By Angelica Duran-Martinez

In the mid 2010s discussions about the pertinence of negotiating with criminal groups increased in Latin America. Although controversial, such negotiations are more common than often thought. This article asks: can negotiations reduce violence and generate peace? I argue that the homicide reduction potential of negotiations depends on the cohesion of the state and on the cohesion and hierarchical control of criminal groups. This in turn generates two challenges for peacebuilding: the challenge of scaling up and down security gains beyond homicide reduction, and the challenge of creating three-way arrangements that include civilians and navigate the blurry boundaries between states, civilians, and criminal actors. To conceptualize these challenges, I also distinguish top-down and bottom-up negotiations and argue that addressing these challenges requires bridging a divide between peace building principles emphasizing the importance of local contexts, and peace processes literature focusing on objective power considerations. I substantiate the theory using evidence from long term fieldwork, archival analysis, and forty-three interviews conducted for this project in Medellín-Colombia and extend the insights to assess the potential for peace negotiations in Mexico.

Crime Law and Social Change 82(4):867-891, 2023

By Megan T. Stevenson and Jennifer L. Doleac

Virginia adopted a risk assessment to help determine sentencing for sex offenders. It was incorporated as a one-way ratchet toward higher sentences: expanding the upper end of the sentence guidelines by up to 300 per cent. This led to a sharp increase in sentences for those convicted of sexual assault. More surprisingly, it also led to a decrease in sentences for those convicted of rape. This raises two questions: (a) why did sentencing patterns change differently across these groups, and (b) why would risk assessment lead to a reduction in sentence length? The first question is relatively easy to answer. While both groups saw an expansion in the upper end of the sentencing guidelines, only sexual assault had the floor lifted on the lower end, making leniency more costly. The second question is less straightforward. One potential explanation is that the risk assessment served as a political or moral shield that implicitly justified leniency for those in the lowest risk category. Even though the risk assessment did not change sentencing recommendations for low-risk individuals, it provided a 'second opinion' that could mitigate blame or guilt should the low-risk offender go on to reoffend. This decreased the risks of leniency and counterbalanced any increase in severity for high-risk individuals.

University of Toronto Law Journal, Volume 73, Supplement 1, 2023, pp. 59-72

By Jennifer L. Doleac

Half of individuals released from prison in the United States will be re-incarcerated within three years, creating an incarceration cycle that is detrimental to individuals, families, and communities. There is tremendous public interest in ending this cycle, and public policies can help or hinder the reintegration of those released from jail and prison. This review summarizes the existing empirical evidence on how to intervene with existing offenders to reduce criminal behavior and improve social welfare.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE

VOL. 61, NO. 2, JUNE 2023

(pp. 383–427)

By Emilie Bruzelius and Silvia S. Martins

Recreational cannabis laws (RCL) in the United States (US) can have important implications for people who are non-citizens, including those with and without formal documentation, and those who are refugees or seeking asylum. For these groups, committing a cannabis-related infraction, even a misdemeanor, can constitute grounds for status ineligibility, including arrest and deportation under federal immigration policy—regardless of state law. Despite interconnections between immigration and drug policy, the potential impacts of increasing state cannabis legalization on immigration enforcement are unexplored.

Methods

In this repeated cross-sectional analysis, we tested the association between state-level RCL adoption and monthly, state-level prevalence of immigration arrests and deportations related to cannabis possession. Data were from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. Immigration arrest information was available from Oct-2014 to May-2018 and immigration deportation information were available from Jan-2009 to Jun-2020 for. To test associations with RCLs, we fit Poisson fixed effects models that controlled for pre-existing differences between states, secular trends, and potential sociodemographic, sociopolitical, and setting-related confounders. Sensitivity analyses explored potential violations to assumptions and sensitivity to modeling specifications.

Results

Over the observation period, there were 7,739 immigration arrests and 48,015 deportations referencing cannabis possession. By 2020, 12 stated adopted recreational legalization and on average immigration enforcement was lower among RCL compared to non-RCL states. In primary adjusted models, we found no meaningful changes in arrest prevalence, either immediately following RCL adoption (Prevalence Ratio [PR]: 0.84; [95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 0.57, 1.11]), or 1-year after the law was effective (PR: 0.88 [CI: 0.56, 1.20]). For the

deportation outcome, however, RCL adoption was associated with a moderate relative decrease in deportation prevalence in RCL versus non-RCL states (PR: 0.68 [CI: 0.56, 0.80]; PR 1-year lag: 0.68 [CI: 0.54, 0.82]). Additional analyses were mostly consistent by suggested some sensitivities to modeling specification.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that decreasing penalties for cannabis possession through state RCLs may reduce some aspects of immigration enforcement related to cannabis possession. Greater attention to the immigration-related consequences of current drug control policies is warranted, particularly as more states weigh the public health benefits and drawbacks of legalizing cannabis.

BMC Public Health volume 24, Article number: 936 (2024)

By Jeremy D. Barnum, Dustin A. Richardson, Dulani Woods, Kevin D. Lucey, Meagan E. Cahill, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Brian A. Jackson

Midlevel police leaders (MLPLs), such as sergeants and lieutenants, have great influence over officers' perceptions, behaviors, and well-being and are crucial for effectuating organizational culture, goals, and objectives. Therefore, they are lynchpins for organizational function, innovation, and change. Given the substantial impact that MLPLs have on a police organization — and ultimately the delivery of public safety — agencies must have mechanisms in place to cultivate, identify, and select the best individuals for these positions. This is achieved through the promotion process — the advancement of organizational members to higher ranks and increased levels of responsibility. In general, the promotion process in police agencies involves some combination of written testing, oral interviews, and assessment center analyses. However, this process lacks uniformity across agencies, and there is a dearth of research on the most-effective ways to conduct police promotions.

On behalf of the National Institute of Justice, RAND and Police Executive Research Forum researchers convened an expert panel to discuss how agencies currently conduct promotions for MLPL positions. Through a series of interviews and a group discussion session, the workshop participants identified and prioritized 47 needs for improving promotions in policing, 26 of which were considered highest priority. These needs are related to bias, disparity, and barriers in promotions; the development of metrics to identify successful candidates; valid and reliable methods to assess candidates; training and career progression; and considerations about transparency and organizational justice.

Key Findings

Some promotion policies, practices, or accepted norms in some agencies may be in violation of employment law.

The existence of or lack of organizational policies (e.g., assignments, training opportunities, bargaining agreements, promotion procedures, accommodations for family circumstances) can create barriers that prevent some employees, particularly women and people of color, from pursuing promotions or being successful in the promotion process.

Although it is important to evaluate past performance, it is currently challenging to use performance evaluations as a metric in the promotion process because evaluation processes are inadequate, inconsistent, and inequitable.

There is a lack of longitudinal and follow-up research with people who have gone through the promotion process and served in leadership roles to assess the promotion process.

Human assessments are inherently subjective, which can lead to inconsistency, and are subject to intentional and unintentional bias. Agencies lack processes for selection, preparation, tools, and oversight for rater selection.

There are no standards or best practices for how stakeholders (e.g., community members, staff from other police agencies, members of the civil service commission, or representatives from other criminal justice and government agencies) should be involved in promotion processes.

Police agencies are not doing enough to provide transparent, fair, equitable, and reasonable assistance to their employees preparing for the promotion process.

Some police agencies provide insufficient constructive feedback to individuals who participated in a promotion process in an honest and respectful way. This prevents employees from remaining engaged and motivated and exposes agencies to turnover and legal liability.

Recommendations

Develop educational materials, curricula, and resource guides that summarize what organizations and employees should know about employment law.

Conduct quantitative and qualitative research to identify disparate barriers to promotion for otherwise qualified candidates.

Develop and validate metrics to evaluate performance across positions.

Conduct qualitative and quantitative research to identify challenges and successes from the perspective of the agency leaders who managed the process.

Conduct longitudinal research to identify challenges and successes from the perspective of the candidates who went through the process.

Conduct a systematic review to identify evidence-based best practices for selecting, training, and overseeing evaluators or raters.

Develop a best-practices guide to help agencies appropriately include stakeholders in promotion processes.

Develop a best-practices guide based on what effective agencies (and those in other industries) are already doing.

Develop training experiments that evaluate different feedback models.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024, 31p.

By Lorenzo Vidino, Sergio Altuna

In December 2015, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the Canadian federal government tax authority, opened an audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), the largest grassroots Muslim charity in Canada. MAC is a very influential actor within Canada’s organized Muslim community and is open about being a Muslim Brotherhood legacy group, admitting it was founded by individuals linked to the Brotherhood and is inspired by the group’s ideology. The CRA initiated its investigation with a comprehensive review of more than one million financial transactions and 415,874 emails. In doing so, it alleged multiple areas of MAC’s suspected non-compliance with Canada’s Income Tax Act and related regulations. Aside from various alleged irregularities related to accounting and funding matters, the CRA opened its inquiry on suspicion that MAC had advanced “unstated non-charitable collateral purposes,” namely the advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. The CRA, argued further that MAC was not merely inspired by the ideas of Hassan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, as it stated, but that it regularly conducted a multiplicity of activities clearly aimed at furthering the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization. Doing so is a violation of the requirement established by Canadian law for entities that are registered as charities. The CRA went on to substantiate its decision with hundreds of pages that summarized the ample evidence it collected during the audit. In substance, it argued that three overlapping elements indicated that MAC acted as part of the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood: 1. Numerous key MAC leaders were actively involved in activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, having occupied senior position in the Freedom and Justice Party and later in the government of Mohammed Morsi; 2. Several MAC leaders had key roles in Canadian-based organizations that openly supported the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and allowed them to use MAC’s premises for free; 3. Members of the Egyptian and other Middle Eastern branches of the Muslim Brotherhood could almost automatically become members of MAC upon transferring to Canada and vice versa. The CRA concluded its report by stating that “the audit found that the Organization appears to conduct and support activities that further the advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood organization.” That means that, according to the CRA, MAC has not operated exclusively for charitable purposes, and the agency therefore assessed that “there may be grounds for revocation of the charitable status of the Organization.” This report takes no position on the CRA audit and its case against MAC. However, the investigation and the evidence uncovered during the process are useful and arguably surprising to anybody studying the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. It is neither unexpected not unprecedented that many top leaders of MAC served in the Morsi government in Egypt and were actively involved in proBrotherhood organizations in Canada. What sets the CRA's findings apart is the indication of a greater level of coordination, with constant communication and requests for action coming from the East towards their counterparts in the West —or, as the CRA refers to it, “authority over.” Even more surprising and telling is the ease in membership transfer from Middle Eastern branches of the Brotherhood to MAC and vice versa, a process resembling that of a student transferring from one campus to another within the same university system. As the CRA put it, “It is not entirely clear how the Organization, which purports to be entirely Canadian based with no foreign activities, is able to transfer membership to and from foreign organizations.” Whether these findings are limited to MAC and Canada, or indicative of broader trends across Western countries, remains an open question. Nonetheless, the evidence emerging from the Canadian investigation is unquestionably an important addition to a more complete understanding of how the Muslim Brotherhood in the West works.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY , 2025. 25p

By Lord Verdirame KC and Richard Ekins KC (Hon)

In a paper published on 25 November 2024, we made clear that it would be unlawful for the British Government to attempt to arrest Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel pursuant to the arrest warrant that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued on 21 November 2024. If the Government were to attempt to enforce the ICC arrest warrant, it would be acting beyond the scope of the powers conferred on it by the International Criminal Court Act 2001 and would be placing the UK in breach of its obligations in international law to respect state or diplomatic immunity. This paper develops this argument by considering three matters arising from our November 2024 paper. First, we assess what the Government has said since then about the ICC arrest warrant and about its obligations as a matter of UK law in relation to those warrants. We show that the Government has either misunderstood or misrepresented its legal obligations and seems intent on maintaining a state of uncertainty about the enforceability of the ICC arrest warrant in UK law, a position that does the Government no credit and cannot be reconciled with respect for the rule of law. Second, we consider again the immunity ratione personae of a serving Head of Government under customary international law. In our November paper, we took the view that State parties to the ICC Statute are still bound by the customary international law on immunities of senior State officials vis-à-vis non-State parties; most importantly for present purposes, they must observe the customary immunity ratione personae to which a serving Head of Government is entitled and which includes absolute immunity from arrest and from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction. This view has received further support since we first outlined it. The UK would not be acting in breach of its international obligations in refusing to enforce the ICC arrest warrant against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Third, we examine the position of former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. Being no longer in office, Mr Gallant is entitled only to immunity ratione materiae, which includes immunity from arrest and from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction but only in respect of official acts. It would however be wrong to assume that the effect of the Pinochet ruling is that the immunity ratione materiae of former Minister Gallant would not extend to the crimes under the ICC Statute of which he is accused. We argue that this interpretation of the Pinochet ruling is incorrect. It thus follows that the Government has no authority under UK law to enforce the ICC arrest warrant against Yoav Gallant and any attempt to enforce the warrant,  including by transferring the warrant to an appropriate judicial officer to endorse, would place the UK in breach of its international obligations.     

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 30p.

By Jennifer A. Tallon, Sruthi Naraharisetti, Viet Nguyen, Lisa Bailey Vavonese, and Michael Mrozinski

Recognizing the “obvious truth” that defendants cannot be assured a fair trial without representation, the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires states to provide a lawyer if a defendant cannot afford one. However, in 42 states and the District of Columbia, individuals experiencing poverty are charged a fee for invoking their Sixth Amendment right to counsel (hereafter referred to as “defender fees”). While defender fees are a marginal contributor to legal system fines and fees imposed on individuals, these fees are unique amongst the larger universe of fines and fees insofar as they essentially impose a fee for a Constitutional guarantee. Although there is a growing body of research on the use and impact of legal system fines and fees broadly defined, specific attention to defender fees remains underexplored within this literature. Policymakers and practitioners can help to ensure quality representation through an evidence-based approach to the problems and potential solutions associated with defender fees. To fill this research gap and start building the necessary evidence base, the Center for Justice Innovation (Center) partnered with the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) to conduct two national surveys to document the uses and perceptions of defender fees among (1) public defense attorneys and (2) public defense and court leadership. What follows is a summary of those findings and a discussion of potential policy and practice considerations. Findings suggest that public defense attorneys are receptive to exploring policy and practice solutions to mitigate the impact of defender fees. • Most public defense attorneys surveyed for this study opposed the use of defender fees, the most common reason being the collateral consequences experienced by clients. Public defense leaders who responded to our survey5 were more supportive, seeing the benefit of fees in offsetting the costs of the public defense system. • Contrary to prior research, few attorneys in our study reported defender fees negatively impacting the attorney-client relationship. Still, some had witnessed clients waive their right to counsel because they could not pay an upfront defender fee. • We also asked attorneys to describe how statutes on defender fees apply in practice, and there was considerable variability, suggesting the need for greater standardization in terms of equipping attorneys with the skills to advocate against the fees and for judges to consistently apply procedural safeguards like ability to pay determinations. • Finally, a secondary survey of public defense and court leaders illustrated jurisdictions’ difficulties tracking data, specifically estimating outstanding debt or the revenue associated with defender fees.

New York: New York Center for Justice Innovation, 2025. 25p.

Edited by Kaius Tuori and Heta Bjorklund

Roman law is widely considered to be the foundation of European legal culture and an inherent source of unity within European law. Roman Law and the Idea of Europe explores the emergence of this idea of Roman law as an idealized shared heritage, tracing its origins among exiled German scholars in Britain during the Nazi regime. The book follows the spread and influence of these ideas in Europe after the war as part of the larger enthusiasm for European unity. It argues that the rise of the importance of Roman law was a reaction against the crisis of jurisprudence in the face of Nazi ideas of racial and ultra-nationalistic law, leading to the establishment of the idea of Europe founded on shared legal principles. With contributions from leading academics in the field as well as established younger scholars, this volume will be of immense interests to anyone studying intellectual history, legal history, political history and Roman law in the context of Europe.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019

By Carolyn Strange, Daniel Pascoe, and Andrew Novak

Literature on opposition to the death penalty typically characterizes abolition as inexorable and attributes its fulfillment to the age of human rights. Although most countries abolished capital punishment after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, this article uses three comparative case studies to demonstrate abolition’s entanglement with a broader range of political, legal, and cultural factors. Applying a historically grounded non-teleological approach, we offer three insights. First, civilizationist values drove abolitionism in countries in the “vanguard,” such as Canada and England/Wales, where human rights rationales were expressed well after abolition and as a mark of superiority. Second, death penalty abolition has often allied with decolonization and penal reform, but assertions of independence and sovereignty have periodically provoked reinstatement, as in Mexican and Philippine history, which underscores the fragility of abolition. Third, state-centric approaches to de jure and de facto abolition overlook the practice of extrajudicial and summary “rebel” executions in polities such as Myanmar and Mali, which lack a state monopoly on force. Further historical studies that do not presuppose a human rights explanation of abolition and that compare jurisdictions within as well as between the Global North and South will better grasp the death penalty’s complex history.

Punishment & SocietyOnlineFirst, 2024, 20p.

Edited by Jacqueline Behrend and Laurence Whitehead

This important book offers an original perspective on the rule of law, development, and democracy in Latin America, establishing a new approach in recognizing the realities of political economy as opposed to merely structural and institutional factors. With contributions from an international team of experts, the book outlines the main challenges that have arisen in the pursuit of a developmental agenda in the region, including subnational variations, state capture by local elites, variations in state capacity, border divergence from centrally designed perspectives, environmental conflicts, uneven access to justice and the role of international organizations. In doing so, the book explores the democratic and developmental implications of conflicts over the rule of law and its application, uneven enforcement, and state capture. Whether a reference tool for the seasoned scholar, a guide aiding practitioner's individual expertise or an introduction to students interested in the complex intersections between the rule of law, development and democracy, this book is a must-have for any library.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 318p.

By Candan Yilmaz

This publication offers a unique comparative analysis of the sentencing of mentally disordered offenders in Türkiye, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, exploring the alignment of these systems with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). While the presence of mental disorders impacts criminal responsibility, the legal responses and practices differ significantly across jurisdictions. The complex sanctioning system in Türkiye faced substantial challenges due to the absence of secure forensic psychiatric facilities until 2018. Despite legal mandates, mentally disordered offenders were often either released or unlawfully detained in prisons, creating a prolonged gap between law and practice. The research highlights how the situation evolved and assesses the lingering issues, which were exacerbated by delays during the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to contextualize the criminal justice system of Türkiye, comparisons are drawn with the criminal justice systems of the Netherlands and England and Wales, two jurisdictions which have distinct and unique frameworks for mentally disordered offenders. The eminent TBS (terbeschikkingstelling) system of the Netherlands and the bifurcated sentencing approach in England and Wales provide valuable points of reference. This publication is of significance in the field of legal academic literature given the paucity of research on the Turkish criminal justice system, carried out in languages other than Turkish. It evaluates the degree to which these systems adhere to or deviate from ECHR standards, thereby providing insights that facilitate improved compliance with human rights requirements. By bridging comparative legal traditions and identifying best practices, this research holds significant societal and academic relevance.

Groningen: University of Groningen Press, 2025. 560p.

By

George Christopher Dertadian and Vicki Sentas

The decriminalization of drug possession in varied forms is gaining some traction around the world. Yet prospects for people with lived and living experience of drug use to influence the direction of drug law and policy reform remains bound by stigma and exclusion. This study considers the aspirations for decriminalization of people who inject drugs through 20 semi-structured qualitative interviews with the clients of the Sydney injecting centre. What does decriminalization mean for those most criminalised by drug law and policy? The study found that participants’ views of what is possible for decriminalization are mediated by the same structures and experiences of criminalization, incarceration and exclusion that has disrupted their lives. Participants anticipate the need to mobilise incremental and partial changes associated with de facto models, including fines, increased police discretion (and therefore power) and treatment

orders. At the same time, participants collective imaginary also exceeds the limits of a police-controlled depenalization. We document people’s claims on a future drug policy that speaks to a world without criminal drug offences, punitive controls and the exclusion of people who use drugs from the policy table

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 135, January 2025, 104657

By Ian Mynot and Oksana Ihnatenko\

On 15 November 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security and the Center for Financial Integrity (CFI)1 launched a Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine. An in-person meeting in Warsaw, held on a non-attributable basis, convened 40 representatives, including those from the public and private sectors in Ukraine, and international experts. The discussion included two sessions focused on the current state of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine and on international experience and recommendations. This report summarises the main findings of each of these sessions. None of the discussions at the meeting are attributable.

London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2025. 15p.

In September 2024, after 56 years under a sentence of death, Hakamada Iwao was acquitted in a retrial in Japan. This article summarizes what went wrong in his wrongful conviction case and what should be learned from it. The Shizuoka District Court’s retrial decision concluded that police and prosecutors conspired to frame Hakamada with evidence they had fabricated, but there is more to the case than that. This tragedy occurred because of mistakes and misconduct that were exacerbated by underlying weaknesses in Japan’s criminal process. To prevent a recurrence, many things need to change in Japanese criminal justice. The conclusion identifies five priorities for reform.

The Asia Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 22 | Issue 11 | Number 3 | Article ID 5872 | Nov. 30, 2024

By Siobhan Lawler, Hayley Boxall, Christopher Dowling

Research evaluating restorative justice programs for domestic and family violence and sexual violence is limited in Australia and internationally. In 2019 the AIC was commissioned to evaluate the Australian Capital Territory’s Restorative Justice Scheme for domestic and family violence and sexual violence (‘Phase Three’). The evaluation examined the process and outcomes of Phase Three, including barriers to delivery, activities delivered and outcomes associated with participation. A range of data was examined, including interviews with participants (n=16) and stakeholders (n=47), analysis of post-conference surveys (n=28) and analysis of administrative and reoffending data. The evaluation demonstrated Phase Three is working effectively overall. Participants and stakeholders report high levels of satisfaction with Phase Three and the service they received. There was evidence that victim-survivors could meet a range of justice needs with varying levels of offender participation and accountability. Some areas for improving referrals were identified.

Research Report no. 33.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 185p.

By Brandon L. Garrett and Luke Mears

After 44 years in prison for a conviction of rape in the small town of Concord, North Carolina, Ronnie Long was released from prison in 2021. Four months later, the Governor granted him a full pardon on the grounds of innocence. That pardon made it possible to obtain compensation from a state commission, which awarded Long $750,000. This amount was the maximum available under state law that permitted compensation of $50,000 per year of incarceration, but with an upper limit of $750,000. After his exoneration, Long also filed a civil rights lawsuit in federal court. This federal case against the city settled for $22 million in 2024. Long also received $3 million from the North Carolina State Crime Lab as a result of its “role in hiding evidence from Mr. Long and his legal team that proved his innocence.” This substantial settlement made Long Compensating Exonerees in the United States highly unusual among exonerees in the United States. Most exonerees, if they are compensated, received something more along the lines of the $50,000 per year available under the state law that initially compensated Long, and nothing more. Many exonerees receive no compensation at all. Academics have long criticized the traditional lack of compensation for wrongful conviction in the United States. In 1932, Edwin Borchard wrote that the United States needed national legislation regarding compensation for wrongful convictions. For many decades, no such legislation existed, however. Civil rights litigation, like the case brought by Long, was uncommon, and compensation under statutory schemes was similarly rare. This changed once exonerations became much more common, including those based on post-conviction DNA evidence, in the 1990s. In general, many of the exonerees that have received substantial compensation, like Ronnie Long, have brought civil rights lawsuits in federal, not state court. For example, of the first 250 DNA exonerees, 60% received some type of compensation, and of those, half of them obtained it in federal court. However, exonerees are increasingly seeeking compensation under state compensation statutes. In this fact sheet, we describe how compensation for exonerees has evolved in the past several decades, including through successful litigation efforts and through the enactment of compensation legislation, in thirty-nine states, Washington D.C., and by the federal government. We summarize each of these state and federal statutes in the table at the end of this document. To date, 39 states have enacted such compensation statutes, in addition to Washington D.C. and the federal government. In addition, five of the remaining 11 states currently have pending legislation on the issue. The figure below shows which jurisdictions have these statutes currently, and which have legislation pending.

Durham, NC: Wilson Center for Science and Justice at Duke Law, 2024. 20p.

By Sarah Monaghan, Kellyann Bock, Michael Rempel, & Olive Lu

Spanning more than four decades, how has the footprint of New York’s criminal legal system changed? This comprehensive report explores the changing landscape of law enforcement in New York State from 1980 to 2023. It analyzes trends in arrests, prosecutorial declinations, criminal convictions, and sentencing practices, with a focus on regional and racial disparities.

Key Takeaways

● Statewide Arrest Trends

● After varying patterns by charge and region from 1980 to 2010, arrest rates declined significantly from 2010 to 2020, with a modest resurgence from 2020 to 2023.

● Misdemeanor arrests in NYC increased nearly fourfold from 1980 to 2010, dropped by 75% from 2010 to 2020 but rose by 40% from 2020 to 2023.

● Felony arrests decreased across all regions from 1980 to 2020, with a modest uptick in recent years.

● Charge-Specific Arrest Patterns

● Drug arrests in NYC peaked at over 128,000 in 2000, before falling to under 18,000 in 2023.

● Prostitution and fare evasion arrests in NYC saw drastic declines. Prostitution declined 99% from 1985 to 2023, and fare evasion declined 99% from 1994 to 2021, before a 2021-to-2023 uptick.

● DUI remained a leading charge outside NYC, comprising 18%-19% of suburban and upstate misdemeanors in 2023.

● Prosecutorial Declinations

● After changing only modestly until 2017, district attorneys’ offices in the Bronx, Manhattan, and Brooklyn declined to prosecute increasing numbers of low level misdemeanor arrests from 2017 to 2023.

● Select low level arrests for transit fare evasion, prostitution, trespass, and marijuana possession saw especially significant increases in declinations in the Bronx, Manhattan, and/or Brooklyn.

● Sentencing Trends: Jail and prison sentences for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies peaked around 2000 before decreasing significantly by 2023. Violent felony convictions increasingly resulted in prison sentences across all regions.

● Racial and Ethnic Disparities: While shrinking in some areas since 1980 (e.g., felony arrest disparities narrowed), the study found that sizable Black-white and Hispanic-white disparities on most metrics examined.

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College, 2024. 45p.

By Chris Tully

JENGbA facilitated a series of Listening Days with the families and friends of those impacted by Joint Enterprise (JE). Between October 2023 and May 2024 four such days took place in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield. The days were attended by 41 family members and friends. Each listening day focussed on five themes; knowledge of JE and when they were first aware their loved ones were to be charged under joint enterprise, the impact on them and their communities following conviction, racism and the gang narrative, role of the media, developing support networks and the fightback against the injustice of joint enterprise. Families reported having little or no previous knowledge of JE and in a considerable number of cases only found out immediately prior to, or during the trial and in some cases not until the judges’ summing up. Inevitably the impact was profound. We heard of the toll on peoples’ physical and mental health, the damage done to family relationships, the breakdown of relationships with neighbours and members of their local communities, often based on stigma, a suspicion that there is ‘no smoke without fire’ and a general lack of awareness amongst the general public of how JE is applied. A lack of independent, accessible information, support and guidance at the point of charging was seen as a fundamental problem for families confronting a trial. Families expressed anger towards the role of the police, often seen as complicit with the Crown Prosecution Service, in using JE as a blunt instrument to “round up” and prosecute young people particularly on the basis of race, class, family name and by dint of neighbourhood. Participants in the conversations also had poor experiences with lawyers citing; a lack of experience, little or no expertise in JE cases, little empathy, a reluctance to share. information and documents. The experiences of trials were predicated on similar concerns. We heard families describe juries who appeared unaware of what guilty verdicts in JE cases meant for defendants, judges who were dismissive of evidence, and concerns that juries rarely reflected the diversity of the cities and towns where trials were taking place. A key concern was disproportionate use of JE in relation to black and racialised communities, working class communities and children and young people. Often underpinning this was the use of a gang narrative to justify charging and prosecution. Families were angered by the speed with which the gang narrative was introduced into proceedings and why this was applied when association was actually founded on living in the same neighbourhood, shared interests such as music and sport, school friendships etc. As such JE was seen as both “lazy” and susceptible to stereotyping and demonisation. Many we heard from had experienced unacceptable treatment at the hands of the media. Commonly this is presented as malign or inaccurate reporting, geared towards racism, blame often attributed to parents and especially mothers. Some felt the media and police worked hand in hand to perpetuate moral panics. Retractions of inaccurate reporting were hard to come by and we also heard how images of families’ children were used repeatedly by local press, sometimes years later, to highlight youth crime or gang violence. The most positive conversations revolved around the value of family relationships as a buffer against the isolation of having a loved one sentenced under JE. Additionally a community of interest has been forged by the work of JENGbA, without which many felt they would have collapsed under the weight of trying to support loved ones and sustain other relationships. JENGbA have provided support, information, understanding and access to a group of people who share campaigning zeal and a desire to put an end to the misuse of a legal doctrine that punishes many more people than ‘just’ those it imprisons.

London: Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association,

2024. 28p.

By Natasha Brown

On September 18, 2022, 42-year-old Shannon Brandt hit and killed 18-year old Cayler Ellingson with his SUV following a heated altercation in McHenry, North Dakota. Brandt admitted to the crime and “was charged with vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in death.” Despite court documents revealing Brandt’s past DUI history, “unlawful possession of alcohol and fleeing a peace officer on foot”, two days later, on September 20, 2022, Brandt was released from custody after posting $50,000 bail. On September 12, 2022, 42-year-old Ivan Cheung was “charged with aggravated rape (four counts), aggravated rape of a child (four counts), and aggravated statutory rape (two counts)” in Boston Massachusetts. Sixteen days later, on September 28, 2022, Cheung walked out of Boston Municipal Court after posting a $200,000 bail. In contrast, in March of 2016, 31-year-old Jessica Preston was arrested for driving with a suspended license in Macomb County, Michigan. Despite being eight months pregnant, the judge gave her the choice of going to jail until she received a hearing date, or come up with $10,000 for bail. Preston did not have the financial resources to make bail and as a result was put in jail. Five days later, Preston went into labor. When the jail staff refused to call an ambulance, Preston had no choice but to give birth on a mat lying on the jailhouse floor. These three stories above reveal that despite the wide range of crimes that were committed, the determining factor to secure the pretrial release of a murderer, a rapist, and a traffic violator was money. While Shannon Brandt and Ivan Cheung were charged with violent crimes, they were both released because they had the means to pay their bail. In contrast, Jessica Preston who was arrested for a non-violent crime remained in pretrial detention because she could not afford to pay her way out. Ending a decades long system that bases someone’s freedom off of access to money requires collective collaboration between advocates across political lines who are ready to implement change. On January 22, 2021, Illinois Governor JB Pritzker signed into law the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity Today Act, otherwise known as the SAFE-T Act (“Act”). Within the SAFE-T Act is the Pretrial Fairness Act (“PFA”) which eliminated cash bail in Illinois. While states like California and New Jersey have passed similar cash bail reform laws, Illinois is the first state in the country to abolish the cash bail system entirely. This bill affirms the notion that people accused of crimes are considered innocent until proven guilty and their release is not based on their access to monetary funds. Those in opposition claim the SAFE-T Act will be the beginning stages of The Purge, the infamous movie where all crime is legal for 12 hours. Critics against the Act have promoted misinformation leading many to believe that violent people will be released into the neighborhoods and cause chaos among communities. This comment explores how the implementation of the PFA does not impose a threat to the safety of Illinois residents, but rather how the PFA will pave the wave for a more just court system that other states should follow. Part II discusses the history of pretrial detention and cash bail in the United States. This will lead to how cash bail became a faulty and unreliable metric to determine whether someone could be a danger to their community and whether they pose a flight risk. Part III discusses the development leading to the PFA in Illinois. Part IV proposes that the PFA should grant judicial decision-making power to the Restorative Justice Community Courts and further explains how this expansion will lead to safer communities. While the Act will impact the entire state of Illinois, most of the analysis for this comment is focused towards Cook County.

57 UIC L. REV. 291 (2024), 37 p.