By Equal Justice Initiative

Race and the Jury: Illegal Discrimination in Jury Selection, released online July 27, 2021, places the continuing illegal exclusion of jurors of color in its historical context as “a continuing legacy of our history of racial injustice,” documenting the country’s “long history of tolerating racial bias in jury selection and a continuing indifference to correcting widespread underrepresentation of people of color on juries.” The report, a follow up to the organization’s 2010 report, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, details the numerous factors that contribute to ongoing jury discrimination today, and what EJI describes as the “persistent and widespread” impact it continues to have on the U.S. legal system.

While racial discrimination in jury selection is present throughout the criminal legal system, the report finds that it has especially pernicious effects in capital trials. “In cases where the death penalty is a possible punishment, the absence of meaningful representation on juries shapes sentencing outcomes, making them less reliable and credible,” the report explains. “The effect is greatest for non-white defendants, as studies show that less representative juries convict and sentence Black defendants to death at significantly higher rates than white defendants. White jurors are also less likely to consider critical mitigating evidence supporting a life sentence, rather than the death penalty, for Black defendants.”

EJI says illegal jury discrimination “persists because those who perpetrate or tolerate racial bias — including trial and appellate courts, defense lawyers, lawmakers, and prosecutors — act with impunity. Courts that fail to create jury lists that fairly represent their communities face no repercussions. Prosecutors who unlawfully strike Black people from juries don’t get fined, sanctioned, or held accountable.”

To redress the problem, EJI recommends that courts and legislatures remove procedural barriers to reviewing claims of jury discrimination, adopt policies and practices that commit to fully representative jury pools, hold accountable decision makers who engage in racially discriminatory jury selection practices, and strengthen the standard of review of jury discrimination claims. However, EJI says, only a few states “have recognized the problem and implemented reforms or initiated studies” and “[m]ost states have done nothing.”

Montgomery, AL: Equal Justice Initiative, 2021. 107p.

Accountability: How Qualified Immunity Shields a Wide Range of Government Abuses, Arbitrarily Thwarts Civil Rights, and Fails to Fulfill Its Promises

By Jason Tiezzi, Robert McNamara, and Elyse Smith Pohl

Qualified immunity is perhaps America’s most controversial legal doctrine, erupting into the national consciousness during debate over police misconduct in 2020. Created by the U.S. Supreme Court four decades ago, the doctrine protects government officials from being sued for violating constitutional rights—unless victims can show those rights are “clearly established.” In practice, this often means pinpointing a published opinion from the Supreme Court or the federal appellate court in their jurisdiction finding the same conduct in the same circumstances unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court intends for qualified immunity to give government officials leeway to make reasonable mistakes—especially in tense or dangerous situations requiring quick thinking—without facing lengthy litigation, onerous discovery, or financial ruin. By insisting rights be clearly established to receive protection, the Court aims to put officials on notice of conduct to avoid before they face such consequences. Critics counter, however, that qualified immunity sets too high a bar for victims of abuse to seek justice and winds up protecting officials who intentionally, maliciously, or unreasonably violate the Constitution. They also argue the doctrine does not work as the Court intends.

This study adds new evidence to the record using the largest ever collection of federal appellate cases, covering the 11-year period from 2010 through 2020. It is the first to use cutting-edge automated techniques to parse thousands of federal circuit court opinions and answer key questions about cases where government defendants claim qualified immunity—what kinds of officials and conduct it protects, its impact on civil rights cases, and whether the doctrine is achieving its aims.

Key findings include:

In the federal circuit courts, qualified immunity appeals have become more common.

From 2010 through 2020, at least 5,526 cases before federal circuit courts raised qualified immunity on appeal, an average of about 500 cases a year.

And from the first half of our study period to the second, the annual average of qualified immunity appeals grew by 20%, even as civil appeals of all types fell.

Contrary to popular belief, qualified immunity is not just about police accused of excessive force. It shields a wide array of government officials and conduct.

While police were the most common defendants, fully half of appeals featured other types of government officials, either alongside or instead of police. Prison officials made up the next largest share, but in more than one in five of all appeals, or 21%, defendants were neither police

nor prison officials. These other officials included mayors and city managers, university and school officials, prosecutors and judges, and child protective services workers.

Excessive force was alleged in just 27% of appeals, followed by false arrest at 25%; some alleged both. But the third largest category, alleged in 18% of appeals, encompassed violations of First Amendment rights, including speech, association, and religious liberty.

Altogether, only 23% of appeals fit the popular conception of police accused of excessive force. In most First Amendment appeals, plaintiffs alleged government officials engaged in premeditated retaliation for protected speech or activity.

In a representative sample of 125 First Amendment appeals, 59% involved plaintiffs alleging premeditated abuse by government officials in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. In nearly half of such cases, government workers alleged retaliation from their superiors, while in nearly a third, private citizens claimed they were targeted for retaliation by government officials.

Qualified immunity favors government defendants and makes it harder for plaintiffs to win—regardless of the merits of their claims.

In all, 59% of qualified immunity appeals were resolved solely in favor of government defendants, while 24% were resolved solely in favor of plaintiffs.

Qualified immunity disadvantages plaintiffs for arbitrary reasons, such as their circuit’s population or publication rate. These vary widely and influence the volume of clearly established law in a circuit—and therefore, the volume and variety of prior cases that plaintiffs can rely on to vindicate their rights.

Qualified immunity rulings often lack precision and clarity, again making it hard for plaintiffs to pinpoint the clearly established law required to win. In common with other legal experts, ours often could not untangle courts’ reasons for granting qualified immunity—if reasons were even offered.

When denied qualified immunity, government defendants have the right to file special immediate appeals—a right unavailable to plaintiffs. And they can do this multiple times in the same lawsuit. Such “interlocutory appeals” accounted for 96% of all defendant appeals.

These special appeals risk wearing down worthy plaintiffs with extended litigation. Their prevalence likely helps explain why the median duration of a qualified immunity lawsuit was three years and two months, 23% longer than the typical federal civil suit up on appeal.

Our findings provide more evidence that qualified immunity is a poor fit for achieving its goals.

Qualified immunity confuses instead of clarifies the rules government workers must follow to avoid burdensome litigation. If legal experts struggle to make sense of qualified immunity, the average government official—let alone one facing a life-or-death situation—cannot be expected to do so.

Qualified immunity fails to protect officials from the burdens of litigation, most notably potentially intrusive discovery. Nearly 70% of appeals came at the summary judgment stage of litigation, when courts typically have already allowed discovery.

Qualified immunity clogs up the courts with extra, often lengthy, appeals—some 2,000 interlocutory appeals that would not have existed without the special appeal rights given to government defendants.

These results suggest qualified immunity shields a much wider array of government officials and conduct than commonly thought. They also add to a growing body of research finding qualified immunity protects officials too much and our rights too little, all while failing to achieve its goals. This strengthens the argument for the Supreme Court or Congress to temper or—better yet—abolish the doctrine.

Whether through outright abolition or significant reform, courts and lawmakers can and should act to eliminate the unbounded impunity allowed by qualified immunity.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2024. 6op.

By DICK M. CARPENTER II, JAIMIE CAVANAUGH & SAM GEDGE

Most, if not all, incorporated communities in the United States have municipal and traffic codes that delineate the powers and duties of local governments or provide rules and regulations for public activity in the community. The primary stated purpose of code enforcement is promoting and protecting public health and safety. Codes are commonly enforced through monetary fines and administrative fees. Recent years have seen growing concern about cities engaging in “taxation by citation”—that is, the use of code enforcement to raise revenue from fines and fees in excess of citations issued solely to protect and advance public safety. A significant focus of the concern is how taxation by citation violates rights in the pursuit of revenue. In this way, taxation by citation seems to illustrate Professor Bernadette Atuahene’s theory of stategraft: state agents transferring property from residents “to the state in violation of the state’s own laws or basic human rights,” often during times of budgetary austerity. But this Essay identifies important features of municipal codes and their enforcement that are not necessarily encompassed by this theory. It suggests how stategraft may be expanded to encompass laws, regulations, and systems that legally—if arguably unconstitutionally—allow or incentivize state actors to exploit their residents for the benefit of the bureaucrat’s budget.

Wisconsin Law Review, 2024(2), 707–728.

By Angelica Duran-Martinez

In the mid 2010s discussions about the pertinence of negotiating with criminal groups increased in Latin America. Although controversial, such negotiations are more common than often thought. This article asks: can negotiations reduce violence and generate peace? I argue that the homicide reduction potential of negotiations depends on the cohesion of the state and on the cohesion and hierarchical control of criminal groups. This in turn generates two challenges for peacebuilding: the challenge of scaling up and down security gains beyond homicide reduction, and the challenge of creating three-way arrangements that include civilians and navigate the blurry boundaries between states, civilians, and criminal actors. To conceptualize these challenges, I also distinguish top-down and bottom-up negotiations and argue that addressing these challenges requires bridging a divide between peace building principles emphasizing the importance of local contexts, and peace processes literature focusing on objective power considerations. I substantiate the theory using evidence from long term fieldwork, archival analysis, and forty-three interviews conducted for this project in Medellín-Colombia and extend the insights to assess the potential for peace negotiations in Mexico.

Crime Law and Social Change 82(4):867-891, 2023

By Megan T. Stevenson and Jennifer L. Doleac

Virginia adopted a risk assessment to help determine sentencing for sex offenders. It was incorporated as a one-way ratchet toward higher sentences: expanding the upper end of the sentence guidelines by up to 300 per cent. This led to a sharp increase in sentences for those convicted of sexual assault. More surprisingly, it also led to a decrease in sentences for those convicted of rape. This raises two questions: (a) why did sentencing patterns change differently across these groups, and (b) why would risk assessment lead to a reduction in sentence length? The first question is relatively easy to answer. While both groups saw an expansion in the upper end of the sentencing guidelines, only sexual assault had the floor lifted on the lower end, making leniency more costly. The second question is less straightforward. One potential explanation is that the risk assessment served as a political or moral shield that implicitly justified leniency for those in the lowest risk category. Even though the risk assessment did not change sentencing recommendations for low-risk individuals, it provided a 'second opinion' that could mitigate blame or guilt should the low-risk offender go on to reoffend. This decreased the risks of leniency and counterbalanced any increase in severity for high-risk individuals.

University of Toronto Law Journal, Volume 73, Supplement 1, 2023, pp. 59-72

By Jennifer L. Doleac

Half of individuals released from prison in the United States will be re-incarcerated within three years, creating an incarceration cycle that is detrimental to individuals, families, and communities. There is tremendous public interest in ending this cycle, and public policies can help or hinder the reintegration of those released from jail and prison. This review summarizes the existing empirical evidence on how to intervene with existing offenders to reduce criminal behavior and improve social welfare.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE

VOL. 61, NO. 2, JUNE 2023

(pp. 383–427)

By Emilie Bruzelius and Silvia S. Martins

Recreational cannabis laws (RCL) in the United States (US) can have important implications for people who are non-citizens, including those with and without formal documentation, and those who are refugees or seeking asylum. For these groups, committing a cannabis-related infraction, even a misdemeanor, can constitute grounds for status ineligibility, including arrest and deportation under federal immigration policy—regardless of state law. Despite interconnections between immigration and drug policy, the potential impacts of increasing state cannabis legalization on immigration enforcement are unexplored.

Methods

In this repeated cross-sectional analysis, we tested the association between state-level RCL adoption and monthly, state-level prevalence of immigration arrests and deportations related to cannabis possession. Data were from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. Immigration arrest information was available from Oct-2014 to May-2018 and immigration deportation information were available from Jan-2009 to Jun-2020 for. To test associations with RCLs, we fit Poisson fixed effects models that controlled for pre-existing differences between states, secular trends, and potential sociodemographic, sociopolitical, and setting-related confounders. Sensitivity analyses explored potential violations to assumptions and sensitivity to modeling specifications.

Results

Over the observation period, there were 7,739 immigration arrests and 48,015 deportations referencing cannabis possession. By 2020, 12 stated adopted recreational legalization and on average immigration enforcement was lower among RCL compared to non-RCL states. In primary adjusted models, we found no meaningful changes in arrest prevalence, either immediately following RCL adoption (Prevalence Ratio [PR]: 0.84; [95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 0.57, 1.11]), or 1-year after the law was effective (PR: 0.88 [CI: 0.56, 1.20]). For the

deportation outcome, however, RCL adoption was associated with a moderate relative decrease in deportation prevalence in RCL versus non-RCL states (PR: 0.68 [CI: 0.56, 0.80]; PR 1-year lag: 0.68 [CI: 0.54, 0.82]). Additional analyses were mostly consistent by suggested some sensitivities to modeling specification.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that decreasing penalties for cannabis possession through state RCLs may reduce some aspects of immigration enforcement related to cannabis possession. Greater attention to the immigration-related consequences of current drug control policies is warranted, particularly as more states weigh the public health benefits and drawbacks of legalizing cannabis.

BMC Public Health volume 24, Article number: 936 (2024)

By Jeremy D. Barnum, Dustin A. Richardson, Dulani Woods, Kevin D. Lucey, Meagan E. Cahill, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Brian A. Jackson

Midlevel police leaders (MLPLs), such as sergeants and lieutenants, have great influence over officers' perceptions, behaviors, and well-being and are crucial for effectuating organizational culture, goals, and objectives. Therefore, they are lynchpins for organizational function, innovation, and change. Given the substantial impact that MLPLs have on a police organization — and ultimately the delivery of public safety — agencies must have mechanisms in place to cultivate, identify, and select the best individuals for these positions. This is achieved through the promotion process — the advancement of organizational members to higher ranks and increased levels of responsibility. In general, the promotion process in police agencies involves some combination of written testing, oral interviews, and assessment center analyses. However, this process lacks uniformity across agencies, and there is a dearth of research on the most-effective ways to conduct police promotions.

On behalf of the National Institute of Justice, RAND and Police Executive Research Forum researchers convened an expert panel to discuss how agencies currently conduct promotions for MLPL positions. Through a series of interviews and a group discussion session, the workshop participants identified and prioritized 47 needs for improving promotions in policing, 26 of which were considered highest priority. These needs are related to bias, disparity, and barriers in promotions; the development of metrics to identify successful candidates; valid and reliable methods to assess candidates; training and career progression; and considerations about transparency and organizational justice.

Key Findings

Some promotion policies, practices, or accepted norms in some agencies may be in violation of employment law.

The existence of or lack of organizational policies (e.g., assignments, training opportunities, bargaining agreements, promotion procedures, accommodations for family circumstances) can create barriers that prevent some employees, particularly women and people of color, from pursuing promotions or being successful in the promotion process.

Although it is important to evaluate past performance, it is currently challenging to use performance evaluations as a metric in the promotion process because evaluation processes are inadequate, inconsistent, and inequitable.

There is a lack of longitudinal and follow-up research with people who have gone through the promotion process and served in leadership roles to assess the promotion process.

Human assessments are inherently subjective, which can lead to inconsistency, and are subject to intentional and unintentional bias. Agencies lack processes for selection, preparation, tools, and oversight for rater selection.

There are no standards or best practices for how stakeholders (e.g., community members, staff from other police agencies, members of the civil service commission, or representatives from other criminal justice and government agencies) should be involved in promotion processes.

Police agencies are not doing enough to provide transparent, fair, equitable, and reasonable assistance to their employees preparing for the promotion process.

Some police agencies provide insufficient constructive feedback to individuals who participated in a promotion process in an honest and respectful way. This prevents employees from remaining engaged and motivated and exposes agencies to turnover and legal liability.

Recommendations

Develop educational materials, curricula, and resource guides that summarize what organizations and employees should know about employment law.

Conduct quantitative and qualitative research to identify disparate barriers to promotion for otherwise qualified candidates.

Develop and validate metrics to evaluate performance across positions.

Conduct qualitative and quantitative research to identify challenges and successes from the perspective of the agency leaders who managed the process.

Conduct longitudinal research to identify challenges and successes from the perspective of the candidates who went through the process.

Conduct a systematic review to identify evidence-based best practices for selecting, training, and overseeing evaluators or raters.

Develop a best-practices guide to help agencies appropriately include stakeholders in promotion processes.

Develop a best-practices guide based on what effective agencies (and those in other industries) are already doing.

Develop training experiments that evaluate different feedback models.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024, 31p.

By Lorenzo Vidino, Sergio Altuna

In December 2015, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the Canadian federal government tax authority, opened an audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), the largest grassroots Muslim charity in Canada. MAC is a very influential actor within Canada’s organized Muslim community and is open about being a Muslim Brotherhood legacy group, admitting it was founded by individuals linked to the Brotherhood and is inspired by the group’s ideology. The CRA initiated its investigation with a comprehensive review of more than one million financial transactions and 415,874 emails. In doing so, it alleged multiple areas of MAC’s suspected non-compliance with Canada’s Income Tax Act and related regulations. Aside from various alleged irregularities related to accounting and funding matters, the CRA opened its inquiry on suspicion that MAC had advanced “unstated non-charitable collateral purposes,” namely the advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. The CRA, argued further that MAC was not merely inspired by the ideas of Hassan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, as it stated, but that it regularly conducted a multiplicity of activities clearly aimed at furthering the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization. Doing so is a violation of the requirement established by Canadian law for entities that are registered as charities. The CRA went on to substantiate its decision with hundreds of pages that summarized the ample evidence it collected during the audit. In substance, it argued that three overlapping elements indicated that MAC acted as part of the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood: 1. Numerous key MAC leaders were actively involved in activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, having occupied senior position in the Freedom and Justice Party and later in the government of Mohammed Morsi; 2. Several MAC leaders had key roles in Canadian-based organizations that openly supported the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and allowed them to use MAC’s premises for free; 3. Members of the Egyptian and other Middle Eastern branches of the Muslim Brotherhood could almost automatically become members of MAC upon transferring to Canada and vice versa. The CRA concluded its report by stating that “the audit found that the Organization appears to conduct and support activities that further the advancement of the Muslim Brotherhood organization.” That means that, according to the CRA, MAC has not operated exclusively for charitable purposes, and the agency therefore assessed that “there may be grounds for revocation of the charitable status of the Organization.” This report takes no position on the CRA audit and its case against MAC. However, the investigation and the evidence uncovered during the process are useful and arguably surprising to anybody studying the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. It is neither unexpected not unprecedented that many top leaders of MAC served in the Morsi government in Egypt and were actively involved in proBrotherhood organizations in Canada. What sets the CRA's findings apart is the indication of a greater level of coordination, with constant communication and requests for action coming from the East towards their counterparts in the West —or, as the CRA refers to it, “authority over.” Even more surprising and telling is the ease in membership transfer from Middle Eastern branches of the Brotherhood to MAC and vice versa, a process resembling that of a student transferring from one campus to another within the same university system. As the CRA put it, “It is not entirely clear how the Organization, which purports to be entirely Canadian based with no foreign activities, is able to transfer membership to and from foreign organizations.” Whether these findings are limited to MAC and Canada, or indicative of broader trends across Western countries, remains an open question. Nonetheless, the evidence emerging from the Canadian investigation is unquestionably an important addition to a more complete understanding of how the Muslim Brotherhood in the West works.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY , 2025. 25p

By Lord Verdirame KC and Richard Ekins KC (Hon)

In a paper published on 25 November 2024, we made clear that it would be unlawful for the British Government to attempt to arrest Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel pursuant to the arrest warrant that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued on 21 November 2024. If the Government were to attempt to enforce the ICC arrest warrant, it would be acting beyond the scope of the powers conferred on it by the International Criminal Court Act 2001 and would be placing the UK in breach of its obligations in international law to respect state or diplomatic immunity. This paper develops this argument by considering three matters arising from our November 2024 paper. First, we assess what the Government has said since then about the ICC arrest warrant and about its obligations as a matter of UK law in relation to those warrants. We show that the Government has either misunderstood or misrepresented its legal obligations and seems intent on maintaining a state of uncertainty about the enforceability of the ICC arrest warrant in UK law, a position that does the Government no credit and cannot be reconciled with respect for the rule of law. Second, we consider again the immunity ratione personae of a serving Head of Government under customary international law. In our November paper, we took the view that State parties to the ICC Statute are still bound by the customary international law on immunities of senior State officials vis-à-vis non-State parties; most importantly for present purposes, they must observe the customary immunity ratione personae to which a serving Head of Government is entitled and which includes absolute immunity from arrest and from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction. This view has received further support since we first outlined it. The UK would not be acting in breach of its international obligations in refusing to enforce the ICC arrest warrant against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Third, we examine the position of former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. Being no longer in office, Mr Gallant is entitled only to immunity ratione materiae, which includes immunity from arrest and from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction but only in respect of official acts. It would however be wrong to assume that the effect of the Pinochet ruling is that the immunity ratione materiae of former Minister Gallant would not extend to the crimes under the ICC Statute of which he is accused. We argue that this interpretation of the Pinochet ruling is incorrect. It thus follows that the Government has no authority under UK law to enforce the ICC arrest warrant against Yoav Gallant and any attempt to enforce the warrant,  including by transferring the warrant to an appropriate judicial officer to endorse, would place the UK in breach of its international obligations.     

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 30p.

By Jennifer A. Tallon, Sruthi Naraharisetti, Viet Nguyen, Lisa Bailey Vavonese, and Michael Mrozinski

Recognizing the “obvious truth” that defendants cannot be assured a fair trial without representation, the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires states to provide a lawyer if a defendant cannot afford one. However, in 42 states and the District of Columbia, individuals experiencing poverty are charged a fee for invoking their Sixth Amendment right to counsel (hereafter referred to as “defender fees”). While defender fees are a marginal contributor to legal system fines and fees imposed on individuals, these fees are unique amongst the larger universe of fines and fees insofar as they essentially impose a fee for a Constitutional guarantee. Although there is a growing body of research on the use and impact of legal system fines and fees broadly defined, specific attention to defender fees remains underexplored within this literature. Policymakers and practitioners can help to ensure quality representation through an evidence-based approach to the problems and potential solutions associated with defender fees. To fill this research gap and start building the necessary evidence base, the Center for Justice Innovation (Center) partnered with the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) to conduct two national surveys to document the uses and perceptions of defender fees among (1) public defense attorneys and (2) public defense and court leadership. What follows is a summary of those findings and a discussion of potential policy and practice considerations. Findings suggest that public defense attorneys are receptive to exploring policy and practice solutions to mitigate the impact of defender fees. • Most public defense attorneys surveyed for this study opposed the use of defender fees, the most common reason being the collateral consequences experienced by clients. Public defense leaders who responded to our survey5 were more supportive, seeing the benefit of fees in offsetting the costs of the public defense system. • Contrary to prior research, few attorneys in our study reported defender fees negatively impacting the attorney-client relationship. Still, some had witnessed clients waive their right to counsel because they could not pay an upfront defender fee. • We also asked attorneys to describe how statutes on defender fees apply in practice, and there was considerable variability, suggesting the need for greater standardization in terms of equipping attorneys with the skills to advocate against the fees and for judges to consistently apply procedural safeguards like ability to pay determinations. • Finally, a secondary survey of public defense and court leaders illustrated jurisdictions’ difficulties tracking data, specifically estimating outstanding debt or the revenue associated with defender fees.

New York: New York Center for Justice Innovation, 2025. 25p.

Edited by Kaius Tuori and Heta Bjorklund

Roman law is widely considered to be the foundation of European legal culture and an inherent source of unity within European law. Roman Law and the Idea of Europe explores the emergence of this idea of Roman law as an idealized shared heritage, tracing its origins among exiled German scholars in Britain during the Nazi regime. The book follows the spread and influence of these ideas in Europe after the war as part of the larger enthusiasm for European unity. It argues that the rise of the importance of Roman law was a reaction against the crisis of jurisprudence in the face of Nazi ideas of racial and ultra-nationalistic law, leading to the establishment of the idea of Europe founded on shared legal principles. With contributions from leading academics in the field as well as established younger scholars, this volume will be of immense interests to anyone studying intellectual history, legal history, political history and Roman law in the context of Europe.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019

By Carolyn Strange, Daniel Pascoe, and Andrew Novak

Literature on opposition to the death penalty typically characterizes abolition as inexorable and attributes its fulfillment to the age of human rights. Although most countries abolished capital punishment after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, this article uses three comparative case studies to demonstrate abolition’s entanglement with a broader range of political, legal, and cultural factors. Applying a historically grounded non-teleological approach, we offer three insights. First, civilizationist values drove abolitionism in countries in the “vanguard,” such as Canada and England/Wales, where human rights rationales were expressed well after abolition and as a mark of superiority. Second, death penalty abolition has often allied with decolonization and penal reform, but assertions of independence and sovereignty have periodically provoked reinstatement, as in Mexican and Philippine history, which underscores the fragility of abolition. Third, state-centric approaches to de jure and de facto abolition overlook the practice of extrajudicial and summary “rebel” executions in polities such as Myanmar and Mali, which lack a state monopoly on force. Further historical studies that do not presuppose a human rights explanation of abolition and that compare jurisdictions within as well as between the Global North and South will better grasp the death penalty’s complex history.

Punishment & SocietyOnlineFirst, 2024, 20p.

Edited by Jacqueline Behrend and Laurence Whitehead

This important book offers an original perspective on the rule of law, development, and democracy in Latin America, establishing a new approach in recognizing the realities of political economy as opposed to merely structural and institutional factors. With contributions from an international team of experts, the book outlines the main challenges that have arisen in the pursuit of a developmental agenda in the region, including subnational variations, state capture by local elites, variations in state capacity, border divergence from centrally designed perspectives, environmental conflicts, uneven access to justice and the role of international organizations. In doing so, the book explores the democratic and developmental implications of conflicts over the rule of law and its application, uneven enforcement, and state capture. Whether a reference tool for the seasoned scholar, a guide aiding practitioner's individual expertise or an introduction to students interested in the complex intersections between the rule of law, development and democracy, this book is a must-have for any library.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 318p.

By Candan Yilmaz

This publication offers a unique comparative analysis of the sentencing of mentally disordered offenders in Türkiye, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, exploring the alignment of these systems with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). While the presence of mental disorders impacts criminal responsibility, the legal responses and practices differ significantly across jurisdictions. The complex sanctioning system in Türkiye faced substantial challenges due to the absence of secure forensic psychiatric facilities until 2018. Despite legal mandates, mentally disordered offenders were often either released or unlawfully detained in prisons, creating a prolonged gap between law and practice. The research highlights how the situation evolved and assesses the lingering issues, which were exacerbated by delays during the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to contextualize the criminal justice system of Türkiye, comparisons are drawn with the criminal justice systems of the Netherlands and England and Wales, two jurisdictions which have distinct and unique frameworks for mentally disordered offenders. The eminent TBS (terbeschikkingstelling) system of the Netherlands and the bifurcated sentencing approach in England and Wales provide valuable points of reference. This publication is of significance in the field of legal academic literature given the paucity of research on the Turkish criminal justice system, carried out in languages other than Turkish. It evaluates the degree to which these systems adhere to or deviate from ECHR standards, thereby providing insights that facilitate improved compliance with human rights requirements. By bridging comparative legal traditions and identifying best practices, this research holds significant societal and academic relevance.

Groningen: University of Groningen Press, 2025. 560p.

By

George Christopher Dertadian and Vicki Sentas

The decriminalization of drug possession in varied forms is gaining some traction around the world. Yet prospects for people with lived and living experience of drug use to influence the direction of drug law and policy reform remains bound by stigma and exclusion. This study considers the aspirations for decriminalization of people who inject drugs through 20 semi-structured qualitative interviews with the clients of the Sydney injecting centre. What does decriminalization mean for those most criminalised by drug law and policy? The study found that participants’ views of what is possible for decriminalization are mediated by the same structures and experiences of criminalization, incarceration and exclusion that has disrupted their lives. Participants anticipate the need to mobilise incremental and partial changes associated with de facto models, including fines, increased police discretion (and therefore power) and treatment

orders. At the same time, participants collective imaginary also exceeds the limits of a police-controlled depenalization. We document people’s claims on a future drug policy that speaks to a world without criminal drug offences, punitive controls and the exclusion of people who use drugs from the policy table

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 135, January 2025, 104657

By Ian Mynot and Oksana Ihnatenko\

On 15 November 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security and the Center for Financial Integrity (CFI)1 launched a Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine. An in-person meeting in Warsaw, held on a non-attributable basis, convened 40 representatives, including those from the public and private sectors in Ukraine, and international experts. The discussion included two sessions focused on the current state of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine and on international experience and recommendations. This report summarises the main findings of each of these sessions. None of the discussions at the meeting are attributable.

London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2025. 15p.

In September 2024, after 56 years under a sentence of death, Hakamada Iwao was acquitted in a retrial in Japan. This article summarizes what went wrong in his wrongful conviction case and what should be learned from it. The Shizuoka District Court’s retrial decision concluded that police and prosecutors conspired to frame Hakamada with evidence they had fabricated, but there is more to the case than that. This tragedy occurred because of mistakes and misconduct that were exacerbated by underlying weaknesses in Japan’s criminal process. To prevent a recurrence, many things need to change in Japanese criminal justice. The conclusion identifies five priorities for reform.

The Asia Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 22 | Issue 11 | Number 3 | Article ID 5872 | Nov. 30, 2024

By Siobhan Lawler, Hayley Boxall, Christopher Dowling

Research evaluating restorative justice programs for domestic and family violence and sexual violence is limited in Australia and internationally. In 2019 the AIC was commissioned to evaluate the Australian Capital Territory’s Restorative Justice Scheme for domestic and family violence and sexual violence (‘Phase Three’). The evaluation examined the process and outcomes of Phase Three, including barriers to delivery, activities delivered and outcomes associated with participation. A range of data was examined, including interviews with participants (n=16) and stakeholders (n=47), analysis of post-conference surveys (n=28) and analysis of administrative and reoffending data. The evaluation demonstrated Phase Three is working effectively overall. Participants and stakeholders report high levels of satisfaction with Phase Three and the service they received. There was evidence that victim-survivors could meet a range of justice needs with varying levels of offender participation and accountability. Some areas for improving referrals were identified.

Research Report no. 33.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 185p.

By Brandon L. Garrett and Luke Mears

After 44 years in prison for a conviction of rape in the small town of Concord, North Carolina, Ronnie Long was released from prison in 2021. Four months later, the Governor granted him a full pardon on the grounds of innocence. That pardon made it possible to obtain compensation from a state commission, which awarded Long $750,000. This amount was the maximum available under state law that permitted compensation of $50,000 per year of incarceration, but with an upper limit of $750,000. After his exoneration, Long also filed a civil rights lawsuit in federal court. This federal case against the city settled for $22 million in 2024. Long also received $3 million from the North Carolina State Crime Lab as a result of its “role in hiding evidence from Mr. Long and his legal team that proved his innocence.” This substantial settlement made Long Compensating Exonerees in the United States highly unusual among exonerees in the United States. Most exonerees, if they are compensated, received something more along the lines of the $50,000 per year available under the state law that initially compensated Long, and nothing more. Many exonerees receive no compensation at all. Academics have long criticized the traditional lack of compensation for wrongful conviction in the United States. In 1932, Edwin Borchard wrote that the United States needed national legislation regarding compensation for wrongful convictions. For many decades, no such legislation existed, however. Civil rights litigation, like the case brought by Long, was uncommon, and compensation under statutory schemes was similarly rare. This changed once exonerations became much more common, including those based on post-conviction DNA evidence, in the 1990s. In general, many of the exonerees that have received substantial compensation, like Ronnie Long, have brought civil rights lawsuits in federal, not state court. For example, of the first 250 DNA exonerees, 60% received some type of compensation, and of those, half of them obtained it in federal court. However, exonerees are increasingly seeeking compensation under state compensation statutes. In this fact sheet, we describe how compensation for exonerees has evolved in the past several decades, including through successful litigation efforts and through the enactment of compensation legislation, in thirty-nine states, Washington D.C., and by the federal government. We summarize each of these state and federal statutes in the table at the end of this document. To date, 39 states have enacted such compensation statutes, in addition to Washington D.C. and the federal government. In addition, five of the remaining 11 states currently have pending legislation on the issue. The figure below shows which jurisdictions have these statutes currently, and which have legislation pending.

Durham, NC: Wilson Center for Science and Justice at Duke Law, 2024. 20p.