By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Claudia Wiehler and Medinat Malefakis

Nigeria has functioned as an anchor of stability in West Africa, a region that has been shaken by seven coups in three years. Yet, Nigeria is also grappling with several internal security crises including a violent-extremist insurgency and large-scale banditry, putting into question Nige ria’s ability to maintain this role. Reports about collaborations between bandit groups and Boko Haram extremists create fear about an unholy alliance across the country’s Northern region, potentially linking violent extremist groups in Mali and Niger with those in the Lake Chad region. It is against this backdrop of severe civilian suffering and potential transnational ripple effects that we argue for a pragmatic and rapid intervention in the banditry crisis. At this point, it is time to make ‘peace’ with the bandits.  

  Policy Perspectives Vol. 12/1. April 2024, 4pg

By ENACT

Iboga, a plant native to Central Africa, has been used for centuries in religious rituals and traditional medicine. In recent years, it has gained notoriety for its potential to treat substance use disorders. However, its increasing commercialisation and global trade are having a negative impact on the plant and the communities that rely on it. Ibogaine, the psychoactive alkaloid found in iboga root, can cause a variety of effects, including stimulation, aphrodisia, trance, and hallucinations. At high doses, it can be toxic. Despite the risks, iboga is being used in unregulated therapeutic clinics around the world to treat addiction. The online market for iboga is thriving, and consumers often seek out Gabonese iboga due to its sacred properties. This has led to overharvesting and deforestation in Gabon, harming local communities and the environment. Criminal networks are involved in the illicit harvesting, trafficking and sale of iboga. These networks are composed mostly of nationals from Gabon and Cameroon with connections to Europe and North America. Iboga is sold online in a variety of formats, including root bark, root powder, capsules, and, less commonly, ibogaine powder or iboga seed.

Lyon, France, INTERPOL, 2023. 31p.

 By Khachik Harutyunyan and Caitlin Maslen   

After a protracted conflict and a period of self-rule from 2005, South Sudan is now the world’s most recent sovereign country. The young state faces considerable governance challenges; it regularly ranks at or near the bottom of international corruption indices. Corruption is systemic across all levels of government and pervades nearly every economic sector, and perpetrators enjoy widespread impunity. As such, it takes a heavy toll on the populace by diverting the wealth from the country’s extensive oil reserves into private pockets instead of public service provision or gross fixed capital formation. This kleptocratic dynamic is embodied in scandals such as the Cash Grab and Dura Saga scandals. The international community has called on the South Sudanese government to take stronger action to tackle corruption. However, progress has been slow, and corruption remains a major challenge for South Sudan's future development  

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

 By David Olusegun Sotola and Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka  

Corruption in Sierra Leone remains a pervasive challenge. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, successive governments have made efforts to tackle corruption and hold perpetrators, especially those from the previous government, accountable, but challenges remain. Anti-corruption efforts have focused on amending laws, institutional frameworks and the establishment of a special anti-corruption judicial division but concerns about the backsliding of democracy in the country, weak checks on the power of the executive and the politicisation of the anti-corruption cause make it difficult to counter corruption effectively.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.

By Caitlin Maslen  

There has been a rapid rise in the number of Mozambican universities in the past two decades, but corruption risks in these institutions and the research sector more broadly remains an under-examined area. Identified risks include political manipulation of university affairs by government, mismanagement of research grant funds and a lack of independence of the country’s quality assurance body. There are also reports of other forms of corruption such as bribery, plagiarism, academic fraud and sextortion for grades within universities. Several mitigation measures can be put into place to strengthen the integrity of the system, and these include accountability mechanisms within universities and research institutions, independence and increased capacity of the CNAQ, anti-plagiarism policies and tools, sanctions for academic dishonesty, anti-corruption clauses in research grant agreements, compliance assessments of universities and research institutions, and enhanced whistleblower protection.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.

By Jackson Oldfield   

Corruption is widespread in Nigeria, where patronage networks and foreign actors play a significant role. Drivers of corruption include neo-patrimonialism and the “resource curse” – referring to the country’s abundance of natural resources. Bribery and other forms of corruption occur in many sectors, including public administration, the judiciary, the electricity sector, and extractive industries. Although several new anti-corruption laws have recently been introduced, weaknesses in relevant institutions have undermined their effectiveness. Despite these challenges, anti-corruption actors, such as civil society organisations, continue addressing corruption as a priority and have had notable achievements, particularly in the area of asset recovery.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023). 25p.

By Mathias Bak

Yemen's ongoing conflict has transformed into an economic battle, with various factions fighting over crucial resources, such as aid flows and control over state resources. The war economy has intensified existing corruption challenges and created avenues for illicit wealth accumulation for new power brokers and previously less powerful networks. However, this takeover of the state has not fundamentally changed the nature of the systematic corruption that has plagued Yemen long before 2014.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2024:1)

By Vaclav Prusa   

In 2023, President Mnangagwa secured a second term amid allegations of election irregularities and corruption in Zimbabwe. Despite anti-corruption efforts, challenges include political interference and resource constraints, hindering transparency. Though there have been efforts to address corruption in the natural resources sector, progress in prosecuting politically exposed persons and recovering stolen assets has been uneven. Likewise, hopes for reform since Mnangagwa's 2017 presidency have been tempered by enduring corruption, economic challenges, and human rights abuses. And illicit financial flows, notably linked to corruption in mining, timber, and wildlife, pose a significant international threat as they have drained billions of dollars from the country. Though civil society and independent media play crucial roles in exposing corruption, initiatives such as The Patriot Act, introduced in 2023, raises concerns about suppressing dissent and investigative journalism.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway ; Berlin: Transparency international, 2023. 26p.

By Max Gallien

Africa has become a growth market for the tobacco industry, as people in the global North have started to smoke much less. The prevalence of smoking in Europe since the 1990s has dropped by one-third, and even further in the Americas (44%). Over the same period, smoking levels in Africa have increased by over 50% (Reitsma et al. 2017).1 Africa’s youth, in particular, is overrepresented among new smokers (N. Ramanandraibe and A.E. Ouma 2011; Blecher and Ross 2013). This is part of a wider shift in tobacco consumption from richer to poorer countries – it has been projected that 6.8 million of a global total of 8.3 million tobacco-related deaths will occur in low- and middle-income countries by 2030 (Mathers and Loncar 2006). Africa is not only facing rising health care costs connected to tobacco consumption, but also the loss of lives, particularly men, as a consequence of smoking-related diseases.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, Summary Brief Number 22, 2020. 8p.

By Martin Ewi, Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Willem Els, Richard Chelin, Yussuf Adam and Elisa Samuel Boerekamp

Collaborative research between the Institute for Security Studies and the Judicial Training Institute of Mozambique revealed that people in Cabo Delgado see the discovery and poor governance of natural resources as a cause of the insurgency. The study also found few links between the insurgency and organised crime, and that regional rather than ethnic differences play a major role in the conflict.

 Key findings: The discovery and poor governance of natural resources such as rubies and liquefied natural gas have escalated terrorism. Regional inequities, not ethnicity, are a major grievance in Cabo Delgado. Despite resentment of the elite, who are blamed for the region’s poverty, there is no evidence that people are voluntarily joining the insurgency en masse. The criminal justice sector lacks basic resources and skills to prosecute the growing number of terrorist suspects. People in Cabo Delgado are more concerned about the threat of the Mashababos (Alu-Sunnah wal Jama'ah) than the Islamic State. Recommendations Government of Mozambique: Partner with local organisations to address legitimate grievances Develop a national strategy covering all aspects of the crisis Effectively manage the amnesty programme Establish a centralised national inter-agency counter-terrorism unit, and prioritise coordination and intelligence-led military operations Strengthen the criminal justice system to prosecute terrorism, organised crime and corruption Set up a commission of inquiry into the drivers of violent extremism Strengthen intelligence sharing with neighbouring countries SADC and Mozambique’s neighbours: Assist Mozambique to tighten border security Regularly share intelligence Mosques, Islamic centres and local markets are believed to be meeting points and areas of recruitment and radicalisation. Respondents fear that the violence could easily spread to other parts of Mozambique and countries in Southern Africa. Evidence of a nexus between terrorism and organised crime is weak.  Since the deployment of foreign forces, mass recruitment has stopped as Al Sunnah evolves into a professional, well-trained group, practising guerrilla warfare.

Pretoria, South Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 2022. 52p.

By Lucia Bird and Lyes Tagziria

As the nature of armed conflict in West Africa is in flux – with the constellation of conflict actors multiplying, the intensity and geographic dispersion of violence growing, civilians increasingly targets of attacks, and conflicts more commonly spreading across borders – now is a key moment to consider the role played by illicit economies in creating the enabling environments for conflicts to develop, and in prolonging them.

Yet the intersection between illicit economies and instability is an often misunderstood and over-simplified subject of research and debate. The inherently clandestine nature of organized crime poses an obstacle to accurately understanding the dynamics of illicit economies and their relationship with conflict and instability. In West Africa, this is compounded by the paucity of comparable data in much of the region.

This report represents a step towards addressing this deficit. It presents the findings of a new initiative that maps the key geographic hubs of illicit economies across West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo)

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022. 88p.