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Posts tagged illicit tobacco
Potential impact of eliminating illicit trade in cigarettes: a demand-side perspective 

By Mark Goodchild , Jeremias Paul, Roberto Iglesias, Annerie Bouw, Anne-Marie Perucic

Background The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (the Protocol) entered into force in September 2018, and commits Parties to implement a package of measures to combat this global problem. The aim of this study is to assess the potential impact of eliminating illicit cigarettes on consumption, use and tax revenues. Methods We identified 36 countries where an independent (non-industry sponsored) study of the illicit cigarette market was available. We developed a conceptual framework for describing how the elimination of illicit cigarettes might impact on demand (consumption and use) and applied this framework to our sample of countries to assess the impact of eliminating illicit cigarettes across different settings. Findings Illicit cigarettes account on average for 11.2% of the market in these 36 countries. The elimination of illicit cigarettes would reduce total cigarette consumption by 1.9% across these countries. The decrease in ’group A’ countries—where illicit cigarettes are >15% of the market—would average 4.1%. The smoking rate would decrease by 1.0% in relative terms including by 2.2% in group A countries. Tax revenues from the legal sale of cigarettes would increase by 11.2% including by 25.1% in group A countries. Conclusions The illicit cigarette market reflects a complex interplay between supply and demand, with an array of different country conditions. Regardless of the situation, our study highlights the contribution that the elimination of illicit trade can make to tobacco control through demand reduction while at the same time generating significant tax revenues. 

Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2020, 8p.

Large Cigarette Tax Hikes, Illicit Producers, and Organized Crime: Lessons from Pakistan

By Roger Bate

With the stated aim of increasing revenue and discouraging smoking, Pakistan raised tobacco duties over the past five years. The result empowered illicit actors, with a flourishing of illicit production and smuggling of cigarettes. Revenue rose initially, only to fall back as untaxed products proliferated. While organized crime and local production interests were the big winners, smoking rates have remained largely unchanged. Pakistan’s authorities have tried to resolve the problem through better enforcement and lowering of duties for certain products, but overall the lesson learned is that rapid duty increases have significant negative effects that are difficult to reverse when illegal supply cannot be controlled.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2018. 10p.

Study to Identify an Approach to Measure the Illicit Market for Tobacco Products: Final Report

By Jirka Taylor, Shann Corbett, Fook Nederveen, Stijn Hoorens, Hana Ross, Emma Disley

The illicit tobacco trade is a global phenomenon with significant negative health, social and economic consequences. This study is intended to support efforts to better understand the scope and scale of the illicit tobacco market. The primary objective was to develop a reliable, robust, replicable and independent methodology to measure the illicit market that can be applied by the EU and its Member States. The key requirements were that the methodology would capture the total volume of the illicit trade and distinguish between the legal and illegal market, ideally distinguishing between types of tobacco products, and types of illicit trade. Based on in-depth literature reviews and interviews with key informants, we constructed a longlist of 11 methodologies that have been or could be used to measure the illicit tobacco market and assessed them against a standardised set of criteria. This resulted in a shortlist of five preferred methods (i.e. discarded pack survey, comparison of sales/tax paid and self-reported consumption, consumer survey with and without pack inspection/surrender, econometric modelling). As individual approaches, these shortlisted methods were not sufficient to meet the minimum criteria. Accordingly, these shortlisted methods were then used to formulate options for combination of methodologies corresponding to various levels of resource intensity.

Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 197p.

The Human Cost of Illicit Trade

By Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

Among the worst crimes associated with illicit trade is the demand it creates for forced and child labor. The TRACIT report, The Human Cost of Illicit Trade: Exposing demand for forced labor in the dark corners of the economy,​ studies an overlooked corner of the global economy, namely the incidence of forced labor in illicit market activities. The report shows that women, children and men of all ages and race are forced to labor in illicit sectors, where they are abused by organized criminals in their pursuit of profits.

Occurrences of forced labor are examined in eight sectors where illicit practices are regularly reported. These activities include: (i) counterfeiting of apparel, footwear and luxury goods; (ii) counterfeiting of electronics machinery and equipment; (iii) substandard and falsified medical products; (iv) illegal mining; (v) illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing; (vi) illicit tobacco products; (vii) illegal pesticides; and (viii) illegal timber.

This report shows how organized criminals are using and abusing labor and demonstrates how forced labor intersects with multiple forms of illicit trade. The findings suggest that putting an end to these human rights abuses will only be possible by eradicating illicit trade and the demand for forced labor associated with it.

NY: Tract.Org. 2021. 52p.

Brexit and the Control of Tobacco Illicit Trade

By Marina Foltea. This book assesses the consequences of Brexit for the control of illicit trade in tobacco products in the UK and EU. Based on the currently applicable legal framework, it examines the significance of a possible non-application of the acquis communautaire in the UK in matters relating to anti-illicit trade in tobacco legislation. It also analyses the modes of future cooperation between the UK and the EU in this area, as well as possible regulatory scenarios and their consequences. The book comprises six main sections. After the introduction (Section 1), Section 2 discusses the state of play of Brexit and possible outcomes of Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union procedure. Section 3 illustrates the data and trends of illicit tobacco trade in the UK. Section 4 describes the relevant legal (e.g. trade and fiscal measures) and enforcement frameworks in the UK and suggests possible post-Brexit scenarios in control of tobacco illicit trade. Section 5 focuses on the relevance of arrangements between governments and the tobacco industry in the control of illicit trade. Section 6 then analyses the relevance of key EU and global anti-illicit trade initiatives. Lastly, Section 7 the book offers some recommendations and conclusions on how the UK could control illicit trade in tobacco after Brexit Cham: Springer, 2020. 89p.

Combatting Illicit Trade on the EU Border

A Comparative Perspective. Edited by Celina Nowak. This chapter outlines the framework of the research presented in this volume. It starts with a notion that national criminal policies on illicit tobacco trade are a part of the national tobacco control policy, and at the same time a part of a general national criminal policy and points to the need for an in-depth research of national criminal laws in this regard. It presents the scope of the research, which consists in a comparative analysis about the illicit tobacco trade and about efforts to counteract that trade in six EU Member States—four post-communist states (Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania), on the Eastern border of the Union and two “old” EU Member States (Germany, Italy). Springer. (2021) 283p.