By Aili Malm, Nicholas Perez, Michael D. White

This publication represents the final research report of California State University, Long Beach’s (CSULB) evaluation of an intelligence-led problem-oriented policing (POP) project to better understand and address illicit fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA. The goals of this study were to: (1) employ problem-oriented policing to drive efforts to identify and disrupt fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA, and (2) use intelligence analysis to identify high-level distributors for investigation. To achieve these goals, researchers worked with a newly hired intelligence analyst and Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Drug Investigation Section (DIS) detectives to improve their fentanyl distribution network investigations. The intervention included POP training, intelligence analyst support [cellular phone extractions, open-source intelligence (OSINT), social network analysis (SNA), etc.], and weekly interactions between the analyst and the research team. To assess the effectiveness of the project, we conducted both process and outcome evaluations. Primary data sources include: (1) interviews of detectives and the analyst; (2) DIS administrative data; (3) network data from three fentanyl distribution cases; and (4) fentanyl-related overdose data from the LBPD and the California Overdose Surveillance Dashboard. We identified findings across multiple analyses that, when taken together, represent a persuasive collection of circumstantial evidence regarding the positive effects of the project on two important outcomes: increased DIS activity and efficiency and effective fentanyl distribution network disruption. While fentanyl-related overdose rates did decrease substantially over the course of the project, there is no conclusive evidence that the project led to the reduction. The effects of COVID-19, the defund movement following George Floyd’s death, and the Los Angeles County District Attorney policy limiting the prosecution of drug offenses confounded our ability to draw a stronger connection between the project and enhanced DIS activity and efficiency, fentanyl distribution network disruption, and overdose rates.   

California State University, Long Beach; School of Criminology, Criminal Justice, and Emergency Management; 2024 77p. 

By Romi Sigsworth 

Artificial intelligence (AI) offers innovative solutions for addressing a range of illegal activities that impact Africa’s environment. This report explores how AI is being used in Africa to provide intelligence on organised environmental crime, craft tools to assess its impact, and develop methods to detect and prevent environmental criminal activities. It discusses the challenges and opportunities AI poses for policing environmental crime in Africa, and proposes recommendations that would allow AI-powered policing to make a real difference on the continent. Recommendations • African governments and organisations should invest in gathering large, local data sets to allow AI models to produce appropriate and relevant solutions. • Investments in digital and communication infrastructure need to be made across Africa to improve and expand access to and affordability of AI solutions. • Police forces across Africa should include technology and AI skills capacity building into their basic and professional development training curricula. • Guardrails should be established through legislation to protect data, ensure privacy where necessary, and regulate the use of AI. • Public-private partnerships must be strengthened for law enforcement agencies across Africa to receive the technology and training they need to effectively embed AI tools into their methodologies to combat environmental (and other) organised crime

Enact Africa 2024. 28p.

By U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Deepfakes, an emergent type of threat falling under the greater and more pervasive umbrella of synthetic media, utilize a form of artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) to create believable, realistic videos, pictures, audio, and text of events that never happened. Many applications of synthetic media represent innocent forms of entertainment, but others carry risk. The threat of Deepfakes and synthetic media comes not from the technology used to create it, but from people’s natural inclination to believe what they see, and as a result, deepfakes and synthetic media do not need to be particularly advanced or believable in order to be effective in spreading mis/disinformation. Based on numerous interviews conducted with experts in the field, it is apparent that the severity and urgency of the current threat from synthetic media depends on the exposure, perspective, and position of who you ask. The spectrum of concerns ranged from “an urgent threat” to “don’t panic, just be prepared.” To help customers understand how a potential threat might arise, and what that threat might look like, we considered a number of scenarios specific to the arenas of commerce, society, and national security. The likelihood of any one of these scenarios occurring and succeeding will undoubtedly increase as the cost and other resources needed to produce usable deepfakes simultaneously decreases - just as synthetic media became easier to create as non-AI/ML techniques became more readily available. In line with the multifaceted nature of the problem, there is no one single or universal solution, though elements of technological innovation, education, and regulation must comprise part of any detection and mitigation measures. In order to have success there will have to be significant cooperation among stakeholders in the private and public sectors to overcome current obstacles such as “stovepiping” and to ultimately protect ourselves from these emerging threats while protecting civil liberties.

Washington, DC: DHS, 2021.  47p.