United States. Executive Office Of The President; United States. Office Of National Drug Control Policy

From the document: "On April 12, 2023, Dr. Rahul Gupta, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), formally designated fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine as an emerging drug threat, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. [United States Code] § 1708. [...] The emerging threat designation, made under the authority provided by 'The Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act of 2018' (P.L. [Public Law] 115-271), requires the Executive Branch to take several steps: First, ONDCP, in collaboration with relevant federal agencies, must draft and publicly issue a fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine Response Plan (within 90 days of designation). Second, ONDCP must issue Implementation Guidance to agencies (120 days after designation). Third, agencies must provide a specific Agency Implementation Report to ONDCP (180 days after designation). Fourth, ONDCP must publish a National Implementation Report on the Response Plan (in February 2024, with other ONDCP annual reports). The response plan presented here fulfills the first of these requirements and addresses urgent public health and safety needs. The SUPPORT Act also requires that the ONDCP Director decide whether a stand-alone national media campaign would be effective in addressing the emerging threat. In the case of xylazine-adulterated fentanyl, Director Gupta has determined that it will be productive to include such public messaging on fentanyl adulterants in existing campaigns and other federal messaging on fentanyl, in lieu of establishing a new stand-alone campaign focused solely on xylazine. The SUPPORT Act requires that an emerging threat response plan include evidence-based prevention, treatment, and supply reduction action steps, in addition to establishing goals and performance measures informed by comprehensive data. In the plan outlined below, we apply those requirements to the case of fentanyl adulterated or associated with xylazine and describe critically important and urgent next action steps."

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of National Drug Control Policy 2023. 15p.

By Camilla Fabbri https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4692-9646 camilla.fabbri@lshtm.ac.uk, Heidi Stöckl, […], and Cathy Zimmerman

Over the past decade, third-party labor recruiters who facilitate employment for migrant workers across low- and middle-income countries have often been considered by the counter-trafficking community as one of the main entry points into human trafficking. In response, anti-trafficking prevention programs have increasingly focused on addressing exploitative recruitment in migrants’ origin countries. Such programs may advocate for increased regulation of migration, greater enforcement actions against unlicensed recruiters, stricter ethical codes of conduct for recruiters and employers, and more pre-departure information about recruitment for migrants. Yet, there remains limited research about the relationship between prospective migrants, recruiters, and human trafficking, and the relative importance of third-party recruitment in the trafficking process. This Research Note draws on the world's largest database of individual victims of trafficking cases, the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Global Victim of Trafficking Database (VoTD), to examine the role and characteristics of recruitment of trafficked victims. The VoTD contains information on nearly 50,000 trafficking victims who were registered for assistance from 2002 to June 2018. Our analysis shows that 94 percent of trafficked victims were recruited, in a broad sense (i.e., not only by third-party intermediaries). Additionally, the data presented here suggest that the relationship between recruitment and trafficking is complex and that forced labor is embedded within the wider structural issues around low-wage labor migration that lead to exploitative work conditions. Interventions to address human trafficking will benefit from strategies that target systemic issues constraining or harming low-wage labor. Further, these findings highlight the value of large-scale administrative datasets in migration research

  International Migration Review 2023, Vol. 57(2) 629-651  

Steven Dudley – Victoria Dittmar – Sara García, Jaime López-Aranda, Annie Pforzheimer, and Ben Westhoff

Precursor chemicals pose an unprecedented challenge for governments and multilateral organizations seeking to mitigate the development, manufacturing, production, and distribution of illicit synthetic drugs. As opposed to most legacy drugs -- which rely on plants, harvests, favorable weather, significant and varied manual labor, and transport of bulk amounts of illicit substances across heavily-policed terrain -- synthetic drugs can be produced in laboratories all year-round using a wide variety of mostly sparsely or unevenly regulated chemicals, which can be employed at different stages of the process in rudimentary laboratories and transported in large or small amounts, often without the knowledge of the transporters themselves. The sources for these chemicals span the globe. They are currently concentrated in China, where a relatively small number of companies appear to be producing precursor chemicals, in mainly two provinces. These chemicals are marketed and sold on the internet, where an army of online providers offer well-regulated and unregulated chemicals via the Clearnet and the dark web. These marketers are sometimes extensions of these same production companies and sometimes independent. Some are also clans, which appear to own numerous production and marketing companies. The precursors are transported to Mexico via cargo ships or air cargo, traveling direct or via circuitous routes. Cargo is often mislabeled, camouflaging the contents, purpose, or amount of their shipment. In Mexico, brokers and independent buyers facilitate this trade, filing paperwork, creating fictitious companies, or bribing officials.

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  The chemicals then make their way to small producers. Often referred to as “cooks,” these producers synthesize the precursors into illicit synthetic drugs that are then sold to large buyers and transport specialists. Two large criminal networks buy and move synthetic drugs in bulk: the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG). These networks are responsible for bringing this product across the most difficult part of its journey and thus charge a premium for their services. After they sell the drugs wholesale, they are largely absent, leaving the distribution and retail sales to other local criminal networks. The precursor industry -- and the synthetic drug industry writ large -- is so challenging to disrupt precisely because it works across legal and illegal spheres, involves many layers and different criminal networks, and has many means to obtain its final objective: the sale of synthetic drugs to an increasing number of consumers. …

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 147p.

By Inés Fynn

“If you see something you have to be blind, deaf, and dumb, that’s how it works here”  “If you keep silent, you don’t mess with them, and they won’t mess with you”  “Everyone here knows what to talk about and what not to talk about”  The above statements exemplify the coping strategies of people living in communities affected by drug gangs. Despite differences in the gangs’ modus operandi, silence is a common factor in how communities respond. The current understanding of criminal territorial control overlooks the role of communities and their silence in shaping how criminal organizations operate. This research aims to explore how drug  gangs establish commitments of silence with communities, how these commitments vary, and why some are more enduring than others. Organized criminal groups often establish localized systems of private order that challenge the territorial reach of the state (O’Donnell, 1993). Comparative politics research has recently focused on criminal governance schemes to analyze the logic of territorial control of drug-trafficking organizations. Criminal governance refers to local orders led by criminal organizations that impose formal or informal rules and restrict the behavior of criminal and non-criminal civilians (Lessing, 2020). However, despite community members dealing with drug gang operations daily, these studies fall short in incorporating the central role of communities in shaping drug gangs’ operations.

  Santiago de Chile, Chile .   Instituto de Ciencia Política Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile , 2023. 178p.

By Pia Johansson Heinsvig, Ask Vest Christiansen, Daniel Ayoubi, Laura Smedegaard Heisel, Christian Lindhols

This study examines doping products seized by the police in three regional police districts in Denmark from December 2019 to December 2020. The products, often referred to as performance and image-enhancing drugs (PIEDs), are described in relation to the country of origin, manufacturing company, and the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) stated on the packaging versus the one identified by subsequent chemical analysis. The study also includes a description of the degree of professionalism by which the products appear according to EU requirements. A total of 764 products were seized during the study period. The products originate from 37 countries, mainly located in Asia (37%), Europe (23%), and North America (13%). One hundred ninety-three different manufacturing companies could be identified from the product packaging. The most frequent compound class was the androgenic anabolic steroids, found in 60% of the products. In 25%–34% of the products, either no or an incorrect API relative to the one stated on the product was found. However, only 7%–10% contain either no API or a compound from a different compound class than the one stated. Most products had a professional appearance fulfilling most EU requirements for packaging information. The study shows that many different companies supply PIEDs to the Danish market and that counterfeit and substandard products are widespread. Many products do, however, appear professional to the user giving an impression of a high-quality product. Although many products are substandard, they most often contain an API from the same compound class as the one labeled.

Drug Testing and Analysis Volume 15, Issue 6Jun 2023, Pages 595-705

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The World Drug Report 2023 comes as countries are struggling at the halfway point to revive stalled progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Crises and conflict continue to inflict untold suffering and deprivation, with the number of people forcibly displaced globally hitting a new record high of 110 million. Peace, justice and human rights, which should be the birthright of all, remain out of reach for far too many. The harms caused by drug trafficking and illicit drug economies are contributing to and compounding many of these threats, from instability and violence to environmental devastation. Illicit drug markets continue to expand in terms of harm as well as scope, from the growing cocaine supply and drug sales on social media platforms to the relentless spread of synthetic drugs – cheap and easy to manufacture anywhere in the world, and in the case of fentanyl, deadly in the smallest of doses. Drug use disorders are harming health, including mental health, safety and well-being. Stigma and discrimination make it less likely that people who use drugs will get the help they need. Fewer than 20 per cent of people with drug use disorders are in treatment, and access is highly unequal. Women account for almost half the people who use amphetamine-type stimulants, but only 27 per cent of those receiving treatment. Controlled drugs needed for palliative care and pain relief, namely pharmaceutical opioids, are denied to those who desperately need them, with too little access in many countries – mainly low- and middle-income countries, where some 86 per cent of the world’s population lives. Drug challenges pose difficult policy dilemmas that cannot be addressed by any one country or region alone. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publishes the World Drug Report every year to provide a global perspective and overview of the world drug problem, offering impartial evidence with the aim of supporting dialogue and shared responses. This edition of the World Drug Report highlights the growing complexity of evolving drug threats. A special chapter explores how illicit drug economies intersect with crimes that affect the environment and insecurity in the Amazon Basin, with impoverished rural populations and Indigenous groups paying the price. Other sections of the report explore urgent challenges, including drug use in humanitarian settings, drugs in conflict situations and the changing dynamics of synthetic drug markets. The report also delves into new clinical trials involving psychedelics, medical use of cannabis and innovations in drug treatment and other services.   

New York: United Nations, 2023. 70p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The booklet opens with a look at the challenges posed to law enforcement by synthetic drugs, both in terms of their increasing potency, adaptability and ease of manufacture and their shorter supply chains, reduced risk and lower production costs compared with drugs of natural origin. Other law enforcement challenges are considered in the context of the increasing use of social media for buying and selling drugs online.
Booklet 2 also examines approaches to regulating the medical cannabis market in different countries and assesses recent developments surrounding the therapeutic, spiritual and non-medical use of substances known as “psychedelics”. The remainder of the booklet focuses on issues related to drugs in specific contexts, including the Amazon Basin, where the convergence of drug crime and crimes that affect the environment poses a threat to natural and human ecosystems. The risk factors for and vulnerability to substance use disorders among forcibly displaced populations are also discussed in the booklet, and the interim outcomes of innovations and modifications of services for people who use drugs during the COVID-19 pandemic are summarized.

New York: United Nations,  2023. 205p.

By Joseph Friedman , George Karandinos, Laurie Kain Hart, Fernando Montero Castrillo, Nicholas Graetz, and Philippe Bourgois

Background. The United States is experiencing a continuing crisis of gun violence, and economically marginalized and racially segregated inner-city areas are among the most affected. To decrease this violence, public health interventions must engage with the complex social factors and structural drivers—especially with regard to the clandestine sale of narcotics—that have turned the neighborhood streets of specific vulnerable subgroups into concrete killing fields. Here we present a mixed-methods ethnographic and epidemiological assessment of narcotics-driven firearm violence in Philadelphia’s impoverished, majority Puerto Rican neighborhoods….Findings. Even controlling for poverty levels, impoverished majority-Puerto Rican areas in Philadelphia are exposed to significantly higher levels of gun violence than majority-white or black neighborhoods. Our mixed methods data suggest that this reflects the unique social position of these neighborhoods as a racial meeting ground in deeply segregated Philadelphia, which has converted them into a retail endpoint for the sale of astronomical levels of narcotics.

PLOS One:  November 21, 2019

By Miriam Cavazos Hernandez and Balasurya Sivakumar

We examine the effect of natural resource shocks on violence by drug cartels at the municipality level in rural Mexico from 2003 to 2017. For this, we use an Instrumental Variable setup by instrumenting our main explanatory variable vegetation density with rainfall. Vegetation density is an indicator for natural resource shocks and reflects the “greenness” in a particular area which is considered as an indicator of land productivity. Our main finding is that negative shocks in vegetation density increase homicides. This negative shock could imply crop failures resulting in bad economic outcomes for people in rural areas thereby pushing people to engage with violent drug cartels. Additionally, in order to confirm the main results we explore possible effects that natural resource shocks have on drug cartel presence, seizure of illegal drugs and other drug-related criminal activities. These results further confirm the negative relationship between natural resource shocks and violence by drug cartels. Our findings highlight the dynamics in the operation of the drug cartels and are relevant for understanding the determinants of conflict in rural Mexico.   

Lund, Sweden: Lund University, 2022. 48p.

By Carolina Sampó · Valeska Troncoso

  This article presents the results of an exploratory study aimed to analyze the contexts in which the use of Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and counterintuitive routes is prioritized, based on the experience of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Moreover, we show that criminal organizations prioritize the Ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio and Montevideo, and the counter-intuitive routes that lead to them, because they are spaces that generate incentives linked to the porosity of borders, the lack of control at the ports, and the possibility of exploiting the country’s lack of reputation for drug exportation to re-export cocaine undetected. This study constitutes a precedent for future research on the role of South American Southern Cone ports in cocaine trafficking. We can identify at least four emerging lines of research: 1. Cocaine trafficking from landlocked countries; 2. The role of the waterway Paraná-Paraguay; 3. The link between Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and new markets; and 4. Other Non-Traditional Ports of cocaine departure, which are not containerized.

Trends in Organized Crime, 2022. 

By Jesse Bruhn 

I study criminal street gangs using new data that describes the geospatial distribution of gang territory in Chicago and its evolution over a 15-year period. Using an event study design, I show that city blocks entered by gangs experience sharp increases in the number of reported batteries (6%), narcotics violations (18.5%), weapons violations (9.8%), incidents of prostitution (51.9%), and criminal trespassing (19.6%). I also find a sharp reduction in the number of reported robberies (-8%). The findings cannot be explained by pre-existing trends in crime, changes in police surveillance, crime displacement, exposure to public housing demolitions, reporting effects, or demographic trends. Taken together, the evidence suggests that gangs cause small increases in violence in highly localized areas as a result of conflict over illegal markets. I also find evidence that gangs cause reductions in median property values (-$8,436.9) and household income (-$1,866.8). Motivated by these findings, I explore the relationship between the industrial organization of the black market and the supply of criminal activity. I find that gangs that are more internally fractured or operate in more competitive environments tend to generate more crime. This finding is inconsistent with simple, market-based models of criminal behavior, suggesting an important role for behavioral factors and social interactions in the production of gang violence

Bravo Working Paper # 2021-004 . Brown University Orlando Bravo Center for Economic Research, 2021. 71p.

By Jose Antonio Sanchez , Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz

Gang research has spanned nearly a century. In that time, we have learned that gang membership increases the chances of involvement in homicide as a victim or offender. The violence that embroils gang life, both instrumental and symbolic, often has consequences. In this paper we review the gang homicide literature covering topics such as definitional issues, available data, correlates and characteristics, and theoretical explanations. The review examines individual, group, and structural contexts for gang homicide. We conclude with a discussion of future needs in theory, data, and methods, to improve our understanding of gang homicide.

Homicide StudiesVolume 26, Issue 1, February 2022, Pages 68-90

By Adrian Bergmann

Gangs impact everyday life and politics across much of the world, yet the literature on gang disengagement—the process whereby people move on from the gang life—is mostly limited to the United States and Europe. In El Salvador, following 30 years of gang wars and a 20-year war on gangs, gang members face severe restrictions from both their gangs and wider society to disengage. Ultimately, this undermines the prospects not only for gang members to remake their lives, but for sustaining reductions in armed violence and addressing a broader set of pressing social issues. Theoretically, I propose a nested, multilevel analysis of gang disengagement, attentive to the interactions between individual, gang-organizational, and social conditions that enable and constrain processes of gang disengagement. Empirically, I employ this framework to scrutinize the evolution of gangs and gang disengagement in El Salvador, and the political solutions necessary for large-scale disengagement moving forward. 

Critical Criminology 2022.

By InSight Crime

In the suffocating heat of summer in El Salvador, José Elvis Herrera Reinoso, alias “Elvis,” is gathered with the family of an elderly woman inside her small home. The woman, who suffers from diabetes, had been close to death just a few days beforehand, but made a seemingly inexplicable recovery. With just a few simple tools, including a Bible and loudspeaker, Elvis guides the family members in a religious celebration of this “miracle.” His well-practiced preaching and passionate reading from the holy book tell anyone listening that he is a dedicated pastor. And the tattoos that cover his face let them know he was a member of the Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS13), one of the most feared gangs in the world.   

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2022. 23p.

By Christopher Blattman, et al.

Urban armed groups, especially criminal gangs, are a growing threat to peace and economic growth in cities across the world. These groups often exert state-like powers, enforcing contracts, policing, and taxing businesses in the areas they informally govern. The conventional wisdom suggests that criminal organizations provide governance when states do not, and that increasing state services could crowd gangs out.  In partnership with the City of Medellín, researchers randomly introduced a program that intensified government outreach to gang-controlled neighborhoods. The study found no evidence that the city’s intervention reduced gang rule.

Washington, DC: Innovations for Poverty Action, 2019. 6p.

By Joana Monteiro, duardo Fagundes , Mariana Carvalho , Ramon Gomes

Some criminal groups are able to avoid confrontation and diversify their economic activities while others are constantly contested by rival groups and the state. To understand why, we propose a model to investigate criminal groups’ incentives to invest in military capacity and the state’s response to arming. Typically it is difficult to map criminal groups’ presence and document their economic activities. We build a novel panel dataset to map presence and characterize the economic activities of criminal groups in Rio de Janeiro, where drug factions and militia groups have controlled territories for at least three decades. We provide evidence that both groups are multi-product enterprises that explore a wide range of licit and illicit goods and services. We empirically test the predictions of our model. Our findings suggest that more groups in the territory increase conflict and state repression and reduce economic diversification. In addition, we argue that the ability to collaborate with the state is crucial for groups to exploit more markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses systematic data to show how criminal groups in Rio de Janeiro evolve over time and diversify their economic activities. 

Encontro da Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - Gran Mareiro Hotel | Fortaleza - CE, n: 44º . 2023. 2022. 48p.

By Paolo Campana  & Federico Varese

In this paper, we explore the determinants of co-membership in organised crime groups in a British police force. We find that co-membership of OCGs is higher among individuals who share the same ethnicity and nationality; who have committed acts of violence; and who perpetrate the vast majority of their crimes in the same area. We also find a homophily tendency in relation to age and gender, and that task specialisation within groups is driven by the type of activity. We interpret some results as conforming to the argument that recruitment from a small area and similar ethnic/national background increases cooperation and reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour in a context of rather effective policing. Our findings do not conform to the suggestive image of OC members as ‘urban marauders’ and OCGs as large and powerful multinationals. OCGs tend to be small, localised and formed by people with the same background.

Global Crime  Volume 23, 2022 - Issue 1: 

By Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero and Nayely Iturbe

When does organized crime resort to assassinating politicians? In narcocracies, criminal groups co-opt political elites through bribery in exchange for protection to traffic illegal drugs. When criminal groups compete, they may also resort to political violence to influence which candidate wins local elections in strategic areas and retaliate when state action threatens their survival. Using new data on political assassinations in Mexico during 2000–21, we show that political candidates are more likely to be assassinated in areas close to oil pipelines used by drug trafficking organizations for oil theft. Former mayors of areas near oil pipelines remain at high risk of assassination. In municipalities where at least one mayor has already been killed, the arrest of a member of organized crime significantly increases the chance that an incumbent mayor will be killed. Political violence is directed at politicians, not voters, so it has a negligible impact on voter turnout. 

WIDER Working Paper 2023/7 . Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, 2023. 43p.

By Pierfrancesco Rolla and  Patricia Justino

Organized crime affects security, development, and democracy worldwide, but not much is known about its social consequences. We study how exposure to the presence of organized crime groups shapes the social capital of Italian citizens, including political participation, civic engagement, and institutional and interpersonal trust. To address this question, we first leverage a survey of almost 800,000 respondents on social capital and exposure to organized crime conducted in Italy between 2000 and 2018. Second, we compile data on social capital and related variables between 1861 and 2020 in the Italian region of Apulia to exploit the unexpected and exogenous arrival, in the 1970s, of organized crime in the region, where no groups had been present before. We compare levels of social capital in Apulia with a synthetic control of regions which were not notably exposed to the presence of organized crime groups. Results from both exercises show that exposure to organized crime reduces political participation, institutional and interpersonal trust and has mixed effects on civic engagement. Using a mediation analysis leveraging both quantitative and qualitative evidence, we show that the negative effects of organized group presence on political participation and trust are largely explained by disinvestment in social capital by those exposed to the presence of criminal groups due to psychological factors (fear and resignation) and frustration with lack of state capacity to deal with the groups.

WIDER Working Paper 2022/106  . HELSINKI: UNU-WIDER 2022 79P.

By Christopher Dowling and Anthony Morgan

Regulatory approaches to organised crime aim to minimise exploitation of the legitimate economy by offenders. Unlike criminal justice approaches, regulatory approaches prioritise prevention over enforcement. This study explores the impact of a regulatory approach to organised crime in Queensland which restricted outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members from working in certain industries. We exploit a delay in the implementation of these occupational restrictions after a wider suite of measures commenced, using interrupted time series analysis to analyse changes in organised crime related harm by OMCG members. Results suggest that the introduction of occupational restrictions was followed by a gradual reduction in organised crime related harm by OMCG members (3% to 4% per month). While the reduction is small, it supports the view that regulatory measures are a promising strategy for reducing organised crime.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 652. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2022. 16p.