be allowed for a preparatory meeting or meetings ahead of the restorative justice process. This is particularly true for more difficult cases. 

  • Restorative justice services will need to be flexible in accepting referrals at different stages of the criminal justice process and afterwards, to allow for cases of serious offending where the person responsible is serving or has served a custodial sentence. 

  • Where necessary, resources should be made available for communication support in restorative justice (interpreters and/or supporters). Non-verbal tools such as picture cards may also be helpful for supporting communication.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2022. 98p.

Faster, Higher, Stronger: Preventing Human Trafficking at the 2010 Olympics

Perrin, Benjamin

This report considers the upcoming 2010 Olympics in Vancouver in the context of Canada's human trafficking response to date, and makes recommendations to ensure that this event is not a flashpoint for human trafficking.

Calgary: Future Group, 2007. 24p.

Tools of Security Risk Management for the London 2012 Olympic Games and FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany

Jennings, Will and Martin Lodge

Mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the football World Cup represent a special venue for the practice of risk management. This paper explores management of security risks in the case of two sporting mega-events, the London 2012 Olympic Games and the FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany. The analysis progresses in three stages. First, it explores three explanations that have dominated the literature on policy instruments and tools and introduces the generic tools of government approach developed by Christopher Hood (1983). Second, it reviews the tools used for security risk management at the two mega-events. Third, it evaluates competing explanations of tool choice and degree to which these are consistent with organisational strategies of risk management at the events. The findings highlight the importance of national political systems in influencing tool choice.

London: Centre fo Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics, 2009. 27p.

Mega-Events and Risk Colonisation: Risk Management and the Olympics

Jennings, Will

This paper uses the idea of risk colonisation (Rothstein et al. 2006) to analyse how societal and institutional risks simultaneously make mega-events such as the Olympics a problematic site for risk management while contributing to the spread of the logic and formal managerial practice of risk management. It outlines how mega-events are linked to broader societal and institutional hazards and threats but at the same time induce their own unique set of organizational pathologies and biases. In this context, it is argued that the combination of societal and institutional risks create pressure for safety and security which in turn give rise to the growing influence of risk as an object of planning, operations and communication both in organisation of the Games and governance of the Olympic movement. This is consistent with the colonizing influence of risk over time: both in the creation of formal institutions (such as risk management teams and divisions) and the proliferation of the language of 'risk' as an object of regulation and control.

London: Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. 31p.

Global Threat Forecast 2024

GUNARATNA, ROHAN

From the document: "In 2024, the Israel-Hamas conflict will emerge as the preeminent threat to global security. An escalation of the conflict could spark a regional war and lead to a global recession. The West's support for Israel will fuel protests in the Muslim world, drive radicalisation and bring about terrorist attacks. Sunni and Shia groups will pose a common threat to western, Israeli and Jewish interests. Preventing the conflict from escalating and working towards a sustainable solution for the Palestinian people will require visionary leadership."

NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY. .30 MAY, 2024.

Risk Management and Enterprise Risk Management

By Sonjai Kumar

This article discusses the differences between the risk management and enterprise risk management. Though the concept of risk management is very old, almost as old as beginning of human existence but the concept of ERM is new around two decades old. The importance of enterprise risk management increased over the period of time due various crisis and emergence risk based capital in banking and insurance industry. The article discuss the various factors necessary for success of enterprise risk management.

Academia Letters, July 2021. Article 2234. 9p

Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, 1975-2023

NOWRASTEH, ALEX

From the document: "This policy analysis is an update and simplification of three previous Cato policy analyses on the same topic that were published in 2016, 2019, and 2023. It differs from the 2016 and 2019 editions because it does not include the total number of visas issued during the years analyzed, does not include a cost-benefit analysis of different immigration policies intended to reduce the threat of foreign-born terrorism, and it further differs from the 2019 version because it does not include native-born terrorists. The risks of foreign-born terrorists on US soil are quantified by evaluating how many people they murdered and injured in attacks, the ideologies of the attackers, the visas on which the foreign-born terrorists entered the country, their countries of origin, and the costs of their terrorist attacks."

CATO INSTITUTE. 9 APR, 2024. 28p.

Improving the Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places A Landscape Assessment

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Edward Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs). Researchers conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures to identify needs for improvement, and they recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs. 

The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts, except that there were more plots in New York City and Washington, D.C. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and racial and ethnic extremist motivations. The ST-CP locations targeted have been diverse and often directly accessible. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. In general, locations in which a would-be attacker had ready access to a dense crowd on scene had the highest average lethality (close to six deaths, on average, as compared with fewer than three when there was not a dense crowd present). Not surprisingly, locations that typically have large crowds without controlled entries, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.

RAND Corporation, Mar 27, 2024, 148 pages

UNDERSTANDING CAR THEFT

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

MICHAEL C. MAXFIELD AND RONALD V. CLARKE

In their compelling book, "Understanding Car Theft," authors Michael C. Maxfield and Ronald V. Clarke delve into the intricate world of vehicular theft. With a keen eye for detail and a wealth of research at their fingertips, Maxfield and Clarke provide a comprehensive analysis of the factors driving car theft, the methods used by thieves, and the strategies for prevention.

This insightful work not only explores the criminal motivations behind car theft but also sheds light on the social and economic implications of this pervasive crime. By synthesizing empirical data and theoretical frameworks, the authors offer readers a nuanced understanding of how car theft intersects with broader issues of law enforcement, urban planning, and public policy.

"Understanding Car Theft" is an essential read for academics, practitioners, and anyone interested in the complexities of auto crime. Maxfield and Clarke's expertise shines through in this meticulously researched and thought-provoking exploration of a crime that affects countless individuals and communities worldwide.

Crime Prevention Studies Volume 17. Criminal Justice Press, Monsey, NY, USA. Willan Publishing, Cullompton, Devon, UK. 2004. 251p.

Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention

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By Andrew von Hirsch, David Garland and Alison Wakefield

Situational crime prevention has drawn increasing interest in recent years,yet the debate has looked mainly at whether it 'works' to prevent crime. This volume addresses the ethics of situational crime prevention and also examines the place of situational crime prevention within criminology. The contributors are twelve distinguished criminologists who together advance our understanding of the ethical and societal questions underlying crime prevention.

Hart Publishing, Nov 18, 2000, 230 pages

Optimizing the Effectiveness of Correctional Programming: The Importance of Dosage, Timing, and Sequencing

By Grant Duwe

Key Points

  • Programming dosage should be calibrated to risk, with higher-risk prisoners receiving longer, more intensive interventions.

  • As program participation increases, recidivism generally decreases. Recidivism outcomes are significantly better when prisoners participate in multiple interventions or spend much of their imprisonment in programming.

  • Back-loading programming closer to release from prison has been associated with better recidivism outcomes.

  • Program sequencing may be effective for those who participate in multiple interventions.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 6p.

Skating to Where the Puck is Going: Anticipating and Managing Risks from Frontier AI Systems

By Toner, Helen; Ji, Jessica; Bansemer, John; Lim, Lucy; Painter, Chris; Corley, Courtney D.; Whittlestone, Jess; Botvinick, Matt; Rodriguez, Mikel; Shankar Siva Kumar, Ram

From the document: "AI is experiencing a moment of profound change, capturing unprecedented public attention and becoming increasingly sophisticated. As AI becomes more powerful, and in some cases more general in its capabilities, it may become capable of posing novel risks in domains such as bioweapons development, cybersecurity, and beyond. Two features of the current AI landscape are especially challenging from a policy perspective: the rapid pace at which research is advancing, and the recent development of more general-purpose AI systems, which--unlike most AI systems, which are narrowly focused on a single task--can be adapted to many different use cases. These two elements add new layers of difficulty to existing AI ethics and safety problems. In July 2023, Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) and Google DeepMind hosted a virtual roundtable to discuss the implications and governance of the advancing AI research frontier, particularly with regard to general-purpose AI models. The objective of the roundtable was to help bridge the gap between the state of the current conversation and the reality of AI technology at the research frontier, which has potentially widespread implications for both national security and society at large."

Georgetown University. Walsh School Of Foreign Service. Center For Security And Emerging Technology . 2023. 23p.

Homeland Threat Assessment 2024

United States. Department Of Homeland Security. Office Of Intelligence And Analysis

From the document: "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Enterprise Homeland Threat Assessment reflects the insights from across the Department, the Intelligence Community, and other critical homeland security stakeholders. It focuses on the most direct, pressing threats to our Homeland during the next year and is organized into four sections. We organized this assessment around the Department's missions that most closely align or apply to these threats--public safety, border and immigration, critical infrastructure, and economic security. As such, many of the threat actors and their efforts cut across mission areas and interact in complex and, at times, reinforcing ways. Going forward, the annual Homeland Threat Assessment will serve as the primary regular mechanism for articulating and describing the prevailing terrorism threat level, which has previously been done through our issuance of National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) bulletins. In the future, the issuance of NTAS bulletins will be reserved for situations where we need to alert the public about a specific or imminent terrorist threat or about a change in the terrorism threat level."

Washington. D.D. United States. Department Of Homeland Security. Office Of Intelligence And Analysis. 2023..

Vehicular Pursuits: A Guide for Law Enforcement Executives on Managing the Associated Risks

By Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)

The COPS Office and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) collaborated with the Police Executive Research Forum to develop this resource to help law enforcement agencies manage the risks of conducting and not conducting vehicular pursuits. This guide uses findings from NHTSA research and other credible institutions on crashes and collisions involving police pursuits as well as focus group discussions and review of 48 agencies’ policies to provide safety information and model policies to encourage the development of safer vehicular pursuits. It includes 65 recommendations that agencies of all sizes and circumstances can consider to develop or refine their vehicular pursuit policies.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.2023. 160p.

Turning the Tide Together: Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission. Volume 6: Implementation - A Shared Responsibility to Act

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 

  As Commissioners, we grounded our work every day in the memory of those whose lives were taken. Interacting with and learning from the individuals, families, and members of the communities most affected is an additional catalyst to the completion of our tasks. We have also been spurred on by the remarkable wisdom and generosity of everyone who contributed to our work: Participants and their counsel, witnesses (both through interviews and in public proceedings), experts, stakeholders, the media, community members, the wider public, and Commission staff. To all of you, we express our gratitude. This Report marks the end of our mandated responsibilities as a public inquiry and the shift to a shared responsibility to act. We do not absolve ourselves of obligations to contribute to the implementation of the Report’s recommendations in the days, weeks, and years to come. Yet acting on our recommendations is clearly in the hands and purview of others once the Commissioners have produced the Report. The leadership for this next phase includes those who participated in the Commission’s work; those external to the Commission, such as those who have reported on it and followed it; and others who have a formal, recognized duty to contribute to public safety and community well-being. We have said many times that this is a shared responsibility and opportunity. In Volume  6, Implementation, we expand on the importance of this collective responsibility, highlighting the significance of co-operation among politicians, policy-makers, institutions, organizations, community groups, and individuals right across society.   

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2023. 83p.

Turning the Tide Together: Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission. Volume 1: Context and Purpose

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

 The mass casualty of April 18 and 19, 2020, created profound grief, disruption, and destabilization in Nova Scotia and beyond. Early in our mandate, the Commission adopted the image and metaphor of rippling water to signify the breadth and depth of the impact of what happened over approximately a 13-hour period on those two days and in their aftermath. The ripple acknowledges that the immediate impact experienced by those most affected – the individuals, families, first responders, service providers, and local communities  – was appropriately the starting point of our mandate. It also captures the dynamic impact of the mass casualty, which expanded outward and affected communities, institutions, and society in Nova Scotia, across Canada, in the United States, and further afield. We introduced the ripple image as we started our work, and we acknowledge that the rippling effects of the mass casualty will continue after our Report is read and our recommendations are implemented. No one can undo the perpetrator’s actions or the actions taken by others in response: these actions are the epicentre of concentric circles of impact caused by one man. Collectively, individuals, communities, the province of Nova Scotia, and all of Canada can learn from this incident and work together toward enhanced safety and well-being in the future. An appreciation of the depth and breadth of this rippling impact is an essential component of effective, concerted, forward-looking efforts. …

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty,  2023. 206p.

Turning the Tide Together: Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission: Executive Summary and Recommendations

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

  The Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission, brings together everything we have learned about the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia as well as our recommendations to help make communities safer. The Report is divided into seven volumes. volumes that are longer are divided into parts and chapters focusing on specific topics, while others just contain chapters. Recommendations, main findings, and lessons learned are woven throughout the Report and are also listed in the Executive Summary. Please note that quoted material is cited in the volume in which it appears. Appendices and annexes are also available. All materials relating to the Final Report are available on the Commission website MassCasualtyCommission.ca and through Library and Archives Canada. Each volume of the Final Report focuses on an area of our mandate: Volume 1 Context and Purpose Volume 2 What Happened Volume 3 violence Volume 4 Community Volume 5 Policing Volume 6 Implementation – A Shared Responsibility to Act Volume 7 Process, and volume 7 Appendices  

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, (2023) . 317p. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Time Frames to Complete DHS Efforts Would Help Sector Risk Management Agencies Implement Statutory Responsibilities, Report to Congressional Committees

By United States. Government Accountability Office

From the document: "Critical infrastructure provides essential functions--such as supplying water, generating energy, and producing food--that underpin American society. Disruption or destruction of the nation's critical infrastructure could have debilitating effects. CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] is the national coordinator for infrastructure protection. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to report on the effectiveness of sector risk management agencies in carrying out responsibilities set forth in the act. This report addresses (1) how the act changed agencies' responsibilities, and the actions agencies have reported taking to address them; and (2) the extent to which CISA has identified and undertaken efforts to help agencies implement their responsibilities set forth in the act. GAO analyzed the act and relevant policy directives, collected written responses from all 16 sectors using a standardized information collection tool, reviewed other DHS documents, and interviewed CISA officials."

Wasginton D.C. United States. Government Accountability Office. 2023.

Top Risks in Cybersecurity 2023

By Romanoff, Tom; Farshchi, Jamil; Neschke, Sabine; Lord, Ben; Draper, Danielle; Douglas, Ahmad

From the document: "The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) convened a working group of leaders to strengthen America's cybersecurity. The group's approach was to identify the nation's top cybersecurity risks to raise awareness so policymakers and businesses can take pragmatic action and invest in countermeasures. In assembling the working group, the co-chairs sought broad inclusivity from strategically important industries, government, and civil society. Every sector with a stake in cybersecurity was included--banking, communications, digital platforms, health, energy, and more. The working group drew from a wide range of important perspectives, including stakeholders representing privacy concerns and digital identities. [...] Identifying cybersecurity risks is the first step in managing them. This report--unlike other, more technical sources that identify cyber risks--frames them for the strategic audience of business and government decision-makers. We intentionally focused on identifying risks, not solutions, because various stakeholders may need to take different approaches. There are no one-size-fits-all fixes. Rather, these top risks must be considered individually by companies and collectively by the nation. Many will require a multifaceted response, across business and government, who will need to work various levers including policy, organizational culture, technology, and processes."

Bipartisan Policy Center 2023. 28p.

Interrupting 'Near Repeat' Burglary Patterns: Rapid Identification and Interaction with At-Risk Residents After a Burglary

By Elizabeth. Groff and Travis Taniguchi

According to the FBI, there were over 1.5 million burglaries in the U.S. in 2016, with almost 70% residential (FBI, 2017a). Combined, the victims of burglary suffered over $3.6 billion in lost property (about $2,400/burglary). Yet, only about 13% of burglaries reported to the police were cleared (FBI, 2017b). While more prevalent than violent crime, burglary rarely generates attention and headlines. Yet, the sense of violation and vulnerability typical of residential burglary victims is considerable, and so prevention would seem the best solution. The Near Repeat Phenomenon The biggest challenge facing crime prevention in policing is the need to correctly anticipate where and when crime will occur (Pease & Laycock, 1999). Hot spots policing focuses on the locations where crimes occur frequently, though knowing when they will occur can help law enforcement effectively deploy personnel. Repeat victimization occurs when the same target is victimized again. However, the “Near Repeat” (NR) phenomenon (Morgan, 2001) is when those that live near to a burglary victim are victimized soon after; in other words, when one home is burglarized, for a particular time period afterwards, homes nearby are at an elevated risk of burglary. Empirical research has clearly confirmed the existence of NR burglary patterns. The exact spatial and temporal extent of increased risk varies; however, we know the increased risk level that occurs after a burglary is temporary, suggesting police must act quickly to maximize the potential for reaping crime prevention benefits.

Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2018. 14p.